This article considers the question ‘What makes hope rational?’ We take Adrienne Martin’s recent incorporation analysis of hope as representative of a tradition that views the rationality of hope as a matter of instrumental reasons. Against this tradition, we argue that an important subset of hope, ‘fundamental hope’, is not governed by instrumental rationality. Rather, people have reason to endorse or reject such hope in virtue of the contribution of the relevant attitudes to the integrity of their practical identity, which (...) makes the relevant hope not instrumentally but intrinsically valuable. This argument also allows for a new analysis of the reasons people have to abandon hope and for a better understanding of non-fundamental, ‘prosaic’ hopes. (shrink)

The language of hope is a ubiquitous part of political life, but its value is increasingly contested. While there is an emerging debate about hope in political philosophy, an assessment of the prevalent scepticism about its role in political practice is still outstanding. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of historical and recent treatments of hope in political philosophy and to indicate lines of further research. We argue that even though political philosophy can draw on recent (...) analyses of hope in analytic philosophy, there are distinct challenges for an account of hope in political contexts. Examples such as racial injustice or climate change show the need for a systematic normative account that is sensitive to the unavoidability of hope in politics as much as its characteristic dangers. (shrink)

I argue for a novel answer to the question “What is hope?”. On my view, rather than aiming for a compound account, i.e. analysing hope in terms of desire and belief, we should understand hope as an irreducible concept. After criticizing influential compound accounts of hope, I discuss Segal and Textor's alternative of describing hope as a primitive mental state. While Segal and Textor argue that available developments of the standard definition do not offer sufficient conditions for hope, I question (...) the deep‐seated idea that desire and belief are even necessary conditions for hope. My suggestion is that we should take seriously the fact that we hope in a great variety of ways and should question the search for elements that are common to all cases. A promising alternative follows the Wittgensteinian idea that cases of hope are related in terms of family resemblance, i.e. are multiply realizable on the ontological level while falling under the non‐definable concept of hope. (shrink)

The notion of hope is of central importance to Kant’s conception of human reason, in particular to his account of the highest good and the related ‘postulates’ of God and immortality. This becomes most obvious when, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously summarizes ‘all interest’ of human reason in three questions: ‘What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?’ (A805/B833). This contribution concentrates on Kant’s answer to the question ‘What may I hope?’ and (...) thus the role of hope in Kant’s account of human reason. After giving a brief account of what hope is, according to Kant, and what exactly he means by the question ‘What may I hope?’ in §2, the chapter turns to Kant’s answer in §3. It clarifies the relation between the highest good and the postulate of God’s existence (3.1) and argues that belief in God is what makes hope for morally deserved happiness rational (3.2). It then provides an account of the psychological role played by hope (3.3) and explains why Kant takes the hope question to be central to the interest of human reason. The chapter closes in §4 by indicating open questions and further lines of research. (shrink)

That we can hope is one of the capacities that define us as human beings. To hope means not just to have beliefs about what will happen, but to imagine the future as potentially fulfilling some of our most important wishes. It is therefore not surprising that hope has received attention by philosophers, psychologists and by religious thinkers throughout the ages. The contributions in this volume, written by leading scholars in the philosophy of hope, gives a systematic overview over the (...) philosophical history of hope, about contemporary debates and about the role of hope in our collective life. (shrink)

Joseph Raz holds that, whereas a commander in issuing her command intends to impose an obligation on the commandee, a requester in making her request purports to create a pro tanto reason for the requestee through her act of request. Chapter 2 uses a series of examples to develop a set of “formal constraints on the concept of request” and then uses these constraints to argue that Raz’s account of request does justice to neither the relation between requester and requestee (...) nor to that between a requester and her own request. The chapter then marshals elements from Kant’s ethics and Elizabeth Anscombe’s work on testimony in order to articulate an alternative conception of the normative structure of request, one according to which request should be understood in terms of a principle obligating requester and requestee to jointly harmonize their ends. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Studie erschließt erstmals umfassendden Zurechnungsbegriff in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ein Zurechnungsurteil bringt zum Ausdruck, dass eine Handlung auf den freien Willen einer bestimmten Person zurückgeführt wird. Zurechnung ist ein zentraler Begriff des Rechts und von grundlegender Bedeutung für unsere alltägliche Praxis, wenn wir andere Personen loben, tadeln oder dankbar sind. Eine fundamentale Relevanz des Zurechnungsbegriffs zeigt die Autorin auch für Kants praktische Philosophie auf. Ausgehend von Kants Definition des Zurechnungsbegriffs in der Metaphysik der Sitten wird deutlich, wie Zurechnung (...) mit anderen zentralen Begriffen von Kants Handlungs- und Moraltheorie verknüpft ist: sowohl für die Auflösung der Freiheitsantinomie als auch für den Begriff der Person als freiem, moralischem Subjekt und Träger eines Gewissens ist Zurechnung ein Schlüsselbegriff. Am Leitfaden des Zurechnungsbegriffs entsteht ein differenziertes Bild der praktischen Philosophie Kants, das diese auch aus heutiger Sicht attraktiv und tragfähig erscheinen lässt. In systematischer Hinsicht schlägt die Arbeit einen Bogen zu aktuellen Debatten und zeigt, dass Kants Theorie in zentralen Punkten anschlussfähig ist. (shrink)

