Silence can be a communicative act. Tanesini (2018) demonstrates how “eloquent” silences can virtuously indicate resistance and dissent; in this paper, I outline one way silence can also be used viciously to cause discursive harm, specifically by slurring victims. By distinguishing between eloquent and “signaling” silences (two kinds of what I call “performative” silences), I show how “slurring” silences — fully quiet discursive moves that signal one's commitment to a slurring perspective — function in a manner that illuminates (...) the pragmatic topography of conversational silence in general. (shrink)

Silencing is usually explained in terms of conventionalism about the nature of speech acts. More recently, theorists have tried to develop intentionalist theories of the phenomenon. I argue, however, that if intentionalists are to accommodate the conventionalists' main insight, namely that silencing can be so extreme as to render certain types of speech act completely unavailable to victims, they must take two assumptions on board. First, it must be possible that speakers' communicative intentions are opaque to the speakers themselves. Secondly, (...) it needs to be assumed that structural oppression can have hidden psychological effects on its victims. Since both assumptions can be motivated independently, I argue that silencing can be fully understood without appealing to linguistic conventions. (shrink)

Theories of assertion must explain how silencing is possible. This chapter defends an account of assertion in terms of normative commitments on the grounds that it provides the most plausible analysis of how individuals might be silenced when attempting to make assertions. The chapter first offers an account of the nature of silencing and defends the view that it can occur even in contexts where speakers’ communicative intentions are understood by their audience. Second, it outlines some of the normative commitments (...) characteristic of assertion when used in the speech act of telling;. This commitment view of assertion is then used to explain silencing as a matter of being deprived of the ability to make some of the commitments one is trying to acquire. Finally, the main rivals of the commitment view of assertion endorsed here are shown to be unable to account for silencing, at least when they are considered in their purest form. (shrink)

Various philosophers discuss perlocutionary silencing, but none defend an account of perlocutionary silencing. This gap may exist because perlocutionary success depends on extralinguistic effects, whereas silencing interrupts speech, leaving theorists to rely on extemporary accounts when they discuss perlocutionary silencing. Consequently, scholars assume perlocutionary silencing occurs but neglect to explain how perlocutionary silencing harms speakers as speakers. In relation to that shortcoming, I defend a novel account of perlocutionary silencing. I argue that speakers experience perlocutionary silencing when they are illegitimately (...) deprived of perlocutionary influence on a conversation in which they are active participants, where perlocutionary influence on the conversation relates to speech-related perlocutionary goals meant to influence the conversation or conversational direction. Thus, this account grounds perlocutionary silencing in linguistic phenomena and characterizes perlocutionary silencing in a way that explains why those who experience perlocutionary silencing are harmed as speakers. Moreover, this account explains how perlocutionary silencing harms speakers as conversational participants in a way that cannot be captured by illocutionary or locutionary silencing, for a speaker may be perlocutionarily silenced despite illocutionary success. Consequently, the account explains why “All Lives Matter” silences Black Lives Matter and “Not All Men” silences women sharing experiences of sexual harassment. (shrink)

Instances of epistemic injustice elicit resistance, anger, despair, frustration or cognate emotional responses from their victims. This sort of response to the epistemic injustices that accompanied historical systems of oppression such as colonialism, for example, is normal. However, if their victims have internalised these oppressive situations, we could get the counterintuitive response of appreciation. In this paper, I argue for the phenomenon of appreciative silencing to make sense of instances like this. This is a form of epistemic silencing that happens (...) when the accepted hegemonic intuitions of the oppressed are formed/influenced by the ideologies of the oppressors over time. Here, we have a resilient, oppressive and hegemonic epistemic system. Put together, it creates a variant of epistemic injustice and silencing that is obscure since its victims are neither resistant nor aware of the injustice they face but are appreciative. (shrink)

There is a view abroad on which perceptual experience has representational content in this sense: in it something is represented to the perceiver as so. On the view, a perceptual experience has a face value at which it may be taken, or which may be rejected. This paper argues that that view is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so. In that sense, the senses are silent, or, in (...) Austin's term, dumb. Perceptual experience is not as such either veridical or delusive. It may mislead, but it does not take representation to accomplish that. (shrink)

_Silence in Philosophy, Literature, and Art_ demonstrates how silence as a form of indirect discourse provides us with access to hitherto inaccessible aspects of human experience.

