This chapter examines the role of the situation model in referential processing and how it can link what appear to be incompatible results from studies of monologue and dialogue as well as studies of reading and visual-world eye tracking. It shows that data from experiments on pronoun resolution in reading indicate a two-step model, in which candidate antecedents for an anaphor are first identified on the basis of gender matching and number matching, then evaluated with respect to the (...) overall situation model. In similar visual-world studies, these stages are seemingly collapsed together, which can be explained in terms of differences in how the situation model is related to the text versus the visual display of potential referents. The chapter suggests that comparing these different types of studies can elucidate the processes of reference resolution. (shrink)

Anxiety disorders represent the most common class of mental illness. In fact, approximately one-third of adults report clinically significant symptoms of anxiety (Kessler et al., 2012), of which sy...

Negative self-referential processing has fruitfully been studied in unipolar depressed patients, but remarkably less in patients with bipolar disorder (BD). This exploratory study examines the relation between task-based self-referential processing and depressive symptoms in BD and their possible importance to the working mechanism of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) for BD. The study population consisted of a subsample of patients with BD (n = 49) participating in an RCT of MBCT for BD, who were assigned to MBCT (...) + TAU (n = 23) or treatment as usual (TAU) (n = 26). Patients performed the self-referential encoding task (SRET), which measures (1) positive and (2) negative attributions to oneself as well as (3) negative self-referential memory bias, before and after MBCT + TAU or TAU. At baseline, all three SRET measures were significantly related to depressive symptoms in patients with BD. Moreover, repeated measures analyses of variance revealed that negative self-referential memory bias diminished over time in the MBCT + TAU group, compared with the TAU group. Given the preliminary nature of our findings, future research should explore the possibly mediating role of reducing negative self-referential memory bias in preventing and treating depressive symptoms in BD through MBCT. (shrink)

This paper outlines the process of verbal communication of emotion as this occurs through the phases of the referential process, including arousal of an emotion schema; detailed and specific descriptions of images and episodes that are exemplars of emotion schemas; and reflection and reorganization, which may include emotion labels and other types of categorical terms. The concepts of emotion schemas and the referential process are defined in the theoretical framework of multiple code theory which includes subsymbolic sensory, visceral (...) and motoric processes, symbolic images and words. Emotion schemas are defined as clusters of representations of events incorporating similar bodily, sensory and motoric processes activated in relation to different people in different contexts. Through the referential process subsymbolic components of a schema that have been activated in a speaker or writer and that may be connected only partially to words may be evoked in a listener or reader. The concept of the emotion schemas is examined in relation to current work in emotion theory and neuroscience. The unique effects of detailed descriptions of episodes in conveying complex aspects of emotional experience are discussed, as recognized by writers, and as demonstrated in empirical research. Computerized measures of the phases of the referential process are presented, focusing particularly on the central measure, the Weighted Referential Activity Dictionary which identifies points of narrative and imagery. The operation of the function words that dominate the WRAD are examined in relation to the structure of narrative expression underlying the verbal representation of emotion schemas. (shrink)

People use language to communicate their perceptions and conceptions of the world, and underlying this communication is the linguistic system that interacts with the human perceptual and conceptual machinery. This is supported by research on sentence comprehension among adults. This chapter examines theories of sentence processing in children and adults. It comments on a study John Trueswell et al. in which they demonstrated that five-year-old children appeared to be unable to use contextual cues to resolve ambiguity in sentences such (...) as “Put the frog on the napkin into the box.” Trueswell et al. explained this finding by arguing that children have limited working memory capacity that prevents them from using information from the context to disambiguate linguistic input. The chapter first discusses real-time sentence processing in adults before presenting a developmental account of sentence comprehension. It then considers the so-called Kindergarten-path Effect along with referential scenes, definite reference, and restrictive modifiers. It also looks at the effects of discourse and pragmatics on parsing by children and concludes with a discussion of the development of attention in children. (shrink)

To reduce ambiguity across a conversation, interlocutors reach temporary conventions or referential precedents on how to refer to an entity. Despite their central role in communication, the cognitive underpinnings of the interpretation of precedents remain unclear, specifically the role and mechanisms by which information related to the speaker is integrated. We contrast predictions of one-stage, original two-stage, and extended two-stage models for the processing of speaker information and provide evidence favoring the latter: we show that both stages are (...) sensitive to speaker-specific information. Using an experimental paradigm based on visual-world eye tracking in the context of a referential communication task, we look at the moment-by-moment interpretation of precedents and focus on the temporal profile of the influence of the speaker and linguistic information when facing ambiguity. We find two clearly identifiable moments where speaker-specific information has its effects on reference resolution. We conclude that these two stages reflect two distinct cognitive mechanisms, with different timings, and rely on different representational formats for encoding and accessing information about the speaker: a cue-driven memory retrieval process that mediates language processing and an inferential mechanism based on perspective-taking abilities. (shrink)

