Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g., Stanley & Williamson Journal of Philosophy 98, 411–44, 2001; Stanley Noûs 45, 207–38, 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard Philosophy Compass 3, 93–118, 2008a, Grazer Philosophische Studien 77, 147–90 2008b, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78, 439–67 2009, 2011) hold, contra Ryle (1946, 1949), that knowing how to do something is just a kind of propositional knowledge. In a similar vein, traditional reductivists about understanding-why (e.g., Salmon 1984; Lipton 2004; Woodward 2003; Grimm The British Journal for the Philosophy of (...) Science 57, 515–35, 2006; Greco 2009; Kelp 2014) insist, in accordance with a tradition beginning with Aristotle, that the epistemic standing one attains when one understands why something is so is itself just a kind of propositional knowledge—viz., propositional knowledge of causes. A point that has been granted on both sides of these debates is that if these reductive proposals are right, then knowledge-how and understanding-why should be susceptible to the same extent as knowledge-that is to being undermined by epistemic luck. This paper reports experimental results that test these luck-based predictions. Interestingly, these results suggest a striking (albeit, imperfect) positive correlation between self-reported philosophical expertise and attributions of knowledge-how, understanding-why and knowledge-that which run contrary to reductive proposals. We contextualize these results by showing how they align very well with a particular kind of overarching non-reductive proposal, one that two of the authors have defended elsewhere (e.g., Carter and Pritchard Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91, 181–99, 2015a, Noûs 49, 440–53, 2015b, Australasian Philosophical Quarterly 93, 799–816, 2015c) according to which knowledge-how and understanding-why, but not knowledge-that, essentially involve cognitive achievement (i.e., cognitive success that is primarily creditable to cognitive ability). We conclude by situating the interpretive narrative advanced within contemporary discussions about the role of expertise in philosophical judgment. (shrink)

A common thesis about ignorance is the Knowledge View, which holds that S is ignorant that p if and only if S doesn’t know that p (cf. Le Morvan 2011a,b, 2012, 2013; Blome-Tillmann 2016; Bondy 2018; De Nicola 2018; Goldman & Olsson 2009; Williamson 2000; Zimmerman 2008). We present a new argument against the Knowledge View. According to the argument, which draws from recent insights about epistemic autonomy (e.g., Carter 2022; Gaultier 2021; McCain 2023; Sylvan 2023; cf. eds. Matheson (...) and Lougheed 2021), knowledge undermining infringements on a belief’s autonomy don’t necessarily lead to ignorance, and on this basis, the Knowledge View should be rejected. We conclude by showing some implications of our view—that a thinker can nonautonomously escape ignorance without possessing knowledge—for epistemic axiology and for the epistemology of learning. (shrink)

This volume is the first in English to provide a full, systematic investigation into Aristotle's criticisms of earlier Greek theories of the soul from the perspective of his theory of scientific explanation. Some interpreters of the De Anima have seen Aristotle's criticisms of Presocratic, Platonic, and other views about the soul as unfair or dialectical, but Jason W. Carter argues that Aristotle's criticisms are in fact a justified attempt to test the adequacy of earlier theories in terms of the (...) theory of scientific knowledge he advances in the Posterior Analytics. Carter proposes a new interpretation of Aristotle's confrontations with earlier psychology, showing how his reception of other Greek philosophers shaped his own hylomorphic psychology and led him to adopt a novel dualist theory of the soul–body relation. His book will be important for students and scholars of Aristotle, ancient Greek psychology, and the history of the mind–body problem. (shrink)

We know facts, but we also know how to do things. To know a fact is to know that a proposition is true. But does knowing how to ride a bike amount to knowledge of propositions? This is a challenging question and one that deeply divides the contemporary landscape. A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How introduces, outlines, and critically evaluates various contemporary debates surrounding the nature of knowledge-how. Carter and Poston show that situating the debate over the nature of knowledge-how (...) in other epistemological debates provides new ways to make progress. In particular, Carter and Poston explore the question of what knowledge-how involves, and how it might come apart from propositional knowledge, by engaging with key epistemological topics including epistemic luck, knowledge of language, epistemic value, virtue epistemology and social epistemology. New frontiers for research on knowledge-how are also explored relating to the internalism - externalism debate as well as embodied and extended knowledge. A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How provides an accessible introduction to the main arguments in this important and thriving debate suited for undergraduates and postgraduates in philosophy and related areas. A strength of the book is its methodology which places a premium on placing the debates over knowledge-how in a broader conversation over the nature of knowledge. This book also offers an opinionated discussion of various lines of argument which will be of interest to professional philosophers as well. (shrink)

Recent critics have called attention to the alienation of contemporary academics from broad currents of intellectual activity in public culture. The general complaint is that intellectuals are finding a professional home in institutions of higher learning, insulated from the concerns and interests of a wider reading audience. The demands of professional expertise do not encourage academics to work as public intellectuals or to take up social, literary, or political matters in imaginative and perspicuous ways. More problematic is the relative absence (...) of religion in the writings of those who aspire to work as public intellectuals. This essay reviews recent attempts by William Dean, Cornel West, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Stephen Carter, and Robin Lovin to remedy the problem of academic alienation and to address the place of religion in American life. (shrink)