This paper is concerned with the phenomenon that has been labeled 'silencing' in some of the recent philosophical literature. A speaker who is silenced in this sense is unable to make herself understood, even though her audience hears every word she utters. For instance, consider a woman who says “No”, intending to refuse sex. Her audience fails to recognize her intention to refuse, because he thinks that women tend to be insincere, and to not say what they really mean, especially (...) in sexual situations. This speaker’s utterance then goes astray in the manner that constitutes silencing in my sense. Regarding this phenomenon, philosophers such as Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby have argued, first, that women are particularly liable to be thus affected, i.e., silenced; second, that, as a result of this silencing, they are systematically disadvantaged; and third, that pornography is responsible for this silencing. Here, I focus on the third of these claims, explaining what it might mean for silencing to be systematic. (shrink)

Despite the relevance of silence in several psychopathologies, first-person perspectives on silence have been largely neglected in the phenomenological scholarship on those conditions. This paper proposes a phenomenological framework for addressing this neglect and demonstrates its usefulness through a case study of empty silence, an experience which can be found in many first-person accounts of depression. The paper begins by surveying research on silence in depression in mental health research and phenomenological psychopathology. Drawing on the thought (...) of Merleau-Ponty, it then outlines a phenomenological framework for explicating the structure of silence experiences in psychopathology. Finally, it applies this framework to articulate the experiential structure and implications of empty silence, with a particular emphasis on the bodily doubt that can flow from repeated experiences of empty silence. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer a map of the dynamics through which pornography may silence women’s illocutions. Drawing on Searle’s speech act theory, I will take illocutionary forces as sets of conditions for success. The different types of silencing, I claim, originate from the hearer’s missed recognition of a specific component of the force of the speaker’s act. In addition to the varieties already discussed in literature (which I label essential, authority, and sincerity silencing), I shall (...) finally consider another kind of silencing produced by the failure to acknowledge the speaker’s words as serious (seriousness silencing). (shrink)

Silence has been a relatively neglected phenomenon despite its significance in psychiatric research. Acknowledging this oversight, there has been a recent move towards systematically describing the first-personal experience of silence in mental disorders within the field of philosophy of psychiatry. This paper contributes to this research effort by highlighting the underexplored interpersonal aspect of silence crucial for both psychopathological and therapeutic research. More specifically, I develop the interpersonal aspect of distressing silence associated with depression, recently coined (...) as ‘empty silence’. Complementing its original analysis, I argue that this distressing silence not only involves the loss of linguistic agency but also the loss of social agency. Having established this claim, I situate it within the wider research context and open an ethical dimension to the current analysis. I explore this by identifying a therapeutic silence others can establish for an individual undergoing a severe depressive episode. I provisionally term it ‘undemanding silence’ and argue that this form of silence can help restore the loss of social agency by providing a distinct form of social affordance that depressed individuals can easily realise at their own pace. (shrink)

It seems plausible that visual experiences of darkness have perceptual phenomenal content that clearly differentiates them from absences of visual experiences. I argue, relying on psychological results concerning auditory attention, that the analogous claim is true about auditory experiences of silence. More specifically, I propose that experiences of silence present empty spatial directions like ‘right’ or ‘left’, and so have egocentric spatial content. Furthermore, I claim that such content is genuinely auditory and phenomenal in the sense that one (...) can, in principle, recognize that one is experiencing silence. This position is far from obvious, as the majority of theories concerning silence perception do not ascribe perceptual phenomenal content to experiences of silence. (shrink)

Silence sometimes constitutes moral complicity. We see this when protestors take to the streets against racial injustice. Think of signs with the words: “Silence is complicity.” We see this in instances of sexual harassment, when we learn that many knew and said nothing. We see this in cases of wrongdoing within a company or organization, when it becomes clear that many were aware of the negligent or criminal activity and stayed silent. In cases like this we consider agents (...) morally complicit in virtue of their silence. Flagrant injustices cry out for action, and sometimes remaining silent amounts to complicity in those injustices. What philosophy owes us is an account of how it could be that silence constitutes complicity. In this paper I argue that one possibility is an account grounded in problematic deliberative contribution. The core idea of “deliberative complicity,” as I call it, is that agents have moral duties concerning the moral deliberation of other agents, and failures in these duties can amount to moral complicity. For example, an agent aware that a colleague is sexually harassing his students has a deliberative obligation to report the misconduct, and their silence in failing to report constitutes a failure to fulfill their deliberative obligation, a failure that grounds their moral complicity in the harassment. If my argument is successful, it provides a distinctive reason to prefer a deliberative account of moral complicity: it can capture cases of silent complicity that other views of moral complicity cannot. And further, by turning our attention toward our interpersonal deliberative obligations, a deliberative account of complicity can incorporate helpful resources from recent work in social epistemology and speech act theory as we set out to determine when and why silence amounts to complicity. And when it does, we cannot stay silent. We must speak. (shrink)

