In this powerfully argued book, Knasas engages a debate at the heart of the revival of Thomistic thought in the twentieth century. Richly detailed and illuminating, his book calls on the tradition established by Gilson, Maritain, and Owen, to build a case for Existential Thomism as a valid metaphysics.Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists is a comprehensive discussion of the major issues and controversies in neo-Thomism, including issues of mind, knowledge, the human subject, free will, nature, grace, and the act (...) of being. Knasas also discusses the Transcendental Thomism of Maréchal, Rahner, Lonergan, and others as he builds a carefully articulated case for completing the Thomist revival. (shrink)

In this powerfully argued book, Knasas engages a debate at the heart of the revival of Thomistic thought in the twentieth century. Richly detailed and illuminating, his book calls on the tradition established by Gilson, Maritain, and Owen, to build a case for Existential Thomism as a valid metaphysics. Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists is a comprehensive discussion of the major issues and controversies in neo-Thomism, including issues of mind, knowledge, the human subject, free will, nature, grace, and the (...) act of being. Knasas also discusses the Transcendental Thomism of Maréchal, Rahner, Lonergan, and others as he builds a carefully articulated case for completing the Thomist revival. (shrink)

Defenders and critics of divine simplicity rightly look to Thomas Aquinas’s important contributions to this pillar of classical theism (=CT). But few contemporary discussions notice the way Aquinas employs pseudo-Dionysius’s triplex via as a principled heuristic that governs and organizes his theological enquiries concerning divine simplicity. This oversight has led to misinterpretations of Aquinas’s doctrine of divine simplicity (=DDS), which must be situated within his triplex via theology (=TVT). In this chapter I show that, like Aquinas’s DDS, the value of (...) Thomist TVT extends beyond historical exegesis and provides exponents of CT with a fertile alternative to the more well-known Anselmian inspired heuristic of perfect being theology (=PBT). In the first part I introduce two problems for CT that cannot be resolved by PBT and Thomistic accounts of DDS that omit Aquinas’s TVT. In the second part, I explain what Thomistic TVT is and why its integrated threefold way of understanding God via causality, negation, and super-eminence can overcome these problems for CT. (shrink)

The authors explicate Aquinas's conception of mathematics. They show that in his work the Aristotelian conception is prevalent, according to which this discipline is—together with physics and metaphysics—a theoretical science, whose subject is the study of real quantity and its necessary properties. But, alongside this dominant and prevalent conception, Aquinas's work contains a number of indications that cast doubt. These sparse and rather marginal reflections lead the authors to conclude that Aquinas's texts contain a "constructivist" conception of mathematics in rudimentary (...) form. According to this approach, mathematics is not a theoretical science examining real quantity but, rather, a special kind of "art" by means of which mathematical objects are "created." From a constructivist point of view the authors then attempt to formulate a conception of mathematics that would accord with the basic Aristotelian assumptions of Aquinas's thought. (shrink)

This paper analyses the criticisms put forward by the Scotists of the 17th century to Thomas Aquinas’ commentators on the subject of the intellect’s first object. What the intellect knows first, and what the extension of human cognition is, are questions that Aquinas addressed in several places in Summa theologiae, presenting conclusions which Scotus famously criticised. From the 15th century on, observed the tendency among Aquinas’ commentators to adjust themselves to Scotus’ opinion concerning this matter. The paper includes a collection (...) of the texts they mention and focuses on this ‘shift’ in the history of Aquinas’ readings. (shrink)

This paper discusses how Thomas Aquinas and some Neo-Thomists scholars (Juan José Urráburu, Joseph Hontheim, Édouard Hugon, and Joseph Gredt) analysed the metaphysical possibility of miracles. My main goal is to unpack the metaphysical toolbox that Aquinas uses to solve the basic question about the possibility of miracles and to compare how his late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century followers solved the issue themselves. The key feature to differentiate the two approaches will reside in their use of different notions to (...) account for the possibility of miracles, namely obediential potency for Aquinas and the laws of nature for the Neo-Thomists. To show why neo-Thomist scholars source to this notion, I also briefly discuss how the notion of the laws of nature emerged in the seventeenth century. (shrink)

