An action is unratifiable when, on the assumption that one performs it, another option has higher expected utility. Unratifiable actions are often claimed to be somehow rationally defective. But in some cases where multiple options are unratifiable, one unratifiable option can still seem preferable to another. We should respond, I argue, by invoking a graded notion of ratifiability.

We formalize Jeffrey's (1983) notion of ratifiability and show that the resulting formal structure can be obtained more directly by means of a theory of counterfactual beliefs. One implication is that, under the appropriate formalizations, together with certain restrictions on beliefs, Bayesian decision theory and causal decision theory coincide.

On 20 May 2025, the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted the Pandemic Agreement at the World Health Assembly in Geneva. After nearly three years of negotiations and after failing to adopt it in 2024, this is a decisive step towards more combined efforts to address future pandemics. The final text of the treaty highlights the need for equitable access to pandemic-related health products and aims to improve the ability of international health regulators to guide countries during future pandemics. There is (...) hope that by learning from mistakes made during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Agreement can be used to address global inequities and make globally equitable resource sharing the norm, preventing harmful practices, such as vaccine hoarding and barriers to data sharing. However, while the current Pandemic Agreement puts equitable access to surveillance, therapeutics, vaccines, and other pandemic-related products at the forefront, many important questions are yet to be answered. The authors of this paper draw attention to ethics preparedness efforts. The piece considers the importance of building the necessary infrastructure for the provision of ethical advice on health-related matters as part of the implementation phases of the WHO Pandemic Agreement to ensure that we learn from the mistakes made during the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

Sufficient conditions are given under which ratifiable acts exist.

In recent years, “deliberation” has become the byword of many political theorists, most of whom identify deliberation with reasoned conversation. Among the most forceful advocates of deliberation as conversation are Jürgen Habermas and, to a greater or lesser extent, his successors who style themselves “deliberative democrats.” For them, the more political decision‐making approximates the ideal of a reasoned public conversation among free and equal individuals, the more legitimate and rational it will be. “Outcomes,” they say are democratically legitimate if and (...) only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals. Their deliberative model produces more rational decision‐making, they say, because it conveys information, impels individuals to order their preferences coherently, and by making persons articulate good reasons in public leads them “to think from the standpoint of all involved.”. (shrink)

Defenders of sophisticated evidential decision theory (EDT) have argued (1) that its failure to provide correct recommendations in problems where the agent believes himself asymmetrically fallible in executing his choices is no flaw of the theory, and (2) that causal decision theory gives incorrect recommendations in certain examples unless it is supplemented with an additional metatickle or ratifiability deliberation mechanism. In the first part of this paper, I argue that both positions are incorrect. In the second part of the (...) paper, I show how the agent's preferences involved in standard counterexamples to EDT, such as Newcomb's problem, violate the Jeffrey/Bolker preference axioms, specifically the Impartiality axiom. (shrink)

On "Revolutionary Road": A Proposal for Extending the Gricean Model of Communication to Cover Multiple HearersThe paper addresses the problem of multiple hearers in the context of the Gricean model of communication, which is based on speaker meaning and the Cooperative Principle, together with its subordinate maxims, legitimately flouted to yield implicatures. Grice appears to have conceived of the communicative process as taking place between two interlocutors, assuming that the speaker communicates meanings, while the hearer makes compatible inferences. A thesis (...) propounded here is that this dyadic account must undergo a number of fundamental modifications to cover a variety of hearer types, both ratified and unratified, partaking in polylogic interactions. (shrink)

After ratifying the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014, Japan became the focus of an initial review designed to assess the quality of the newly implemented measures. One of the points that particularly caught the attention of UN Commissioners concerned Article 19 on independent living. This paper examines the opportunities and practicalities of independent living for people with disabilities in Japan, particularly those with intellectual disabilities who are still mostly supported by their families. The notion of (...) “independent living” and associated concepts of support emerged in the 1970s under the impetus of a group of people with multiple disabilities. After tracing this development, an overview of the living conditions of disabled people in Japan is presented, based on available statistical data, along with a brief description of the regulatory provisions and services supporting independent living. Finally, the analysis of a qualitative survey conducted people with mental disabilities experiencing independent living highlights the crucial roles of parents who are still often reluctant to their children living independently, underlining the importance of access to information. (shrink)

Ratifying Haeckel and contradicting Kant’s negative prophesy, in this paper I try to show that Darwin was, really, the Newton of the blade of grass. Darwin showed how the configurations according to goals of the living beings, could be explained from a naturalistic point of view, without having to postulate the existence of an intentional agent that had arranged or prearranged then. This achievement, nevertheless, was obtained by a way that Kant could not foresee and that Haeckel could not understand: (...) Darwin came there showing that there was more natural science than that Newton, Kant and Haeckel could conceive. (shrink)

