For more than two decades political scientists have discussed rising elite polarization in the United States, but the study of mass polarization did not receive comparable attention until fairly recently. This article surveys the literature on mass polarization. It begins with a discussion of the concept of polarization, then moves to a critical consideration of different kinds of evidence that have been used to study polarization, concluding that much of the evidence presents problems of inference that render conclusions problematic. The (...) most direct evidence‚Äîcitizens’ positions on public policy issues‚Äîshows little or no indication of increased mass polarization over the past two to three decades. Party sorting‚Äîan increased correlation between policy views and partisan identification‚Äîclearly has occurred, although the extent has sometimes been exaggerated. Geographic polarization‚Äîthe hypothesized tendency of like-minded people to cluster together‚Äîremains an open question. To date, there is no conclusive evidence that elite polarization has stimulated voters to polarize, on the one hand, or withdraw from politics, on the other. (shrink)

"What culture war? Abortion, gay marriage, school prayer, gun control. Is the nation really polarized on these hot-button moral, religious, and cultural issues? Should we believe the media pundits and politicians who tell us that Americans are deeply divided? No, says Morris Fiorina. At a time when the rift between the "red" and the "blue" states can seem deeper than ever, Fiorina debunks the assumption that Americans are deeply split over national issues. He presents quite a contrary picture -- that (...) most Americans stand in the middle of the political landscape and are in general agreement even on those issues thought to be most divisive. Poking holes in the concept of a "culture war," Fiorina explains that the majority of Americans are both moderate and tolerant, and that their greatest concerns are leadership and security, not moral values. Fiorina supports this position with newly released data from the 2004 election and a variety of other recent surveys. According to Fiorina, the view of a divided America is simply false. By recognizing our common ground, we have a basis for creating a more unified and moderate approach to government and politics in the near future."--. (shrink)

People are able to take advantage of statistical regularities in scenes, using those regularities to bias their attention to the likely locations of items of interest. People also seem able to learn object-centered statistical regularities—for example, that the top of an object is the most likely target location. We show here that such regularities transfer to new spatial locations even in the absence of any explicit object and hence may not be truly object centered. Additionally, when transfer is measured on (...) a new object with a new shape—the transfer is substantially reduced. The findings suggest that statistical information about likely target locations can be encoded in a configuration-based reference frame that is sensitive to the context established by the objects in the scene. The results lead to a new interpretation of earlier findings and have important implications for understanding the coordinate systems in which attentional priorities are represented. (shrink)

This research investigated whether sequence effects, or facilitation from two consecutive trials that share incongruency, reduce taboo interference during speech production. Participants named pictures accompanied by distractor words that were congruent with (i.e. identical to) or incongruent with (different from) the name of the picture. Incongruent distractors also varied in emotion (taboo or neutral). Similar to pictures with incongruent-neutral distractors, pictures with incongruent-taboo distractors were named faster when preceded by a trial with an incongruent-neutral distractor relative to a congruent-neutral distractor. (...) These results demonstrate that robust taboo interference can be reduced through adjustments to attentional control. However, naming on incongruent-taboo trials did not differ as a function of whether the preceding incongruent trial’s emotion was taboo or neutral, suggesting limitations in attentional mechanisms beyond those employed to control incongruency. Implications of these findings for attentional control accounts of sequence effects are discussed. (shrink)

Restorative practice was first introduced to higher education as an alternative to traditional disciplinary processes. While this philosophical shift in student conduct was beneficial to the field, one unintended consequence has been restorative processes have become, in the minds of many in higher education, indelibly tied to specific offices and practitioners responsible for discipline. Restorative practice as a set of principles and processes has the most impact when supported as foundational to the work of the institution as a whole. We (...) envision a higher education environment that emphasizes restorative practice as a comprehensive, proactive, and preventive approach to building and maintaining campus community as well as developing a healthy and productive approach to conflict resolution. To this end, we invite practitioners across the field of higher education to shift how restorative practice is implemented in four specific ways: from primarily responsive to primarily proactive; from an individual to a collective focus; from a compartmentalized to a comprehensive approach; and from a singular learning experience to an immersive learning experience. (shrink)

