Call the following claim Asymmetry: rationality often requires a more steadfast response to pure moral disagreement than it does to otherwise analogous non-moral disagreement. This paper briefly motivates Asymmetry and explores its implications for meta-ethics. Some philosophers have thought that anti-realists are better-placed than realists to explain Asymmetry because, if anti-realism is true, disagreement cannot provide evidence against the reliability of one's thinking about objective moral facts. This paper argues that this simple diagnosis fails to support otherwise plausible anti-realisms. (...) It closes by discussing an alternative explanation for Asymmetry, which appeals to the moral importance of steadfastness. (shrink)

Recently, Levinstein has offered two interesting arguments concerning epistemic norms and epistemic peer disagreement. In his first argument, Levinstein claims that a tension between Permissivism and steadfast attitudes in the face of epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to conciliatory attitudes; in his second argument, he argues that, given an ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into Uniqueness. However, in this paper, I show that when we clearly distinguish among several types of Permissivism, Permissivism\, and Permissivism\), (...) we can see that any type of Permissivism fits well with steadfast attitudes. Further, even though Levinstein’s ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle’ does rule out a possibility for some types of Permissivism and Permissivism\), it is still compatible with the other type of Permissivism ), so we may regard at least that version of a deference principle as a viable position in connection with that particular type of permissive rationality. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Steadfast Views of peer disagreement – a family of views according to which standing firm in the face of peer disagreement can be rationally permissible -- are incoherent. First, I articulate two constraints that any Steadfast Views of disagreement should endorse: (i) Steadfastness’s Core (ii) The Deference Principle. I show that (i) and (ii) are inconsistent: they cannot both be true. My argument, briefly put, is that one cannot rationally treat one’s peer’s (...) opinion as unconditionally relevant to a hypothesis, H, but conditional on the supposition of a disagreement, irrelevant to H. Because Steadfast Views endorse a set of mutually inconsistent propositions, I conclude that Steadfast Views are incoherent. (shrink)

According to conciliatory views about peer disagreement, both peers must accord their disagreeing peer some weight, and move towards him. Non‐conciliatory views allow one peer, the one who responded correctly to the evidence, to remain steadfast. In this paper, I consider the suggestion that it may be rational for both disagreeing peers to hold steadfastly to their opinion. To this end, I contend with arguments adduced against the permissiveness the supposition involves, and identify some ways in which different responses (...) for different agents to the evidence might be reasonable. (shrink)

In this paper we consider a puzzle concerning Hume's account of time and what he calls “steadfast unchanging objects”—that is, unchanging objects coexisting with temporal successions. On the one hand, Hume maintains that steadfast unchanging objects are temporally indivisible. On the other, he allows that such unchanging objects are capable of undergoing a determinate number of alterations in a given length of time, which seems to imply that they are at least potentially temporally divisible. After arguing that Donald (...) Baxter's influential interpretation of Hume's theory of time cannot resolve this tension, we propose that Hume offers a skeptical resolution of the difficulty. (shrink)

Epistemic rationality seems to permit a more steadfast response to disagreements over our fundamental convictions than it does for our ordinary beliefs. Why is this? This essay explores three answers to this question: web-of-belief conservatism, moral encroachment, and hinge theories, and argues that hinge theories do a better job than the alternatives at vindicating the intuition that there is a rationally permissible asymmetry in our responses to disagreements over ordinary beliefs and fundamental convictions. The essay also shows how hinge (...) theorists can explain the existence of moral hinge propositions, which enables them to account for the rational permissibility of being steadfast in response to disagreements over fundamental moral convictions. (shrink)

The problem of religious disagreement between epistemic peers is a potential threat to the epistemic justification of one’s theistic belief. In this paper, I develop a response to this problem which draws on the central epistemological thesis of skeptical theism concerning our inability to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for permitting evil. I suggest that this thesis may extend over to our judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, and that when it does so, it can enable theists to remain (...) steadfast amid disagreement with epistemic peers who hold a contrary theistic belief (i.e., atheistic belief). For if we’re unable to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, then for all we know, God has some reason for not revealing Himself to our apparent epistemic peer. Thus, their epistemic credentials needn’t provide reason to reduce one’s confidence to such a degree as to no longer uphold one’s theistic belief. (shrink)

An important principle in the epistemology of disagreement is Independence, which states, “In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P” (Christensen 2011, 1-2). I present a series of new counterexamples to both Independence and also a revised, more widely applicable, version of it. I then (...) formulate and endorse a third version of Independence that avoids those counterexamples. Lastly, I show how this third version of Independence reveals two new ways one may remain steadfast in the face of two real life disagreements: one about God’s existence and one about moral realism. (shrink)

Hume argues that there are steadfast objects - objects not themselves successions at all, yet which co-exist with successions. Given Hume's account of moments as abstractions from temporal simples, there being steadfast objects entails there being single moments that co-exist with successions of moments. Thus time is more like a wall of variously sized bricks than like a line. I formalize the assumptions behind this surprising view, in order to make sense of it and in order to show (...) that it is consistent. I note also that this view justifies the common-sense assumptions that time flows and is unlike space. (shrink)