Development economists have suggested that the hopes of the poor are a relevant factor in overcoming poverty. I argue that Kant’s approach to hope provides an important complement to the economists’ perspective. A Kantian account of hope emphasizes the need for the rationality of hope and thereby guards against problematic aspects of the economists’ discourse on hope. Section 1 introduces recent work on hope in development economics. Section 2 clarifies Kant’s question “What may I hope?” and presents the outlines of (...) his answer. Crucially, hope is rational if it is rational to trust in the structures of reality on which the realization of one’s hope depends. Section 3 argues that central tenets of Kant’s account of what makes hope rational can be applied to the context of poverty. It becomes apparent that the poor often have good reason to be hopeless since they may not trust fundamental structures that are necessary for realizing their hope. Thus, the insight that the poor need more hope must go hand in hand with a commitment to establishing trustworthy political structures, such that their hope can be rational. Section 4 highlights the relevance of the secular highest good for a better understanding of the justification and scope of our duties to the poor in a Kantian framework. (shrink)

The independence of research is a key strategic issue of modern societies. Dealing with it appropriately poses legal, economic, political, social and cultural problems for society, which have been studied by the corresponding disciplines and are increasingly the subject of reflexive discourses of scientific communities. Unfortunately, problems of independence are usually framed in disciplinary contexts without due consideration of other perspectives’ relevance or possible contributions. To overcome these limitations, we review disciplinary perspectives and findings on the independence of research and (...) identify interdisciplinary prospects that could inform a research programme. (shrink)

It has been argued that Kants actions. However, it would be uncompromising to allow for only two possibilities: either full responsibility or none. Moreover, in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant himself claims that there can be degrees of responsibility, depending on the magnitude of the obstacles that have to be overcome when acting. I will show that this claim is consistent with Kant’s theory as a whole and thereby make transparent how degrees of responsibility are possible for Kant. The solution (...) is based on the distinction between two senses of responsibility: taking oneself to be an accountable person is an all-or-nothing affair, whereas praise- or blameworthiness for a particular action can still be a matter of degree. (shrink)

The contributions in this volume, written by leading scholars in the philosophy of hope, gives a systematic overview over the philosophical history of hope, about contemporary debates and about the role of hope in our collective life.

This article proposes a Kantian account of our reasons to forgive that situates our moral fallibility as their ultimate ground. I explore similarities and differences between Kant’s account in the Doctrine of Virtue and the more recent account offered by Garrard and McNaughton, 39–60, 2003). After tracing the connection between moral fallibility and moral luck, I discuss Kant’s argument for a duty to be forgiving. Kant’s strategy yields a plausible account of the normative status of forgiveness: Although we generally have (...) a moral reason to forgive others, forgiveness is not required in every case of wrongdoing. Kant’s argument is based on the assumption that we are all in need of forgiveness, the nature of which I go on to explain. Forgiveness has the power to relieve us of a burden that results from moral failure, which grounds both its standing as a duty and its importance in the lives of fallible moral agents. (shrink)

With this special issue, we would like to promote research on changes in the funding of the sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Since funding secures the livelihood of researchers and the means to do research, it is an indispensable condition for almost all research; as funding arrangements are undergoing dramatic changes, we think it timely to renew the science studies community’s efforts to understand the funding of research. Changes in the governance of science have garnered considerable attention from science studies (...) and higher education research; however, the impact of these changes on the conduct and content of research has not received sufficient attention, and theoretical insights into the connections between funding practices and research practices are few and far between. The aim of this special issue is to contribute to our theoretical understanding of the changing nature of research funding and its impact on the production of scientific knowledge. More specifically, we are interested in the interplay between funding and research practices: What is the impact of institutionalised funding arrangements on the production of scientific knowledge? (shrink)

