Biological regulation is what allows an organism to handle the effects of a perturbation, modulating its own constitutive dynamics in response to particular changes in internal and external conditions. With the central focus of analysis on the case of minimal living systems, we argue that regulation consists in a specific form of second-order control, exerted over the core regime of production and maintenance of the components that actually put together the organism. The main argument is that regulation (...) requires a distinctive architecture of functional relationships, and specifically the action of a dedicated subsystem whose activity is dynamically decoupled from that of the constitutive regime. We distinguish between two major ways in which control mechanisms contribute to the maintenance of a biological organisation in response to internal and external perturbations: dynamic stability and regulation. Based on this distinction an explicit definition and a set of organisational requirements for regulation are provided, and thoroughly illustrated through the examples of bacterial chemotaxis and the lac-operon. The analysis enables us to mark out the differences between regulation and closely related concepts such as feedback, robustness and homeostasis. (shrink)

The present article reviews modern research on the psychology of emotion regulation. Emotion regulation determines the offset of emotional responding and is thus distinct from emotional sensitivity, which determines the onset of emotional responding. Among the most viable categories for classifying emotion-regulation strategies are the targets and functions of emotion regulation. The emotion-generating systems that are targeted in emotion regulation include attention, knowledge, and bodily responses. The functions of emotion regulation include satisfying hedonic needs, (...) supporting specific goal pursuits, and facilitating the global personality system. Emotion-regulation strategies are classified in terms of their targets and functions and relevant empirical work is reviewed. Throughout this review, emotion regulation emerges as one of the most far-ranging and influential processes at the interface of cognition and emotion. (shrink)

The article assesses the achievements and limitations of the private regulation of global corporate conduct. Private regulation occurs through voluntary, private, nonstate industry and cross-industry codes that address labor practices, environmental performance, and human rights policies. The author argues that while private regulation has resulted in some substantive improvements in corporate behavior, it cannot be regarded as a substitute for the more effective exercise of state authority at both the national and international levels. Ultimately, private regulation (...) must be integrated with and reinforced by more effective state-based and enforced regulatory policies at both the national and international levels. (shrink)

Before embarking on a discussion of the regulation of artificial intelligence (AI), it is first necessary to define the subject matter regulated. Defining artificial intelligence is a difficult endeavour, and many definitions have been proposed over the years. Although more than 70 years have passed since it was adopted, the most convincing definition is still nonetheless that proposed by Turing; in any case, it is important to be mindful of the risk of anthropomorphising artificial intelligence, which may arise in (...) particular from its very definition. Once we have established the subject matter regulated, we must ask ourselves whether lawmakers should pursue an approach that seeks to regulate artificial intelligence as a whole, or whether by contrast they should regulate applications of artificial intelligence in specific sectors or individual areas. The proposal for a regulation on artificial intelligence published on 21 April 2021 implements the former approach whilst also pursuing geopolitical goals. After providing an initial overview of the notion of artificial intelligence, this article investigates the geopolitical context to the proposal for a regulation, and then goes on to illustrate the regulatory model embraced by the proposal as well as related critical aspects. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that emotions can be regulated in an astonishing variety of ways. Most research to date has focused on explicit (effortful) forms of emotion regulation. However, there is growing research interest in implicit (automatic) forms of emotion regulation. To organise emerging findings, we present a dual-process framework that integrates explicit and implicit forms of emotion regulation, and argue that both forms of regulation are necessary for well-being. In the first section of this review, (...) we provide a broad overview of the construct of emotion regulation, with an emphasis on explicit and implicit processes. In the second section, we focus on explicit emotion regulation, considering both neural mechanisms that are associated with these processes and their experiential and physiological consequences. In the third section, we turn to several forms of implicit emotion regulation, and integrate the burgeoning literature in this area. We conclude by outlining open questions and areas for future research. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) regulatory frameworks are being used to emphasise specific values in previously purely technical areas. One clear example is the European Union’s (EU) AI Act regulation, which sets rules on AI while relying on technical standards to guide compliance and strengthen global cooperation. However, it also states that regulatory efforts have to be in accordance with Union values. Hence, we analyse the EU's approach as an example of the importance that values have gained in AI regulatory frameworks (...) and standards. Therein, we argue that diverse conceptions of values could prevent interoperability between AI systems across regulatory contexts. To illustrate our argumentation, we identify values stated in AI regulatory frameworks from the EU, the United States and China and compare them according to the Theory of Basic Values. The comparison highlights that maintaining interoperability is crucial for regulatory frameworks and standards aiming to advance AI-based systems’ successful deployment and function in and across different regulatory contexts. Consequently, we propose a value-sensitive AI standardisation approach based on our analysis of AI regulatory values, a previous ISO/IEC/IEEE standard’s approach and value sensitive design. Our approach aims to relate AI regulatory values to requirements in AI regulations and provide suggestions for value-based configurability in AI standards. While we find there is no harmonised approach for the embedment of value-based consideration in AI standardisation, this could be a tool used to maintain the interoperability of AI systems that have global reach. Our proposed approach aims to address this shortcoming within the interplay of global AI markets and regulatory strategies. (shrink)