Current responses to the question of how one should adjust one’s beliefs in response to peer disagreement have, in general, formed a spectrum at one end of which sit the so-called ‘conciliatory’ views and whose other end is occupied by the ‘steadfast’ views. While the conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that one is required to make doxastic conciliation when faced with an epistemic peer who holds a different stance on a particular subject, the steadfast views allow us to (...) maintain our confidence in our relevant beliefs. My aim in this paper is not to adjudicate between these views. Rather, I shall focus on a particular strategy, namely, denying the appearance of epistemic symmetry between peers, that the steadfast views standardly invoke in support of their position. Having closely examined certain representative examples of the steadfast approach, I will argue that this strategy is fundamentally flawed. (shrink)

Some moral propositions are so obviously true that we refuse to doubt them, even where we believe that many people disagree. Following Fritz and McPherson, I call our behaviour in such cases ‘moral steadfastness’. In this paper, I argue for two metaethical implications of moral steadfastness. I first argue that morally steadfast behaviour is sufficiently prevalent to present an important challenge for some prominent analogies between moral epistemology and non‐moral forms of epistemology. These analogies are often pressed by moral (...) realists. I then argue that moral quasi‐realism, unlike realism, can explain and vindicate our presumption that moral steadfastness is frequently rational. On the assumption that we frequently act as it is rational to act, quasi‐realism is therefore well placed to explain why we are so frequently morally steadfast. I conclude that this is an important respect in which quasi‐realism is explanatorily preferable to realism. (shrink)

For Descartes, duration is an attribute of everything that takes up time. Things with duration have successive temporal parts. Hume agrees that duration entails succession. However, his skeptical empiricism constrains him from attributing duration to everything that takes up time. To all appearances, some things—steadfast objects—take up time without being successive. Seeing Hume’s idiosyncratic view as a successor to Descartes’s under skeptical empiricist constraints makes Hume’s easier to understand and appreciate.

It is sometimes said that faith is recalcitrant in the face of new evidence, but it is puzzling how such recalcitrance could be rational or laudable. I explain this aspect of faith and why faith is not only rational, but in addition serves an important purpose in human life. Because faith requires maintaining a commitment to act on the claim one has faith in, even in the face of counter-evidence, faith allows us to carry out long-term, risky projects that we (...) might otherwise abandon. Thus, faith allows us to maintain integrity over time. (shrink)

In recent years, epistemologists have devoted enormous attention to this question: what should happen when two epistemic peers disagree about the truth-value of some proposition? Some have argued that that in all such cases, both parties are rationally required to revise their position in some way. Others have maintained that, in at least some cases, neither party is rationally required to revise her position. In this paper, I examine a provocative and under-appreciated argument for the latter view due to Elgin (...) Disagreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 53–68, 2010; The Philosopher’s Magazine, fourth quarter, pp 77–82, 2012; True enough, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2017; in: Johnson Voicing dissent: the ethics and epistemology of making disagreement public, Routledge, New York, pp 10–21, 2018). I defend it against a series of objections, and I then identify some fruitful ways in which her view could be developed further. (shrink)

What is the rational response to disagreement with an epistemic peer? Some say the steadfast response of holding on to your own belief can be rational; others argue that some degree of conciliation is always rationally required. I argue that only an epistemological externalist about rationality—someone who holds that the rationality of a belief is partly constituted by factors outside a subject’s cognitive perspective—can defend the steadfast view. Or at least that this is so in the kinds of (...) idealized cases of peer disagreement that take center stage in the current debate about disagreement. The argument has three steps. First, I show how rationality internalism motivates conciliationism: in view of the mutually recognized internal epistemic symmetry between peers, it would be arbitrary for either peer to hold on to her own belief. Second, I strengthen this line of thought by considering various proposed ‘symmetry breakers’ that appear to introduce a relevant asymmetry between peers, which could be used to defend the rationality of a steadfast response. I argue that none of these alleged symmetry breakers can help internalists. Third, I show how externalism does have the resources to defend steadfastness and expose how extant defenses of steadfastness implicitly rely on externalist intuitions. (shrink)

Paul frequently refers to the traditions of his ancestors as ‘the scriptures’, or with introductory formula such as ‘it is written’. Such references have often been taken as self-explanatory in that it was assumed that these were references to the writings which in Jewish and Christian tradition have acquired the status of canonicity. Since such a perception of the scriptures as canonical is anachronistic for the first century, the question needs to be asked to what does Paul actually refer when (...) he refers to the Scriptures. Which parts of which canon encompassed ‘the holy scriptures’ which Paul refers to e.g. in Rom 1:2? In addition to issues of divergent interpretations of scriptural texts could there also have been issues under debate concerning which written traditions were perceived as ‘scripture’? The issue of the fluidity of the collection as well as of the text deemed ‘holy’ in first-century Judaism has an impact on the question of how the authority of such a collection is perceived, particularly since Paul clearly aims at enculturating gentile Christ-followers into the world of the Scriptures. The mysterious reference in 1 Cor. 2:9 is explored as a test case for Paul’s understanding of the collection and text which he deemed to be ‘scripture’. (shrink)

Choo and Pittard recently have presented new attractive incommensurability arguments for remaining steadfast in religious beliefs even when disagreeing with sophisticated disputants. This article responds to the latest iteration of this genre in the work of Choo, and does double duty evaluating more generally the merits of this genre, which is becoming increasingly more popular since originally championed by Alston. Both Choo and Alston argue that it is reasonable to stay steadfast in one’s religious beliefs when there are (...) no commensurable ways of evaluating the disputant’s claims. This paper first describes four views about disagreement that inform Choo’s conclusion, one of which is the incommensurability argument similarly championed by Alston. Incommensurability arguments are attractive, but, when deployed in the most challenging disagreements, ultimately complacent. (shrink)