When a newspaper systematically omits a relevant causal explanation, it does not merely fail to inform — it performs an illocutionary act. Drawing on Austin's speech act theory and Grice's cooperative principle, this paper argues that the systematic press silence on structural drivers of urban violence in Guayaquil, Ecuador (2025) constitutes an act of structural erasure: a communicative action that produces a distorted public understanding of violence causation with real perlocutionary effects on policy, investment, and citizen perception. We provide (...) the first empirical, quantitative evidence for this claim at scale. Using four Large Language Models (LLMs) to score 31 press sources (16 local Spanish-language, 15 international English-language) across eight structural causal conditions, and applying Neutrosophic fsQCA (N-fsQCA) to compute illocutionary consistency and indeterminacy, we find that five of eight structural drivers are systematically under-represented in the press relative to a validated structural baseline: weapons trafficking (gap=-0.444), extortion (gap=-0.345), prison linkages (gap=-0.340), drug routes (gap=-0.290), and economic pressure (gap=-0.214). Crucially, this silence is not random: it is patterned, stable across 31 sources and 4 LLMs, and exhibits a local/international asymmetry that reveals two distinct illocutionary communities enacting different acts of erasure about the same referential reality. We term this empirical pragmatics of violent silence: the systematic, measurable breach of Gricean maxims in press accounts of urban violence. (shrink)

The notion of ‘illocutionary silencing’ has been given a key role in defining the harms of pornography by several feminist philosophers. Though the literature on silencing focuses almost exclusively on the speech act of sexual refusal, oddly enough, it lacks a thorough analysis of that very act. My first aim is to fill this theoretical gap. I claim that refusals are “second-turn illocutions”: they cannot be accomplished in absence of a previous interrogative (or open) call by the hearer. Furthermore, I (...) maintain that refusals constitute authoritative illocutions only when preceded by requests for permission. The secondary goal of my paper is to assess Mary Kate McGowan’s (2009) account of silencing as authority denial. Despite its virtues, I argue that ultimately it should be rejected on two grounds: (i) it entails an objectification of female sexuality; (ii) if sexual advances are requests for permission (as McGowan implies), a man who asks a woman for sex cannot fail to ratify her authority over her own body. I conclude by sketching an alternative explanation for the failure of women’s refusals, according to which women may be unable to refuse sex for their interlocutors’ advances are intended as imperative (or closed) calls. (shrink)

This paper identifies three claims that feature prominently in recent discussions concerning the experience of silence: that experiences of silence are the most “negative” of perceptions, that we do not hear silences because those silences cause our experiences of silence, and that to hear silence is to hear a temporal region devoid of sound. The principal proponents of this approach are Phillips and Soteriou, and here I present a series of objections to common elements of their (...) attempts to place these three claims within an account of experience of silence. The final section of the paper returns to the first of the three claims and argues that, in fact, there is no good reason to accept it as initially formulated. However, when properly formulated, the claim ceases to offer support for Phillips’s and Soteriou’s approach to experience of silence. (shrink)