In March 2021, the Spanish Congress approved the law regulating euthanasia, that regulates both euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS). In this article, we analyse the Spanish law regulating euthanasia and PAS, comparing it with the rest of the European laws on euthanasia and PAS (Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg). Identified strengths of the Spanish law, with respect to other norms, are that it is a law with many safeguards, which broadly recognises professionals’ right to conscientious objection and the specification that it (...) makes on the prior comprehensive care of the patient, including the approach to care dependency. Regarding its shortcomings, the law does not differentiate well between euthanasia and PAS; it barely assigns a role to the healthcare team as a whole (similar to other regulations); it does not clarify the functions of the different professionals involved; it does not detail the specific composition and duration of theevaluation commission; it has not been accompanied by a prior or simultaneous regulation of palliative care; and, lastly, the period of time to implement the law is too short. (shrink)

This paper examines the evolving regulation of the media environment in the digital age, focusing on innovative tools and practices aligned with European Union (EU)standards. The analysis underscores the dual challenge of safeguarding freedom of expression while addressing new risks such as disinformation, ownership concentration, and political interference. Drawing on the EU’s regulatory instruments, including the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), Digital Services Act (DSA), Digital Markets Act (DMA), General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and the newly adopted European (...) Media Freedom Act (EMFA), the paper highlights the EU’s role as a normative leader in shaping democratic media governance. Particular emphasis is placed on Albania, a candidate country whose progress toward EU membership depends on aligning its media framework with European standards. The findings show that while Albania has made formal legislative advances, implementation and enforcement remain weak, leaving journalists vulnerable to political and economic pressures. By situating Albania’s case within broader European developments, the paper identifies regulatory innovations and self-regulatory practices essential for building a resilient, independent, and pluralistic media landscape in the digital era. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to influence people’s lives in various ways as it is increasingly integrated into important decision-making processes in key areas of society. While AI offers opportunities, it is also associated with risks. These risks have sparked debates about how AI should be regulated, whether through government regulation or industry self-regulation. AI-related risk perceptions can be shaped by national cultures, especially the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance. This raises the question of whether people in (...) countries with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance might have different preferences regarding AI regulation than those with lower levels of uncertainty avoidance. Therefore, using Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance scale and data from ten European countries (N = 7.855), this study investigates the relationships between uncertainty avoidance, people’s AI risk perceptions, and their regulatory preferences. The findings show that people in countries with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance are more likely to perceive AI risks in terms of a lack of accountability and responsibility. While people’s perceived AI risk of a lack of accountability exclusively drives their preferences for government regulation of AI, the perceived AI risk of a lack of responsibility can foster people’s requests for government regulation and/or industry self-regulation. This study contributes to a better understanding of which mechanisms shape people’s preferences for AI regulation. (shrink)

This essay develops a teleodynamic account of metastability as a regime of regulated openness within a normatively structured semantic field. Building on the interaction of three fundamental forces—microvitic selectivity, Zeno-like stabilization, and Anti-Zeno destabilization—together with a residual background of non-selective perturbation, the essay argues that semantic systems evolve neither through fixed equilibrium nor through undirected stochastic drift, but through curvature-sensitive regulation of trajectories. Microvita are interpreted not as random fluctuations but as ontologically real agents of teleodynamic mediation: they facilitate (...) certain semantic couplings, inhibit others, and thereby bias transformation toward privileged paths of organization. Teleodynamic curvature is introduced as a global criterion of coherence that evaluates the integrability of evolving paths within the larger semantic organization of the field. On this basis, Zeno and Anti-Zeno regulation are reinterpreted as adaptive responses to positive or negative curvature, selectively reinforcing coherent attractors or releasing exhausted configurations. -/- The essay then proposes a minimal formal model in which state evolution is shaped by field-guided drift, microvitically biased transformation, residual perturbation, and curvature-dependent regulation. A Lyapunov-type instability functional is used to characterize metastability as a condition in which deviations remain globally bounded without vanishing asymptotically. This yields a conception of metastability distinct from both rigid stability and unbounded disorder: the system remains open to transformation while preserving structural continuity. Near Ω4, where restoring structure weakens and attractors approach bifurcation, this openness becomes maximally productive. Meaning thus emerges not as a static state, but as a metastable trajectory within a teleodynamically regulated field. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the nature and consequences of confabulation about political opinions and behaviours. When people confabulate, they give reasons for their choices or behaviour which are ill-grounded and do not capture what really brought the behaviour about, but they do this with no intention to deceive and endorse their own accounts. I suggest that this can happen when people are asked why they voted a certain way, or support certain campaigns, and so on. Confabulating in these political (...) contexts seems bad because we do not get a fully truthful account of why some political choice was made, and so the reasoning behind the choice is under-scrutinised. However, I argue that if people have a virtue of self-regulation, confabulation in political contexts can actually be part of the process of coming to better understand our political choices and embody more consistently the political values which we ascribe to. (shrink)