In the literature on John Locke’s metaphysics of space and time, there is a near-consensus that his views undergo a radical evolution. In the 1670s, Locke holds relationism, but, by the first, 1690 edition of Locke’s _Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, Locke has adopted Newtonian absolutism. This chapter argues for an alternative reading, on which Locke’s _Essay_ is explicitly neutral or non-committal with regard to the ontology of space and time, and yet there is reason to believe that the _Essay_ implicitly (...) preserves Locke’s earlier relationism. As well as challenging the existing scholarship, this chapter excavates another form of pre-Leibnizian relationism, and which may be of interest to twenty-first-century relationists; and provides ammunition to anti-Newtonian readings of Locke more generally. (shrink)

This chapter discusses responses to the author’s “Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason).” Among other things, the chapter: explains how the author understands rationality; explains why akrasia is irrational; intuitively overviews the argument from the Akratic Principle to the Fixed Point Thesis; explains why you can’t avoid this argument by distinguishing the rational from the reasonable, ideal rationality from everyday rationality, or substantive from structural norms; responds to the suggestion that misleading higher-order evidence creates rational dilemmas; explains (...) why the Fixed Point Thesis doesn’t assume objectivist or externalist notions of rationality; dismisses complaints about agents who aren’t able to “figure out” what’s rational; then responds to an objection that peer disagreement undermines doxastic justification. Finally, the chapter modifies the author’s steadfast position on peer disagreement to take into account cases in which peer disagreement rationally affects an agent’s first-order opinions without affecting higher-order ones. (shrink)