“To hear silence is to find stillness in the midst of the restlessness that makes creative life possible and the inescapability of death acceptable.” So writes Mark C. Taylor in his latest book, a philosophy of silence for our nervous, chattering age. How do we find silence—and more importantly, how do we understand it—amid the incessant buzz of the networks that enmesh us? Have we forgotten how to listen to each other, to recognize the virtues of modesty (...) and reticence, and to appreciate the resonance of silence? Are we less prepared than ever for the ultimate silence that awaits us all? Taylor wants us to pause long enough to hear what is not said and to attend to what remains unsayable. In his account, our way to hearing silence is, paradoxically, to see it. He explores the many variations of silence by considering the work of leading modern and postmodern visual artists, including Barnett Newman, Ad Reinhardt, James Turrell, and Anish Kapoor. Developing the insights of philosophers, theologians, writers, and composers, Taylor weaves a rich narrative modeled on the Stations of the Cross. His chapter titles suggest our positions toward silence: Without. Before. From. Beyond. Against. Within. Between. Toward. Around. With. In. Recasting Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit and Kierkegaard’s stages on life’s way, Taylor translates the traditional Via Dolorosa into a Nietzschean Via Jubilosa that affirms light in the midst of darkness. Seeing Silence is a thoughtful meditation that invites readers to linger long enough to see silence, and, in this way, perhaps to hear once again the wordless Word that once was named “God.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Silence is often considered under the sign of repression or oppression, and as such, the result of forces hostile to democracy. In this paper we will try to demystify that unilateral image of silence, reviving the dialectic between silence and democracy in which the former operates as a foundational precondition for exchanges in the democratic public spheres. An increased awareness of the structures of silence will help us reflect upon what remains external to ongoing public (...) discourses. Through a reading of Deleuze, Foucault, Derrida and Heidegger, it will be shown that understanding silence not as the passive negative of speaking, but as an active form of reflection, will help us become aware of what is pre-emptively excluded from discursive exchanges. It is argued that an awareness of this kind of silence can help us reflect upon the structures of public discourses. (shrink)

In ‘Conversational Pressure. Normativity in Speech Exchanges’ (2020), Sanford Goldberg discusses the significance of conversational silence, arguing that, absent certain defeating conditions, we have a general entitlement to assume that somebody who remains silent in a conversation doesn't reject what was said. Call this ‘No‐Silent‐Rejection’ (NSR). I reconsider Goldberg's account of conversational silence by arguing that silence cannot be explained via a universal claim like NSR: I show that there are at least some examples where, absent defeating (...) conditions, silence doesn't communicate assent—argue that my account of silent conversational implicature can meet and better capture the complexity of silences. (shrink)

Who is recognised as a philosopher and what counts as philosophy influence both the content of a philosophical education and academic philosophy’s continuing demographic skew. The “philosophical who” and the “philosophical what” themselves are a partial function of matters that have been passed over in collective silence, even if that now feels to some like a silence belonging to the distant past. This paper discusses some philosophical silences regarding race, gender, and disability in the context of reflection on (...) philosophical education and on philosophical practice in the public sphere. It focuses on Charles Mills’ writings on race, Susan Babbitt’s on race and gender, and on more collaboratively-generated work on eugenics and disability. (shrink)

Silence et sagesse montre combien les innombrables expériences et ascèses du silence, à travers la littérature ou les arts aussi bien que la philosophie ou la théologie, ont contribué à la constitution de la culture des hommes et de leur hominisation, au-delà ou en deça du logos et de son primat.

Silence, Implicite et Non-Dit chez Rousseau/Silence, the Implicit, and the Unspoken in Rousseau prend acte d'un grand nombre de publications ayant trait à l'analyse par Rousseau des langues et du langage, de la parole par rapport à l'écriture, de la voix (y compris la voix de la nature). Mais ce volume se consacre tout particulièrement au fonctionnement et aux effets du silence, de l'implicite et du non-dit dans la pensée de Rousseau. Son approche est à la fois (...) polyvalente et cohérente, et ses réflexions sur le silence sont associées à d'autres préoccupations esthétiques, politiques, et morales de son œuvre. Silence, Implicite et Non-Dit chez Rousseau/Silence, the Implicit, and the Unspoken in Rousseau capitalizes on a great number of publications dealing with Rousseau's analysis of languages and language, speech versus writing, of voice (including the voice of nature). But this volume is particularly dedicated to the study of the functioning and the effects of silence, the implicit and the unspoken in Rousseau's thought. His approach is both polyvalent and consistent, and his reflections on silence are associated with other aesthetic, political, and moral concerns in his work. (shrink)

Treats time, eternity, language, and silence in an original way.