Depression is a disorder of impaired emotion regulation. Consequently, examining individual differences in the habitual use of emotion-regulation strategies has considerable potential to inform models of this debilitating disorder. The aim of the current study was to identify cognitive processes that may be associated with the use of emotion-regulation strategies and to elucidate their relation to depression. Depression has been found to be associated with difficulties in cognitive control and, more specifically, with difficulties inhibiting the processing of (...) negative material. We used a negative affective priming task to assess the relations among inhibition and individual differences in the habitual use of rumination, reappraisal, and expressive suppression in clinically depressed, formerly depressed, and never-depressed participants. We found that depressed participants exhibited the predicted lack of inhibition when processing negative material. Moreover, within the group of depressed participants, reduced inhibition of negative material was associated with greater rumination. Across the entire sample, reduced inhibition of negative material was related to less use of reappraisal and more use of expressive suppression. Finally, within the formerly depressed group, less use of reappraisal, more use of rumination, and greater expressive suppression were related to higher levels of depressive symptoms. These findings suggest that individual differences in the use of emotion-regulation strategies play an important role in depression, and that deficits in cognitive control are related to the use of maladaptive emotion-regulation strategies in this disorder. (shrink)

We contribute to the growing literature on white fragility by examining how the distinctively emotional manifestations of white fragility (which we dub ‘emotional white fragility’) make it more difficult for white people to have constructive, meaningful thoughts and conversations about race. We claim that emotional white fragility typically involves a failure of emotion regulation, or the ability to manage one’s emotions in real time. We suggest that this lack of emotion regulation can contribute to an unjust distribution of (...) burdens that can further entrench moral damage in the context of relationships as well as help support large-scale patterns of white supremacy. Given the serious implications of emotional white fragility, we suggest a number of emotion regulation techniques that one can deploy to mitigate the potential harms wrought by emotional white fragility. (shrink)

Many are calling for transformative food systems changes to promote population and planetary health. Yet there is a lack of research that considers whether current food policy frameworks and regulatory approaches are suited to tackle whole of food systems challenges. One such challenge is responding to the rise of ultra-processed foods (UPF) in human diets, and the related harms to population and planetary health. This paper presents a narrative review and synthesis of academic articles and international reports to critically examine (...) whether current food policy frameworks and regulatory approaches are sufficiently equipped to drive the transformative food systems changes needed to halt the rise of UPFs, reduce consumption and minimise harm. We draw on systems science approaches to conceptualise the UPF problem as an emergent property of complex adaptive food systems shaped by capitalist values and logics. Our findings reveal that current food policy frameworks often adjust or reform isolated aspects of food systems (e.g., prices, labels, food composition), but under-emphasise the deeper paradigms, goals and structures that underlie the rise of UPFs as a systems phenomenon, and its socio-ecological implications. We propose that a ‘leverage points’ framework illuminates where to intervene in food systems to generate multi-level changes, while the theory of ecological regulation highlights how to respond to complex multi-factorial problems, like the rise of UPFs, in diverse ways that respect planetary boundaries. More research is needed to better understand the transformative potential of ecological regulation to advance food systems transformation and attenuate whole of food systems challenges. (shrink)

Endocrinologists apply the idea of feedback loops to explain how hormones regulate certain bodily functions such as glucose metabolism. In particular, feedback loops focus on the maintenance of the plasma concentrations of glucose within a narrow range. Here, we put forward a different, organicist perspective on the endocrine regulation of glycaemia, by relying on the pivotal concept of closure of constraints. From this perspective, biological systems are understood as organized ones, which means that they are constituted of a set (...) of mutually dependent functional structures acting as constraints, whose maintenance depends on their reciprocal interactions. Closure refers specifically to the mutual dependence among functional constraints in an organism. We show that, when compared to feedback loops, organizational closure can generate much richer descriptions of the processes and constraints at play in the metabolism and regulation of glycaemia, by making explicit the different hierarchical orders involved. We expect that the proposed theoretical framework will open the way to the construction of original mathematical models, which would provide a better understanding of endocrine regulation from an organicist perspective. (shrink)