郢都巷深，皇山路远 Deep Lanes of Yingdu, Distant Roads to Huangshan -/- —献给我最亲爱的妈妈 — In Memory of My Dearest Mother -/- 清明的雨，如期而至。 细密，无声，落在硅谷我的屋檐与青石之间。 -/- 天地一片湿润的静默。 -/- 这是母亲离开后的第一个清明。 -/- 从刘冲村的小杨子湖岸， 到钟祥市郢中镇的古巷； 从寒门求学，到远赴重洋； 再到今日立身太平洋彼岸—— 四十八年的路，越走越远。 -/- 而今，西六巷十九号的四合院里， 桂影依旧轻摇，暗香仿佛仍在旧时的风中流转， 却再没有母亲忙碌的身影。 只剩父亲一人，在院落深处，守着岁月沉沉。 -/- 记忆缓缓回溯。 -/- 我出生时，是一个早产的孩子。 体弱、多病，整整哭了一百天。 -/- 那一百天里，昼夜颠倒，啼声不止。 母亲几乎没有睡过一个完整的觉。 她一遍遍将我抱起，在昏黄的灯下轻轻摇着， 用最原始、也最坚韧的方式，与命运对抗。 -/- 她从未抱怨。 -/- 后来我才明白—— 我这一生最初的存在， 并不是来自我自己， 而是来自母亲以身体与时间， 一点一点托起的生命。 -/- 她用自己的消耗， 换来了我的开始。 -/- 此后几十年，这种付出，从未停止。 -/- 在小杨子湖岸边， 她带着我们上山砍柴、放牛割草， 在艰难岁月里，为一家人撑起天空； 在郢中镇，她守着家门， 看我远行求学，走向更远的世界， 却始终站在身后，沉默而坚定。 -/- 她常说： “只要肯努力，就没有过不去的坎。” -/- 这句话，陪我走过长安的求学岁月， 也陪我走过异国他乡的孤独与不确定。 -/- 离开母亲，开始自己的人生旅途， 至今已四十八年。 -/- 从楚国郢都出发， 到秦国长安求学， 再到美国加州硅谷—— 山河更迭，时代变迁， 我的脚步不断向远方延伸。 (...) -/- 而母亲，始终停留在原点。 -/- 她未曾远行， 却让我走向远方； 她未曾言说世界， 却给了我面对世界的力量。 -/- 这些年里，无论身在何处—— 当我面对困境， 当我需要做出选择， 当世界变得复杂而动荡—— -/- 内心深处，总有一种最朴素而坚定的力量。 -/- 那不是理论， 也不是知识， 而是母亲一生所呈现的那种存在方式： -/- 坚韧、沉默、不退让。 -/- 她没有读过书， 却以一生的实践，让我理解了什么是“智慧”。 -/- 那不是抽象的思辨， 而是在艰难之中依然向前； 是在困顿之中仍然稳定； 是在风雨之中，不失方向。 -/- 后来我走得越来越远， 接触科学、技术与更宏大的世界。 -/- 但我渐渐发现—— 那些被称为“规律”“系统”“秩序”的“道”， 在更深处， 与母亲身上那种朴素而坚定的生命力量， 竟是相通的。 -/- 她不言“道”，却活出了“道”。 -/- 2025年9月12日的那个夜晚， 我陪在母亲身边。 -/- 那一夜，很长。 长得仿佛时间被拉开，又缓慢流走。 -/- 灯光微弱，呼吸可闻。 我不记得说了多少话， 也不记得沉默了多久。 -/- 只是守着。 一刻也不愿离开。 -/- 那或许是我一生中， 最清醒、也最无能为力的一夜。 -/- 我看着生命一点点安静下来， 却无法为她分担分毫。 -/- 那一夜之后， 世界悄然改变。 -/- 母亲，在第二天，永远地离开了我们。 -/- 没有预兆，也没有告别。 -/- 如今，她长眠于皇山故园。 山色沉静，草木有情。 她终于与这片她一生未曾离开的土地， 长久相守。 -/- 母亲离开后的日子里， 我常常梦见她。 -/- 梦里的她，已经恢复了健康。 她走动、说话， 像从未离开过一样。 -/- 有时，我们在院中； 有时，又回到更早的岁月。 -/- 仿佛时间，从未断裂。 -/- 梦醒之时， 我几乎相信，一切不过是虚惊一场。 -/- 而现实，总在下一瞬， 将人带回沉默。 -/- 于是我渐渐明白—— 人之所以会梦见逝去的亲人， 并不是因为他们“回来”， 而是因为，他们从未真正离开。 -/- 清明又至，细雨如丝。 -/- 而我，远在太平洋的彼岸。 山海万重，归路漫长。 -/- 不能在墓前俯身一拜， 不能在风中点上一炷清香， 这一清明，更加怀念我最亲爱的妈妈。 -/- 唯有在异乡的雨声里， 静静伫立。 -/- 我将在太平洋的彼岸， 借一场清明的雨， 把哀思，送回母亲安眠的故园。 -/- 此刻，我才真正明白： 所谓母亲，从来不只是一个人。 -/- 她是一个生命的源头， 是一个人得以存在的起点。 -/- 她以身体承载生命， 以时间抚养成长， 以沉默支撑远行。 -/- 一个人可以跨越山海， 进入更广阔的世界； 可以用理性理解规律， 用科学解释宇宙， 甚至用思想去接近“道”。 -/- 但在此之前—— 母亲，已经完成了一次最真实的“生”。 -/- 从道生万物， 到万物有源， 这世间一切生成的逻辑， 并不抽象。 -/- 它最真实、最直接的呈现， 就是母亲。 -/- 于是我终于明白： -/- 我走过的路， 从楚地，到长安，到加州， 看似进入世界； -/- 但若追溯其起点—— 不过是母亲当年在灯下， 轻轻抱起那个啼哭百日的孩子。 -/- 那一刻， 生命已经被赋予方向。 -/- 清明的雨，还在下。 一滴一滴，落在故园，也落在异乡。 -/- 仿佛天地之间， 从未真正分离。 -/- 母亲，您未曾远去。 因为我本身， 就是您生命的延续。 -/- 而我的一切远行， 不过是在您给予的起点之上， 继续向前。 -/- Deep Lanes of Yingdu, Distant Roads to Huangshan -/- — In Memory of My Dearest Mother -/- Charles X. Yang -/- The Qingming rain arrives, as it always does. Fine, silent, falling upon my rooftops and stone paths—even here in Silicon Valley. -/- Between heaven and earth, a quiet, damp stillness. This is the first Qingming since my mother left us. -/- From the shores of Xiao Yangzi Lake in Liuchong Village, to the ancient alleys of Yingzhong Town in Zhongxiang; from a humble beginning in study, to journeys across oceans; and now, standing on the far side of the Pacific— forty-eight years have passed, carrying me ever farther away. -/- And yet, in the courtyard at No. 19, West Sixth Lane, the osmanthus trees still sway gently, their fragrance lingering as if in the winds of earlier days. But my mother’s busy figure is no longer there. Only my father remains, alone in the depths of the courtyard, keeping watch over the weight of passing time. -/- Memory slowly turns backward. -/- I was born premature— frail, sickly, crying for a hundred days. -/- During those hundred days, day and night lost their order, and my cries never ceased. My mother scarcely slept a full night. Again and again, she lifted me in her arms, rocking me gently beneath a dim lamp, facing fate in the most primal, most enduring way. -/- She never complained. -/- Only later did I come to understand— the beginning of my life did not come from myself, but from my mother, who, with her body and her time, held up my existence, piece by piece. -/- She gave of herself, so that I could begin. -/- In the decades that followed, this giving never ceased. -/- By the lake, she led us to gather firewood, tend cattle, cut grass— holding up the sky for our family in difficult times. In Yingzhong Town, she stayed by the home, watching me leave to study, to journey farther into the world, always standing behind me—silent, unwavering. -/- She often said: “If you are willing to work hard, there is no obstacle you cannot overcome.” -/- Those words accompanied me through my years of study in Chang’an, and through the loneliness and uncertainty of life abroad. -/- I left my mother to begin my own journey— forty-eight years ago. -/- From Yingdu of Chu, to Chang’an of Qin, and then to California Silicon Valley on the far shore of the Pacific—landscapes shifted, eras changed, and my steps carried me ever farther outward. -/- But my mother remained at the origin. -/- She never traveled far, yet she sent me into the distance. She never spoke of the world, yet she gave me the strength to face it. -/- All these years, wherever I have been— in moments of hardship, in times of decision, when the world grew complex and uncertain— -/- there has always been, deep within me, a quiet and steadfast force. -/- It is not theory. It is not knowledge. It is the way my mother lived: -/- resilient, silent, unyielding. -/- She had no formal education, yet through her life, she taught me what wisdom truly is. -/- Not abstract thought, but the ability to keep moving through hardship; to remain steady in difficulty; to hold one’s direction in the storm. -/- Later, as I went farther into the world, encountering science, technology, and grander systems, I gradually came to see— -/- what we call “laws,” “systems,” and “order,” what philosophy names the Dao, are, at a deeper level, not separate from the quiet strength my mother embodied. -/- She never spoke of the Dao, yet she lived it. -/- On the night of September 12, 2025, I sat by my mother’s side. -/- That night was long— as though time had been stretched, then slowly released. -/- The light was dim; her breathing was faint. I do not remember how much we spoke, nor how long we sat in silence. -/- I only remember staying— unwilling to leave, even for a moment. -/- It may have been the most lucid, and the most powerless, night of my life. -/- I watched life grow quiet, little by little, and could do nothing to bear even a fraction of it for her. -/- After that night, the world was quietly altered. -/- The next day, my mother closed her eyes forever. -/- No warning. No farewell. -/- Now she rests in the homeland of Huangshan. The mountains are still, the grass and trees full of feeling. At last, she remains with the land she never left, in enduring peace. -/- In the months since her passing, I often dream of her. -/- In my dreams, she is well again— walking, speaking, as though she had never gone. -/- Sometimes we are in the courtyard; sometimes in earlier years, as if time had never broken. -/- When I wake, for a fleeting moment, I almost believe it was all just a passing illusion. -/- But reality, in the next instant, returns me to silence. -/- And so I begin to understand: -/- we do not dream of those we have lost because they return— -/- but because they never truly leave. -/- Qingming comes again. The rain falls, fine as silk. -/- And I remain here, across the Pacific. Mountains and oceans stretch between us; the road home is long. -/- I cannot bow before her grave. I cannot light a single stick of incense in the wind. -/- And so, this Qingming, I miss my dearest mother all the more. -/- I stand quietly, listening to the rain in a foreign land. -/- Here, on the far side of the Pacific, I borrow this Qingming rain to carry my grief back to where my mother rests. -/- Only now do I truly understand: -/- a mother is never merely a person. -/- She is the source of a life, the beginning of existence itself. -/- She bears life with her body, nurtures it with her time, and sustains it with her silence. -/- A person may cross mountains and seas, enter vast worlds, use reason to understand laws, science to explain the universe, even thought to approach the Dao— -/- but before all of this, a mother has already completed the most real act of creation. -/- From Dao giving birth to all things, to all things having their source— the logic of existence is not abstract. -/- Its most immediate, most tangible form is the mother. -/- And so I finally understand: -/- the path I have walked— from Chu to Chang’an to California— seems to lead into the world. -/- Yet its true origin lies only in that moment when my mother, beneath a dim lamp, lifted a crying infant into her arms. -/- In that instant, life was given its direction. -/- The Qingming rain continues to fall. -/- Drop by drop, upon the homeland, and upon this distant shore. -/- As if heaven and earth had never truly been separated. -/- Mother, you have not gone far. -/- For I myself am the continuation of your life. -/- And all my journeys are but a continuation from the place you began. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the prospects of a knowledge-first approach to disagreement. This approach takes knowledge to be the central value of the epistemic domain, and norms governing moves in this domain – such as belief in the face of disagreement – to drop right out of this value. On our account, in a case in which A and B disagree about whether p – where, after the discovery of the disagreement, A has a doxastic attitude D with content p and (...) B has a doxastic attitude D* with content not-p – A prima facie should conciliate in virtue of her disagreement with B if and only if A’s doxastic attitude thus adopted would thereby be closer to knowledge than D, or else hold steadfast. (shrink)