Saudi Arabia has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, it has made general reservations to the effect that where there is a conflict between a Convention article and Islamic Law principles, Islamic Law shall have precedence. The family law rights of women and children in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been criticised for not reaching the standards set by CEDAW and CRC. This (...) article looks at the internationally set standards of these rights and compares them with the Family Law rules of Islamic Law as applied in Saudi Arabia. The applications in Saudi Arabia are then examined by looking at certain practices, case judgments and recent developments in the country in this field. Amongst these developments are the first case in which a Saudi judge annuls a child's marriage, the first death sentence declared on a father who abused his daughter causing her death, and the Saudi Divorce Initiative which aims to educate women and call for the protection of their rights during marriage and after its dissolution. The article stresses that despite the many improvements, there remains a need for codifying the Islamic Law of Personal Status in Saudi Arabia as this measure would be the basis that defines and protects the rights of women and children in Family Law. (shrink)

Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predetermines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be performed, but she does have some power over whether it is performed. Call this (...) the ratification theory of uptake. Several philosophers have recently endorsed an alternative theory of uptake, according to which the hearer can determine the nature of the act the speaker performs. According to this theory, if the hearer regards an utterance as illocutionary act y, then it is act y, even if the speaker intended to perform act x. Call this the constitution theory of uptake. The purported advantage of this theory is that it identifies a common but underanalysed way in which speakers can be silenced. I argue that despite its initial intuitive pull, the constitution theory of uptake should be rejected. It is incompatible with ordinary intuitions about speech, it entails a conceptual impossibility, and it has unsavoury political implications, entailing that marginalised speakers barely qualify as agents. (shrink)

Constitutivism argues that the source of the categorical force of the norms of rationality and morality lies in the constitutive features of agency. A systematic failure to be guided by these norms would amount to a loss or lack of agency. Since we cannot but be agents, we cannot but be unconditionally guided by these norms. The constitutivist strategy has been challenged by David Enoch. He argues that our participation in agency is optional and thus cannot be a source of (...) categorical demands. In this paper, I defend the viability of constitutivism by showing that agency is indeed a special ‘inescapable’ enterprise. Agency has the largest jurisdiction, and it is closed under rational assessment. This inescapability does not exempt constitutivism from raising the question whether agents have reason to be agents, but this question has to be taken up within agency. If this question is answered affirmatively, then—I argue—the criteria of practical correctness are self-ratifying in a non-circular way. This is sufficient to show the viability of the constitutivist strategy. Whether agents have conclusive reasons to be agents, however, is a matter to be addressed in the terms of particular versions of constitutivism. (shrink)

This article addresses uncertainties over authorship in the age of generative AI by developing the theoretical underpinnings of a systematic approach to attributing authorship in visual art practices involving generative AI, which build on the workings of multiple agents and technologies. By using an analytic philosophical methodology to analyze the practices and key concepts under discussion it is clarified what is meant by authorship in these practices and what kind of works are at stake. As this analysis finds, authorship becomes (...) complicated in these practices not just because of the non-deterministic workings of generative AI systems, but because the works under discussion can be viewed on the one hand as the outputs of generative AI systems and on the other as works of AI art, including kinds referred to here as “synthetic images”. Importantly, authorship in the latter case requires intentionality and autonomy from agents to both initiate the creative process and ratify, or evaluate, the work as theirs, something that only humans can do at this point. Nevertheless, the dependence of synthetic images on AI-generated images means that in attributing authorship in the practices under discussion, we ought to account for the dual identity of these items and, accordingly, the different forms of authorship and contributions attached to them. This dual approach, it is demonstrated, provides the tools to assess when the potentially many and varied figures involved in these practices should count as authors, or other kinds of contributors, and facilitates more rewarding appreciation of the artworks. (shrink)

Practically every contemporary mainstream scientist presumes that all aspects of mind are generated by brain activity. We demonstrate the inadequacy of this picture by assembling evidence for a variety of empirical phenomena which it cannot explain. We further show that an alternative picture developed by F. W. H. Myers and William James successfully accommodates these phenomena, ratifies the common sense view of ourselves as causally effective conscious agents, and is fully compatible with contemporary physics and neuroscience.