This article discusses whether it is rational and valuable to have hope in the face of the climate crisis. The aim is to explore a distinctive Kantian perspective characterized by three main elements. First, hope is not seen primarily as a means of sustaining action, but action is viewed as a condition for rational hope. Second, the value of certain ‘fundamental’ hopes is not merely instrumental but derives from their constitutive role in our practical identity. Here, I focus on Kantian (...) hope in the compatibility of our fundamental ends, happiness and morality. Third, the rationality of such a hope presupposes trust – in particular, trust that our conceptions of morality and the good life are sufficiently flexible to adapt to drastically new circumstances. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the attempts by science studies to identify epistemic effects of new governance instruments have largely failed. I suggest two main reasons for this failure. The first reason is that neither quantitative nor qualitative studies of effects of governance instruments meet the respective methodological standards for establishing causality. While much of this could be repaired, the second reason is more severe: given the complex causal web between governance and knowledge production and the multi-level nature of (...) causation, a strategy that starts from a particular governance instrument and tries to identify its effects cannot work. I propose to reverse this strategy by starting from the observation of epistemic change and applying a strategy of “causal reconstruction” (Mayntz), which identifies the causes of this epistemic change and among them the contribution by governance. This approach has the advantage of starting from well-identified change. Challenges posed by the new approach include the empirical identification of epistemic change and the need to integrate sociological methods in science policy studies. (shrink)

Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia contains one of the earliest and best-known criticisms of John Rawls’s theory of justice in general and the difference principle in particular. The discussion of Nozick’s critique of Rawls in the literature has focused on his argument against “patterned” conceptions of justice, of which the difference principle as Nozick understands it constitutes merely one version among others. In this article I consider the objection Nozick raises against the difference principle specifically, namely that it unfairly (...) favors the “worse endowed” over the “better endowed” members of society. I argue that Nozick’s charge of unfairness against the difference principle is ambiguous between two distinct interpretations of the difference principle and as such divides into two distinct objections, the pre-cooperative and the cooperative fairness objection. I then argue that neither of these two interpretations of the difference principle represents the actual, Rawlsian difference principle accurately and that, more fundamentally, Nozick lacks the concept of politics as the distinctive moral category implicitly at work in Rawls’s theory of justice. Not as much of Nozick’s charge of unfairness against the difference principle therefore remains on reflection as may have appeared at first sight. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to suggest that a necessary condition of autonomy has not been sufficiently recognized in the literature: the capacity to critically reflect on one’s practical attitudes (desires, preferences, values, etc.) in the light of new experiences. It will be argued that most prominent accounts of autonomy—ahistorical as well as history-sensitive—have either altogether failed to recognize this condition or at least failed to give an explicit account of it.

One of the few points of consensus in the Kantian literature is that Kant’s Moral Law is binding universally and unconditionally. Hence, the Moral Law is binding for all human agents (universally) irrespective of the agents’ particular interests (unconditionally). Whether or not we intend to act on the Moral Law, this is the law we ought to follow. Beyond this point of consensus, however, even the most important details are matters of controversy. What exactly does the Moral Law require of (...) us? What, if anything, grounds its bindingness? In particular, does Kant argue that the Moral Law is binding because it is ‘self-legislated’? What is the relation between the Moral Law (supreme principle of morality) and substantive moral laws such as the law that we ought to promote the happiness of others? What does Kant mean by his claim that the will has autonomy? In the four articles discussed in this special issue, Kleingeld proposes novel answers to these questions. This introduction presents the articles and brings to the fore the larger theme tying them all together. (shrink)

Menschen bedürfen des Zeugnisses der Anderen, um sich zu vergewissern, was und wer sie sind oder was und wozu sie denken, reden und handeln – soweit eine gemeinhin unstrittige These. Doch gilt dies auch für die Zeug*innenschaft an Orten und in Momenten, in denen Menschen Opfer von extremem Unrecht, massiver Gewalt, Hass oder Diskriminierung werden? Lässt sich das Unsagbare eigentlich bezeugen? Matthias Käser plädiert mithilfe interdisziplinärer Zeug*innenschaftsdiskurse gegen das Unbeschreibliche und für das Ethos des Erzählens. Er zeigt auf, dass Erfahrungen (...) um der Betroffenen willen versuchsweise bezeugt werden müssen – so gebrochen oder lückenhaft sie auch sein mögen. (shrink)