The process of learning a new language can be filled with many emotions, both positive and negative, for the learner. This is particularly true in the area of writing, where students may feel a close connection to their sense of self. Thus far, the foreign language teaching profession has tended to prioritize cognition over emotion in research and classroom practice, with limited attention paid to the role of emotions in language learning. Recently, however, scholars, influenced by psychology, have taken a (...) more active look at how emotions might mediate language learning. Among these scholars, Rebecca Oxford proposed a model that integrates tenets of positive psychology and second language learning, which she has designated as EMPATHICS. This nine-component model examines emotions/empathy, meaning/motivation, perseverance, agency/autonomy, time, hardiness/habits of mind, intelligences, characteristics, and self-factors. In this paper, we apply the EMPATHICS model to teaching second language writing and offer suggestions for task design at different stages of the writing process. While many second language teachers already incorporate some aspects of positive psychology in their classroom, becoming explicitly aware of its potential to foster better learning outcomes behooves us all. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses Edmund Husserl's concept of the ‘life-world’, found in his Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. We argue that Husserl's phenomenology fails to consider the social and material arrangements that allow subjectivity to emerge in our shared world. We begin by outlining the concept as formulated in Husserl’s Crisis. We then entertain Husserl’s critique by his most famous student, Martin Heidegger. We suggest a reformulation of intersubjectivity, along the lines of Heidegger’s mitdasein, accounts for subjectivity as (...) it emerges in the shared world. Next, we introduce ethnomethodology, pioneered by Harold Garfinkel, which gives sociological support to this argument. Through the ethnomethodological disability studies of A.B. Robillard, we argue that the life-world is not always as democratic as Husserl's philosophy may suggest. This shows the necessity of disability politics. We end by asking what a phenomenology sensitive to this fact might look like, in terms of both disability studies and phenomenological philosophy more generally. (shrink)

The perception of separation between school and home/community is related to diminished achievement in school and lack of motivation to learn STEM subjects. The National Council of Educational Research and Training is among many research organisations that have strongly recommended that schools bridge the disconnect between school-based knowledge and learners’ everyday knowledge. We designed the SPIRALS curriculum to bridge this gap between formal science and students’ everyday lives. SPIRALS helps students explore community-based practices to learn about science, environmental sustainability and (...) systems thinking. We implemented the SPIRALS curriculum in a private, urban, English medium school in Western India with approximately 315 students and their four teachers, 214 of whom also participated in the research from which our conclusions are drawn. Our findings about program impacts rely upon analysis of interviews with teachers and students, as well as student work, and conference participation assessment surveys distributed after a capstone experience at which students present their work. This chapter describes our findings about how students learned science, environmental sustainability, and systems thinking through engagement with community-based practices. We also discuss the process of how the SPIRALS approach worked in India and how it could be expanded into a broader learning model across different socio-cultural contexts within India. (shrink)

Legal precedent, professional‐society statements, and even many medical ethicists agree that some situations may call for a clinician to engage in an act of lying or nonlying deception of a patient or patient's family member. Still, the moral terrain of clinical deception is largely uncharted, and when it comes to practical guidance for clinicians, many might think that ethicists offer nothing more than the rule never to deceive. This guidance is insufficient to meet the real‐world demands of clinical practice, and (...) this article endeavors to articulate a framework to help clinicians better navigate the ethics of clinical deceit. The framework articulates four morally relevant dimensions of a potential deceptive act that should be examined to better determine the moral justification that might be required: the target of the act, the nature of the information, the nature of the act, and the context of the act. (shrink)

Moral pluralism poses a foundational problem for secular clinical ethics: How can ethical dilemmas be resolved in a context where there is disagreement not only on particular cases, but further, on...