Introduction: This article applies theory-testing process tracing to assess how media self-regulation functions in Albania and how it interacts with statutory oversight. Building on a documentary corpus (codes of ethics; institutional rule books; complaint decisions; regulator bulletins), the study reconstructs three sequences: (A) a 2025 cluster of Albanian Media Council and Alliance for Ethical Media ethics decisions concerning legacy online coverage and privacy-related claims (voluntary pillar); (B) a 2023–2024 run of Audiovisual Media Authority complaints culminating in sanctions/warnings in high-audience (...) reality/talk formats (statutory pillar); and (C) the 2019–2024 policy trajectory of the “anti-defamation” package aimed at extending administrative oversight to a broad range of online publications and resources. Methods: Across cases, we probe a hypothesized mechanism in which clear procedural rules, an empowered complaint-handling body, and timely, public, reasoned decisions are expected to increase accountability visibility- approximated through observable indicators such as accessibility of decisions, public communication of outcomes, and verifiable remedial action by outlets. Working with documentary sources, we operationalize accountability through observable proxies such as the visibility of decisions, outlet-side corrections, and complaint-routing patterns. Results: Evidence suggests that the voluntary pillar issues reasoned, public decisions but faces publication-and-compliance visibility gaps, while the statutory pillar provides faster, visible redress (warnings/fines) that may crowd out voluntary mechanisms. The policy-process case shows how international standards and domestic veto points constrained the design of the proposed defamation package extension, shaping the feasible configuration of oversight. Conclusions: Implications include stabilizing and standardizing transparency practices for self-regulatory outcomes (e.g., building a public registry of self-regulatory decisions and compliance logging) and clarifying coordination and referral practices between the statutory regulator and voluntary bodies in line with EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence is currently governed by a complex framework of ethical guidelines and scattered sector-specific legislation. Against the backdrop of rapid technological development, the legal landscape is also facing a period of fast paced innovation, and the European AI Act is at the forefront of the regulatory race. However, while there seems to be a general consensus on the opportunity to provide safeguards and legal certainty through comprehensive legal frameworks, regulating such a dynamic and pervasive technology is certainly a highly (...) challenging task for any legislator. The first part of the chapter examines the characteristics (the three Ts) that are necessary for any AI law to be sustainable, future-proof and tailored to the specific technology. Therefore, a law should be Tuned (developed in accordance with scientific expertise and societal pluralism), Timely (able to provide certainty, yet flexible to technological change) and Tailored (focused on the particular technology at hand). Thus, a preliminary analysis of the AI Act is carried out by comparing it with the above features. The second part of the chapter examines analytically the content of the proposed regulation, focusing first on the risk-based approach of the AI Act, its scope and the definition of AI system. It then focuses on an overview of the different levels of risk (including the ad hoc legal framework for general-purpose models) and, in particular, the regulation of high-risk systems. Finally, it presents a general framework for regulatory sandboxes, governance and enforcement measures. Considerations on the regulation’s ability to remain future-proof and preserve innovation while safeguarding fundamental rights are presented in the Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

If the short-term effectiveness or long-term adaptivity of emotion regulation (ER) depends on the specific ER (covert or overt) behaviours that are executed, it is important to know how to influence those behaviours. Whereas ER refers to influencing emotions, meta-emotion-regulation (MER) refers to influencing ER behaviours. Instead of trying to close the gap between desired and perceived emotion (like ER), MER tries to close the gap between intended and actual ER behaviour. We show how the concept of MER (...) extends previous ideas by focusing on the determinants of ER choice and behaviour. Furthermore, we propose a first collection of potential MER strategies that may help increase desirable and decrease undesirable ER behaviour (e.g. deliberate practice or stimulus control). We also call for a research programme of identifying and testing MER strategies through experimental manipulations of probable ER choice determinants like ER beliefs or motivation. This could lead to new and refined clinical interventions and treatments in the context of ER, for example, by creating precise interventions aimed at reducing maladaptive avoidance, rumination, aggressive or addictive behaviour. (shrink)

This paper proposes the idea of thinking about practical rationality in terms of self-regulation and defends the thesis that self-regulation is a virtue, insofar as we have reason to think it is our highest form of practical rationality. I argue that understanding self-regulation as a virtuous form of practical reasoning is called for given the kinds of limitations we face in developing agency and pursuing our goals, and presents us with several advantages over traditional understandings of practical (...) rationality. (shrink)

Confucianism demands that individuals comport themselves according to the strictures of ritual propriety—specific forms of speech, clothing, and demeanor attached to a vast array of life circumstances. This requires self-regulation, a cognitive resource of limited supply. When this resource is depleted, a person can experience undesirable consequences such as social isolation and alienation. However, one’s cultural background may be an important mediator of such costs; East Asians, in particular, seem to have comparatively greater self-regulatory strength. I offer some considerations (...) as to why this may be so, and what insights it may afford to theories of virtue generally. (shrink)

The distinction between the regulative (‘practical’, ‘subjective’, ‘decision-procedural’) and the theoretical (‘objective’, ‘absolute’) pertains to the aims (the desiderata) of an account of justification. This distinction began in ethics and spread to epistemology. Each of internalism, externalism, is separately forced to draw this distinction to avoid a stock, otherwise fatal, argument levelled against them by the other. Given this situation however, we may finesse much partisan conflict in epistemology by simply seeing differing accounts of justification as answering to radically distinct (...) desiderata of adequacy. We should see knowledge as answering to the theoretical desideratum of adequacy alone; and rationality as answering to the regulative desideratum of adequacy alone. Objections to this ‘Gordian’ [knot] approach to epistemology (from virtues theorists and others) are rejected. Such an approach may make for accounts that violate our ordinary language intuitions; but in developing an epistemological axiology, any such intuitions are not to the point. (shrink)

In July 2014, the roboticist Ronald Arkin suggested that child sex robots could be used to treat those with paedophilic predilections in the same way that methadone is used to treat heroin addicts. Taking this onboard, it would seem that there is reason to experiment with the regulation of this technology. But most people seem to disagree with this idea, with legal authorities in both the UK and US taking steps to outlaw such devices. In this paper, I subject (...) these different regulatory attitudes to critical scrutiny. In doing so, I make three main contributions to the debate. First, I present a framework for thinking about the regulatory options that we confront when dealing with child sex robots. Second, I argue that there is a prima facie case for restrictive regulation, but that this is contingent on whether Arkin’s hypothesis has a reasonable prospect of being successfully tested. Third, I argue that Arkin’s hypothesis probably does not have a reasonable prospect of being successfully tested. Consequently, we should proceed with utmost caution when it comes to this technology. (shrink)