This book presents a contextual study of the life and work of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688). Focusing on the theological basis of Cudworth's ethical philosophy, this book unlocks the hitherto ignored political aspect to Cudworth's ethical philosophy. Through a detailed examination of Cudworth's published works - particularly his voluminous "True intellectual system of the Universe" -, his posthumously published writings, and his 'freewill' manuscripts Benjamin Carter argues that the ethical and political arguments in Cudworth's philosophy develop out (...) of Cudworth's Trinitarian theology. Carter traces the link between Cudworth's trinitarianism and his ethical and political ideas by placing Cudworth's work in the turbulent religious and intellectual context of seventeenth-century England, and the University of Cambridge in particular. (shrink)

A familiar point in the literature on the epistemology of disagreement is that in the face of disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer the epistemically virtuous agent should adopt a stance of intellectual humility. That is, the virtuous agent should take a conciliatory stance and reduce her commitment to the proposition under dispute (e.g., Elga 2007; Feldman 2004; Christensen 2007). In this paper, we ask the question of how such intellectual humility would manifest itself in a corresponding peer disagreement regarding (...) knowledge-how. We argue that while it is relatively straightforward to recast this debate in terms of a reductive intellectualist account of knowledge-how (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011), whereby knowledge-how just is a matter of having a particular propositional attitude, the issue becomes more complex once we turn to anti-intellectualist positions (e.g., Ryle 1945; 1949; Poston 2009; Carter & Pritchard 2013; 2014). On these views, after all, such a disagreement won’t be just a matter of disagreeing about the truth of a proposition. Accordingly, to the extent that some kind of conciliation is plausibly required of the virtuous agent in the face of a recognised peer disagreement, this conciliation will not consist simply in belief revision. We propose a novel way to address this problem. We claim that what is required of the epistemically virtuous agent when confronted with peer disagreement regarding knowing how to φ is that thereafter she should be disposed to employ her way of φ-ing across a narrower range of practical circumstances than beforehand. Moreover, just as an agent needs to call on her intellectual virtues in order to determine the extent of conciliation required in an ordinary case of epistemic peer disagreement, so the intellectual virtues will play an important role in determining this shift in dispositions to φ that occurs as regards epistemic peer disagreement about knowledge-how. (shrink)

This book examines the distinctive and significant contribution of the great French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur to contemporary debates in ethics and philosophy of religion. James Carter argues that Ricoeur's later writings in particular offer a vision of ethical life that can be understood as a moral religion.

How is a person's freedom related to his or her preferences? Liberal theorists of negative freedom have generally taken the view that the desire of a person to do or not do something is irrelevant to the question of whether he is free to do it. Supporters of the “pure negative” conception of freedom have advocated this view in its starkest form: they maintain that a person is unfree to Φ if and only if he is prevented from Φ-ing by (...) the conduct or dispositions of some other person(s) (Steiner, 1994; Carter, 1999; Kramer, 2003). This definition of freedom is value-neutral in the sense that no reference is made to preferences over options or indeed to any other indicators of the values of options, either in the characterization of “Φ-ing” itself (any conduct fits the bill) or in the characterization of the way in which Φ-ing can be constrained (any prevention counts as a constraint on freedom). (shrink)

When we hear the term "Japanese philosophy" we think of Zen Buddhism or the Shinto scriptures. Yet one of the great 20th century interpreters of Western philosophy, Nishida Kitaro, lived and wrote in the Japanese islands all his life, laboring at an ultimate synthesis of oriental thought and Western hermeneutics. To be sure, Nishida's aim was to understand his own cultural influences in relation to the Western world. What distinguished him, however, was his passion for rendering oriental metaphysics understandable in (...) the language of Western philosophy, and his attempts to contrast the paradoxicality of Buddhist logic with the logical strategies of Aristotle, Kant, or Hegel. Featured in this book is an interpretation of Nishida's writings. Professor Carter focuses on the Japanese thinker's notion of "basho," a concept of nothingness as field, place or topos as borrowed from Plato's Tim'us. Expounding on the logical foundations and archaic elements in Nishida's work, and carefully explaining Nishida's critical approach to the questions of God, religion and morality, and pure existence, this discerning book offers students of Western philosophy and oriental thought alike a highly readable introduction to the teachings of a true world philosopher. (shrink)

Rita Carter ponders the nature, origins, and purpose of consciousness in this fascinating inquiry into the toughest problem facing modern science and philosophy. Building on the foundation of her bestselling book _Mapping the Mind, _she considers whether consciousness is merely an illusion, a by-product of our brain's workings, some as yet inexplicable feature or property of the material universe or—as the latest physics may suggest—the very fundament of reality. Little, she discovers, is as it first seems. Carter draws (...) from a solid body of knowledge—empirical findings and theoretical hypotheses--about consciousness, much of it derived from recent discoveries about the brain. Her lively, accessible narrative ranges widely over new ways of thinking about the subject and what direction new research is taking. Leading scholars from a range of perspectives provide topical essays that complement Carter's account. The book also discusses how traditional approaches—philosophical, scientific, and experiential—might be brought together to create a more complete understanding of consciousness. (shrink)