Language is more than a source of information for accessing higher-order conceptual knowledge. Indeed, language may determine how people perceive and interpret visual stimuli. Visual processing in linguistic contexts, for instance, mirrors language processing and happens incrementally, rather than through variously-oriented fixations over a particular scene. The consequences of this atypical visual processing are yet to be determined. Here, we investigated the integration of visual and linguistic input during a reasoning task. Participants listened to sentences containing conjunctions (...) or disjunctions and looked at visual scenes containing two pictures that either matched or mismatched the nouns. Degree of match between nouns and pictures and between their expected and actual spatial positions affected fixations as well as judgments. We conclude that language induces incremental processing of visual scenes, which in turn becomes susceptible to reasoning errors during the language-meaning verification process. (shrink)

Evidence shows that adults adapt to patterns found in their language environment both at the syntactic level and referential level. However, little is known about how adaptation shifts in response to changes in the input, and existing theories make conflicting predictions. In two experiments, we examine referential adaptation with a between‐subjects blocked priming paradigm to test whether participants adapt flexibly if multiple referential patterns are present in the language input. The study exposed subjects to two blocks of (...) exposure stimuli, each featuring a distinct referential pattern. Ambiguous critical sentences were interleaved throughout, in order to measure the effect of exposure to each reference remention pattern. Experiment 1 used a written paradigm, and Experiment 2 used an audio paradigm. Across experiments, we found that subjects were able to adapt flexibly to both referential patterns. However, this effect was limited: participants adapted to the second exposure condition only when they encountered a low‐frequency referential pattern first. These results suggest that participants are especially sensitive to the exposure they receive at the start of a new situation, and subsequent adjustments depend on whether the new pattern is consistent with lifetime processing biases. Our findings have implications for theories of implicit learning and adaptation. (shrink)

Two experiments examined the restriction of referential domains during unscripted conversation by analyzing the modification and online interpretation of referring expressions. Experiment 1 demonstrated that from the earliest moments of processing, addressees interpreted referring expressions with respect to referential domains constrained by the conversation. Analysis of eye movements during the conversation showed elimination of standard competition effects seen with scripted language. Results from Experiment 2 pinpointed two pragmatic factors responsible for restriction of the referential domains used (...) by speakers to design referential expressions and demonstrated that the same factors predict whether addressees consider local competitors to be potential referents during online interpretation of the same expressions. These experiments demonstrate, for the first time, that online interpretation of referring expressions in conversation is facilitated by referential domains constrained by pragmatic factors that predict when addressees are likely to encounter temporary ambiguity in language processing. (shrink)

This paper defends a reference-based approach to concept individuation against the objection that such an approach is unable to make sense of concepts that fail to refer. The main line of thought pursued involves clarifying how the referentialist should construe the relationship between a concept's (referential) content and its role in mental processes. While the central goal of the paper is to defend a view aptly titled Concept Referentialism , broader morals are drawn regarding reference-based approaches in general. The (...) paper closes by calling for a shift in the current debate between referentialists and their opponents. (shrink)

Age has been shown to influence language comprehension, with delays, for instance, in older adults' expectations about upcoming information. We examined to what extent expectations about upcoming event information change across the lifespan and as a function of different world-language relations. In a visual-world paradigm, participants in all three age groups inspected a speaker whose facial expression was either smiling or sad. Next they inspected two clipart agents depicted as acting upon a patient. Control scenes featured the same three characters (...) without the action depictions. While inspecting the depictions, comprehenders listened to a German sentence [e.g., Den Marienkäfer kitzelt vergnügt der Kater; literally: “The ladybug tickles happily the cat ”]. Referential verb-action relations could, in principle, cue the cat-agent and so could non-referential relations via links from the speaker's smile to “happily” and the cat's smile. We examined variation in participants' visual anticipation of the agent before it was mentioned depending on participant age and whether the referentially mediated action depiction or the non-referentially associated speaker smile cued the agent. The action depictions rapidly boosted participants' visual anticipation of the agent, facilitating thematic role assignment in all age groups. By contrast, effects of the non-referentially cued speaker smile emerged in the younger adults only. We outline implications of these findings for processing accounts of the temporally coordinated interplay between listeners' age-dependent language comprehension, their interrogation of the visual context, and visual context influences. (shrink)