Public bioethics aims to provide moral guidance on questions of public policy, research, and clinical ethics. However, Alasdair MacIntyre famously opened his seminal work, _After Virtue_, with a ‘disquieting suggestion’ that contemporary moral language is in such a state of disorder that securing authoritative moral guidance will not be possible. In _Ethics After Babel,_ Jeffrey Stout responds to MacIntyre’s pessimistic description of contemporary moral discourse by developing the idea of _moral bricolage_, which involves taking stock of the ethical questions that (...) need answering, the available conceptual resources at hand from a variety of traditions (e.g., philosophies, theologies, law), and then reworking them to create a solution. In this essay, we draw upon MacIntyre’s insight about tradition and Stout’s metaphor of moral bricolage to argue that _some_ works of bioethical consensus are appropriately described as works of moral bricolage that, when analyzed, reveal theoretical insights about an emerging tradition of secular bioethics. (shrink)

_Shusterman’s Somaesthetics_ is a wide-ranging collection of penetrating essays by twelve scholars examining in rich detail the many dimensions of philosopher Richard Shusterman’s pragmatism and somaesthetics, complemented by his own chapter of responses to these scholars.

Bioethicists aim to provide moral guidance in policy, research, and clinical contexts using methods of moral analysis (e.g., principlism, casuistry, and narrative ethics) that aim to satisfy the constraints of public reason. Among other objections, some critics have argued that public reason lacks the moral content needed to resolve bioethical controversies because discursive reason simply cannot justify any substantive moral claims in a pluralistic society. In this paper, the authors defend public reason from this criticism by showing that it contains (...) sufficient content to address one of the perennial controversies in bioethics—the permissibility and limits of clinician conscientious objection. They develop a “reasonability view” grounded in public reason and apply it to some recent examples of conscientious objection. (shrink)

I describe a realist, ontologically objective interpretation of probability, "far-flung frequency (FFF) mechanistic probability". FFF mechanistic probability is defined in terms of facts about the causal structure of devices and certain sets of frequencies in the actual world. Though defined partly in terms of frequencies, FFF mechanistic probability avoids many drawbacks of well-known frequency theories and helps causally explain stable frequencies, which will usually be close to the values of mechanistic probabilities. I also argue that it's a virtue rather than (...) a failing of FFF mechanistic probability that it does not define single-case chances, and compare some aspects of my interpretation to a recent interpretation proposed by Strevens. (shrink)

Background on probability and evolution -- Laying the foundation. Population-environment systems ; Causal probability and empirical practice ; Irrelevance of fitness as a causal property of token organisms ; Roles of environmental variation in selection -- Reconstructing evolution and chance. Populations in biological practice: Pragmatic yet real ; Real causation in pragmatic population-environment systems ; Fitness concepts in measurement and modeling ; Chance in population-environment systems ; The input measure problem for MM-CCS chance -- Conclusion.

Organisms' environments are thought to play a fundamental role in determining their fitness and hence in natural selection. Existing intuitive conceptions of environment are sufficient for biological practice. I argue, however, that attempts to produce a general characterization of fitness and natural selection are incomplete without the help of general conceptions of what conditions are included in the environment. Thus there is a "problem of the reference environment"—more particularly, problems of specifying principles which pick out those environmental conditions which determine (...) fitness. I distinguish various reference environment problems and propose solutions to some of them. While there has been a limited amount of work on problems concerning what I call "subenvironments", there appears to be no earlier work on problems of what I call the "whole environment". The first solution I propose for a whole environment problem specifies the overall environment for natural selection on a set of biological types present in a population over a specified period of time. The second specifies an environment relevant to extinction of types in a population; this kind of environment is especially relevant to certain kinds of long-term evolution. (shrink)

In a forthcoming book titled The Emerging Tradition of Bioethics, we take up Parker’s timely question, ‘How should the role(s) of bioethics be understood in the context of a world of intense value conflict and polarisation?’. Specifically, we focus on whether the field of bioethics in the pluralistic and increasingly polarised American context can give justified moral guidance in foundational, clinical, research and public health domains.