In this paper, I motivate a puzzle about epistemic rationality. On the one hand, there seems to be something problematic about frequently changing your mind. On the other hand, changing your mind once is often permissible. Why do one-off changes of mind seem rationally permissible, even admirable, while constant changes seem quintessentially irrational? The puzzle of fickleness is to explain this asymmetry. To solve the puzzle, I propose and defend the Ratifiable Reasoning Account. According to this solution, as agents redeliberate, (...) they gain two types of evidence. First, they gain inductive evidence that they will not stably settle their belief. Second, this inductive evidence affords higher-order evidence that they are unreliable at assessing the matter at hand. The fact that fickle agents gain this higher-order evidence explains why fickleness can be epistemically—not just practically—irrational. In addition to solving the puzzle, my account captures a wide range of contextual factors that are relevant for our judgments. (shrink)

Introduction -- Foundationalism versus coherentism : a dichotomy disclaimed -- Foundationalism undermined -- Coherentism discomposed -- Foundherentism articulated -- The evidence of the senses : refutations and conjectures -- Naturalism disambiguated -- The evidence against reliabilism -- Revolutionary scientism subverted -- Vulgar pragmatism : an unedifying prospect -- Foundherentism ratified -- Selected essays -- "Know" is just a four-letter word -- Knowledge and propaganda : reflections of an old feminist -- "The ethics of belief" reconsidered -- Epistemology legalized : or, (...) truth, justice, and the American way. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the asymmetrical mediated communication of the broad democratic public sphere can profitably be understood through the lens of deliberative democracy only if we adopt a system approach to deliberation. A system approach, however, often introduces a division of labor between ordinary citizens and experts. Although this division of labor is unavoidable and I believe compatible with a deliberative principle of legitimacy, it flirts with elitist theories of democracy: epistemic elites come up with the agendas, (...) ideas, and policy positions and democratic publics ratify or repudiate the agendas but do not generate or really engage with them. This I argue would violate an essential defining feature of deliberative democracy, namely that epistemic quality and equal participation are tightly linked. I turn to Habermas and his idea of a feedback loop as a possible solution to this dilemma. (shrink)

Seeking a decision theory that can handle both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory, some philosophers recently have turned to ‘graded ratifiability’. However, the graded ratifiability approach to decision theory is, despite its virtues, unsatisfactory; for it conflicts with the platitude that it is always rationally permissible for an agent to knowingly choose their best option.

Torture used to be incompatible with American values. Our Bill of Rights forbids cruel and unusual punishment, and that has come to include all forms of corporal punishment except prison and death by methods purported to be painless. Americans and our government have historically condemned states that torture; we have granted asylum or refuge to those who fear it. The Senate ratified the Convention Against Torture, Congress enacted antitorture legislation, and judicial opinions spoke of "the dastardly and totally inhuman act (...) of torture.” Then came September 11. (shrink)

The main thesis is that sensory experience is not “predicative” but rather “presentational”, and hence cannot be properly modeled by propositional attitudes to the effect that such and such is the case. Indeed, the propostional attitude model not only (i) mischaracterizes the success conditions of experience, it also (ii) occludes the very thing that makes sensory experience epistemically distinctive. Once we see just how the object-directed and “perceiving-as” states make room for the distinctive epistemic significance of perceptual experience, the newly (...) “discovered” propositional attitude—Exing that _p_—will be seen to be not only an ill-fitting, but an idle, wheel, both internally to the theory of perception and more broadly within epistemology. Experiences, understood as attentive sensory episodes, provide us with awareness of the truthmakers for what we often go on to immediately judge. We are thereby often in a postion to ratify our immediate perceptual judgments on the basis of what we have experienced. This is the epistemic virtue that has been occluded by the now dominant idea that perceptual experience is a non-factive relation to a propositional content. The factive attitude model, reminiscent of John McDowell’s view, is also shown to be an inadequate account of the kind of entitlement perceptual experience delivers. Facts are pleonastic, and are “etiolated” in a way that the things we perceive are not. (shrink)

This book examines the complex relationship between politics and hate speech laws, domestic and international. How do political contexts shape understandings of what hate speech is and how to deal with it? Why do particular states enact hate speech laws and then apply, extend or reform them in the ways they do? What part does hate speech play in international affairs? Why do some but not all states negotiate, agree and ratify international hate speech frameworks or instruments? What are some (...) of the best and worst political arguments for and against hate speech laws? Do political figures have special moral duties to refrain from hate speech? Should the use of hate speech by political figures be protected by parliamentary privilege? Should this sort of hyperpolitical hate speech be subject to the laws of the land, civil and criminal? Or should it instead be handled by parliamentary codes of conduct and procedures or even by political parties themselves? What should the codes of conduct look like? Brown and Sinclair answer these important and overlooked questions on the politics of hate speech laws, providing a substantial body of new evidence, insights, arguments, theories and practical recommendations. The primary focus is on the UK and the US but several other country contexts are also explored and compared in detail, including: Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, India, China, Japan, Turkey, Germany, Hungary and Italy. Methodologically, the two authors draw on approaches and concepts from a range of academic disciplines, including: law and legal theory, political theory, applied ethics, political science and sociology, international relations theory and international law. (shrink)