Recent philosophy of memory tends to treat confabulation as a distinctive type of representational error, marked by reference failure, often via direct analogy with the traditional conception of sensory hallucination. I argue that this model misrepresents the phenomenon. Drawing on the empirical possibility of referential confabulation—wherein confabulators mnemically refer to events in their past—I argue that mnemic reference and genuine remembering come apart. This, in particular, challenges causalist theories for which one element—appropriate causation—purports to secure reference and to separate (...) genuine remembering from confabulation. Acknowledging referential confabulation requires causalists to complicate their story in a way that has implications on what remembering is. More generally, referential confabulation prompts a broader rethinking of memory error debates. Rather than being a distinctive type of content-level error, confabulation is better characterised as a processing malfunction: a breakdown in strategic retrieval and monitoring, but not necessarily in referential success. Appreciating this calls us to aim at a more nuanced conception of remembering and its frailties. (shrink)

I argue that the contextualist account of the referential/attributive interpretation of definite descriptions, presented by Recanati and Bezuidehnout and based on the idea that definite descriptions are semantically underdetermined and in need of completion through optional top-down pragmatic processes, suffers from an explanatory gap. I defend the contextualist view but hold that the determination of the content of definite descriptions is a mandatory, linguistically driven process based on saturation rather than on optional pragmatic processes.

How do infants disaggregate referential and affective pitch?

The general consensus emerging from decades of empirical investigation of metaphor processing is that, when appropriately contextualised, metaphorically used language is no more demanding of processing effort than literally used language. However, there is a small number of studies which contradict this position, notably Noveck, Bianco, and Castry (2001): they maintain that relevance-based pragmatic theory predicts increased cognitive costs incurred in deriving the extra effects that metaphors typically yield, and they provide experimental results that support this prediction. In (...) our study, we first surveyed and assessed the tasks and stimulus materials of many experiments on metaphor processing from the 1970's to the present day. The most telling result was an apparent disparity between the processing of metaphorical language used predicatively versus referentially. We then ran two self-paced reading experiments to test our hypothesis that when used as a predicate, metaphorical language is no more costly than literal language, but when used referentially, it does incur extra costs, even given a preceding biasing context. In the first experiment, all metaphorical referring expressions were in subject position so occurred early in the sentence; in the second experiment, we controlled for any effect of sentence position by placing metaphorical referring expressions in object position, thus later in the sentence, similar to the predicate metaphors. In both cases, metaphorical referring incurred significantly greater costs relative to literal equivalents than did metaphorical predication, with no effect of sentence position. We end with a brief analysis of why the referential use of metaphor is special and effort-demanding. (shrink)

This contribution investigates the idea that an act of signification can be understood in terms of the self-referentiality that is typical of the biological organization. The capacity of a living being to interpret and appreciate its own environment can be understood as being grounded in its ability to perform self-referential experiences. We may call this the living being’s capacity of sense. In any act that generates sense, it is possible to distinguish a process of signification from its outcome, but (...) such a distinction between logical levels inevitably demands an external observer’s point of view. Hence, the concept of ‘subjectivity’ can be defined in terms of an absence of such distinction between logical levels. This absence is considered pivotal both for the self-referential organization of the living and for the generation of sense. A case example from the field of psychotherapy is added to illustrate the distinction as well as the non-distinction between logical levels of description. (shrink)

We examine metonymy at psycho- and neurolinguistic levels, seeking to adjudicate between two possible processing implementations. We compare highly conventionalized systematic metonymy to lesser-conventionalized circumstantial metonymy. Whereas these two metonymy types differ in terms of contextual demands, they each reveal a similar dependency between the named and intended conceptual entities. We reason that if each metonymy yields a distinct processing time course and substantially non-overlapping preferential localization pattern, it would not only support a two-mechanism view but would suggest (...) that conventionalization acts as a linguistic categorizer. By contrast, a similar behavior in time course and localization would support a one-mechanism view and the inference that conventionalization acts instead as a modulator of contextual felicitousness, and that differences in interpretation introduced by conventionalization are of degree, not of kind. Results from three paradigms: self-paced reading, event-related potentials, and functional magnetic resonance imaging, reveal the following: no main effect by condition for either metonymy type immediately after the metonymy trigger, and a main effect for only the Circumstantial metonymy one word post-trigger ; a N400 effect across metonymy types and a late positivity for Circumstantial metonymy ; and a highly overlapping activation connecting the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Altogether, the pattern observed does not reach the threshold required to justify a two-mechanism system. Instead, the pattern is more naturally understood as resulting from the implementation of a generalized referential dependency mechanism, modulated by degree of context dependence/conventionalization, thus supporting architectures of language whereby “lexical” and “pragmatic” meaning relations are encoded along a cline of contextual underspecification. (shrink)