Pornography deserves special protections, it is often said, because it qualifies as speech. Therefore, no matter what we think of its content, we must afford it the protections that we extend to most speech, but don’t extend to other actions.1 In response, Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton have argued that the case is not so simple: one of the harms of pornography, they claim, is that it silences women’s speech, thereby preventing women from deriving from speech the very benefits that (...) warranted the special protections in the first place.2 At first glance, it is hard to see how to make sense of this response. If the claim is that pornography prevents women from actually uttering words, then it just seems false; on the other hand, if that isn’t the claim, then it isn’t clear how anyone can be said to be silenced. Faced with such worries, many have been inclined to dismiss these claims about silencing as confused. (shrink)

In this provocative analysis of historical narrative, Michel-Rolph Trouillot demonstrates how power operates, often invisibly, at all stages in the making of history to silence certain voices. From the West's failure to acknowledge the Haitian Revolution, the most successful slave revolt in history, to the continued debate over denials of the Holocaust, and the meaning of Columbus's arrival in the Americas, Trouillot shows us that history is not simply the recording of facts and events, but a process of actively (...) enforced silences, some unconscious, others quite deliberate. (shrink)

Perhaps one of the most pervasive behaviours in organisations is individual silence. Although individual silence may be triggered by various motives, prior research has predominantly discussed individual silence from the dark side. Thus, individual silence has been viewed as a dysfunctional and antisocial workplace behaviour. In this article, we take a bright perspective by incorporating virtues into the discussion of individual silence. Specifically, we propose the concept of virtuous silence to capture individuals' inclination to (...) remain silent in order to feel, think, and act in ways that contribute to the common good within the organisation. Additionally, virtuous silence contains the following key characteristics: 1) it is driven by an individual's natural propensity for righteousness and collective prosperity; 2) it is a dyadic behaviour; 3) it is a communicative behaviour that focuses on engaging oneself and others in deeper thinking and reasoning. Theoretical contributions and managerial implications are discussed. (shrink)

In an overlooked section of his influential book What We Owe to Each Other Thomas Scanlon advances an argument against the desire-model of practical reasoning. In Scanlon’s view the model gives a distorted picture of the structure of our practical thinking. His idea is that there is an alternative to the “weighing behavior” of reasons, a particular way in which reasons can relate to each other. This phenomenon, which the paper calls “silencing”, is not something that the desire-model can accommodate, (...) or so Scanlon argues. The paper first presents and interprets Scanlon’s challenge. After this, the paper argues, through the examination of three responses, that Scanlon is right in claiming that the model cannot accommodate the phenomenon as he describes it. However, the paper further argues that there is no need to accept Scanlon’s depiction of silencing: advocates of the model can give an alternative account of what happens in cases of silencing that is just as plausible as Scanlon’s own. Scanlon’s challenge is thus, the paper concludes, illegitimate. (shrink)

Silence often plays a significant role in Christian experience and practice. However, the varieties of silence and the effects of silence for good and. bad merit examination. It is important to distinguish between physical, auditory, and metaphorical silence, and bet- ween experiencing silence as "quiet" and experiencing silence as keeping quiet . Silence can be an instrumental good as well as an expressive good, a concomitant good, or a constitutive good. Christian monks, theologians, (...) and other thinkers sometimes identify experiences of silence, for example, as light or dark, as spatially vast or enclosed, and as temporal or atemporal. Practices of silence can bring persons closer to God, though a kenotic spirituality; of silence and a stress on solitude create perils for some members of religious orders, such as Carthusians. The chief aim of this article is to show, with philosophical techniques, how silence .can be good in manifold ways and even, perhaps, an ideal. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the contemporary philosophical literature, ideal virtue is often accused of setting a standard more appropriate for saints or gods than for human beings. In this paper, I undermine divinity-infused depictions of the fully virtuous, and argue that ideal virtue is, indeed, human. I focus on the virtuous person’s imperviousness to temptation, and contend that this imperviousness is not as psychologically implausible as it might seem. I argue that it is a virtuous person’s subjective construal of a situation that (...) silences reasons in favour of acting contrary to virtue. That silencing, however, is not the whole story when it comes to their practical reasoning. Practical reasoning can, and often does, continue beyond silencing, particularly in the search for what Bernard Williams calls ‘constitutive solutions’. The upshot is a view of the virtuous as less god-like and more human—who will sometimes have to figure out what the virtuous response to a situation is, and who can still care deeply about the central concerns of human existence, including their life, health, loved ones, and life projects, even if those things will never provide them with a reason to act contrary to virtue. (shrink)

Gareth Evans famously affirmed an explanatory connection between answering the question whether p and knowing whether one believes that p. This is commonly interpreted in terms of the idea that judging that p constitutes an adequate basis for the belief that one believes that p. This paper formulates and defends an alternative, more modest interpretation, which develops from the suggestion that one can know that one believes that p in judging that p.