The many problems we face in today's world -- among them war, environmental destruction, religious and racial intolerance, and inappropriate technologies -- demand that we carefully re-evaluate such issues as our relation to the environment, the nature of progress, ultimate purposes, and human values. These are all issues, Robert Carter explains, that are intimately linked to our perception of life's meaning. While many books discuss life's meaning either analytically or prescriptively, Carter addresses values and ways of meaningful living (...) from a broader perspective, using Japanese philosophy to augment his investigation. He examines Martin Heidegger's distinction between "dwelling" and existing in the world, Lawrence Kohlberg's "stage seven" of human moral development, and the works of Viktor Frankl, Carol Gilligan, and Nel Noddings. He applies hermeneutic and deconstructionist theory to the question of meaning, and explores the feminist contribution to ethics and its relation to the interconnectedness of things celebrated in Zen and Shinto thought. Bridging various dichotomies such as East/West, reason/emotion, male/female, and caring/justice, Carter shows that ethics, environmental concern, caring, and joy in living are dependent on the growth and transformation of the self. Only by becoming aware of the interrelatedness of things, Carter reveals, can we become as supple and as strong as the bamboo tree, long the symbol of longevity and constancy. (shrink)

This is an interview by the Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics with Ian Carter. The interview covers Carter's intellectual biography; his extensive writings on the measurement and value of freedom; his reflections on the use of formal methods in philosophical work on freedom and in political philosophy more broadly; his more recent work on basic equality and respect for persons; and, finally, his advice to young scholars.

In this article, Carter tells the weaving tale of the globalization of art and the interplay between eastern and western contemporary art. Carter sketches out the history of contemporary art in China with a keen eye towards the interplay between Chinese artists and the various western influences over time, such as the 16th century Jesuit artists, Impressionism, Cubism, Fauvism, and Dada to name a few. This history is marked by a ubiquitous tension as Chinese artists incorporated western innovations (...) into their work, while also maintaining the poetic and literary foundation of Chinese art. Coupling that with the influence of the Cultural Revolution and Soviet realism on the Chinese are world, Carter discusses the tenuous boundaries upon which Chinese art has been and continues to be produced. After considering this history, Carter goes on to analyze the effect Chinese art has on the western art world--both how it shapes the western art world and how this globalization, in turn, shapes Chinese art. In navigating this boundary, Carter explains how Chinese artists find mediate appealing to a global audience while maintaining their Chinese roots. Carter concludes this essay by considering the economic success of Chinese art in the west and drawing attention to the negotiations still taking place today between local culture/global culture, tradition/innovation and authenticity/market appeal. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nonviolence—A Brief History: The Warsaw Lectures by John Howard YoderCarter AikinNonviolence—A Brief History: The Warsaw Lectures John Howard Yoder Edited By Paul Martens, Matthew Porter, and Myles Werntz Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2010. 150 pp. $29.95This helpful collection of lectures, delivered during a 1983 Polish Ecumenical Council (PEC) conference in Warsaw, displays John Howard Yoder’s emerging conviction that nonviolent action is not only a faithful response but (...) also an anthropologically natural and effective instrument of social change. Yoder constructively narrates the joining of theological and philosophical clarity about the importance of nonviolence with realizations of its social effectiveness as this connection blossomed in the turmoil of the twentieth century.The introduction nicely situates these lectures in their original social and ecumenical contexts, both of which turn out to be tremendously important. Yoder gave these lectures just weeks before Pope John Paul II met with the PEC for the first time and during the period when the US Catholic Bishop’s letter, “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response” was being formed. Additionally, in 1983 the vulnerable Polish Communist Party was trying to suppress the rising Solidarity Movement, the country’s first noncommunist trade union. The movement’s protests and strikes had only recently gained media attention [End Page 216] and had, thus far, stopped short of violence. In its setting alone, the collection offers a Yoder rarely seen through his modern interpreters: Yoder is socially relevant in the highest degree, concerned with the effectiveness of non-violence as a means of change, more than willing to incorporate the wisdom of non-Christian masters, and attentive to the response of the entire church catholic. Here Yoder is no more the resident alien than Martin Luther King Jr. was on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.Yoder begins with a three-lecture equation: Tolstoy + Gandhi = MLK. Tolstoy’s corrective interpretations of the Gospels—emphasizing the personhood of Jesus and “the ‘key’ to the Scripture message: the cure for evil is suffering” (21)—used nonviolence and the suffering of the persecuted as the fabric of moral progress. Gandhi “moves with Tolstoy, but beyond him” (24); he sees the power of truth and suffering as a natural force of good. Martin Luther King Jr. becomes Tolstoy + Gandhi, championing the power of love and non-violence as faithful but also practical and metaphysically natural. Much of the book provides theological, scriptural, socioanthropological, and historical arguments for why this is the case. Yoder’s treatments of the “powers” (chap. 8), just war (chap. 4), and the political nature of Jesus (chap. 7) are all paralleled elsewhere, but their inclusion is important to the modern reader who wishes to trace the logic of Yoder’s present argument and the evolution of his overall thought.In the closing chapters Yoder turns to flourishing nonviolence movements in Roman Catholicism that exhibit a “restoration of original Christianity” (120). He highlights several facets of Catholic nonviolent spirituality including the valuing of the cultivation of virtues (and the people who best exhibit them), the growth of the nonviolence movement among American Catholics, and the emergence of the Catholic Worker movement. In the final two chapters, Yoder brings into conversation a few Western theologians, the “increasingly important” products of American bishops (especially in their argument for the limits of just war thinking in the nuclear age), and two prophetic Latin American theologians: Dom Hélder Câmara and Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. Together this assembled chorus expresses the unique and hope-giving character of modern Catholic theologies of nonviolence: “love, not violence... will have the last word in history” (145).As a collection these lectures represent a part of Yoder’s emerging hope in the natural logic of nonviolence and its potential for effective social change. The fact that these lectures were delivered in such a highly charged setting provides a courageous and pastoral backdrop for what amounts to a rich metaphysics of nonviolence. [End Page 217]Carter AikinHastings CollegeCopyright © 2013 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Throughout her life Diane Hirabayashi Carter has seen a flow, or interconnection, that has led to self-awareness. It is the awareness of the intertwining of families and life experience that can offer peace of mind and purpose.