One controversy about the existence of so called evolutionary forces such as natural selection and random genetic drift concerns the sense in which such “forces” can be said to interact. In this paper I explain how natural selection and random drift can interact. In particular, I show how population-level probabilities can be derived from individual-level probabilities, and explain the sense in which natural selection and drift are embodied in these population-level probabilities. I argue that whatever causal character the individual-level probabilities (...) have is then shared by the population-level probabilities, and that natural selection and random drift then have that same causal character. Moreover, natural selection and drift can then be viewed as two aspects of probability distributions over frequencies in populations of organisms. My characterization of population-level probabilities is largely neutral about what interpretation of probability is required, allowing my approach to support various positions on biological probabilities, including those which give biological probabilities one or another sort of causal character. ‡This paper has benefited from feedback on and discussions of this and earlier work. I want to thank André Ariew, Matt Barker, Lindley Darden, Patrick Forber, Nancy Hall, Mohan Matthen, Samir Okasha, Jeremy Pober, Robert Richardson, Alex Rosenberg, Eric Seidel, Denis Walsh, and Bill Wimsatt. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, HB 414A, 900 13th Street South, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

The rich moral diversity of academic bioethics poses a paradox for the practice of giving moral recommendations in secular clinical ethics: How are ethicists to provide moral guidance in a pluralistic society? The field has responded to this challenge with a “procedural approach,” but defining this term stirs debate. Some have championed a contentless proceduralism, where ethicists work only to help negotiate resolutions among stakeholders without making any moral recommendations. Others have defended a moral proceduralism by claiming that ethicists should (...) make moral recommendations that are grounded in bioethical consensus (e.g., relevant law, policy, professional consensus statements, and bioethics literature), which is secured using moral principles such as respect for persons or justice. In contrast, we develop a moral–metaphysical proceduralism by identifying many metaphysical commitments in points of secular bioethical consensus. The moral–metaphysical view of secular clinical ethics is important because it challenges the discipline to accept the substantive philosophical foundations required to support giving moral recommendations in a pluralistic context, which may lead to further insights about the nature of the field. (shrink)

Abstract“Conscientious provision” refers to situations in which clinicians wish to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments prohibited within their (usually Catholic) health care institutions. It mirrors “conscientious objection,” which refers to situations in which clinicians refuse to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments offered within their (usually secular) health care institutions. Conscientious provision is not protected by law, but conscientious objection is. In practice, this asymmetry privileges conservative religious or moral values (usually associated with objection) over secular moral values (usually (...) associated with provision). In this article, we first argue for a legal right to one kind of conscientious provision: referral for procedures prohibited at Catholic hospitals. We then argue that a premise in that argument—the principle of comparably trivial institutional burdens—justifies legal protections for some additional forms of conscientious provision that include, for example, writing prescriptions for contraception or medical abortions. However, this principle cannot justify legal protections for other forms of conscientious provision, for instance, the right to perform surgical abortions or gender-affirming hysterectomies at Catholic hospitals. (shrink)

What is the proper role of a clinical ethics consultant’s religious beliefs in forming recommendations for clinical ethics consultation? Where Janet Malek has argued that religious belief should have no influence on the formation of a CEC’s recommendations, Clint Parker has argued a CEC should freely appeal to all their background beliefs, including religious beliefs, in formulating their recommendations. In this paper, I critique both their views by arguing the position envisioned by Malek puts the CEC too far from religion (...) and the position envisioned by Parker puts the CEC too close. For a CEC to give recommendations about what is morally prohibited, permissible, or obligatory in the clinic, I propose a view of the CEC that is neither religious nor non-religious but quasi-religious. I argue that a quasi-religious approach avoids the problems of both religious and non-religious views while preserving their benefits. Additionally, a quasi-religious view resists the marginalization of “religious” traditions that occurs when secular ethicists come to think of their approach as somehow distinctly non-religious. (shrink)