In seven chapters and an epilogue, McCool gives a fairly complete and well-documented survey of the history of the Thomistic movement in Catholic philosophy from the early nineteenth century until the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council. After a summary of Aquinas' main doctrines, McCool presents a fine account of the Thomistic revival during the nineteenth century. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the discussions concerning Blondel and Bergson and the Thomism of Maritain and Gardeil. McCool insists on the importance (...) of Maritain's distinction between experiential and conceptual knowledge. (shrink)

This article first presents the aristotelian criticism of the conception of God as Esse ipsum subsistens in Thomas Aquinas, through one of the most important aristotelian philosophers today, Enrico Berti. Then the answer offered by the thomist Stephen L. Brock in his defense of the ipsum esse is set forth, with reference to the recent disputes regarding this issue in the so-called «analytical thomism». The aim is to determine the status of the recent debate between aristotelians and thomists regarding (...) the question of God as Esse ipsum subsistens, in order to ascertain whether the historical incompatibility between the two metaphysical conceptions is to be considered definitive. (shrink)

Thomism is solidly based on the assumption that we know the world first through our senses and then through concepts formed on the basis of our sense experience. In this informally discursive introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, Ralph McInerny shows how this basic assumption contrasts with dominant modern alternative views and is developed by Thomas into a coherent view of ourselves, of knowledge, and of God. McInerny first places Thomism in context within philosophical inquiry, discussing the relationship between philosophy and (...) theology, and between modern and classical views of philosophy. He then describes the challenges Thomas faced with the introduction of Aristotle’s works into the Christian West. The reader is subsequently guided through such key concepts as art, nature, causes, and motion and shown how Thomas used these concepts to resolve the problems presented by Aristotle. Each chapter is tied to a specific Thomistic text, providing a sample froma number of Thomas’s works. In addition to articles from both _Summas_, there are sections from the Disputed Questions and the Commentaries, among others. McInerny also provides an annotated list of the writings of Thomas available in English. Bibliographical notes provivded by the author, grouped by subject and following his general chapter divisions, will be particularly helpful for further reading. (shrink)

This study systematically identified and enumerated Aquinas’ direct references to the two most frequently quoted Islamic and Jewish philosophers, Avicenna, Averroes, Rabbi Moyses, and Avicebron, in Summa Theologiæ (ST), analyzed Aquinas’ argumentative responses to their philosophical positions, and based on Aquinas’ alignment or divergence with the cited and attributed philosophical thought, categorized them according to agreement, partial agreement/disagreement, and disagreement. Furthermore, the study compared these arguments vis-à-vis their locus in ST, Aquinas’ stance, and philosophical and denominational origins. This investigation introduced (...) a novel data-driven methodology that integrated traditional textual and philosophical qualitative analyses with a structured quantitative assay and rigorous cross-examination of data, yielding precise qualitative and quantitative findings and filling the extant gap in Thomistic scholarship. The results demonstrated that Aquinas’ engagement with these philosophers was strategically selective. Aquinas’ direct reference-based arguments were most prevalent in ST I, followed by ST Supplement and ST I–II. Conversely, ST II–II and ST III featured minimal engagement. Avicenna and Averroes were the principal focus of Aquinas’ arguments, whereas Rabbi Moyses and, marginally, Avicebron received less attention. The correlational pattern identified herein originates in Aquinas’ realization of Aristotelian peripatetic philosophy and Abrahamic scriptural theology. Aquinas’ attainment of knowledge from divergent philosophical traditions represents a critical element of Thomistic theological synthesis, strengthening ST’s philosophically expansive yet doctrinally consistent character. Furthermore, it attests that Aquinas’ philosophical theology, as a scientific discipline, has matured in profoundly dynamic interactions with Islamic and Jewish traditions, remaining influential over the past 750 years since the composition of ST. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHistorians have portrayed the papal bull Coeli et terrae as a significant turning point in the history of the Catholic Church’s censorship of astrology. They argue that this bull was intended to prohibit the idea that the stars could naturally incline humans towards future actions, but also had the effect of preventing the discussion of other forms of natural astrology including those useful to medicine, agriculture, and navigation. The bull, therefore, threatened to overturn principles established by Thomas Aquinas, which not (...) only justified long-standing astrological practices, but also informed the Roman Inquisition’s attitude towards this art. The promulgation of the bull has been attributed to the ‘rigour’ of the incumbent pope, Sixtus V. In this article I revise our understanding of this bull in two ways. First, I reconsider the Inquisition’s attitude towards astrology in the mid-sixteenth century, arguing that its members promoted a limited form of Thomist astrology that did not permit the doctrine of inclination. Second, using Robert Bellarmine’s unpublished lectures discussing Aquinas’s views of astrology, I suggest that this attitude was common during the sixteenth century, and may have been caused by the crisis of Renaissance astrology precipitated by the work of Giovanni Pico. (shrink)