The essence of life in an oligarchy like George Orwell presents in '1984' is that freedom of choice is virtually non-existent. But what happens when so many trivial and meaningless choices inundate a culture such as our own and freedom itself becomes devalued? In 'A Do-It-Yourself Dystopia', through a variety of essays, Steven Carter addresses this and other issues in a wide-ranging search for hidden oligarchies of the American self.

Look around you. The world is more homogenous than you think. Far too often, distinctions among people, places, and things are matters of degree rather than kind. Many are illusory. As satire, Little House of Imaginary Distinctions is meant to complement Steven Carter's previous book, Little House of Oxymorons, published by Hamilton Books in 2010.

It is often said that one person or society is 'freer' than another, or that people have a right to equal freedom, or that freedom should be increased or even maximized. Such quantitative claims about freedom are of great importance to us, forming an essential part of our political discourse and theorizing. Yet their meaning has been surprisingly neglected by political philosophers until now.Ian Carter provides the first systematic account of the nature and importance of our judgements about degrees (...) of freedom. He begins with an analysis of the normative assumptions behind the claim that individuals are entitled to a measure of freedom, and then goes on to ask whether it is indeed conceptually possible to measure freedom.Adopting a coherentist approach, the author argues for a conception of freedom that not only reflects commonly held intuitions about who is freer than whom but is also compatible with a liberal or freedom-based theory of justice. (shrink)

In this remarkable and often dazzling book, Paul Carter explores the conditions for sociability in a globalized future. He argues that we make many assumptions about communication but overlook barriers to understanding between strangers as well as the importance of improvisation in overcoming these obstacles to meeting. While disciplines such as sociology, legal studies, psychology, political theory, and even urban planning treat meeting as a good in its own right, they fail to provide a model of what makes meeting (...) possible and worth pursuing: a yearning for encounter. The volume's central narrative-between Northern cultural philosophers and Australian societies-traverses the troubled history of misinterpretation that is characteristic of colonial cross-cultural encounter. As he brings the literature of Indigenous and non-Indigenous anthropological research into dialogue with Western approaches of conceptualizing sociability, Carter makes a startling discovery: that meeting may not be desirable and, if it is, its primary objective may be to negotiate a future of non-meeting. To explain the phenomenon of encounter, Carter performs it in differing scales, spaces, languages, tropes, and forms of knowledge, staging in the very language of the book what he calls "passages." In widely varying contexts, these passages posit the disjunction of Greco-Roman and Indigenous languages, codes, theatrics of power, social systems, and visions of community. In an era of new forms of technosocialization, Carter offers novel ways of presenting the philosophical dimensions of waiting, meeting, and non-meeting. (shrink)

In _The Anarchy of Black Religion_, J. Kameron Carter examines the deeper philosophical, theological, and religious history that animates our times to advance a new approach to understanding religion. Drawing on the black radical tradition and black feminism, Carter explores the modern invention of religion as central to settler colonial racial technologies wherein antiblackness is a founding and guiding religious principle of the modern world. He therefore sets black religion apart from modern religion, even as it tries to (...) include and enclose it. Carter calls this approach the _black study of religion_. Black religion emerges not as doctrinal, confessional, or denominational but as a set of poetic and artistic strategies for improvisatory living and gathering. Potentiating non-exclusionary belonging, black religion is anarchic, mystical, and experimental: it reveals alternative relationalities and visions of matter that can counter capitalism’s extractive, individualistic, and imperialist ideology. By enacting a black study of religion, Carter elucidates the violence of religion as the violence of modern life while also opening an alternate praxis of the sacred. (shrink)

This is the third volume in a trilogy of fables by Steven Carter. Carter's butterflies are naive, worldly, sarcastic, philosophical, and very funny—in short, perfectly human!