Emotion processing is known to be impaired in psychopathy, but less is known about the cognitive mechanisms that drive this. Our study examined experiencing and suppression of emotion processing in psychopathy. Participants, violent offenders with varying levels of psychopathy, viewed positive and negative images under conditions of passive viewing, experiencing and suppressing. Higher scoring psychopathics were more cardiovascularly responsive when processing negative information than positive, possibly reflecting an anomalously rewarding aspect of processing normally unpleasant material. When required to experience emotional (...) response, by ‘getting into the feeling’ of the emotion conveyed by a negative image, higher factor 1 psychopathic individuals showed reduced responsiveness, suggesting that they were less able to do this. These data, together with the absence of corresponding differences in subjective self-report might be used to inform clinical strategies for normalising emotion processing in psychopathic offenders to improve treatment outcome, and reduce risk amongst this client group. (shrink)

This article takes a critical approach to emotion regulation suggesting that the concept needs supplementing with a relational position on the generation and restraint of emotion. I chart the relational approach to emotion, challenging the “two-step” model of emotion regulation. From this, a more interdisciplinary approach to emotion is developed using concepts from social science to show the limits of instrumental, individualistic, and cognitivist orientations in the psychology of emotion regulation, centred on appraisal theory. Using a social (...) interactionist approach I develop an ontological position in which social relations form the fundamental contexts in which emotions are generated, toned, and restrained, so that regulation is decentred and seen as just one moment or aspect in the relational patterning of emotion. (shrink)

Scientific models typically contain idealizations, or assumptions that are known not to be true. Philosophers have long questioned the nature of idealizations: Are they heuristic tools that will be abandoned? Or rather fictional representations of reality? And how can we reconcile them with realism about knowledge of nature? Immanuel Kant developed an account of scientific investigation that can inspire a new approach to the contemporary debate. Kant argued that scientific investigation is possible only if guided by ideal assumptions—what he calls (...) “regulative ideas”. These ideas are not true of objects of nature, and yet they are not heuristic tools or fictional represen- tations. They are necessary rules governing the construction and assessment of scientific explanations. In this paper, I suggest that some idealizations can be interpreted as having necessary regulative value and as being compatible with scientific realism. I first analyze the puzzle of the nature of idealization and present the main approaches to this topic in the literature. Second, I reconsider the puzzle vis-a-vis a restricted, Kantian definition of idealization and a novel characterization of the relation between idealization and truth. Finally, I discuss in detail an example of idealization (the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium) along the suggested Kantian lines. (shrink)

The negative emotions generated following stressful life events can increase one’s risk of depressive symptoms and promote higher levels of perceived stress. The process model of emotion regulation can help distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies to determine who may be at the greatest risk of worse psychological health across the lifespan. Heart rate variability may affect these relationships as it indexes aspects of self-regulation, including emotion and behavioral regulation, that enable an individual to (...) dynamically adapt to the changing demands of both internal and external environments. In this study, we expected individual differences in resting vagally mediated HRV to moderate the influence of emotion regulatory strategies among our sample of 267 adults. We found support for the hypothesis that higher vagally mediated HRV buffers against the typical adverse effects of expressive suppression when evaluating depressive symptoms and found weak support when considering perceived stress. There was no evidence for an interaction between cognitive reappraisal and vagally mediated HRV but there was a significant, negative association between cognitive reappraisal and depressive symptoms and perceived stress. Future work may determine if intervening on either emotion regulation strategies or HRV may change these within-persons over time. (shrink)

Regulation and governance of medical research is frequently criticised by researchers. In this paper, we draw on Everett Hughes’ concepts of professional licence and professional mandate, and on contemporary sociological theory on risk regulation, to explain the emergence of research governance and the kinds of criticism it receives. We offer explanations for researcher criticism of the rules and practices of research governance, suggesting that these are perceived as interference in their mandate. We argue that, in spite of their (...) complaints, researchers benefit from the institutions of governance and regulation, in particular by the ways in which regulation secures the social licence for research. While it is difficult to answer questions such as: “Is medical research over-regulated?” and “Does the regulation of medical research successfully protect patients or promote ethical conduct?”, a close analysis of the social functions of research governance and its relationship to risk, trust, and confidence permits us to pose these questions in a more illuminating way. (shrink)

Emotions are foremost self-regulating processes that permit rapid responses and adaptations to situations of personal concern. They have biological bases and are shaped ontogenetically via learning and experience. Many situations and events of personal concern are social in nature. Thus, social exchanges play an important role in learning about rules and norms that shape regulation processes. I argue that (a) emotions often are actively auto-regulating—the behavior implied by the emotional reaction bias to the eliciting event or situation modifies or (...) terminates the situation; (b) certain emotion components are likely to habituate dynamically, modifying the emotional states; (c) emotions are typically intra- and interpersonal processes at the same time, and modulating forces at these different levels interact; (d) emotions are not just regulated—they regulate. Important conclusions of my arguments are that the scientific analysis of emotion should not exclude regulatory processes, and that effortful emotion regulation should be seen relative to a backdrop of auto-regulation and habituation, and not the ideal notion of a neutral baseline. For all practical purposes unregulated emotion is not a realistic concept. (shrink)