Cosmological reasoning is an important facet of classical arguments for the existence of God, but these arguments have been subject to many criticisms. The thesis of this book is that Thomas Aquinas can dodge many of the classic objections brought against cosmological reasoning. These objections criticize cosmological reasoning for its use of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; its notion of existence as a predicate; its use of ontological reasoning; its reliance on sense realism; its ignoring of the problem of evil; (...) and its susceptibility to the critique of "ontotheology" as famously put forward by Heidegger. Secondly, the book proposes that the kind of reasoning found in Aquinas's De Ente can be formulated in a more robust version. Prompted by Aquinas’s admissions that philosophical knowledge of God is the prerogative of metaphysics, the second main portion of the book extensively illustrates how the more robust version of the De Ente is the interpretive key for Aquinas’s many arguments for God. Hence, the book should be of interest both to philosophers engaged in cosmological reasoning discussion and to Thomists interested in understanding Aquinas’s viae to God. Finally, the deep purpose of the book is to reawaken interest in Thomistic Existentialism, an interpretation of Aquinas that flourished in the 1950's in the works of Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Joseph Owens. In this interpretation, a particular thing’s existence is the actuality of the thing in the sense of a distinctive actus not translatable into something else, for example, the fact of the thing or the thing having form. This book clearly explains how this interpretation looks at Thomas's metaphysics, and why it helps illuminate metaphysical realities. (shrink)

Special relativity inclines most contemporary interpreters (DiSalle, Maudlin, Penrose, Sider, Wheeler) away from the Thomistic three-dimensional, substance ontology. Most interpreters say space and time serve only as hermeneutics for accessing the deeper ontological foundation, four-dimensional spacetime. Unfortunately, this reigning narrative seems to replace the conventions of measuring rods and clocks with an even greater convention. Noticeably absent in the literature is a Thomistic interpretation of special relativity. Some Thomistic authors (Feser, Kiley, McLaughlin, Moreno) defend aspects of Aquinas’ metaphysics on the (...) periphery of special relativity, and suggest misgivings about four-dimensionalism. But none have attempted to demonstrate the viability of a three-dimensional alternative. This paper attempts to do just that, to provide a three-dimensional, Thomistic interpretation of special relativistic phenomenon—specifically, length contraction and time dilation. Behind this phenomenon, I argue, is the ordinary physical structure of clocks and the fact that every Aristotelian motion involves multiple true velocities. (shrink)

We are confronted by the clash of contradictory ideologies and a crisis of universal knowledge. Two major causes of this crisis are the erosion of common sense and a relativistic view of doctrinal development. Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange foresaw today's crisis and wrote keenly in defense of the classical Thomistic synthesis. His critiques of modern philosophy and theology, we are now able to see, were prophetic. This first-time English translation of his Le sens commun: La philosophie de l'être et les formules (...) dogmatiques addresss the relationship between common sense and both philosophy and faith; the proper defense for philosophical realism; the subordination and coordination of philosophical first principles; our natural capacity for knowing God's existence; and, at length, the problem of dogmatic development. (shrink)