In the previous chapters, I have analysed some empirical evidence in favour of the proposed distinction between inferential and referential competence and I have outlined a neurocognitive model supporting this distinction at the level of the human brain. In this conclusive chapter, I shall discuss an important potential complication for this general picture, namely the alleged involvement of referential (visual) cortex during inferential tasks, especially when concrete, highly imageable stimuli (words, sentences) are involved in the tasks. According to (...) a popular view, such involvement might reflect (visual) imagery/simulation processes that are essential to language. This would have critical implications for the theory assessed in this book: the cognitive autonomy of inferential competence and referential competence would have to be significantly weakened. In the present chapter, contrary to this popular view, I shall argue that the involvement of referential visual (and perceptual) cortex in inferential tasks should not be overstated. (shrink)

Beliefs about diverse status characteristics have a common core content of performance capacities and qualities made up of two features: hierarchy (superior/inferior capacities) and role-differentiation (instrumental/expressive qualities). Whatever the status characteristic, its more-valued state tends to be defined as superior and instrumental, and the less-valued state tends to be defined as inferior but expressive. We account for this in terms of the typification of differences in behavioral inequalities and profiles that emerge in task oriented social interaction. Status construction theory argues (...) that new configurations of the states of a nonvalued discriminating characteristic, status values, and status typifications of actors possessing these states arise from a similar process. The theory we present here makes new predictions on the construction and institutionalization of status characteristics and generalized beliefs about the relation of status characteristics to social rewards, called referential structures. This theory, we argue, integrates micro and macro elements in a way that may be applicable to explaining the social construction of cultural objects more generally. (shrink)

Non-classical logic via approximation of self-referential sentences by dynamical systems are consistently presented. The new 6-valued truth values (here A=Liar, V=TruthTeller) are presented as a function of the classical truth values xi ∈ {0,1}, which resulted in a philosophical standpoint known as Suszko’s Thesis. Three-valued truth tables were created corresponding to Priest’s tables of the same name. In the process of constructing 4-valued truth tables, two more new truth values (va, av) were revealed that do not coincide with the (...) four original ones. Therefore, the closed tables turned out to be 6-valued. Prof Dunn’s 4-valued truth tables are compared with our 4-valued truth tables. De Morgan’s laws are confirmed by six-valued truth tables. Constructed 3-, 4- and 6-valued lattices obeying De Morgan’s laws. (shrink)

Phrasal semantics is concerned with how the meaning of a sentence is composed both from the meaning of the constituent words, and from extra meaning contained within the structural organization of the sentence itself. In this context, grammatical constructions correspond to form-meaning mappings that essentially capture this “extra” meaning and allow its representation. The current research examines how a computational model of language processing based on a construction grammar approach can account for aspects of descriptive, referential and information (...) content of phrasal semantics. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness often treat experience as a state, property, or representational structure instantiated at a time. This paper argues that this shared assumption underlies persistent explanatory problems, including the Hard Problem, the explanatory gap, and functionalist equivalence objections such as the unfolding argument. It proposes instead Computational Dynamic Monism (CDM), a process-metaphysical framework according to which phenomenal consciousness is constituted by temporally extended, hierarchically self-referential delay coordinate embedding (DCE) in plastic recurrent neural networks. The experiential and the (...) dynamical are not two things requiring a bridge, but one thing accessed via different epistemic routes. CDM departs from standard type-B physicalism by reconceiving consciousness as a process rather than a property: a reconception that dissolves the Hard Problem by denying the separation between process and phenomenal character that the snapshot view presupposes. The paper defends CDM against the explanatory gap objection, the conceivability argument, and the knowledge argument; establishes through converging arguments that consciousness requires temporal extension; and shows how CDM survives the unfolding argument that threatens static structural theories. The threshold problem - which processes are conscious - is addressed through a self-reference criterion for subjectivity. Building on the State Space Theory of Consciousness, the account integrates insights from dynamical systems theory, neuroscience, and process philosophy. It distinguishes the metaphysical framework (CDM) from the specific mechanism (DCE), and yields principled constraints on artificial systems capable of conscious experience. (shrink)