This paper examines investigative interviewing and the application of deontological ethics, arguing that the methods used to obtain information are as morally significant as the outcomes they produce. True, persuasion is often necessary in investigative settings, but ethical concerns arise when influence shifts into manipulation, deception, or coercion. Drawing on deontological principles of duty, honesty, and respect for individual autonomy, the paper evaluates most up-to-date interviewing practices, including the Wicklander-Zulawski method and the PEACE model. Too, it contrasts deontological reasoning with (...) utilitarian and virtue ethics perspectives, highlighting the strengths and limitations of each framework in investigative settings. Supported by research on false confessions and ethical interviewing, the analysis argues that truth-seeking must be steadfast in every attempt to maintain transparency, integrity, and respect for human dignity. Finally, the paper argues that ethical investigative interviewing requires adherence to professional duties alongside of the cultivation of moral character and organizational cultures that prioritize accountability over expediency. (shrink)

The economic empowerment of women weavers in the village of Boti is one of the efforts of the Evangelical Christian Church in Timor Boti to overcome the problem of poverty. However, these efforts face challenges in capital, technological innovation, product variety, and marketing strategy. Nevertheless, both the church and the weavers have remained steadfast in their business. One of the contributing factors is the strong spiritual values they hold dear. These values have been passed down from generation to generation (...) by their ancestors and combined with the Christian values to which they adhere. This study, which uses a qualitative descriptive approach, shows that the weavers’ spirituality is always unified in their relationship with God, fellow human beings, and the universe, expressed in the form of work. Work's interconnectedness, sustainability, and sacredness suggest that work is not merely a transactional activity aimed at economic gain, but is closely related to community well-being and ecological balance. (shrink)

Disagreement holds a central place within standpoint theory, yet its intersection with the debate on peer disagreement has been largely overlooked. Standpoint theory emphasizes the situatedness of knowledge based on social positions – defined by factors such as gender, race, class, and other axes of identity. This fragmentation of knowledge creates a distinct challenge for traditional notions of epistemic peers as it would make epistemic peerhood, especially across identity groups, almost impossible. To accommodate this, I suggest broadening the notion of (...) epistemic peers using a community model of knowledge. Furthermore, I explore the dynamics of peer disagreements when one interlocutor emerges from a marginalized position. In such situations, I contend that the marginalized perspective should be assigned more weight, posing a challenge to both steadfast and equal weight views. This argument culminates in the introduction of ‘Peer-Predominant Conciliationism’, a view suggesting that, under certain circumstances, it is rational to privilege a peer’s perspective over one’s own in peer disagreement. (shrink)