SOME MODERN THOMISTS claiming to follow the lead of Thomas Aquinas, hold that the objects of the types of mathematics known in the thirteenth century, such as the arithmetic of whole numbers and Euclidean geometry, are real entities. In scholastic terms they are not beings of reason but real beings. In his once-popular scholastic manual, Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, Joseph Gredt maintains that, according to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the object of mathematics is real quantity, either discrete quantity in arithmetic (...) or continuous quantity in geometry. The mathematician considers the essence of quantity in abstraction from its relation to real existence in bodily substance. "When quantity is considered in this way," he writes, "it is not a being of reason but a real being. Nevertheless it is so abstractly considered that it leaves out of account both real and conceptual existence." Recent mathematicians, Gredt continues, extend their speculation to fictitious quantity, which has conceptual but not real being; for example, the fourth dimension, which by its essence positively excludes a relation to real existence. According to Gredt this is a special, transcendental mathematics essentially distinct from "real mathematics," and belonging to it only by reduction. (shrink)

In this paper I seek to consider the project of analytical Thomism with particular regard to Aquinas’s metaphysics of esse. My overall conclusion is that Thomas’s thought on esse is part and parcel of a way of philosophizing that is alien to analytical philosophy and is such that analytical philosophy is constitutionally unable to come to terms with it. In order to argue for such a conclusion, I begin with a presentation of Aquinas’s metaphysics of esse. I then respond to (...) the objection that arguably some analytical philosophers have already arrived at the same thought at which Aquinas arrived, thereby blocking the way to my denial of the possibility of an encounter between analytical philosophy and Thomist esse. Having removed that obstacle, I argue that analytical philosophy is constitutionally unable to come to terms with Thomist esse. (shrink)

The problem of divine hiddenness has in the recent literature joined the problem of evil as one of the principal positive arguments for atheism. My chief goal here is to mine Aquinas’s metaphysics and natural theology for a distinctively Thomistic response, making particular use of a neglected text in which he considers a similar issue. Towards the end of the paper I also consider some resources provided by Aquinas’s interpretation of revealed theology.

In Advice to Christian philosophers Alvin Plantinga suggested that Christians who propose to be philosophers should not limit themselves to being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be Christians. Instead, they should develop a Christian philosophy. From this, however, a problem followed, which is still seen as a reason to deny that a Christian philosophy is possible. It seems implausible that the outcome of the interaction between faith and philosophy is, really, philosophy and not merely theology. Plantinga did not deal with (...) this problem. Unlike him, thinkers of various orientations, especially scholars of Thomas Aquinas, had discussed it during the French querelle in the 1930s. In this article, I argue that they did not solve this problem because they did not examine the relationship between faith and philosophy by considering what faith requires in order to relate to reason. Instead, this consideration was suggested by Plantinga’s Advice and, long before, it had been developed in detail by Thomas Aquinas. It is, therefore, time to propose Thomist Advice to Christian Philosophers. (shrink)

Words signify things. Or so O’Callaghan wants to argue, against the “mental representationalist” tradition of modern philosophy which holds that words signify concepts in the mind, which in turn problematically correspond to or represent things. O’Callaghan gives extended consideration to the possibility that the “linguistic turn” of twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy suggests a way out of mental representationalism. He concludes, however, that a more compelling response may be had by drawing upon Thomas Aquinas and the Thomist tradition, to which he attributes (...) a “willingness and sense of obligation to engage contemporary modes of thought”. (shrink)

Here we examine the Thomistic and Rationalist proofs. The Thomistic proof reasons from the reality of essence-existence composites to the existence of something in which essence and existence are identical. The Rationalist proof reasons from the reality of contingent beings to the existence of a purely actual, necessary being. Drawing on the resources of previous chapters, we argue that both proofs fail.