For readers looking for insights into key issues linking current Eastern and Western views on the arts, aesthetics, and philosophy, Unsettled Boundaries offers fresh and insightful perspectives on current issues as seen by leading Chinese and Western scholars. Represented in the volume are previously unpublished essays of Nöel Carroll, Garry Hagberg, Richard Shusterman, and Jason Wirth alongside writings of Chinese peers Gao Jianping, Peng Feng, Liu Yuedi, Wang Chunchen and Cheng Xiangzhan. The essays in this volume draw attention to evolving (...) cultural and philosophical connections linking the cultures of East and West, while taking note of important differences in the respective cultures. These connections draw upon both traditional Confucian ideas and Chinese Marxist-Leninist aesthetics as well as western pragmatism, somaesthetics, and Wittgenstein-based analytic philosophy. Alongside these philosophical currents, are reflections on issues linking globalization to contemporary Balinese, Chinese, and Japanese arts, by Curtis Carter, Stephen Davies, Garry Hagberg, and Mary Wiseman. (shrink)

Philosophizing the Americas establishes the field of inter-American philosophy. Bringing together contributors who work in Africana Philosophy, Afro-Caribbean philosophy, Latin American philosophy, Afro-Latin philosophy, decolonial theory, and African American philosophy, the volume examines the full range of traditions that have, separately and in conversation with each other, worked through how philosophy in both establishes itself in the Americas and engages with the world from which it emerges. The book traces a range of questions, from the history of philosophy in the (...) Americas to philosophical questions of race, feminism, racial eliminativism, creolization, epistemology, coloniality, aesthetics, and literature. The essays place an impressive range of philosophical traditions and figures into dialogue with one another: some familiar, such as José Martí, Sylvia Wynter, Martin R. Delany, José Vasconcelos, Alain Locke, as well as such less familiar thinkers as Arturo Alfonso Schomburg, Hilda Hilst, and George Lamming. In each chapter, the contributors find fascinating and productive matrices of tension or convergence in works throughout the Americas. The result is an original and important contribution to knowledge that introduces readers from various disciplines to unfamiliar yet compelling ideas and considers familiar texts from novel and prescient perspectives. Philosophizing the Americas stands alone as a representation of current scholarly debates in the field of inter-American philosophy. Contributors: Stephanie Rivera Berruz, Jacoby Adeshei Carter, Nadia Celis, Tommy J. Curry, Hernando A. Estévez, Daniel Fryer, James B. Haile III, Chike Jeffers, Lee A. McBride III, Michael Monahan, Eliana Díaz Muñoz, Adriana Novoa, Susana Nuccetelli, Andrea J. Pitts, Dwayne A. Tunstall, and Alejandro A. Vallega. (shrink)

The human is supposed to be top animal, but every one of these true stories shows how ridiculous that idea can be... As an RSPCA Inspector based in North Yorkshire in the 1980s, Carter Langdale found himself at the heart of rural life. Part doctor, part vicar, part undertaker - you name it, the locals decided that he was the man to help them and their animals. Each day brought a new, and often absurd, challenge. Whether he was rescuing (...) a cow stuck halfway down a ravine, a tortoise trying to cross the road, or being presented with an injured owl at his door, Carter never knew what was coming next. Evoking James Herriot's classic memoirs as well as My Family and Other Animals, Langdale's stories, some hilarious, some likely to bring a tear to the eye, are told with great humour and sympathy. For animal lovers, this is an absolute treat. (shrink)

When it comes to evolution, we've all heard about fossils and fruit flies, Darwin and Dawkins. But the idea of evolution is far more profound-and far-reaching. Today, a movement of visionary scientists, philosophers, and spiritual thinkers is forging a new understanding of evolution that honors science, reframes culture, and radically updates spirituality. Carter Phipps calls them Evolutionaries."--Page 4 of cover.

Is consciousness merely an illusion, a by-product of our brain's workings, or is it, as the latest physics may suggest, the basis for all reality? Your perception of the world around you, your consciousness, should be the one thing you could talk about with absolute confidence. But nothing about consciousness is clear-cut and understanding it is perhaps the hardest problem facing modern science. But some extraordinary insights gathered by the latest research suggest that the answers are within our grasp. Building (...) on the success of her bestselling book MAPPING THE MIND, Rita Carter gathers these insights together to throw new light on consciousness, its nature, its origins and its purpose. (shrink)