In this paper, the author attempts to make explicit certain of the key variables that underlie the wide variety of positions which have been offered in answer to the question posed by the title of the paper. Several positions are reviewed briefly, ranging from Bertrand Russell’s to Jasper’s to Milton Meyer’s to Thoreau’s. These are then considered as a group in terms of possible systems of values which traditionally have formed the basis for condemnations or defenses of political and social (...) silence, of marginal commitment, or of individual nonparticipation or complicity. The author does not hope to settle the issue, but rather to increase our sensitivity to it, and to its complexity. (shrink)

In a paper published in 1992, Dennis Kurzon shows that silence does not necessarily mean lack of power: the silent response to a question may well be aiming at gaining control of a situation, viz. exercising power. I would like to extend Kurzon's analysis and argue that at times silence may mean derision or ridicule.

This open-access editorial discusses confronting silences in different disciplinary contexts, such as science and technology studies, cultural anthropology, and philosophy. It has a focus on race and concludes with thoughts about Indigenous expertise, the Australian referendum on the Indigenous Voice, to parliament, and racism.

Silence in organizations refers to a state in which employees refrain from calling attention to issues at work such as illegal or immoral practices or developments that violate personal, moral, or legal standards. While Morrison and Milliken (Acad Manag Rev 25:706–725, 2000) discussed how organizational silence as a top-down organizational level phenomenon can cause employees to remain silent, a bottom-up perspective—that is, how employee motives contribute to the occurrence and maintenance of silence in organizations—has not yet been (...) given much research attention. In this paper, we argue that this perspective is a meaningful complementation of the existing literature and that it is sensible to conceptualize distinct forms of employee silence (Pinder and Harlos, Research in personnel and human resources management. JAI Press, Greenwich, 2001; van Dyne et al., J Manag Stud 40:1359–1392, 2003). Drawing on past research and theory we conceptualize four forms of employee silence, namely quiescent, acquiescent, prosocial, and opportunistic silence. We present scales to assess the four forms and provide empirical tests for their distinctiveness and patterns of relationships to various correlates and potential antecedents and consequences. (shrink)

In the course of demarcating the senses, Aristotle defined sound in _De Anima_ as the proper object of hearing: ‘sight has colour, hearing sound, and taste flavour’ (II.6, 418b13). Sound cannot be seen, tasted, smelled, or felt. And nothing other than sound can be directly heard. All subsequent commentators agree, often characterizing the principle as an analytic truth. This chapter argues that there is a single exception. We hear silence, which is the absence of sounds. Silence cannot be (...) seen, tasted, smelled, or felt. It can only be heard. It is argued that hearing silence is the successful perception of the absence of a sound, not the failure to hear a sound. (shrink)

The commodification of silence responding to a disturbing environment is integrated in the growing attention economy. This paper suggests that the idea of silence embedded in these products preclude fruitful understandings of—and interventions in—theproblematics they address, and it proposes Cage’s silence as a more efficacious model for understanding our problems with a disturbing environment, and a better practice for intervening in it. Informed by Yves Citton’s ecology of attention the paper argues that Cage’s silence centers the (...) interplay of attention, subjectivity and intentionality, as it takes play between us and the background, which to some extent produces us. And finally, it suggests that the Cagean practice of paying attention to this background is what Citton calls a “micropolitics of attention”, because it reveals the background as a battleground. (shrink)

It has been argued in the literature on hate speech and subordination theory that even ordinary hate speakers who are not “figures of authority” in the conventional sense can possess the power or authority to subordinate (rank as inferior, deny rights and powers, or legitimate discrimination against) the targets of their hate speech in virtue of the fact that when witnesses to the hate speech remain silent they “license” or grant authority to the hate speaker. A typical example is when (...) a hate speaker targets a victim on public transport and other passengers remain silent. The aim of this chapter is to examine the extent to which this account of licensing is applicable to online hate speech or cyberhate. More generally, the chapter explores whether the potentially distinctive nature of online communication changes the meaning of silence such that it becomes difficult to interpret silence in cyberspace as acquiescence, licensing, or complicity. (shrink)