Alongside a revival of interest in Thomism in philosophy, scholars have realised its relevance when addressing certain contemporary issues in bioethics. This book offers a rigorous interpretation of Aquinas's metaphysics and ethical thought, and highlights its significance to questions in bioethics. Jason T. Eberl applies Aquinas’s views on the seminal topics of human nature and morality to key questions in bioethics at the margins of human life – questions which are currently contested in the academia, politics and the media such (...) as: When does a human person’s life begin? How should we define and clinically determine a person’s death? Is abortion ever morally permissible? How should we resolve the conflict between the potential benefits of embryonic stem cell research and the lives of human embryos? Does cloning involve a misuse of human ingenuity and technology? What forms of treatment are appropriate for irreversibly comatose patients? How should we care for patients who experience unbearable suffering as they approach the end of life? _Thomistic Principles and Bioethics_ presents a significant philosophical viewpoint which will motivate further dialogue amongst religious and secular arenas of inquiry concerning such complex issues of both individual and public concern. (shrink)

This paper contrasts the Thomistic and Cartesian interpretations of what the substantial unity of the body and mind can consist in. A detailed discussion of the Thomistic account of the substantial unity of body and soul identifies especially those principles of the presupposed hylomorphist metaphysical background of this account that Descartes abandoned. After arguing for the consistency of the Thomistic view, briefly outlines how certain developments in late-medieval scholasticism prepared the way for the abandonment of precisely these principles. Finally, the (...) paper shows why from the perspective of the Thomistic principles identified in the first part, Descartes has to appear as someone paying mere lip-service to the thesis of the substantial unity of body and mind. (shrink)

Perfectionism is the view that what is intrinsically good is the fulfillment of human nature or the development and exercise of the characteristic human capacities. An important objection to the theory is what Gwen Bradford calls the “Deep Problem”: explaining why nature-fulfillment is good. We argue that situating perfectionism within a Thomistic metaethical framework and adopting Aquinas's account of the metaphysical “convertibility” of being and goodness gives us a solution to the Deep Problem. In short, the fulfillment of human nature (...) consists in the actualization of human potentialities or fullness of human being, and because being is ultimately the same thing as goodness, the fulfillment of human nature is good. We show that Thomistic perfectionism meets the requirements for an answer to the Deep Problem, provides the best explanation possible for the goodness of nature fulfillment, and is a natural foundation for perfectionist theories of value. (shrink)

Rationality should not be seen as a ghostly process exclusive of the world of matter, but rather as a transcendent process within matter itself by virtue of a participated power. A Thomistic metaphysics of embodied participation in being effectively answers Robert Pasnau’s objection that the standard hylomorphic account confuses ontological and representational immateriality, and is more satisfying than nonreductive physicalist accounts of rationality, and the Anglo-American hylomorphic accounts reliant on formal causality. When the active intellect is understood as a participated (...) power and not as a formal or constitutive principle of rationality, the transcendent basis of rationality is clarified; all embodied rational operations are seen to utilize, without being reduced to, a substrate of neurophysiological systems, processes and structures. I utilise an allegory of alien abduction, to illustrate participation as a key to understanding the intrinsic relationship between transcendent, immaterial thought and embodiment. (shrink)

Contemporary Thomists, by and large, have been very critical of the intelligent design movement. Their criticism raises two important issues; the first being whether such criticism is well-founded, the second being whether it is consistent with the views of St. Thomas, from whom they claim to take their direction. I shall argue that their criticism typically misses the mark and that they are mistaken in their representation of Thomas’s views as regards intelligent design.