This paper reports of a case where a physician conscientiously objected to prescribing PrEP to a bisexual patient so as not to “enable immoral sexual behavior.” The case represents an instance of conscience creep, a phenomenon whereby clinicians invoke conscientious objection in sometimes objectionable ways that extend beyond the traditional contexts of abortion, sterilization, or physician aid in dying. This essay uses a reasonability view of conscientious objection to argue that the above case represents a discriminatory instance of conscience creep (...) that should not be permitted. (shrink)

It has been argued that biological fitness cannot be defined as expected number of offspring in all contexts. Some authors argue that fitness therefore merely satisfies a common schema or that no unified mathematical characterization of fitness is possible. I argue that comparative fitness must be relativized to an evolutionary effect; thus relativized, fitness can be given a unitary mathematical characterization in terms of probabilities of producing offspring and other effects. Such fitnesses will sometimes be defined in terms of probabilities (...) of effects occurring over the long term, but these probabilities nevertheless concern effects occurring over the short term. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, HB 414A, 900 13th Street South, Birmingham, AL 35294‐1260; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

In the debate over clinicians’ conscience, there is a greater ethical, legal, and scholarly focus on negative, rather than positive, claims of conscience. This asymmetry produces a seemingly unjustified double standard with respect to clinicians’ conscience under the law. For example, a Roman Catholic physician working at a secular institution may refuse to provide physician-aid-in-dying on the basis of conscience, but a secular physician working at a Roman Catholic institution may not insist on providing physician-aid-in-dying on the basis of conscience. (...) This article outlines arguments against this asymmetry and critiques them for failing to distinguish between positive claims of conscience as positive or negative rights. I suggest the asymmetry debate should be focused on whether positive claims of conscience as positive rights ought to enjoy the same protections as negative claims of conscience. Clarifying the debate in this way helps elucidate some of the best reasons for the asymmetry, which these arguments have not addressed. This article does not take a definitive position on whether the asymmetry is justified, but attempts to bring some focus to the debate by directing arguments against the asymmetry to address the significant differences between positive claims of conscience as positive rights and negative claims of conscience. (shrink)

Musing for Puncta special issue on "Critically Sick: New Phenomenologies Of Illness, Madness, And Disability.".

The award-winning author of The Spell of the Sensuous presents a cautionary assessment of human involvement in the natural world that celebrates nature's sensuous qualities while revealing how consciousness is a ubiquitous part of the biosphere.

Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content (e.g. beliefs.

Douglas Diekema has argued that it is not the best interest standard, but the harm principle that serves as the moral basis for ethicists, clinicians, and the courts to trigger state intervention to limit parental authority in the clinic. Diekema claims the harm principle is especially effective in justifying state intervention in cases of religiously motivated medical neglect in pediatrics involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists. I argue that Diekema has not articulated a harm principle that is capable of justifying (...) state intervention in these cases. Where disagreements over appropriate care are tethered to metaphysical disagreements, it is moral-metaphysical standards, rather than merely moral standards, that are needed to provide substantive guidance. I provide a discussion of Diekema’s harm principle to the broader end of highlighting an inconsistency between the theory and practice of secular bioethics when overriding religiously based medical decisions. In a secular state, ethicists, clinicians, and the courts are purportedly neutral with respect to moral-metaphysical positions, especially regarding those claims considered to be religious. However, the practice of overriding religiously based parental requests requires doffing the mantle of neutrality. In the search for a meaningful standard by which to override religiously based parental requests in pediatrics, bioethicists cannot avoid some minimal metaphysical commitments. To resolve this inconsistency, bioethicists must either begin permitting religiously based requests, even at the cost of children’s lives, or admit that at least some moral-metaphysical disputes can be rationally adjudicated. (shrink)