This chapter reclaims teleological ethics, arguing that the proper aim of moral thought and action is human flourishing. Building on Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia, it extends classical virtue ethics in three ways: (1) grounding flourishing in empirical evidence from developmental psychology and archaeology; (2) shifting from merely individual excellence to excellence within systemic interdependence; and (3) moving from civic friendship in the polis to trust and the vow‑motive in complex societies of strangers. Flourishing is defined as the integrated exercise of (...) informed agency to sustain a meaningful life, operationalised through three measurable capacities (cognitive, moral, sustained agency). The chapter distinguishes ordinary flourishing (the threshold baseline) from horizon flourishing (clarity – the stable perception of interdependence). It integrates care ethics critiques of Kohlberg, proposing two post‑conventional stages (vow‑motive and clarity). The vow‑motive is the durable commitment to sustain and repair the conditions for flourishing; it arises naturally from clarity and the exercise of agency within a just commonwealth. The chapter concludes that moral heroism is a symptom of systemic failure, and that the proper task of moral philosophy is architectural: designing institutions that make flourishing possible without superhuman sacrifice. This work is part of a larger project, Noura: Justice, Flourishing, and the Commonwealth, and is cross‑referenced with two other PhilArchive preprints on value efficiency and the architecture of trust. (shrink)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has long been criticized for ignoring human well‑being, but its deeper limitation is teleological: GDP optimizes for monetary throughput rather than the conditions that enable human flourishing. By treating all monetized activity as positive output, it obscures what this paper terms the attentional cost of abstraction—the systemic displacement of human and ecological realities by symbolic representations such as prices, metrics, and algorithmic scores. This cost generates rising defensive expenditure, cognitive burden, and institutional fragility, all of which (...) GDP records as growth. To diagnose this structural failure, the paper introduces the Durable Flourishing Indices (DFIₓ) and Flourishing Cost Indices (FCIₓ), a measurement framework that shifts evaluation from output to value efficiency: how effectively societies convert material resources and human time into flourishing lives. The DFI family isolates productive, defensive, cognitive, extractive, and coordination costs that remain invisible in GDP, while the complementary FCI indices reveal the cost per flourishing life. Grounded in an interdisciplinary account of flourishing as an empirically assessable institutional output, the framework provides a diagnostic architecture for distinguishing growth that enhances human development from growth that monetizes friction, opacity, and repair. (shrink)

Human flourishing exhibits vast cultural diversity – monastic contemplation, scientific inquiry, communal traditions, entrepreneurial innovation, and many other forms of meaningful life. Yet this diversity does not imply that flourishing is arbitrary or purely relative. Flourishing, defined as living a sustained life of adaptive, meaning‑making (Moore, forthcoming d), is the topic of this paper. It argues that just as there is a deep structure in all languages (universal grammar), flourishing, too, possesses universal, innate deep structural conditions that are realised in (...) culturally variable surface forms. These deep conditions are three innate capacities: cognitive capacity (self‑construction, self‑location, trajectory projection, causal inference, narrative integration), agentive capacity (sustained intention and coherent action), and moral capacity (forming and revising a conception of a meaningful life, taking responsibility). These capacities are species‑typical and developmentally real; they require enabling institutional scaffolds – visibility, symmetry, contestability, and repair – in order for a society of strangers to enable its participants to fully exercise these capacities and develop and sustain flourishing lives. The scaffolds are not themselves innate; they are analogous to the social interaction necessary for language acquisition. The framework reconciles universalism and pluralism without collapsing into cultural imperialism or relativism, and it provides a diagnostic basis for evaluating whether any large‑scale civilisation supports the deep structure of flourishing. (shrink)

Modern political theory often equates legitimate government with procedural democracy – competitive elections, multiparty systems, and formal rights. This paper argues that Aristotle’s classical typology offers a more fundamental standard: a regime is good when it rules for the common good, regardless of how many hold government power. Drawing on global survey data showing that citizens worldwide define democracy primarily by welfare, fairness, and protection rather than by procedures alone, I propose a structural criterion for legitimacy: the four revealing‑form conditions (...) of visibility, symmetry, contestability, and repair. Any regime – democracy, constitutional monarchy, or one‑party rule – that satisfies these conditions governs with the consent of the governed, because the governed can see consequences, challenge decisions, and expect repair. A concrete example from contemporary China (the “Blue Wind Chime” restorative justice programme) illustrates how a one‑party system can instantiate revealing‑form institutions and generate genuine consent. The paper concludes that Aristotle was right: the purpose of politics is flourishing, not procedure; monarchy (or any regime) is defensible not by heredity or tradition, but by its revealing‑form architecture. (shrink)

Standard accounts of freedom focus on negative liberty (non‑interference) or positive liberty (rational self‑direction). Both neglect a crucial dimension: epistemic scaffolding. A person may be legally uncoerced yet remain structurally disoriented – acting within architectures that obscure consequences, displace burdens, and prevent intelligible action. This paper proposes a third conception: freedom as the absence of systemic ignorance and the presence of intelligible action within revealing‑form institutions (visibility, symmetry, contestability, repair). Drawing on recent work on the architecture of trust, I argue (...) that agency in complex societies of strangers is not a metaphysical given but an emergent capacity scaffolded by institutional design. The paper defends a compatibilist view of causation, a two‑stage model of responsibility (structural plus individual), and the claim that freedom culminates in the vow‑motive – the durable commitment to sustain and repair the conditions for flourishing. It concludes that the free person does not seek isolation but clarity, and that clarity reveals interdependence, leading naturally to care. (shrink)

Perception is often treated as the passive reception of sensory data, a process that merely informs an already‑constituted self. This paper argues for a different view: perception is an active, constructive capacity that simultaneously builds a coherent self and supplies the causal information needed for intentional agency. Drawing on phenomenological (Husserl, Merleau‑Ponty), enactive (Varela, Thompson), and predictive processing (Clark, Friston) traditions, the paper defends a constructive‑enactive account of perception. It shows that perception is not only epistemic (providing mental maps of (...) the world) but also ontological – it participates in the ongoing self‑construction of the agent. Because perception makes causal pathways legible, it is the epistemic gateway to interdependence. Consequently, institutional visibility – the condition that makes causal consequences traceable – is a moral necessity. A society that blocks perception of causal relations (an obscuring‑form society) directly undermines the cognitive capacity that underlies flourishing. (shrink)