Binding theory (e.g., Chomsky, 1981) has played a central role in both syntactic theory and models of language processing. Its constraints are designed to predict that the referential domains of pronouns and reflexives are nonoverlapping, that is, are complementary; these constraints are also thought to play a role in online reference resolution. The predictions of binding theory and its role in sentence processing were tested in four experiments that monitored participants' eye movements as they followed spoken instructions (...) to have a doll touch a picture belonging to another doll. The instructions used pronouns and reflexives embedded in picture noun phrases (PNPs) containing possessor phrases (e.g., Pick up Ken. Have Ken touch Harry's picture of himself). Although the interpretations assigned to pronouns were generally consistent with binding theory, reflexives were frequently assigned interpretations that violated binding theory. In addition, the timing and pattern of eye movements were inconsistent with models of language processing that assume that binding theory acts as an early filter to restrict the referential domain. The interpretations assigned to reflexives in PNPs with possessors suggest that they are binding‐theory‐exempt logophors, a conclusion that unifies the treatment of reflexives in PNPs. (shrink)

It has long ben recognised that there are referential uses of definite descriptions. It is not as widely recognised that there are atttributives uses of idexicals and other such paradigmatically singular terms. I offer an account of the referential/attributive distinction which is intended to give a unified treatment of both sorts of cases. I argue that the best way to account for the referential/attributive distinction is to treat is as semantically underdetermined which sort of propositions is expressed (...) in a context. In certain contexts the proposition expressed will be a descriptive one, and in others it will be an object-dependent one. I appeal to Sperer and Wilson's (1986) idea that the recovery of the content of an utterance involves pragmatic processes of enrichment of a representation of the logical form of utterance. According to the account I offer, the first-level descriptive meaning associated with an expression (whether this is an indexical or a definite description) is pragmatically enriched and then used either to track an individual in the context, or is taken to lay down a condition of satisfaction for an individual. The proposition that the listener takes the speaker to have expressed is recovered on the basis of considerations of relevance and contextually available information about the speaker's directive intentions. Although my account has affinities with those of Recanati (1993) and Nunberg (1993), it also differs from theirs in crucial ways. Each of these authors sees asymmetries where I see none. I give reasons for preferring my symmetrical account. (shrink)

The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want (...) to do something similar replacing the Kripkean sets of grounded true sentences with revision-theoretic sets of stable true sentences. This can be done by defining a monotone operator through a variant of van Fraassen’s supervaluation scheme which is simply based on ω-length iterations of the Tarskian operator. Clearly, all virtues of Kripke-style theories are preserved, and we can also prove that the resulting set of “grounded” true sentences shares some nice features with the sets of stable true sentences which are provided by the usual ways of formalising revision. What is expected is that a clearer philosophical content could be associated to this way of doing revision; hopefully, a content directly linked with the insights underlying finite revision processes. (shrink)

Previous research reported that in processing structurally ambiguous sentences comprehenders often preserve an initial incorrect analysis even after adopting a correct analysis following structural disambiguation. One criticism is that the sentences tested in previous studies involved referential ambiguity and allowed comprehenders to make inferences about the initial interpretation using pragmatic information, suggesting the possibility that the initial analysis persisted due to comprehenders' pragmatic inference but not to their failure to perform complete reanalysis of the initial misanalysis. Our study (...) investigated this by testing locally ambiguous relative clause sentences in Japanese, in which the initial misinterpretation contradicts the correct interpretation. Our study using a self-paced reading technique demonstrated evidence for the persistence of the initial analysis with this structure. The results from an eye-tracking study further suggested that the phenomenon directly reflected the amount of support given to the initial incorrect analysis prior to disambiguating information: The more supported the incorrect main clause analysis was, the more likely comprehenders were to preserve the analysis even after the analysis was falsified. Our results thus demonstrated that the preservation of the initial analysis occurs not due to referential ambiguities but to comprehenders' difficulty to fully revise the highly supported initial interpretation. (shrink)