In the essay “‘Please baptize my son’: The Case against Baptizing a Dying, Unconscious Atheist,” in the same issue of this journal, Tate Shepherd and Michael Redinger describe a case in which a clinical ethicist is consulted when a mother requests that someone from the hospital's spiritual care services baptize her dying, unconscious, atheist adult son. The mother's request produces a moral conflict between providing emotional benefits to the patient's mother from seeing her son baptized at the end of his (...) life and a concern about inflicting dignitary harm on the patient by violating a preference related to a deeply held belief. In this essay, we argue that, in these tragic circumstances, some atheists would be agreeable to being baptized to bring some measure of emotional comfort to their family. We suggest that the clinical ethicist should not respond with a categorical rejection of this possibility but take time with the family to reflect on whether there are good reasons to conclude that the patient would have been receptive to his mother's request. (shrink)

BackgroundThe purpose of this study is to make a philosophical argument against the phenomenological critique of standardization in clinical ethics. We used the context of clinical ethics in Saudi Arabia to demonstrate the importance of credentialing clinical ethicists.MethodsPhilosophical methods of argumentation and conceptual analysis were used.ResultsWe found the phenomenological critique of standardization to be flawed because it relies on a series of false dichotomies.ConclusionsWe concluded that the phenomenological framing of the credentialing debate relies upon two extreme views to be navigated (...) between, not chosen among, in the credentialing of clinical ethicists. (shrink)

Recent debate on the nature of probabilities in evolutionary biology has focused largely on the propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF), which defines fitness in terms of a conception of probability known as “propensity”. However, proponents of this conception of fitness have misconceived the role of probability in the constitution of fitness. First, discussions of probability and fitness have almost always focused on organism effect probability, the probability that an organism and its environment cause effects. I argue that much of the (...) probability relevant to fitness must be organism circumstance probability, the probability that an organism encounters particular, detailed circumstances within an environment, circumstances which are not the organism’s effects. Second, I argue in favor of the view that organism effect propensities either don’t exist or are not part of the basis of fitness, because they usually have values close to 0 or 1. More generally, I try to show that it is possible to develop a clearer conception of the role of probability in biological processes than earlier discussions have allowed. (shrink)

In a recent issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, several scholars wrote on the topic of ethics expertise in clinical ethics consultation. The articles in this issue exemplified what we consider to be two troubling trends in the quest to articulate a unique expertise for clinical ethicists. The first trend, exemplified in the work of Lisa Rasmussen, is an attempt to define a role for clinical ethicists that denies they have ethics expertise. Rasmussen cites the dependence of ethical (...) expertise on irresolvable meta-ethical debates as the reason for this move. We argue against this deflationary strategy because it ends up smuggling in meta-ethical assumptions it claims to avoid. Specifically, we critique Rasmussen’s distinction between the ethical and normative features of clinical ethics cases. The second trend, exemplified in the work of Dien Ho, also attempts to avoid meta-ethics. However, unlike Rasmussen, Ho tries to articulate a notion of ethics expertise that does not rely upon meta-ethics. Specifically, we critique Ho’s attempts to explain how clinical ethicists can resolve moral disputes using what he calls the “Default Principle” and “arguments by parity.” We show that these strategies do not work unless those with the moral disagreement already share certain meta-ethical assumptions. Ultimately, we argue that the two trends of attempting to avoid meta-ethics by denying that clinical ethicists have ethics expertise, and attempting to articulate how ethics expertise can be used to resolve disputes without meta-ethics both fail because they do not, in fact, avoid doing meta-ethics. We conclude that these trends detract from what clinical ethics consultation was founded to do and ought to still be doing—provide moral guidance, which requires ethics expertise, and engagement with meta-ethics. To speak of ethicists without ethics expertise leaves their role in the clinic dangerously unclear and unjustified. (shrink)