A Thomistic ontology of spacetime seems impossible, given Thomas Aquinas’s (1224–1275) outdated science and mathematics. By extension, it would seem that his modern followers are foolhardy to attempt to defend such a view. Indeed, a critique of Jacques Maritain by Adolf Grünbaum proceeds apace, dismantling his attempts to save Thomistic philosophical realism from Einstein. However, Grünbaum’s attack was given in better form thirty years prior by the Belgian Thomist Charles De Koninck. The two critiques are analyzed here. De Koninck’s arguments (...) are superior to Grünbaum’s due to their greater precision as refutations as well as their more adequate ontology of spacetime, made possible but not explicit in Thomistic philosophy. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to accept either some version of dualism or physicalism when considering the mind–body problem. Likewise, recent philosophers of religion typically assume that we must work within these two categories when considering problems related to the possibility of bodily resurrection. Recently, some philosophers have reintroduced the Thomistic version of hylomorphism. In this article, we will consider the distinctive doctrines of Thomistic hylomorphism and how they can be used to address concerns about both the mind–body problem and (...) the possibility of resurrection. We will see that hylomorphism allows for a novel version of emergent property dualism that is both metaphysically plausible and allows us to recognize the irreducibility of mental states and the possibility of resurrection without ignoring the fact of human embodiment. We will also discuss the currently lively debate among Thomistic hylomorphists who advocate opposed corruptionist and survivalist versions of the afterlife. (shrink)

The Thomistic doctrine of the soul as the form of the body has many of the right intentions. It aims to promote a close integration of soul and body, and more broadly of the human person with the overall world of nature. Emergent dualism responds that all creatures possess souls if the biological organism has developed in a way that enables it to be the “emergence base” for a soul. This chapter explains a brief survey of Aquinas's view of the (...) soul, following the exposition of that view by Eleonore Stump. The human soul is different from other subsistent immaterial forms, in that the human soul, unlike an angel, does configure matter. The distinctive nature of the human soul, as contrasted with the souls of animals, makes it plain that humans are not merely animals; rather, they are “rational animals”, with all that implies. (shrink)

My argument has three parts. In the first, I shall explain some key Thomist distinctions concerning necessity and premotion. In the second, I shall argue that many philosophers who object to the Thomist position misconstrue the relevant understanding of necessity and contingency. In the third, I shall focus directly on their denial that the doctrine of premotion is helpful for discussions of how God moves the human will. The first two sections illustrate that the Thomists think plausibly that our (...) understanding of necessity is connected either with a logical necessity or secondary causality. Consequently, in order to show that the will is free, they argue that human actions are necessitated neither logically nor by secondary causes. In the third section, I argue that Thomists do not simply beg the question by asserting that God’s predetermining decrees are compatible with human freedom. They have an understanding of God’s causation which allows both for God’s infallible motion and the contingency of many created events, among which are free human actions. (shrink)

A healthy Thomism is one engaged with the discoveries and challenges of other traditions and disciplines. In this article I argue for one way of integrating Thomistic ethics and recent work in psychology. I assert that Thomists should think of virtue as a kind of expertise, something that psychologists have studied for decades. First, I provide context and motivation for my integration project. Next, I offer a definition of expertise and contrast it with recent discussions of skill and Aristotle's (...) account of techne. Third, I argue that virtue and expertise are deeply similar. Finally, I conclude by showing some benefits of considering virtue to be a kind of expertise for virtue formation. (shrink)

This paper presents a Thomistic analysis of addiction that incorporates scientific, philosophical, and theological features of addiction. I will argue first, that a Thomistic hylomorphic anthropology provides a cogent explanation of the causal interactions between human action and neuroplasticity. I will employ Karol Wojtyła’s account of self-determination to further clarify the kind of neuroplasticity involved in addiction. Next, I will elucidate how a Thomistic anthropology can accommodate, without reductionism, both the neurophysiological and psychological elements of addiction, and finally, I will (...) make clear how Thomism can provide an ethics and a theology of grace that can be integrated with these ontological and scientific considerations into a holistic theory of addiction. (shrink)