The central role played by emotions in conflict has long been recognized by many of the scholars who study ethnic conflicts and conflict resolution. Yet recent developments in the psychological study of discrete emotions and of emotion regulation have yet to receive adequate attention by those who study and seek to promote conflict resolution. At the same time, scholars of emotion and emotion regulation have only rarely tested their core theories in the context of long-term conflicts, which constitute (...) a unique and highly emotional environment. I argue that building bridges between these two communities would help us to form a better understanding of core processes in emotion and emotion regulation as well as greatly advance theory and practice in conflict resolution. To address that goal, a theoretical, appraisal-based model elucidating the way emotions operate in the context of conflict resolution processes is presented, followed by a review of recent empirical developments in the study of discrete emotions in conflict resolution processes. Next, I discuss various avenues of influence and provide preliminary data regarding the potential role of two types of emotion regulation processes in conflict resolution efforts. Finally, I describe the future challenges in integrating these two bodies of knowledge, at both the theoretical and the applied levels. (shrink)

Variability in the emotion regulation (ER) strategies one uses throughout daily life has been suggested to reflect adaptive ER ability and to act as a protective factor in mental health. Moreover, psychological inflexibility and persistent negative affect (or affective inertia) are key features of depression and other forms of mental illness and are often further exacerbated by rigid or overly passive regulatory behaviours. The current study investigated the hypothesis that ER variability might serve as a protective factor against depressive (...) symptoms and affective inertia. Using experience-sampling (N = 213), we tested whether two indictors of ER variability (between- and within-strategy SDs) were related to depressive symptoms and affective inertia. We found that people with higher between-strategy variability and within-strategy variability (specifically for reappraisal and distraction) reported fewer depressive symptoms. Both within- and between-strategy variability were negatively related to negative affective inertia. Between-strategy variability and negative affective inertia had unique effects on depression, when used as simultaneous predictors. Altogether, this study provides further evidence for the utility of ER as a factor buffering against depressive symptoms and particularly for the use of variable ER strategies. (shrink)

Emotion dynamics, which describe affective patterns over time, may illustrate how specific emotion regulation difficulties manifest in daily life. However, limited research links emotion regulation with emotion dynamics assessed naturalistically. In two samples, 62 and 304 university students completed the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale then completed ecological momentary assessments of positive and negative affect thrice daily for seven and 14 days, respectively, to examine mean positive and negative affect, affective variability, affective instability, and emotional inertia. Self-reported (...) emotion regulation difficulties broadly correlated with elevated mean negative affect and lower positive affect. However, no specific association of an emotion regulation difficulty with affective variability, instability, or inertia replicated across samples. Further research is needed with diverse methodologies to explore how in situ emotion dynamics reflect emotion regulation difficulties. (shrink)

The ability to represent emotional experiences in a precise fashion with language, termed emotional granularity, is related to a number of beneficial outcomes. However, the emotion granularity construct and operationalization are rooted in the lens of so-called Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) societies that focus on emotions as a mental-state phenomena. Using evidence from multiple non-WEIRD societies, we illustrate that people's everyday vernacular often emphasizes bodily over, or in addition to, mental states. This suggests that granularity focused only (...) on mental state language may limit our ability to operationalize this construct in a culturally valid manner. To overcome this limitation, we propose capturing “experiential” granularity and a concept model on how it may link to regulation and health. (shrink)

This book in the philosophy of law and risk assessment is concerned with the topic of the standards of evidence in legal proceedings and regulatory decisions regarding the toxicity of chemicals. The book argues that the scientific and statistical criteria usually used to determine whether substances are toxic are too rigorous and time-consuming for evidentiary purposes in tort cases and for regulation. The result is the under-regulation of toxic substances and the under-compensation of plaintiffs in tort cases. The (...) book proposes the evidential standards now used should be evaluated with the purposes of the law in mind. (shrink)

How should we regulate genome editing in the face of persistent substantive disagreement about the moral status of this technology and its applications? In this paper, we aim to contribute to resolving this question. We first present two diametrically opposed possible approaches to the regulation of genome editing. A first approach, which we refer to as “elitist,” is inspired by Joshua Greene’s work in moral psychology. It aims to derive at an abstract theoretical level what preferences people would have (...) if they were committed to implementing public policies regulating genome editing in a context of ethical pluralism. The second approach, which we refer to as the democratic approach, defended by Francoise Baylis and Sheila Jasanoff et al., emphasizes the importance of including the public’s expressed attitudes in the regulation of genome editing. After pointing out a serious shortcoming with each of these approaches, we propose our own favored approach—the “enlightened democracy” approach—which attempts to combine the strengths of the elitist and democratic approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. (shrink)