As a fervent rationalist, Husserl placed considerable emphasis on the delineation of the different levels of reason. Its highest form, he contends, is position-taking (Stellungnahme) understood as a critical stance towards a positional act P. Specifically, such a Stellungnahme is a three-step procedure: the subject, possibly motivated by a passive discordance, starts by questioning P (active doubt); she then seeks to validate P by returning to its originary fulfillment (active search for evidence); finally, she ratifies such a fulfillment in an (...) act of acknowledgment (active decision), thereby making P a permanent personal conviction. In the literature, the role of position-taking in the formation of persons has been aptly emphasized, but insufficient attention has been paid to its intrinsic structure and concrete functioning; furthermore, the few existing studies on this topic are limited to the theoretical domain. The aim of this paper is to fill this twofold gap by providing a comprehensive account of critical Stellungnahme in both the intellectual and the axiological spheres, drawing especially on the manuscripts from the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. The first part examines Stellungnahme in the theoretical realm, underscoring its teleological orientation towards justification and the active role played by the subject in it. The second part shows how this procedure can be extended to rationalize value-experiences, by elucidating the nature of affective evidence and approval (Billigung). Finally, the third part demonstrates how a particular value, that of knowledge, can concretely pass the axiological position-taking and thus be recognized as an actual value. (shrink)

Semantic originalism is a theory of constitutional meaning that aims to disentangle the semantic, legal, and normative strands of debates in constitutional theory about the role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation and construction. This theory affirms four theses: (1) the fixation thesis, (2) the clause meaning thesis, (3) the contribution thesis, and (4) the fidelity thesis. -/- The fixation thesis claims that the semantic content of each constitutional provision is fixed at the time the provision is framed and ratified: (...) subsequent changes in linguistic practice cannot change the semantic content of an utterance. -/- The clause meaning thesis claims that the semantic content is given by the conventional semantic meaning (or original public meaning) of the text with four modifications. The first modification is provided by the publicly available context of constitutional utterance: words and phrases that might be ambiguous in isolation can become clear in light of those circumstances of framing and ratification that could be expected to known to interpreters of the Constitution across time. The second modification is provided by the idea of the division of linguistic labor: some constitutional provisions, such as the natural born citizen clause may be terms of art, the meaning of which are fixed by the usages of experts. The third modification is provided by the idea of constitutional implicature: the constitution may mean things it does not explicitly say. The fourth modification is provided by the idea of constitutional stipulations: the constitution brings into being new terms such as House of Representatives and the meaning of these terms is stipulated by the Constitution itself. -/- The contribution thesis asserts that the semantic content of the Constitution contributes to the law: the most plausible version of the contribution thesis is modest, claiming that the semantic content of the Constitution provides rules of constitutional law, subject to various qualifications. Our constitutional practice provides strong evidence for the modest version of the contribution thesis. -/- The fidelity thesis asserts that we have good reasons to affirm fidelity to constitutional law: virtuous citizens and officials are disposed to act in accord with the Constitution; right acting citizens and officials obey the constitution in normal circumstances; constitutional conformity produces good consequences. Our public political culture affirms the great value of the rule of law. -/- We can summarize semantic originalism as a slogan: The original public meaning of the constitution is the law and for that reason it should be respected and obeyed. The slogan recapitulates each of the claims made by semantic originalism, but it is potentially misleading because it does not clearly distinguish between the semantic claims made by the fixation and clause meaning theses, the legal claim made by the contribution thesis, and the normative claim made by the fidelity thesis. -/- Part I introduces the four theses. Part II is entitled An Opinionated History of Constitutional Originalism, and it provides the context for all that follows. Part III is entitled Semantic Originalism: A Theory of Constitutional Meaning, and it lays out the case for original public meaning as the best nonnormative theory of constitutional content. Part IV is entitled The Normative Implications of Semantic Originalism, and it articulates a variety of normative arguments for originalism. Part V is entitled Conclusion: Semantic Originalism and Living Constitutionalism, and it explores the broad implications of semantic originalism for living constitutionalism and the future of constitutional theory. (shrink)

This text upon the national and universal acceptance of Iranians, may serve as a testament and a sturdy wall against the transgressions of future autocracy. We possess a history and a tendency toward individual rule; however, autocratic rule bears no relation to the Rule of Law. This Covenant does not derive its authority from any parliament; rather, the legitimacy of every future parliament shall be contingent upon its adherence to this Covenant. Should the people ratify this text, we shall be (...) empowered to draft a new Constitution aimed at the preservation and fulfillment of these rights, thereby constructing a democratic future for all the children of Iran. These “Rights” belong to man not to God. Let us forge a new history. A new law signifies a new history! (shrink)

The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy may (...) be selected, and (2) under conditions of perfect correlation a strictly efficient strategy must be selected. (shrink)