Both classic thought experiments and recent empirical evidence suggest that children frequently encounter new words whose meanings are underdetermined by the extralinguistic contexts in which they occur. The role that these referentially ambiguous events play in children's word learning is central to ongoing debates in the field. Do children learn words from referentially ambiguous events via an incremental learning process? Or, do children learn words primarily from the rare referentially transparent events they experience? Across two experiments with adults as model (...) word learners, the current work asks whether the answer to these questions depends in part on how word learning is assessed. Participants were asked to learn the meanings of novel words solely from their referentially ambiguous contexts. When learning was assessed by asking participants to identify the exact meanings of those novel words, participants struggled mightily. However, when learning was assessed by asking the same participants to identify which of two new contexts the novel word most likely occurred in, even those who failed the exact meaning assessment succeeded. These data suggest that although referentially ambiguous events may fall short in allowing learners to identify a word's exact meaning, they nevertheless lead learners into the right regions of semantic space. These findings are a reminder of the pervasiveness of partial word learning effects in vocabulary acquisition and highlight that the resolution to the debate over the role of referentially ambiguous events in learning may depend on how learning is defined. (shrink)

Despite significant efforts to support those bereaved by intrauterine death, they remain susceptible to avoidable psychological harm such as disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and emotional shock. This is in part because the words available to describe intrauterine death—“miscarriage,” “spontaneous abortion,” and “pregnancy loss”—are referentially ambiguous. Despite appearing to refer to one event, they can refer to two distinct events: the baby’s death and his preterm delivery. Disenfranchised grief increases when people understand “miscarriage” as the physical process of preterm delivery alone, (...) for this obscures the baby’s death and excludes non-gestational parents, such as the father. Additionally, focusing on the delivery reinforces the mistaken idea that a gestational mother bears responsibility for her baby’s death, increasing misplaced guilt. When these terms instead shift the focus to the baby’s intrauterine death rather than the preterm delivery, they can obscure the physically difficult and often traumatic experience women have when they deliver their dead children, leaving women shocked by preterm delivery’s physical reality. Given their outsized role in framing the bereaved’s experiences, and their duty to avoid harming their patients, healthcare practitioners in particular should take special care to discuss intrauterine death and preterm delivery appropriately with patients and their families. Changing language to describe intrauterine death and preterm delivery clearly and precisely helps mitigate disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and shock, while also helping to reframe the social response to intrauterine death, making it more obvious why certain steps, such as allowing bereavement leave following an intrauterine death, promote healing. (shrink)

All information results from a process, intrinsic to living beings, of info-autopoiesis or information self-production; a sensory commensurable, self-referential feedback process immanent to Bateson’s ‘difference which makes a difference’. To highlight and illustrate the fundamental nature of the info-autopoietic process, initially, two simulations based on one-parameter feedback are presented. The first, simulates a homeostatic control mechanism (thermostat) which is representative of a mechanistic, cybernetic system with very predictable dynamics, fully dependent on an external referent. The second, simulates a homeorhetic (...) process, inherent to biological systems, illustrating a self-referenced, autonomous system. Further, the active incorporation/interference of viral particles by prokaryotic cells and the activation of CRISPR-Cas can be understood as info-autopoiesis at the most fundamental cellular level, as well as constituting a planetary network of self-referenced information. Moreover, other examples of the info-autopoietic nature of information are presented to show the generality of its applicability. In short, info-autopoiesis is a recursive process that is sufficiently generic to be the only basis for information in nature: from the single cell, to multi-cellular organisms, to consideration of all types of natural and non-natural phenomena, including tools and artificial constructions. (shrink)

Referential gaze has been shown to benefit language processing in situated communication in terms of shifting visual attention and leading to shorter reaction times on subsequent tasks. The present study simultaneously assessed both visual attention and, importantly, the immediate cognitive load induced at different stages of sentence processing. We aimed to examine the dynamics of combining visual and linguistic information in creating anticipation for a specific object and the effect this has on language processing. We report (...) evidence from three visual‐world eye‐tracking experiments, showing that referential gaze leads to a shift in visual attention toward the cued object, which consequently lowers the effort required for processing the linguistic reference. Importantly, perceiving and following the gaze cue did not prove costly in terms of cognitive effort, unless the cued object did not fit the verb selectional preferences. (shrink)

The association between brooding and reflection, components of rumination, and attentional control, was examined using a novel executive attention task. Participants (n=156) self-encoded words from two semantic categories by providing autobiographical memories involving the words. They subsequently classified the self-encoded and non-self encoded (new) words into the two semantic categories. The degree to which stimuli self-encoding interfered with semantic classification was used as a measure of attentional control impairment. Whereas brooding was positively associated with attentional impairment, reflection was negatively associated (...) with such impairment. These associations were not attributable to current depression levels or to differences in the nature (valence and meaningfulness) of the autobiographical memories generated by participants. These findings emphasise the importance of self-referential processing biases in rumination. (shrink)