In contemporary bioethics, a live debate exists about how to properly adjudicate the conscientious objections of physicians and other health professionals to certain practices—such as abortion and euthanasia—that are deemed medical in some jurisdictions. However, surprisingly, this debate often takes place without a clear definition of terms. This article will contribute to this debate by orienting the question of conscientious objection in direct relation to conscience, law, and the common good which unites and directs multiple parties toward a common end, (...) using the lens of Thomistic philosophy. Building on this foundation, it will suggest a framework for evaluating instances of conscientious objection in medicine. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers of mathematics are deadlocked between two alternative ontologies for numbers: Platonism and nominalism. According to contemporary mathematical Platonism, numbers are real abstract objects, i.e. particulars which are nonetheless “wholly nonphysical, nonmental, nonspatial, nontemporal, and noncausal.” While this view does justice to intuitions about numbers and mathematical semantics, it leaves unclear how we could ever learn anything by mathematical inquiry. Mathematical nominalism, by contrast, holds that numbers do not exist extra-mentally, which raises difficulties about how mathematical statements could be (...) true or false. Both theories, moreover, leave inexplicable how mathematics could have such a close relationship with natural science, since neither abstract nor mental objects can influence concrete physical objects. The Thomist understanding of quantity as an accident inhering in concrete substances breaks this deadlock by granting numbers a foundation in extra-mental reality which explains why numeric expressions are relevant in natural science and how we come to know the truth or falsity of mathematical statements. Further, this kind of moderate realism captures the semantic advantages of the Platonists and the ontological parsimony of the nominalists (since for Thomists quantity is not a separate, free-standing ontological addition). Despite these advantages, the Thomistic understanding of number has been out of favor since the work of Cantor, who argued that actual infinities (regarded by Aristotelians as impossible) are required for modern developments in mathematics. This paper frees philosophers of mathematics to embrace the advantages of Thomistic realism by showing that Cantor’s understanding of actual and potential infinity is not the same as Aquinas’s, and that potential infinities (in Aquinas and Aristotle’s sense) can do all the work Cantor claims for actual infinities in modern mathematics. (shrink)

This article makes a case for why human equality and the wrongness of racism are best accounted for by the philosophical anthropology derived from Thomistic Essentialism. After presenting this view and explaining its contemporary application in the American civil rights struggle, the author briefly reviews three major secular alternatives: Ruse and Wilson’s Darwinian account; Rawlsian social contract theory; and Dworkinian ungrounded realism. He shows how the advocates of each, in their own way, rely on notions that are more at home (...) with Thomistic Essentialism, even though each is offered by its champions as a way to ground human equality without appealing to the sort of rich metaphysical and theistic beliefs that Thomistic Essentialism entails and King and his allies took for granted. (shrink)

“Existential risks” are risks that threaten the destruction of humanity’s long-term potential: risks of nuclear wars, pandemics, supervolcano eruptions, and so on. On standard utilitarianism, it seems, the reduction of such risks should be a key global priority today. Many effective altruists agree with this verdict. But how should the importance of these risks be assessed on a Christian moral theory? In this paper, I begin to answer this question – taking Thomas Aquinas as a reference, and the risks of (...) anthropogenic extinction as an example. I’ll suggest that on a Thomist framework, driving ourselves extinct would constitute a complete failure to fulfil our God-given nature, a radical form of hubris, and a loss of cosmological significance. So the reduction of such risks seems vital for Thomists, or Christians more broadly. Indeed, I end with the thought that these considerations are not parochially Christian, or indeed specifically religious: everyone with a similar view of mankind – as immensely valuable yet fallen and fragile – should agree that existential risks are a pressing moral concern. (shrink)

This chapter continues the Thomistic account of human sexual difference by exploring the ontological status of maleness and femaleness. First, it considers whether they are realities that determine the very existence of a new substance or rather are accidental qualities that modify an ontologically prior substance. Having concluded that sexual difference is not a specific difference, it then considers the precise mode of accidental being that characterizes maleness and femaleness and notes their unique relationship to the substances in which they (...) inhere. (shrink)