Nietzsche characterizes the sovereign individual using the metaphysical and moral language of free will and responsibility. It is, therefore, unsurprising that this description has sparked significant controversy among Nietzsche’s commentators—particularly in Anglo-American scholarship—as it appears to contradict the vast majority of his positions on these subjects. First, the article presents the two principal currents of interpretation: on one side, commentators who affirm the figure of the sovereign individual as compatible with Nietzsche’s philosophy; on the other, scholars who argue that the (...) passage should be understood as ironic, since it not only contradicts Nietzsche’s steadfast fatalism but also clashes with the central tenets of his philosophy. Second, the article advances a position within this ongoing controversy. In my reading, Nietzsche understands agency as the incorporation of certain attitudes. An agent’s free choice consists only in the decision to transform certain attitudes into instinct, that is, to internalize ideals of conduct in such a way that they can become habits of action. (shrink)

Contemporary AI ethics emphasizes safety, fairness, accountability, and utility, yet often remains value-thin with respect to human flourishing and insufficiently attentive to how AI systems shape cognitive, moral, and relational capacities over time. This paper argues that love should be taken seriously as a foundational ethical principle for artificial intelligence – one that orients evaluation toward purpose, formation, and care rather than harm mitigation alone. Drawing on philosophical and theological traditions, love is understood not as sentiment but as steadfast (...) care for the good of persons as others. On this basis, the paper develops a love-based ethical framework comprising three contributions: a criterion of purpose, a norm of formative protection, and a standard of non-instrumentality. Applied to recommendation systems, generative AI in education, and AI companions, the framework shows how love-based ethics can guide concrete design and governance choices often overlooked in current approaches. (shrink)

This research explores shalom, ḥesed, and tsedaqah as Old Testament theological virtues that shape the moral and spiritual foundations of human flourishing in religious communities. Through an exegetical-theological reading of Psalm 85, Isaiah 32, and Jeremiah 29, this research argues that the Hebrew Scriptures present flourishing not as individual achievement but as covenantal participation in God’s order of love, justice, and peace. Shalom represents the holistic goal of restored life; ḥesed is the relational virtue of faithful love sustaining solidarity; and (...) tsedaqah embodies the structural virtue of justice that orders communal and ecological life. Together, they form an integrated moral ecology—ḥesed as the root of divine faithfulness, tsedaqah as the trunk of justice, and shalom as the fruit of peace. The research concludes that true human flourishing arises not from autonomy or prosperity, but from covenantal relationships grounded in God’s steadfast love, social justice, and peace that embraces all creation. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has shown that the success of Pascal’s wager rests on precarious grounds. To avoid notorious problems, it must appeal to considerations such as what probability we assign to the existence of various gods and what religion we think provides the greatest happiness in this life. Rational judgments concerning these matters are subject to change over time. Some claim that the wager therefore cannot support a steadfast commitment to God. I argue that this conclusion does not follow. By (...) drawing upon the line of reasoning employed in getting married, I explain how unstable considerations can provide a sufficient rational foundation for a stable commitment. (shrink)

In this essay, Quine reflects on his philosophical development, taking a steadfast adherence to extensionalism as a unifying principle of his whole philosophy starting as far back as the 1930s. Quine calls two sentences coextensive if they have the same truth value, two general terms or predicates coextensive if they are true of just the same objects, and two singular terms coextensive if they designate the same object. Extensionalism is the general doctrine that no distinction is clear and philosophical (...) significant if it cannot be captured by differences in extensions. Intensionalism, by contrast, takes distinctions of meaning as irreducible and prior to distinctions of extension. The philosophical origin his extensionalism Quine takes to be his seeing that the intensional ontology of propositional functions not only does no mathematical work in Russell’s and Whitehead’s _Principia Mathematica_, but, in addition, had no clear criteria of individuation. Quine’s doctoral dissertation was thus concerned with reinterpreting the _Principia_ extensionally. Much of the rest of his career consisted of meeting other philosophically significant challenges to extensionalism. The most important challenges discussed in this essay are the idiom of logical implication, predicates of irreferential singular terms, and propositional attitude ascriptions. The two most important strategies for meeting these challenges are the elimination of singular terms via Russell’s theory of descriptions and semantic ascent. (shrink)

The article illuminates the broad audience of problems, bound with specificity of usage of art-technique in activity with children. The historical review of development of representational methods in quality of psychocorrection of the tool is shown. The attention to the necessity is stressed to allow for idiosyncrasies of an inner life of the child in a psychodiagnosis and psychocorrection with the help of art-techniques. Is demonstrated, that verbal interaction and overseeing by behaviour of the child are especially relevant in a (...) course interpretation of children's activities. The steadfast attention is given to specificity of interplay of a psychologist and a child at usage of art-techniques, and also features of application of representational stuffs in activity with children. Key words: art-engineering, art-therapy, representational stuffs, emotional education, emotional formation. (shrink)