Ecologists and environmental theorists have paid little attention to our direct, sensory experience of the enveloping world. In this paper I discuss the importance of such experience for ecological philosophy. Merleau-Ponty’s careful phenomenology of perceptual experience shows perception to be an inherently creative, participatory activity-a sort of conversation, carried on underneath our spoken discourse, between the living body and its world. His later work discloses the character of language itself as a medium born of the body’s participation with a world (...) experienced as alive. That living world is none other than the Earth. (shrink)

Analyses of factual causation face perennial problems, including preemption, overdetermination, and omissions. Arguably, the thorniest, are cases of omissive overdetermination, involving two independent omissions, each sufficient for the harm, and neither, independently, making a difference. A famous example is Saunders, where pedestrian was hit by a driver of a rental car who never pressed on the (unbeknownst to the driver) defective (and, negligently, never inspected) brakes. Causal intuitions in such cases are messy, reflected in disagreement about which omission mattered. What (...) these analyses mistakenly take for granted, is that at issue is the 'efficacy' of each omission. I argue, on the contrary, the puzzle of omissive overdetermination favors taking the act/omission distinction seriously. Factual causation, properly understood precludes omissions (i.e. omissions are not causal). Of course, the law also attaches liability to omissions, but this works differently from liability for real causes (e.g. omissions have a duty requirement, they also respond differentially to difference-making considerations). The manner in which liability attaches for omissions differs from that of straightforward causal liability, and is entirely dependent on the underlying causal structure. Attention to that structure (e.g. that the driver's hitting the pedestrian with his car is what actually caused the injury) sheds light on which omissions matter (e.g. driver's failure to press on the brakes) and why (because that failure removes a defense the driver would have to liability for the accident he caused). Other cases, where the parties' connection is entirely omissive (e.g. two physicians fail to detect independently lethal conditions), come out differently (tracking moralized elements). The analysis offered makes better sense of both why omissive determination cases are puzzling and how to resolve them. (shrink)

The theory and doctrine of proximate cause has been too easily dismissed. Two primary errors underlie this dismissal: a misunderstanding of “causal proximity,” and a mistaken inference from the correct observation that effects have multiple causes, to the claim that there is no hierarchy between proximate and more remote causes. This article defends the classic conception of proximate causation as causally grounded by reconstructing the doctrine and articulating an underlying concept of proximate causation in which proximity is relative (though still (...) objective). Proximate causation is a relation between two causes and an effect, when one cause mediates the effects of another. This idea informs the doctrines of proximate cause, which, following Bacon’s Maxim, trace back from the injury to its causes, in sequence. along the paths of causation, until responsibility is absorbed, at which point the process terminates. Causal chains “break”: not because the cause and effect are too remote, but because a set of causes that are proximate, relative to these remote causes, are sufficient to absorb responsibility. With responsibility absorbed, there is nothing further to trace back. This is missed if tracing is from cause to injury, rather than in reverse, from injury to cause. As a matter of responsibility, the responsibility of remote actors—those that act through the agency of others, or those that fail to prevent the wrongdoing of others—is always subordinate to that of the causally proximate actor. This does not mean that the proximate actor always bears greater responsibility than the remote one, but when responsibility is transmitted remotely, it must be in virtue of a justifying or excusing condition for the proximate actor’s act. The order of justification follows the order of causation. Properly understood, proximate cause is essentially a defense that asserts that the defendant is not the most proximate cause to the harm, and that someone (or something) else is. The implications for both liability and contribution are discussed. (shrink)

This chapter explores a philosophical hypothesis about the nature of (some) probabilities encountered in social sciences. It should be of interest to those with philosophical concerns about the foundations of probability, and to social scientists and philosophers of science who are somewhat puzzled by the nature of probability in social domains. As will become clear below, the chapter is not intended as a contribution to an empirical methodology such as a particular way of applying statistics.