In 'Jackson on physical information and qualia' Terry Horgan defended physicalism against Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument by raising what later has been called the 'mode of presentation reply'- arguingthatthe Knowledge Argumentis fallacious because itsubtly equivocates on two different readings of 'physical information'. In 'Mary, Mary, quite contrary' however, George Graham and Terry Horgan maintain that none of the replies against Jackson has yet been successful, not even Horgan's own 1984 rejoinder.Tosubstantiate their claim, they present an allegedly improved version (...) of the Knowledge Argument, the 'Mary Mary Argument' whose default moral is property-dualism. In section 1, I will set the scene by making some clarifying remarks regarding Jackson's original argument. In section 2, I will consider several objections to the most promising physicalist rejoinder to the Knowledge Argument, the mode of presentation reply. In section 3 I will discuss the Mary Mary Argument and propose the indexical account of consciousness that, as it happens, is based on Horgan's own 1984 account as a possible solution. Finally,in section 4, I will argue that to the extent that the Mary Mary Argument exceeds the force of Jackson's original challenge it coincides with Joe Levine's Explanatory Gap Argument. (shrink)

People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question (...) nor quite right to say that the person lacks the belief. (shrink)

It might seem quite commonplace to say that Aristotle identifies fire, air, water and earth as the στοιχεῖα, or ‘elements’ – or, to be more precise, as the elements of bodies that are subject to generation and corruption. Yet there is a tradition of interpretation, already evident in the work of the sixth-century commentator John Philoponus and widespread, indeed prevalent, today, according to which Aristotle does not really believe that fire, air, water and earth are truly elemental. The basic (...) premise of this interpretation is that Aristotle takes fire, air, water and earth to be, in some sense, composite bodies and, as such, analysable into simpler constituents. But, of course, an element of bodies is defined by Aristotle himself as something into which bodies can be analysed, and which does not admit further analysis. So if fire, air, water and earth can be analysed into simpler or more basic constituents, then it would seem to follow that the latter ought to be considered Aristotle's true elements. These are usually identified as the primary contraries hot and cold, dry and wet; many, perhaps most, commentators would insist also upon prime matter as the subject upon which these contraries act. (shrink)

In the year 1841, the sixty-six year old philosopher, Schelling, was installed in the chair of philosophy at Berlin. Because he wanted someone with sufficient authority to combat the influence of Hegel, the new king of Prussia supported his appointment. As Crown Prince he had been concerned about the liberal and subversive elements in Hegel’s political philosophy. In power, he chose an associate of Hegel’s youth to lead the attack, a man who had disappeared from the intellectual scene just as (...) Hegel’s star was beginning to rise. Although Schelling and Hegel were collaborators in the years that led up to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Schelling had not been converted to dialectical philosophy. Indeed, in lectures on the history of philosophy given in Munich during the years after Hegel’s death, he challenged its rationality. The move from the logic of pure thought to a philosophy of nature was unjustified. For Schelling there could be no logical bridge between transcendental idealism and the theory which expressed the inherent structures of the natural order. They are two quite different disciplines, of quite a different order. When Hegel moved from one to the other, then, he was violating a fundamental logical principle, first enunciated by Aristotle. He was passing over into another genus—from thought to reality. The image that sprang to Schelling’s mind was one vividly expressed by Lessing for an analogous problem. Between the two—thought and reality—lay a “nasty broad ditch.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In her paper “On the Nature of Judgment”, published in 1919 in Mind, Dorothy Wrinch aimed at understanding how Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement might be made to work. In this paper we will focus on Wrinch’s claim that on the theory it is impossible, as it should be, to judge nonsense. After having presented the prima facie objection to the theory created by nonsense and what we can take her solution to such a problem to imply, we (...) will show how Wrinch can resist the two main objections that have been moved to such a solution, whether as explicitly attributed to Wrinch or discussed without mentioning her. The conclusion will be, contrary to what one might be tempted to think, that even if there might be reasons to take the multiple relation theory as doomed, Wrinch was the first to show us that nonsense is not one of those reasons. (shrink)

Quite contrary to the mainstream history of ideas, Spanish intellectuals play an important part in the 17 th century dispute about natural law, physical evidence and the principle of induction. Optimism as taught by Antonio Perez and Martin Esparza in Salamanca and Rome has given rise to a sophisticated theological debate of a subject that was to demand philosophers' attention for centuries to come. The features of empirism brought forward by Bernardo Aldrete and Antonio Bernaldo de Quiros will (...) stimulate the research on Hume's scholastic reading. (shrink)