After noting the limitations of an ‘Epistemic’ and a ‘Content’ presupposition made in recent analytical philosophy of religion, this chapter argues that philosophy has a core normative interest in religion as making metaphysical posits that support hopeful and steadfast commitment to ethical ideals. The nub of religious faith is held to be practical commitment to the foundational propositions of such religious worldviews. Philosophy, therefore, needs to seek a theory of permissible faith-commitment to putatively revealed truths for use in assessing (...) particular forms of religious commitment. While philosophy cannot construct an ideal religion, it can, this chapter contends, develop our understanding of the cognitive content that religions need to have in order to play the identified ethical role. (shrink)

The debate over targeted killing in this volume begins with a joint introduction by the authors, briefly setting out the terms of discussion, and presenting a short overview of the practice—what is targeted killing, and how has it been used, in which conflicts, and by whom. Following some historical examples, mostly from Israel and the United States, the authors distinguish between contemporary signature strikes and personality strikes, and focus their forthcoming debate on the latter, i.e., named killing. While this book (...) touches on a wide array of issues, e.g., civilian immunity, drones, violation of sovereignty, abuse of government power, etc., the authors urge the reader early on to maintain a steadfast focus on the essence of targeted killing debated throughout, namely, the targeting for death of named and identified individuals by our states and leaders. (shrink)

This paper considers some aspects of the ideology and political legacy of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966), the ‘disowned father of the nation in India’. The essay traces the politics of Savarkar, a Maharashtrian Brahmin, and his steadfast commitment to the project of state-formation and his attempts to bring the unruly, passive, and easily bullied Hindus, as he saw them, to an acceptance of the sacred task of nation-building. In the achievement of this objective, a muscular and modern nation state (...) that would earn the world’s respect, Savarkar would stop at nothing; but in South Asia, the author argues, the violence involved in the crafting of such a nation state still does not enjoy complete legitimacy. Thus, if Savarkar is the unacknowledged father of the nation for some, he also provokes anxieties among other Indians who understand the psychopathic tendencies that he exemplified. Ultimately, however, as Nandy argues, Savarkar is a cipher, the name of a ‘blown-up, grotesque temptation’ inherent in the global South’s encounter with the modern nation state system. (shrink)

Interfaith Friends and Ideological Foes examines the evolution of American Jewish–evangelical relations as it relates to pro-Israel support. It argues that Jewish interfaith partnerships with evangelicals developed as a necessary, adaptive strategy to deal with the shifting American political landscape. As evangelicals moved from a subculture to the mainstream, they appealed to Jewish communal organizations due to their increased influence in American politics and their steadfast defense of Israel. Jewish groups acknowledged—and accepted—a certain amount of ideological inconsistency to secure (...) broad political support for Israel. Without an understanding of this complex history of Jewish–evangelical relations, there is a greater likelihood that one might misread the current political moment. Intensified support for white Christian nationalism, the rise of antisemitism, and debates surrounding Israeli governmental policies have all created a divisive American landscape. This book speaks directly to today’s challenges regarding polarization and the difficulty of coalition-building. Pundits and the public tend to describe the present as an especially divided time in history. Support for Israel, at almost any cost, has shaped the policies of major American Jewish organizations, sometimes leading them to act in profound tension with the views of their constituents and their own long-standing commitments to American democracy and religious pluralism. This evidence therefore upends established claims about Jewish organizations’ commitments to strategies promoting religious pluralism. It also helps to explain how support for Israel has become increasingly associated with the American political right, further underscoring the ongoing, ever-changing dynamics of dialogue and partnership. (shrink)

In his discussion of our idea of time in the Treatise, Hume makes the perplexing claim that unchanging objects cannot be said to endure. While Hume is targeting the Newtonian conception of absolute time, it is not at all clear how his denial that unchanging objects are in time fits with this target. Moreover, Hume diagnoses our belief that unchanging objects endure as the product of a psychological fiction, but his account of this fiction is also riddled with puzzling claims (...) about our experience of unchanging objects. In this paper, we argue that Hume’s claims are a lot less baffling and indeed, much more sophisticated than they appear. We do so by considering his arguments as a response to Locke’s specific approach to the concept of absolute time. (shrink)

Argumentation is often conceived as a rational response to disagreement, even when it does not resolve differences of opinion. Arguing in the face of disagreement has, however, distinctive epistemic effects. Sometimes argumentation achieves convergence of opinion or at least the mutual recognition that a more thorough inquiry is required. But facing disagreement, participants of argumentative exchanges quite often remain steadfast in their initial views or even radicalize them. Can we make sense of these latter situations? To account for their (...) occurrence, it is common to point out that people’s ability to argue is flawed, that an “argumentative culture” is lacking, and that emotional and other non-rational factors often interfere in confrontative situations. But these suggestions do not amount to a thorough satisfactory explanation. In this paper, I provide the outline of a purely epistemic account of these peculiar effects of argumentation in the face of disagreement. I argue that probabilistic models of degrees of confidence (or “credences”) can shed light on the conditions that give rise to several of these effects. This could provide some guidance on how to avoid them. (shrink)

Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or ‘sticking to one's guns’ in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as intellectual (...) humility, courage, grit, and actively open-minded thinking, on the other. We observed positive correlations between measures of conciliationism, intellectual humility, and actively open-minded thinking but failed to find any reliable association between steadfastness, courage, and grit. Our studies reveal that there are at least two important intellectual virtues associated with conciliationist responses to peer disagreement (viz., intellectual humility and actively open-minded thinking) and two vices associated with steadfast responses (intellectual arrogance and myside bias). These findings shed new light on the overall epistemic goodness of the conciliationist perspective. (shrink)

Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or “sticking to one’s guns” in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as intellectual (...) humility, courage, grit, and actively open-minded thinking, on the other. We observed positive correlations between measures of conciliationism, intellectual humility, and actively open-minded thinking but failed to find any reliable association between steadfastness, courage, and grit. Our studies reveal that there are at least two important intellectual virtues associated with conciliationist responses to peer disagreement (viz., intellectual humility and actively open-minded thinking) and two vices associated with steadfast responses (intellectual arrogance and myside bias). These findings shed new light on the overall epistemic goodness of the conciliationist perspective. keywords: disagreement, conciliationism, steadfastness, intellectual humility, courage, actively open-minded thinking. (shrink)

This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing (...) party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast. (shrink)

In the late 1930s Heidegger makes allusions to?the wild? and?the mild? in connection with a human liberation that he understands as a steadfast response to the claim that historical being (Seyn) makes upon us. The following paper elucidates these allusions in terms of the overturning of metaphysics that they entail.

This paper examines religious disagreements between epistemic peers—individuals with equal cognitive capacities—focusing on the two dominant responses: conciliationism and steadfastness. While conciliationism advocates for a moderate attitude towards epistemic peers and revising one’s beliefs in case of disagreement, steadfastness argues that it is rational for an individual to maintain their current beliefs. I argue that conciliationism faces serious epistemic challenges, rendering it an unsustainable position. Building on a novel account of steadfastness, this study contends that retaining one’s belief in religious (...) peer disagreement is rational if the following four conditions are met: (i) the believer’s evidence continues to support their belief within their interpretive and epistemic framework (independent justification); (ii) no genuine defeater undermines the belief either by rebutting it directly or undercutting the reliability of the evidence (absence of genuine defeat); (iii) the believer’s confidence remains above a rational threshold appropriate to the stakes of inquiry (confidence threshold);, and (iv) the believer holds a higher-order judgment affirming that their justification remains at least as strong as their peer’s (meta-belief endorsement). By integrating these conditions, the paper demonstrates that conciliationism (a) has a restrictive effects on religious and philosophical inquiry, (b) is internally inconsistent, (c) carries the risk of widespread epistemic uncertainty by opening the way to skepticism, and finally (d) carries the risk of weakening or even eliminating the function of evidence. Consequently, this study argues that this revised steadfastness framework offers a more defensible and epistemically responsible alternative to conciliationism, preserving the integrity of religious, inquiry while upholding the demands of epistemic rationality. (shrink)

This chapter defends the view that an awareness of the facts of religious disagreement doesn’t make theistic belief irrational. The first section makes some general remarks about when discovering disagreement (on any topic) makes it rational to give up your beliefs. The second section argues that in cases of disagreement about theism, the theist’s evidence for theism and for the reliability of her theistic belief is often strong enough to support steadfastness in the face of disagreement. The third section argues (...) that the theist’s evidence for the reliability of her disputant’s atheistic beliefs is often weak enough to allow her to rationally demote her atheist interlocutor. The final section focuses on theists whose disagreement-based doubts about theism persist. These doubts could result in defeaters for theistic belief, but the gift of faith can compensate for this. (shrink)

There are several proposals to resolve the problem of epistemic peer disagreement which concentrate on the question of how to incorporate evidence of such a disagreement. The main positions in this field are the equal weight view, the steadfast view, and the total evidence view. In this paper we present a new argument in favour of the equal weight view. As we will show, this view results from a general approach of forming epistemic attitudes in an optimal way. By (...) this, the argument for equal weighting can be massively strengthened from reasoning via epistemic indifference to reasoning from optimality. (shrink)

The current debate about disagreement has as rivals those who take the steadfast view and those who affirm conciliationism. Those on the steadfast side maintain that resolute commitment to a belief is reasonable despite peer disagreement. Conciliationists say that peer disagreement necessarily undermines warrant for one’s belief. This article discusses the relevance of open‐mindedness to the matter of peer disagreement. It shows how both the steadfast and the conciliatory perspective are consistent with a robust and substantive display (...) of open‐mindedness. However, it also turns out that there are more ways to display open‐mindedness on the steadfast view than on the conciliatory view. (shrink)

Suppose we learn that we have a poor track record in forming beliefs rationally, or that a brilliant colleague thinks that we believe P irrationally. Does such input require us to revise those beliefs whose rationality is in question? When we gain information suggesting that our beliefs are irrational, we are in one of two general cases. In the first case we made no error, and our beliefs are rational. In that case the input to the contrary is misleading. In (...) the second case we indeed believe irrationally, and our original evidence already requires us to fix our mistake. In that case the input to that effect is normatively superfluous. Thus, we know that information suggesting that our beliefs are irrational is either misleading or superfluous. This, I submit, renders the input incapable of justifying belief revision, despite our not knowing which of the two kinds it is. (shrink)

This paper argues for extreme rational permissivism—the view that agents with identical evidence can rationally believe contradictory hypotheses—and a mild version of steadfastness. Agents can rationally come to different conclusions on the basis of the same evidence because their way of weighing the theoretic virtues may differ substantially. Nevertheless, in the face of disagreement, agents face considerable pressure to reduce their confidence. Indeed, I argue that agents often ought to reduce their confidence in the higher-order propositions that they know or (...) rationally believe disputed content. I argue, however, that when the subject matter is difficult, there is more flexibility for agents to simultaneously believe that p while withholding belief about whether such belief is rational or known. This allows for modest steadfastness on hard questions in, e.g., philosophy and religion. (shrink)