Silence in organizations refers to a state in which employees refrain from calling attention to issues at work such as illegal or immoral practices or developments that violate personal, moral, or legal standards. While Morrison and Milliken (Acad Manag Rev 25:706–725, 2000) discussed how organizational silence as a top-down organizational level phenomenon can cause employees to remain silent, a bottom-up perspective—that is, how employee motives contribute to the occurrence and maintenance of silence in organizations—has not yet been (...) given much research attention. In this paper, we argue that this perspective is a meaningful complementation of the existing literature and that it is sensible to conceptualize distinct forms of employee silence (Pinder and Harlos, Research in personnel and human resources management. JAI Press, Greenwich, 2001; van Dyne et al., J Manag Stud 40:1359–1392, 2003). Drawing on past research and theory we conceptualize four forms of employee silence, namely quiescent, acquiescent, prosocial, and opportunistic silence. We present scales to assess the four forms and provide empirical tests for their distinctiveness and patterns of relationships to various correlates and potential antecedents and consequences. (shrink)

How silence relates to politics has traditionally been connected to the dismissal of silence from politics. However, there is a growing recognition that this representation of silence as absence is harmful to our ability to think through the integral and productive role that silences play in political life. This book exchange contributes to this shift in theorising that emerges from the field of ‘silence studies’. To this end, the following exchange between Michael Freeden and Mónica Brito (...) Vieira regarding their recent books on the politics of silence looks at how each author specifically engages with how and in what ways silence relates to politics. In bringing these authors together not only is clarity given to why silence(s) should be a research concern, but also to the issues of how and to what end silence can or should be researched. (shrink)

Comment le silence agit-il au cinéma? Qu'est-ce qui permet d'identifier ce phénomène? Implique-t-il la disparition intégrale de la matière sonore ou seulement sa minimalisation à l'intérieur d'un film? Son intervention, ponctuelle ou durable, tend à engager une raréfaction, voire une suppression, des paroles et de la musique, mais pas forcément de tout bruit. Des lieux particulièrement silencieux, ainsi que le mutisme ou la surdité d'un personnage, sont également propices à l'instauration de telles situations audiovisuelles. Cet ouvrage analyse, à travers (...) une approche généalogique et herméneutique, la présence du silence dans le cinéma contemporain sur le double principe d'héritages figuratifs et de ruptures discursives. Il s'appuie sur un corpus de films réalisés entre autres par Robert Bresson, Marguerite Duras, Andrei Tarkovski, Theo Angelopoulos, Tsaï Ming-liang, Béla Tarr, Pedro Costa ou Sharunas Bartas. Au-delà des considérations esthétiques, le livre interroge aussi les valeurs anthropologiques, morales, sociales et/ou politiques qui se glissent derrière ces manifestations concrètes du silence. Celui-ci nous invite, tant sur le plan éthique que sensible, à repenser notre rapport fondamental au monde."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Pornography silences women, or so claims Catharine MacKinnon. Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton have partially defended this silencing claim by identifying one type of silencing; it involves systematic interference with women’s communicative capabilities. This chapter identifies three more types of silencing by identifying other types of communicative interference that pornography might bring about. There are many ways for pornography (or its consumption) to bring about these types of silencing. This chapter distinguishes between merely causing silencing and constituting it. For each (...) of the four types of silencing discussed, the chapter identifies ways in which pornography (or its consumption) might cause that type of silencing and identifies ways in which pornography (or its consumption) might constitute that type of silencing. By identifying all of these ways in which pornography could silence women, MacKinnon’s provocative silencing claim is further supported. (shrink)

Some speakers have their linguistic agency unfairly restricted. Here I explore one way in which silencing can be countered. Instead of individual speakers, I focus on group political action, a strategy successfully employed by feminist movements. I argue that protests have the power to update our normative landscape and, in particular, to amend silencing linguistic practices. To this aim, I apply the presupposition framework introduced by Langton and West, as well as Langton’s view on blocking and counterspeech, to the analysis (...) of feminist movements. In this framework, silencing is the result of the presence of silencing presuppositions. I then argue that some feminist slogans can be understood as blocking silencing presuppositions and therefore promoting more just linguistic practices. Importantly, collective speakers can avoid some of the problems that individual speakers face in their attempts to undo silencing. (shrink)