The central question of this article is what hope contributes to a good life. The starting point is the assumption that living a good life involves having a good relation to the past, present and future. Hope is a central attitude towards the future that contributes, I argue, to having an own future. I distinguish three ways in which there is reference to an "own future" and thus different ways in which hope contributes to the good life. Finally, I discuss (...) the objection that hope is detrimental to a good life precisely because of its reference to the future, insofar as a good life essentially takes place "in the present". (shrink)

Defeasibility, most generally speaking, means that given some set of conditions A, something else B will hold, unless or until defeating conditions C apply. While the term was introduced into philosophy by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in 1949, today, the concept of defeasibility is employed in many different areas of philosophy. This volume for the first time brings together contributions on defeasibility from epistemology, legal philosophy and ethics and the philosophy of action. The volume ends with an extensive bibliography.

When feminists speak about sexuality, they sometimes refer to social and political power structure, sometimes to procreation, others speak about pleasure practices or subcultures and even others refer to questions of identity. Taking the example of the body, these disparities in feminist thought regarding sexuality become even more evident. In this chapter I would like to retrace some of the ways in which the body has been thought of in feminist theories on sexuality, discussing first the body in feminist struggles (...) with psychoanalysis. Second, I will address the ways in which the feminist sex wars brought the topic of pleasure back into feminist views on sexuality and gender and, third, I would like to present more recent perspectives on the sexual body including the questions of race and of validity. Can we still find revolutionary potential in our sexual and desiring bodies today? (shrink)

Auf den ersten Blick besteht eine enge und positive Beziehung zwischen Hoffnung und Utopie: Utopien können Hoffnungen wecken und Hoffnungen können Utopien inspirieren. Je nachdem, was man unter ‚Hoffnung’ und ‚Utopie’ genauer versteht, ist die Beziehung jedoch komplexer. In diesem Beitrag werden in einem ersten Abschnitt historische philosophische und theologische Positionen zur Hoffnung dargestellt. Dabei geht es um die Klassifikation der Hoffnung (als Tugend oder Emotion), um die Frage ihrer Vernünftigkeit und um ihr Verhältnis zum Handeln. Der zweite Abschnitt stellt (...) verschiedene Auffassungen von Utopie vor, wobei ein engerer Begriff – Utopie als moderne Gattung spezifisch politischen Denkens – von einem weiteren Begriff – Utopie als anthropologische Konstante, Bewusstseinsform oder Intention – unterschieden wird. (shrink)

1. In the opening chapter of his arresting book on Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of international and cosmopolitan right, Kant and the Law of War,1 Arthur Ripstein presents Kant’s position as a respon...

In view of the increasing social and economic inequality in recent decades, both globally and locally, more and more attempts are being made in political philosophy to understand social structures not only in terms of their symbolic and idealistic constitution, but also in the light of their underlying political-economic foundations. However, the concepts of materialism used in these works, especially in feminist thought over the last ten years, have caused much confusion due to their different meanings, especially when they are (...) considered transnationally. This article discusses the numerous publications on materialism in feminist and queer thought and situates them in their respective contexts of origin. Their analysis is then placed in a broader context of philosophical debates on materialism in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics at play but also in order to better grasp the contributions of feminist and queer thought to the philosophical study of materialism. (shrink)

Die Analyse von R. M. Rilkes »Atmen« (Sonette an Orpheus) zeichnet einen Begriff von Rhythmus nach, der das Gedicht als exemplarischen Beitrag zur Rhythmusdebatte um 1900 lesbar macht. Das Sonett wird zum Ausgangspunkt von Überlegungen zur Logik von zeitgenössischen Rhythmuskonzepten: Indem das Gedicht genau die neuen Raummodelle aufruft, die Wissenschaften und Kunst der Jahrhundertwende entwerfen, läßt es einen modernen Rhythmusbegriff denkbar werden. Zugleich stellt das Sonett die zentrale Frage nach poetischer Repräsentation unter den Bedingungen jener rhythmischen Räume.

Kant holds that transcendental freedom of the will—“a faculty of absolutely beginning a state, and hence also a series of consequences”—is a necessary condition for moral imputation. The question of whether we are really free is a vexed issue. In this contribution, I pursue two aims: On the one hand, I provide an account of how, according to Kant, theoretical and practical reason work together in a way that allows us to affirm that we are free. On the other hand, (...) I bring Kant’s position into contact with the contemporary debate and defend Kant’s decidedly practical justification of freedom against objections. (shrink)