The article discusses ways of developing bioethical guidance in the Orthodox Christian discourse. Here, “ethical” refers to what contributes to holiness, “un-ethical” refers to sin as what hinders man’s foundational calling to holiness. To explore the development of guidance for emerging bioethical issues, we use the “therapeutic” understanding of treatment for sin in two senses. (1) It refers to the spiritual means provided by the “hospital” of the Orthodox Church for healing the fallenness of human nature in general; and (2) (...) it helps identify in particular cases both what counts as transgression of unconditional boundaries (defining what is illicit for everyone) and what is advisable in order to help particular persons to choose rightly within the area of the “more or less licit” (or “permissible”). Sources of the Orthodox faith that frame the general understanding of the boundaries between the permissible and the impermissible reflect the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church framing her Sacred (Holy) Tradition. In Holy Tradition, prayers, as communion with God, occupy a central position. This is why Orthodox moral reasoning, and thus also Orthodox bioethics, takes the form of liturgical bioethics. Penalties of excommunication determine hard boundaries that believers should not overstep: when crossing such boundaries, they enter on a spiritually dangerous path that completely distracts them away from God. Many minor sins, by contrast, have not been codified in Canons. They are not taken to remove the sinner completely from contact with the Lord. Within this realm of actions, it depends on a person’s spiritual maturity whether such actions are classified as sinful. Thus, an act can be counted merely as a small offense if committed by a beginner, while that same act can become a grave sin for an advanced believer. Due to acceleration of the technological progress, Orthodox recourse to Holy Tradition encounters ever-new challenges. There are bioethical issues that had not surfaced at the time of the Fathers of the Church. Today, Bishops gathered at a local council can supply the guidance lacking on a newly emerging bioethical problem. Even if ratified only by such local councils, the resulting decrees can also be regarded as the expression of the Holy Spirit working within a local Church and conveying His guidance. The article illustrates this source of Christian bioethics by reference to how the Russian Orthodox Church orients and develops its position on the ethics of reproductive technologies. (shrink)

The most prominent philosophical defenders of indigenous rights have been egalitarian liberals such as Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten. Libertarians, on the other hand, are often critical of such arrangements. Given the prevalence of this view, it is natural to think that no form of libertarianism is compatible with a distinct set of legal rights for native people. But the work of one of libertarianism's most distinguished defenders is striking in the degree to which it ratifies the liberal case for (...) indigenous rights. In support of this claim, I offer a reconstruction of arguments drawn from the work of Robert Nozick. I start with his libertarian framework for utopia and the many ways in which it legitimizes separate and distinct native communities. I then note how any state, even a minimal one, inevitably places indigenous minorities at a disadvantage. Given this, Nozick's libertarianism lends support to the liberal conception of native rights as a form of compensation for state-imposed disadvantage. I justify this claim by noting how a libertarian principle of compensation overlaps with and validates the understanding of compensation that features in the liberal rationale for native rights. While my primary motivation is to bolster the legitimacy of indigenous rights, I also hope to show how the aspects of libertarianism that vindicate such rights have bearing on broader debates about Nozick's work. Charles Mills, for example, has argued that Nozick's libertarianism displays a colonialist mindset, one that Mills takes to be representative of Anglo-American political philosophy as a whole. That fact that libertarianism lends support to a theory of indigenous rights suggests that it does not suffer from this and other charges. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Belgium legalised voluntary euthanasia in 2002, thus ending the long isolation of the Netherlands as the only country in which doctors could openly give lethal injections to patients who have requested help in dying. Meanwhile in Oregon, in the United States, doctors may prescribe drugs for terminally ill patients, who can use them to end their life – if they are able to swallow and digest them. But despite President Bush's oft‐repeated statements that his philosophy is to ‘trust individuals (...) to make the right decisions’ and his opposition to ‘distant bureaucracies’, his administration is doing its best to prevent Oregonians acting in accordance with a law that its voters have twice ratified. The situation regarding voluntary euthanasia around the world is therefore very much in flux. This essay reviews ethical arguments regarding voluntary euthanasia and physician‐assisted suicide from a utilitarian perspective. I shall begin by asking why it is normally wrong to kill an innocent person, and whether these reasons apply to aiding a person who, when rational and competent, asks to be killed or given the means to commit suicide. Then I shall consider more specific utilitarian arguments for and against permitting voluntary euthanasia. (shrink)

Andy Egan has recently produced a set of alleged counterexamples to causal decision theory in which agents are forced to decide among causally unratifiable options, thereby making choices they know they will regret. I show that, far from being counterexamples, CDT gets Egan's cases exactly right. Egan thinks otherwise because he has misapplied CDT by requiring agents to make binding choices before they have processed all available information about the causal consequences of their acts. I elucidate CDT in a way (...) that makes it clear where Egan goes wrong, and which explains why his examples pose no threat to the theory. My approach has similarities to a modification of CDT proposed by Frank Arntzenius, but it differs in the significance that it assigns to potential regrets. I maintain, contrary to Arntzenius, that an agent facing Egan's decisions can rationally choose actions that she knows she will later regret. All rationality demands of agents it that they maximize unconditional causal expected utility from an epistemic perspective that accurately reflects all the available evidence about what their acts are likely to cause. This yields correct answers even in outlandish cases in which one is sure to regret whatever one does. (shrink)