Democratic legitimacy is often grounded in procedural consent – voting, representation, majority rule. This paper argues that procedural consent is insufficient. Drawing on a structural account of trust and flourishing developed in previous work, we propose four conditions – Visibility, Contestability, Repair, and Symmetry – as prerequisites for meaningful consent. A government that conceals consequences, forecloses challenge, defers repair, or decouples benefits from burdens does not govern by consent, regardless of its electoral procedures. We show how these conditions diagnose legitimation (...) deficits that standard democratic metrics miss, and we outline an institutional architecture for government as care for the governed. This framework does not reject democracy but deepens it: consent without these conditions is formally procedural but substantively hollow. (shrink)

To explore how molecules became signs I will ask: “What sort of process is necessary and sufficient to treat a molecule as a sign?” This requires focusing on the interpreting system and its interpretive competence. To avoid assuming any properties that need to be explained I develop what I consider to be a simplest possible molecular model system which only assumes known physics and chemistry but nevertheless exemplifies the interpretive properties of interest. Three progressively more complex variants of this model (...) of interpretive competence are developed that roughly parallel an icon-index-symbol hierarchic scaffolding logic. The implication of this analysis is a reversal of the current dogma of molecular and evolutionary biology which treats molecules like DNA and RNA as the original sources of biological information. Instead I argue that the structural characteristics of these molecules have provided semiotic affordances that the interpretive dynamics of viruses and cells have taken advantage of. These molecules are not the source of biological information but are instead semiotic artifacts onto which dynamical functional constraints have been progressively offloaded during the course of evolution. (shrink)

Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development identifies post-conventional morality with abstract principle-based reasoning, including utilitarian, contractarian, and rights-based approaches. This paper argues that such reasoning remains conventional because it operates within established legal, social, and philosophical frameworks, even when it involves critical reflection. We argue that genuinely post-conventional morality arises at stage 5 from the lived experience of interdependent agency and culminates at stage 6 in the direct, stable perception of interdependence. Drawing on care ethics (Gilligan), Blasi’s account of moral (...) identity, and the author’s framework of flourishing, we propose a two-stage model of post-conventional moral development: the vow-motive, a stabilised commitment to sustain and repair the conditions of flourishing arising from the perception of interdependence, and clarity, the spontaneous expression of care grounded in the direct perception of interdependence. We argue that flourishing, suffering, and interdependence provide an account of moral motivation that avoids both principle-based formalism and moral relativism. The paper further argues that conventional care and conventional rule-based reasoning are products of socialisation rather than biological determinism and that neither constitutes genuinely post-conventional morality. Finally, it develops empirical predictions concerning moral development, self-construal, institutional design, and the cultivation of post-conventional care, and proposes directions for future research. (shrink)

Hobbes’s Leviathan is often read as a defense of absolute sovereignty grounded in fear and self‑preservation. This paper reinterprets Hobbes as a proto‑empirical thinker whose insights into vulnerability, reciprocal dependence, and coordination remain foundational but were limited by the science of his era. Drawing on developmental psychology, attachment theory, social cognition, flourishing research, and institutional epistemology, I reconstruct Hobbes’s “law of accommodation” as a principle of care rather than fear. The sovereign’s stability, I argue, implicitly requires a proto‑vow motive — (...) a durable commitment to sustain the laws of nature — but such a motive can be cultivated in all persons, not only rulers. This dissolves the case for absolutism and points toward revealing‑form institutions (visibility, symmetry, contestability, repair) as the true foundation of legitimacy. The result is a trajectory from Leviathan to Noura: a rebirth of liberalism that is historically continuous, empirically updated, and oriented toward flourishing‑based legitimacy. (shrink)

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been transformative. They are pre-trained foundational models that are self-supervised and can be adapted with fine tuning to a wide range of natural language tasks, each of which previously would have required a separate network model. This is one step closer to the extraordinary versatility of human language. GPT-3 and more recently LaMDA can carry on dialogs with humans on many topics after minimal priming with a few examples. However, there has been a wide range (...) of reactions and debate on whether these LLMs understand what they are saying or exhibit signs of intelligence. This high variance is exhibited in three interviews with LLMs reaching wildly different conclusions. A new possibility was uncovered that could explain this divergence. What appears to be intelligence in LLMs may in fact be a mirror that reflects the intelligence of the interviewer, a remarkable twist that could be considered a Reverse Turing Test. If so, then by studying interviews we may be learning more about the intelligence and beliefs of the interviewer than the intelligence of the LLMs. As LLMs become more capable they may transform the way we interact with machines and how they interact with each other. Increasingly, LLMs are being coupled with sensorimotor devices. LLMs can talk the talk, but can they walk the walk? A road map for achieving artificial general autonomy is outlined with seven major improvements inspired by brain systems. LLMs could be used to uncover new insights into brain function by downloading brain data during natural behaviors. (shrink)