This article examines silence and stillness as central aesthetic strategies in contemporary slow cinema, exploring their capacity to evoke contemplation, resist narrative acceleration, and offer alternative temporal experiences in an era of media saturation. Drawing on Paul Schrader’s theory of transcendental style, with its progression from everyday realism to decisive stasis (2018), Ira Jaffe’s conceptualization of slow movies as an existential counter to the spectacle-driven “cinema of action” through curtailed motion and spatiotemporal vacancy (2014), and Tiago de Luca and (...) Nuno Barradas Jorge’s plural, global framing of slow cinema’s challenge to instrumentalized time (2016), the study employs a transcultural comparative approach. Through the interpretive lens of Emersonian Transcendentalism, American filmmakers Terrence Malick, Paul Schrader, and Kelly Reichardt deploy silence as a site of individual spiritual trial, ethical introspection, and quotidian transcendence amid modern alienation. In contrast, guided by Daoist aesthetics, Chinese directors Jia Zhangke, Wong Kar-wai, and Bi Gan utilize stillness, long takes, and minimal dialogue to foreground emptiness (xu), non-action (wuwei), and relational flux, integrating human experience with environmental and temporal processes. By placing these practices in dialogue, the article argues that silence and stillness operate as transcultural strategies that converge in their defiance of contemporary hyper-acceleration while remaining rooted in distinct philosophical horizons—Emersonian self-reliance versus Daoist interdependence—thus broadening slow and transcendental cinema scholarship toward a more inclusive global perspective. (shrink)

Statistics reveal that women who show aptitude for philosophy nevertheless abandon study or work in this field at markedly higher rates than men. They fall silent, as it were, when they might have been expected to go on speaking. Why? This paper explores the hypothesis that philosophical speech acts performed by women are systematically liable to turn out ‘unhappily’ due to the effect of unexamined, prejudical presuppositions that work to undermine their success. This approach to the silencing of women is (...) adapted from the work of Rae Langton and Caroline West (1999) who draw upon J.L Austin’s theory of performative speech acts, and David Lewis’ analysis of language games. I also consider Judith Butler’s position on how best to combat injurious speech, and advocate an alternative approach inspired in part by the teaching of an early Buddhist nun. (shrink)

This book investigates silence as a normal, ubiquitous and indispensable element of political thinking, theory, and language. It explores the diverse dimensions in which silences mould the different core features of the political-by summoning-up finality, by contributing to rendering support for communities or withholding it, by processing consent or dissent, by the manner in which it secures continuities or generates ruptures, and by its role in shaping national time, public memory and collective identity. Not least, silence is a (...) highly flexible power resource, both enabling and constraining major social practices, traditions, and currents. The emphasis of this study is primarily on the concealed, unintentional, and unrecognized ways through which silence pervades socio-political life, departing from the typical focus on intentional silencing and the dominance of logos. Instead, silence adopts the guises of the unspeakable, the ineffable, the inarticulable, and the unconceptualizable. En route, silence is juxtaposed with stillness, absence contrasted with lack, agency set against undetected conventions, and the veiled paired with the wondrous. Drawing extensively from historical, philosophical, anthropological, psychoanalytical, theological, linguistic, and literary viewpoints, the book demonstrates the common threads that connect silences to those different disciplines, alongside the features that pull them asunder. In extracting and decoding their political implications, it explores both academic literature and colloquial, everyday discourse. Selected case-studies elaborating the overall analysis include topics such as Buddhist nondualism, Locke's tacit consent, the submerging of historical narratives, state neutrality, Pinter's miscommunications and menace, and the separate ways ideologies integrate silence into their beliefs. (shrink)

Employee silence refers to a conscious decision made by an employee to remain silent. Scholarship in management and organization studies has mainly researched employee silence as a barrier to management excellence. Scholarship on employee silence is carried out mainly within the disciplines of psychology and sociology. There is a lack of philosophical inquiry into employee silence, both in organization studies as well as in philosophy of management. This paper provides a philosophical inquiry into employee silence (...) through the metaphysical understandings of self and life from a particular philosophical tradition, namely the Indian epic of Ramayana. The paper discusses how three major themes in the Ramayana provide a normative foundation for silence: dharma, forgiveness, and the father figure. Whilst the extant literature on employee silence conceptualizes the driving forces in terms of negative immediate relational impacts, our inquiry in this paper suggests how metaphysical understandings of self and life can cast silence as morally correct behavior instead of moral failure. (shrink)

The silence of the mind is the heart’s dialogue with God. A peaceful mind resides in a peaceful heart, communicating with God through “unspeakable words,” as the Apostle Paul affirms. This paper explores the connection among actions, words, and silence as depicted in Saint Gregory the Theologian’s Twelfth Homily, aiming to understand what he describes as 'the silence of the mind,' a result of spiritual insight and an expression of contemplative prayer.