To identify the place of religious pluralism in democratic political discourse, this chapter refocuses on the purported normative authority of religious claims, providing a philosophical analysis of its features and implications. Bagnoli proposes an account of religious authority as a variety of normative authority, whose distinctive features are the independence of epistemic proof, the unconditionality and universality of its foundational claims, and the obligations based on membership. Bagnoli then considers whether and how the appeal to religious authority could contribute to (...) the process of rational justification in political discourse in contexts marked by divisive religious disagreements. To this purpose, she adopts a constructivist approach, which takes rational justification to be “public,” that is, addressed to others as having equal normative standing. Bagnoli takes reasoning to be productive and transforming: it does not merely manage conflicts by ratifying overlapping reasons but generates new forms of rational agency. Radically departing from current debates, Bagnoli argues that we should reconceive of public reason dynamically, rather than as a static concept. In the third part, Bagnoli points out and illustrates how constructivism may help provide a suitable normative framework for interfaith dialogue and normative adjustments. (shrink)

“[A]ny truly neutral state,” writes George Sher in this important and timely new book, “must needlessly cut its citizens off from important goods”. For that reason, he argues, liberal neutrality, the view that government must remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good life, is indefensible. There is, moreover, a uniquely best, rationally defensible conception of the good life—not a subjective view that insists that all value depends on satisfying actual or hypothetical desires, but an objective view that recognizes that (...) some value depends on the realization of certain broad capacities that humans share. However, this objective or perfectionist view, as Sher calls it, is not communitarian, since it rejects the idea that society’s history or conventions must ratify its values or that civic participation or engagement in common projects must be among its recommendations. It is a liberal perfectionism, since it requires procedural and substantive liberal rights and recognizes that there are many different ways of realizing the human capacities whose exercise generates value. Hence, although government may legitimately promote the good, “the ability to promote the good is not all-or-nothing”. (shrink)

This special issue deals with anthropogenic climate change, which represents an urgent normative challenge. Carbon emissions that humans produce mainly through their consumption of relatively cheap fossil fuels are causing dangerous climate change, that is, climate change that threatens present and future people’s ability to lead decent lives. While the international community has been acknowledging the existence of dangerous climate trends since 1990 (when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published its first report), various initiatives designed to launch a coherent (...) international climate policy have systematically been failing until very recently. The UN climate change conference – which concluded its work in Paris in December 2015 – does, however, give us some grounds for hope. The Paris Agreement, published on December 12th 2015, consists in a global commitment to limit the rise in global temperatures to less than 2 degrees Celsius. The pact will become binding once 55 parties who produce over 55% of the world’s greenhouse gases ratify it. The Paris Agreement is the first global pact on climate change to enjoy unanimous consensus, yet doubts about its effectiveness and success conditions remain. Furthermore, to determine the shape that our global climate policies should take, persistent normative disagreements need to be settled. These include, crucially, disagreements on how the burdens and costs of climate change mitigation, as envisaged by the Paris Agreement, should be distributed. After all, how to go about addressing dangerous climate change touches upon several disputed normative questions. And this is where this special issue intervenes. The issue includes contributions from Elizabeth Cripps, Dale Jamieson, Anja Karnein, Darrel Moellendorf, and Henry Shue. (shrink)

The notion of ‘illocutionary silencing’ has been given a key role in defining the harms of pornography by several feminist philosophers. Though the literature on silencing focuses almost exclusively on the speech act of sexual refusal, oddly enough, it lacks a thorough analysis of that very act. My first aim is to fill this theoretical gap. I claim that refusals are “second-turn illocutions”: they cannot be accomplished in absence of a previous interrogative (or open) call by the hearer. Furthermore, I (...) maintain that refusals constitute authoritative illocutions only when preceded by requests for permission. The secondary goal of my paper is to assess Mary Kate McGowan’s (2009) account of silencing as authority denial. Despite its virtues, I argue that ultimately it should be rejected on two grounds: (i) it entails an objectification of female sexuality; (ii) if sexual advances are requests for permission (as McGowan implies), a man who asks a woman for sex cannot fail to ratify her authority over her own body. I conclude by sketching an alternative explanation for the failure of women’s refusals, according to which women may be unable to refuse sex for their interlocutors’ advances are intended as imperative (or closed) calls. (shrink)