Liberal theories of justice, from Hobbes to Rawls, rest on a particular theory of value: the satisfaction of subjective preferences. On this view, a person's good is whatever they happen to prefer, and justice consists in fairly distributing the means to satisfy those preferences. This paper argues that the preference‑satisfaction model is both empirically and philosophically inadequate. Human beings are not preference machines; they are meaning‑makers. Flourishing is not the satisfaction of arbitrary preferences, but the integrated exercise of cognitive, moral, (...) and agentive capacities to sustain a meaningful life. -/- The paper further argues that Rawls was mistaken to identify justice with fairness, and mistaken to suppose that his two principles fully articulate the concept of fairness. Properly understood, fairness is a necessary condition of justice, and fairness consists in symmetry—the alignment of benefits and burdens with causal responsibility. Rawls's "fairness" is a vague mixture of the indeterminate "maximum co‑possible liberty" principle and an intuitive belief that society should make the worst off as well off as possible. But without a concept of flourishing, "as good as it can be" is empty. -/- Justice in a complex society of strangers—a commonwealth—requires more than fairness alone. A just commonwealth enables all citizens to flourish by providing the institutional and material conditions necessary for the development and exercise of distinctly human capacities for meaning‑making, care, and informed agency. Fairness as symmetry is one of four institutional conditions required for such flourishing. Together with visibility, contestability, and repair, it forms part of the deep structure of a commonwealth. In addition, a just commonwealth must provide adequate education and ensure meaningful opportunities to secure the material requisites of flourishing through participation in cooperative production. Together with the four scaffolds, these conditions result in informed agency. -/- The paper concludes that society is not responsible for equalising outcomes. It is responsible for ensuring that everyone has fully informed agency and the necessary support so that each can develop and sustain a flourishing life through their own informed choices and cooperative production. Justice is not the fair distribution of the means to satisfy preferences. It is the design of institutions that enable all persons to develop and exercise their capacities for meaning‑making, care, and agency, thereby sustaining lives of their own choosing. -/- . (shrink)

John Locke's theory of property rests upon three claims: that property arises through labour, that appropriation is legitimate only where enough and as good is left for others, and that no one may take more than they can use before it spoils. Contemporary discussions often retain the first claim while neglecting the second and third. This paper argues that the provisos are not historical curiosities but the central conditions of property's legitimacy. Drawing upon the Noura framework, I reinterpret labour as (...) participation in cooperative productive activity, reinterpret the "enough and as good" proviso as requiring that institutions preserve fair access to the requisites of flourishing, and reinterpret the spoilage proviso as prohibiting the hoarding of capital outside productive circulation. Because productive activity depends upon socially generated capacities, shared knowledge, infrastructure, care, and ecological systems, property rights cannot be understood as absolute individual entitlements. They are conditional claims arising within cooperative systems whose legitimacy depends upon maintaining the conditions under which all persons can participate as informed agents. The paper extends this reconstruction to inheritance, ecological sustainability, intellectual property, and the global commonwealth, showing that the Bancor system's prohibition on hoarding is a global instantiation of the spoilage proviso, and that the same principle applies at the individual level. The result is a reconstruction of property rights that remains recognisably Lockean while providing a contemporary account of justice, cooperation, and flourishing. -/- . (shrink)

The dollar‑centric financial order entrenches asymmetry, externalises ecological costs, and records defensive load as growth. This paper proposes a counter‑model: a Global Commonwealth built on four structural invariants — Visibility, Symmetry, Contestability, and Repair — extended to the planetary scale. At its core is a Neutral Clearing Union with a Bancor unit of account, whose exchange rates are determined not by speculation but by each nation's value efficiency (nF/TPE), measured through Durable Flourishing Indices (DFIs). Surpluses trigger automatic demurrage, reinvested into (...) repair. New Bancors are minted only when defensive load decreases, aligning currency creation with flourishing. The Five Articles of Perpetual Commonwealth articulate reciprocity, law, visibility, dialogue, and repair as functional prerequisites for trust among nations. For BRICS and the Global South, this architecture offers a cooperative alternative to IMF conditionality and neoliberal austerity: debt denominated in flourishing, not dollars. The paper outlines institutional prototypes — Moralogy Institute, Court of Repair, Neutral Clearing Union — and sketches pathways for pilot implementation within BRICS+ frameworks. -/- . (shrink)

The contemporary international order remains incapable of reliably producing peace, sustainability, or durable flourishing. This paper argues that the failure is not primarily moral but structural. The nation‑state system was designed for a world of limited interdependence. The contemporary world, however, is characterised by dense economic, ecological, informational, epidemiological, and security interdependence. Institutions adequate for a world of deep interdependence must satisfy the same conditions required for flourishing at the domestic level: visibility, symmetry, contestability, and repair. -/- This paper extends (...) those conditions to the international order. It argues that the world does not require a world state, a universal culture, or a single form of government. Rather, it requires an architecture that enables diverse nations to cooperate, learn from one another, resolve disputes peacefully, and repair harms that arise within a shared web of interdependence. The Five Articles of Perpetual Commonwealth articulate the normative principles of such an architecture, while institutions such as the Moralogy Institute, the Court of Conflict Resolution and Repair, the Neutral Clearing Union, and the Bancor illustrate how those principles might be operationalised. The Global Commonwealth is therefore not a world government but an architecture for transforming interdependence from a source of vulnerability into a foundation for shared flourishing. (shrink)