Attachment theory posits that early relationships shape emotional development through Internal Working Models of self and others, reflected in attachment dimensions (anxiety and avoidance). These dimensions influence emotion regulation (ER) and the strategies used to manage emotions, with physiological manifestations, such as pupil dilation. This study investigates how attachment anxiety and avoidance interact with perceived ER success (PERCS) and emotional arousal to influence pupil size during cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. Eighty-five adults (ages 18–58) viewed emotional images from the (...) International Affective Picture System, including both negative and neutral stimuli, while implementing these two ER strategies. Pupil diameter was recorded continuously from stimulus onset (0 ms) to 4,000 ms. Linear mixed-effects modelling revealed that reappraisal, compared to suppression, elicited greater pupil dilation, particularly between 500 and 4,000 ms post-stimulus. Attachment anxiety exhibited increased pupil dilation during reappraisal, reflecting heightened cognitive effort and hypervigilance, while attachment avoidance showed the opposite pattern, with reduced pupil dilation. Emotional arousal significantly predicted larger pupil size across conditions. Additionally, higher PERCS were associated with smaller pupil dilation during reappraisal. These findings emphasize the role of attachment dimensions in shaping physiological responses during emotional challenges. (shrink)

Sphingolipids are a structurally unique, widespread, and diverse family of lipids. Serine palmitoyltransferase (SPT) is the first and rate‐limiting enzyme required for the synthesis of all sphingolipids. Not unexpectedly, SPT is highly regulated. SPT is a multi‐subunit enzyme, the level of activity of which is controlled by the regulatory subunits known as the ORMDLs. Here, we discuss how the regulation of SPT activity is accomplished by multiple mechanisms, underscoring the importance of this regulation. A rapid homeostatic regulation (...) of SPT, monitoring cellular sphingolipid levels, is mediated by the direct binding of the central sphingolipid ceramide to the SPT/ORMDL complex. This acute regulation is overlaid by a longer‐term regulation in which ORMDL is removed from the remainder of the SPT complex and trafficked for degradation, resulting in enhanced SPT activity. A third level of regulation is conferred by the inclusion of specific isoforms of the subunits of SPT into the complex. The isoform composition of the SPT complex dictates both the sensitivity of the complex to levels of cellular sphingolipid and the molecular species of sphingoid backbone that are produced. Here we discuss the mechanisms, interplay, and physiological roles of these three levels of regulation of sphingolipid biosynthesis. (shrink)

‘The price of peace is eternal vigilance’: much the same might be said about the price of progress in medical ethics, since without disciplined and enquiring minds willing to question received opinion, the promotion of good practice as well as the development of ethical theory is at risk. To achieve progress, moreover, such minds must digest, intellectually and emotionally, the nuances and complexities of the ethical and practical issues under consideration before they can provide others with an accessible digest of (...) their thoughts, arguments and always provisional conclusions. In this issue, the journal is again privileged to publish communications from such disciplined and enquiring minds on a range of issues both currently and perennially relevant in medical ethics. Of these contributions in this issue, around half are concerned in one way or another with regulation. Given our title, this should not be surprising: historically, from the ancient Greek Hippocratic... (shrink)

In the available psychological literature, affect regulation is fundamentally considered in terms of self-regulation, and according to this standard picture, the contribution of other people in our affect regulation has been viewed in terms of socially assisted selfregulation. The present article challenges this standard picture. By focusing on affect regulation as it unfolds in early infancy, it will be argued that instead of being something original and fundamental, self-regulation developmentally emerges from the basis of a (...) further type of affect regulation. While infants’ capacities in recognizing, understanding, and modifying their own affective states are initially immature and undeveloped, affect regulation is initially managed by the other: it is initially the self, and not the other, that plays the role of an assistant in affect regulation. To capture this phenomenon, the concepts of “auto-matic,” “hetero-matic,” and “altero-matic” affect regulation will be introduced and their interrelations elaborated. By showing how the capacity of affective self-regulation, which is characteristic to maturity, is developmentally achieved by internalizing regulative functions that, at the outset of development, are managed by the caregiver, it will be argued that altero-matic affect regulation is an autonomous type of affect regulation and the developmental basis for self-regulation. (shrink)

The LIM domain kinases (LIMKs) are important actin cytoskeleton regulators. These proteins, LIMK1 and LIMK2, are nodes downstream of Rho GTPases and are the key enzymes that phosphorylate cofilin/actin depolymerization factors to regulate filament severing. They therefore perform an essential role in cascades that control actin depolymerization. Signaling of the LIMKs is carefully regulated by numerous inter‐ and intra‐molecular mechanisms. In this review, we discuss recent findings that improve the understanding of LIM domain kinase regulation mechanisms. We also provide (...) an up‐to‐date review of the role of the LIM domain kinases, their architectural features, how activity is impacted by other proteins, and the implications of these findings for human health and disease. (shrink)

The commercial launch of ChatGPT in November 2022 and the fast development of large language models have catapulted the regulation of artificial intelligence to the forefront of policy debates. A vast body of scholarship, white papers, and other policy analyses followed, outlining ideal regulatory regimes for AI. The European Union and other jurisdictions have moved forward by regulating AI and LLMs. One overlooked area is the political economy of these regulatory initiatives—or how countries and companies can behave strategically and (...) use different regulatory levers to protect their interests in the international competition on how to regulate AI. This Article helps fill this gap by shedding light on the tradeoffs involved in the design of AI regulatory regimes in a world where (i) governments compete with other governments in using AI regulation, privacy, and intellectual property regimes to promote their national interests; and (ii) companies behave strategically in this competition, sometimes trying to capture the regulatory framework. We argue that this multilevel competition to lead AI technology will force governments and companies to trade off risks of regulatory arbitrage versus those of regulatory fragmentation. This may lead to pushes for international harmonization around clubs of countries that share similar interests. Still, international harmonization initiatives will face headwinds given the different interests and the high-stakes decisions at play, thereby pushing towards isolationism. To exemplify these dynamics, we build on historical examples from competition policy, privacy law, intellectual property, and cloud computing. (shrink)

This commentary examines the laws and policies on reproduction adopted in New China since 1949 and reflects on how they have regulated womanhood and whether they have promoted gender equality. By doing so, it also demonstrates how the regulation of reproduction constructs the notion of an ideal womanhood in order to justify the state’s enforcement of the population policy and its exercise of control over women’s fertility.