This essay examines the function of the concept of human dignity (both as an inherent feature of human existence and as an ideal achievement) in the United Nations's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It explains why the key framers of the document affirmed an inherent human dignity in order to provide an explanatory basis for the validity of universal human rights while eschewing any religious or metaphysical justification for this affirmation. It argues that the key framers, while aware of (...) the Christian anthropology informing the modern Western concept of the dignity of the person, grasped (1) that the Declaration, to be ratifiable, would need to be free of religious reference, and also (2) that the notion of inherency suffices to suggest heuristically not only a universal human nature but also, crucially, a transcendent reality in which all persons participate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Theory of International Bioethics: The Negotiable and the Non-NegotiableRobert Baker (bio)AbstractThe preceding article in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal presents the argument that “moral fundamentalism,” the position that international bioethics rests on “basic” or “fundamental” moral principles that are universally accepted in all eras and cultures, collapses under a variety of multicultural and postmodern critiques. The present article looks to the contractarian tradition of (...) Hobbes and Locke—as reinterpreted by David Gauthier, Robert Nozick, and John Rawls—for an alternative justification for international bioethics. Drawing on the central themes of this tradition, it is argued that international bioethics can be rationally reconstructed as a negotiated moral order that respects culturally and individually defined areas of nonnegotiability. Further, the theory of a negotiated moral order is consistent with traditional ideals about human rights, is flexible enough to absorb the genuine insights of multiculturalism and postmodernism, and yet is strong enough to justify transcultural and transtemporal moral judgments, including the condemnation of the Nazi doctors at Nuremberg. This theory also is consistent with the history of the ethics of human subjects experimentation and offers insights into current controversies such as the controversy over changing the consent rule for experiments in emergency medicine and the controversy over exempting certain clinical trials of inexpensive treatments for preventing the perinatal transmission of AIDS from the ethical standards of the sponsoring country.The Preamble to the Council of Europe’s (1997) Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, the most recently ratified code of international bioethics, is noteworthy because it never mentions “principles,” the concept most frequently cited by the fundamentalists as basic to international bioethics. Instead it stresses rights, a concept that has been utterly ignored by the fundamentalist theorists of international bioethics. The Preamble exemplifies a conception of international [End Page 233] bioethics as an ethics of covenants and conventions grounded in human rights. In the full text of the Preamble, the term “rights” appears eight times and the expressions “convention” and “covenant” are used six times; the term “principle” does not appear at all. In this essay, I develop a theoretical framework for international bioethics based on conventions, covenants, and areas of “nonnegotiability”—a concept that serves as a functional analogue to the traditional notion of “human rights.” I also shall argue that, unlike the theory of basic principles central to moral fundamentalism, the theory of negotiated morality appears immune to the multicultural and postmodern critiques of international bioethics that were analyzed in the preceding article in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (Baker 1998).Negotiated Moral Order: A Model for International BioethicsReconsidering ContractarianismThe linkage of “conventions” and “covenants” with human rights that is evident in the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine traces back directly to the moral and political theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Such philosophers as David Gauthier (1986), Robert Nozick (1974), and John Rawls (1971, 1993) recently have reinvigorated this classic contractarian line of analysis. In this section, I shall reconsider classical contractarian theory from a perspective informed by these more recent analyses.The most riveting feature of all forms of contractarian theory is the metaphor of the contract itself, particularly the legitimating role it accords to assent. Because contractarians look to the assent of those who would be bound by a moral norm as ultimately the sole source of a norm’s legitimacy, the most important corollary of contractarian moral theory is that moral norms are illegitimate insofar as agents either in principle could not, hypothetically would not, or actually will not rationally assent to be bound by them. Contractarians also argue that because legal norms are legitimated by acceptance of the authority of those who promulgate them, the authority of such norms is bounded by the actual or hypothetical assent of the governed. These features of contractarian analysis generate the correlative concepts of human rights and civil rights.Less often remarked, but nonetheless integral to the metaphor of the social contract, is the contractarian recognition that the interests of the [End Page 234] parties who contract to form civil society are naturally in conflict (or, as Hobbes put... (shrink)

Totalitarianism theory was one of the ratifying principles of the Cold War, and remains an important component of contemporary political discourse. Its origins, however, are little understood. Although widely seen as a secular product of anticommunist socialism, it was originally a theological notion, rooted in the political theory of Catholic personalism. Specifically, totalitarianism theory was forged by Catholic intellectuals in the mid-1930s, responding to Carl Schmitt's turn to the in 1931. In this essay I explore the notion's formation and circulation (...) through the Catholic public sphere in both France and Austria, where was born as a new form of the traditional Catholic animus against the nation state project. (shrink)

Mineral species are, at first glance, an excellent candidate for an ideal set of natural kinds somewhere beyond the periodic table. Mineralogists have a detailed set of rules and formal procedure for ratifying new species, and minerals are a less messy subject matter than biological species, psychological disorders, or even chemicals more broadly—all areas of taxonomy where the status of species as natural kinds has been disputed. After explaining how philosophers have tended to get mineralogy wrong in discussions of natural (...) kinds, I show how minerals species don’t behave like natural kinds. They are defined on the basis of human intentionality, not merely natural distinctions. They aren’t ideal grounds for inductive inference. And they don’t form a system that divides nature along a set of equivalent joints. While this is a regrettable outcome to those of us who like the idea of science relying on natural kinds, I contend that mineralogy is doing just fine without a natural kind-based taxonomy, and may in fact be better off without one. (shrink)

Torture is unequivocally prohibited under all circumstances, whether in peacetime, wartime, or during a state of national emergency. Any justification for the use of torture is indefensible under international law. The prohibition of torture constitutes a peremptory norm (jus cogens) of international law, binding upon all states that have ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). This paper examines the provisions of the CAT in relation to Vietnam’s legal framework governing the rights (...) of the accused in criminal proceedings. The analysis reveals that Vietnam’s legal provisions lack the necessary clarity and specificity, contributing to the continued occurrence of torture coupled with an inaccurate statistical recording of such cases. To align more closely with the CAT and enhance the protection of human rights, this paper argues for the imperative need to strengthen Vietnam’s Penal Code and criminal procedure laws. Furthermore, the establishment of robust enforcement mechanisms is essential to ensuring compliance and effectiveness. The author recommends the development of a comprehensive legal framework dedicated to the protection of human rights and the formulation of strategic measures aimed at preventing torture. (shrink)

Contractualism conceives of firm-stakeholder relations as cooperative schemes for mutual benefit. In essence, contractualism holds that these schemes, as well as the normative principles that guide and constrain them, are ultimately ratified by the consent and endorsement of those subject to them. This paper explores the empirical validity of a contractualist perspective on firm-stakeholder relations. It first develops a typology of firm-stakeholder contracting problems. It subsequently confronts this typology with empirical data collected in an interview study of concrete stakeholder management (...) practices, involving in-depth research interviews with forty-four managers working in the Dutch financial services industry. The findings of this theory-building study suggest that there are limits to the applicability of the contract model in the context of stakeholder management, and that disregarding either the model or its limitations may lead to highly ineffective firm-stakeholder relations. (shrink)

Crop genetic resources constitute a ‘new’ global commons, characterized by multiple layers of activities of farmers, genebanks, public and private research and development organizations, and regulatory agencies operating from local to global levels. This paper presents sui generis biocultural community protocols that were developed by four communities in Benin and Madagascar to improve their ability to contribute to, and benefit from, the crop commons. The communities were motivated in part by the fact that their national governments’ had recently ratified the (...) Plant Treaty and the Nagoya Protocol, which make commitments to promoting the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities and farmers, without being prescriptive as to how Contracting Parties should implement those commitments. The communities identified the protocols as useful means to advance their interests and/or rights under both the Plant Treaty and the Nagoya Protocol to be recognized as managers of local socio-ecological systems, to access genetic resources from outside the communities, and to control others’ access to resources managed by the community. (shrink)

_Among the most contentious practices within a globalized and corporatized economy is allegations of so-called ‘biopiracy’. This refers to the taking of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge without either free, prior and informed consent or any mechanisms for benefit-sharing with the community that provided the resource. Attempts to revise the TRIPS Agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) to bring it more in compliance with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) have not led to concrete results. The article analyzes (...) CBD provisions, binding protocols and non-binding guiding documents, and two less known treaties of the United Nations. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), that joined the United Nations in 1974, has – after negotiating for almost 15 years – adopted the WIPO Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge. The article demonstrates how this WIPO Treaty is embedded in the ‘defensive strategy’ of traditional knowledge protection, enabling patent examiners to reject a patent as the alleged invention does not represent new and applicable knowledge. The alternative, termed ‘positive strategy’, is witnessed primarily in India’s Plant Variety and Farmers’ Rights Act, which has resulted in more grants of certificates for so-called ‘farmers’ varieties’ compared to all other varieties together. Other United Nations treaties include elements of such protection, but not on the level of specify and subsequent implementation as found in India. The negotiations of what became the WIPO Treaty has generated increased awareness of indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge and should be easy to ratify as it aligns with existing legislation__._ _Keywords_: India’s Plant Variety and Farmers’ Rights Act, traditional knowledge, TRIPS Agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), WIPO Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge. (shrink)

Causal and Epistemic Decision theories differ in their recommendations in a large number of cases, the most famous of which is Newcomb's Problem. These cases, including the original one, tend to be outlandish and unusual. We show that if one applies decision theory to epistemic utilities measured by a strictly proper scoring rule, the two theories will deviate in their recommendations in cases that any Bayesian agent can easily put themselves in. Moreover, the recommendations of Causal Decision Theory in these (...) cases are implausible: it recommends that we perform the action whose performance gives us no information regarding the hypothesis with respect to which we are maximizing our epistemic utility. We shall see that requiring choices to be ratifiable, or using Barnett's recent graded ratifiability criterion, does not help either. Nor is it completely clear that Evidential Decision Theory is off the hook. (shrink)