Flexibility lies at the heart of person‐centered care, enabling nurses to respond to the particularities of patients' needs, preferences, and circumstances. Yet hospital work unfolds within highly regulated systems designed to ensure safety and consistency, often constraining individualized practice. This tension sometimes positions nurses between organizational regulations and the imperatives of care, a space documented in the literature but still posing important questions about how nurses manage competing demands. This study explores how nurses manage conflicts between institutional rules and patient (...) needs and develops a typology of the strategies they use to do so. Data were generated through semi‐structured interviews and shadowing observations in internal medicine, surgical, neurological, and orthopedic wards across four hospitals. Findings show that nurses' strategies align along two axes: procedure orientation–patient orientation and personalization–depersonalization. Nurses moved fluidly among these modes, revealing flexibility as a dynamic practice rather than a fixed trait. The typology offers a conceptual lens for understanding how nurses enact discretion within highly standardized systems. Recognizing these patterned responses can help organizations support professional judgment, creating space for safe, responsive care without undermining institutional integrity. (shrink)

This study aimed to develop recommendations for enhancing the protection of user rights in the digital environment by implementing transparent mechanisms for monitoring compliance with human rights and optimising regulatory acts. The study included a comprehensive analysis of the legal regulation of the use of social media for marketing purposes, the specifics of user data processing and their impact on privacy, personal autonomy and freedom of choice. The analysis found that existing mechanisms for protecting personal data on social networks (...) are insufficient, and current regulatory acts do not fully ensure transparency in information processing. In particular, users are often unaware of the scope of the data being collected and processed by social platforms, indicating a problem of insufficient awareness and the complexity of obtaining consent for data processing. It was found that social networks use personalised content algorithms, which not only aim to optimise advertising but can also shape users' digital behaviour by restricting their access to alternative information. The study also showed that Ukraine’s current legislation contains significant gaps in the area of digital privacy, particularly concerning the consent of users for personal data processing, the responsibility of platforms for confidentiality breaches, and the regulation of automated decision-making systems in marketing strategies. An analysis of international standards, notably the General Data Protection Regulation, revealed substantial differences between the European and Ukrainian models of personal data protection. Based on the identified shortcomings, the study formulated recommendations for improving personal data protection mechanisms, including strengthening the responsibility of technology companies for confidentiality breaches, including imposing significant fines for the unlawful collection and use of personal data. (shrink)

It is often acknowledged that mindfulness facilitates emotion regulation on a long-term scale. Only few empirical studies support the hypothesis that even a brief mindfulness induction among subjects without previous experience of meditation allows an effective reduction of both positive and negative emotions. To the best of our knowledge, this hypothesis has never been tested when comparing mindfulness to other regulation strategies known to be effective. The current study investigates the effects of mindfulness, reappraisal and expressive suppression during (...) the regulation of positive emotions. Forty-five participants without previous meditation experience watched four positive video clips while applying a specific regulation strategy: mindful attention, reappraisal, expressive suppression or no strategy (control condition). Video clips were matched for intensity and positive emotions index. Each of them was evaluated on two dimensions, valence (negative/positive) and arousal (calming/exciting). Moreover, participants’ facial expressions were recorded during the presentation of the video clips. Results showed that (a) participants report less positive affect in reappraisal and mindful attention conditions compared to expression suppression and a control condition; and (b) the facialexpression – activation of AU12 (lip corner pull) and AU6 (cheek raiser) – varies with the regulation strategy applied. Results demonstrate the effectiveness of mindfulness in decreasing both the evaluative judgment of positive video clips and the related facial expression, among participants without previous mindfulness experience. (shrink)

Kant identifies regulative principles of cognition both in the Critique of pure reason and the Critique of the power of judgment. While it seems that assuming a principle regulatively implies forming an attitude such that we take a certain proposition to be true, it is not clear what the nature of this attitude is. In this paper, I approach this problem by focusing on the third Critique and on our assumption of the principle of purposiveness in exercises of the reflective (...) power of judgment directed at extending our empirical cognition of nature. I argue that Kant’s account of this assumption suggests that a new form of taking-to-be-true should be added to his classification in the Canon of the first Critique. I call this form practical opinion, which is a taking-to-be-true that is based on practical considerations, but is below the level of subjective sufficiency. Furthermore, I argue that identifying this form has consequences for the story we tell regarding the evolution of Kant’s notion of belief. While Kant recognizes moral belief as the only type of belief in the third Critique, this does not mean that moral belief is the only form of taking-to-be-true justified on practical grounds. (shrink)