The early paragraphs of John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government describe a poetic idyll of property acquisition widely supposed by contemporary theorists and historians to have cast the template for imperial possessions in the New World. This reading ignores the surprises lurking in Locke’s later chapters on conquest, usurpation, and tyranny, where he affirms that native rights to lands and possessions survive to succeeding generations. Locke warned his readers that this “will seem a strange doctrine, it being quite (...) class='Hi'>contrary to the practice of the world.” His doctrine of native right is equally strange to recent scholars who see in Lockean theory the ideological prototype for England’s colonial expropriation in the “vacant lands” of North America. This interpretation, dignified by the elusive principle of vacuum domicilium, is considerably weakened when Locke’s arguments are placed in the historical context of the sixteenth and early seventeenth-century English colonial experience. Locke’s Second Treatise, with its literary flourish of a vast and idyllic state of nature, was written in the full appreciation of Amerindian agriculture, its established populations, the acknowledgement of native property rights, and the policy and practice of purchasing land from the native inhabitants. (shrink)

SummaryIn this article I argue that Darwin was the author, quite contrary to his original intentions, of a fundamental revolution in the theory of scientific knowledge. In 1838, in order to meet the anti-evolutionist challenge of his professional colleague, William Whewell, he began to sketch a transmutationist theory of the origin of human ideas which would explain the success of inductive science: its discovery of what Whewell and his contemporaries thought were necessary and certain truths. But though it (...) explained how scientific ideas originated, Darwin's theory implied also that theoretical certainty in science was impossible. Thus Darwin's evolutionism when combined with Whewell's a priorism led to a thorough-going fallibilism. This was worked out in detail by W. K. Clifford, a Cambridge evolutionist, Kantian and fallibilist. (shrink)

Legality in the Global South suffers from problems of application by convenience. Some rules are applied, and some are not, depending on certain actors, such as the State, the stakeholders, or others. This undermines legitimation as constructed by legality and due process. These problems are connected to a wider complex formed by coloniality, internal colonialism, and a form of functional differentiation that limits autonomy of the different social systems. This complex of structural properties allows States and other actors to systematically (...) use one system against the other or—within a given system—one level of rules against the other. This was the case in Ecuador: in the initial months of quarantine due to Covid-19, the government took decisions about external state bonds following international legislation—and quite contrary ones related to local work contracts. Once again, legality followed different paths in diverse cases. Ecuadorian economic authorities accept and respect conditions on external public bonds which are protected by some complex and specific clauses to secure the payment. The same authorities have different practices towards international and national legislation that were organized in the sense of legal subsidiarity. This text will explore reasons and effects of legal de-differentiation in the Global South in times of crisis. The Ecuadorian case in time of Covid-19 helps to understand how structural problems related to the lack of autonomy of the legal system are perpetuated and lead to effects of convenient political action. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan has recently developed the embodied mind theory of identity in place of the other standing theories, which he examines and consequently rejects. This paper examines the performance of his theory on cases of commissurotomy or the split-brain syndrome. Available experimental data concerning these cases seem to suggest that a single mind can divide into two independent streams in ways that are incompatible with our intuitive notion of mind. This phenomenon poses unique problems for McMahan's theory that we are (...) essentially minds. I attempt to use his considered response to these cases as a weapon against his own embodied mind theory by highlighting some of the tensions in McMahan's response. In particular, I argue that in reaching his conclusion McMahan admits to something quite contrary to the very spirit of his own theory and that it is a powerful point in its support that one of the theories McMahan rejects can deal very well with these cases. (shrink)

Assuming minimal fine-individuation--that there are some necessarily equivalent intensional objects (e.g. propositions) that are nonetheless distinct objects, on standard actualist frameworks, the answer to our title question is "No". First I specify a fully cognitively accessible, purely qualitative maximal consistent state of affairs (MCS). (That there is an MCS that is either fully graspable or purely qualitative is in itself quite contrary to conventional dogma.) Then I identify another MCS, one necessarily equivalent to the first. It follows that (...) there could have been more than one obtaining MCS. I then argue that there is more than one obtaining MCS. So there is nothing answering to "the actual world", and the set of worlds is not the set of MCSs. I explore various patch-ups. Finally, I compare the actualist and modal realist notions of worlds, and I argue that even if the realist were right about concrete world ensembles, our reflections indicate that necessary truth is not truth in all worlds anyway, which undercuts the rationale for the realist's program. (shrink)

The present essay explores the sources and the scope of a major feature of the scholastic logic and metaphysics: the 16th-century distinction of the reasoning reason in contradistinction to the distinction of reasoned reason. Depending on whether the non-identity was meant to refer to first-order or second-order intentions, the distinctio rationis ratiocinantis intervened either between a definition and the term defined or between the two terms of identical propositions: »A = A«. How to save this elusive kind of distinction was (...) a common concern of Thomists, Scotists and early modern Jesuits. Special attention is paid to the logician and metaphysician Bartholomew Mastri. German philosophy up to Frege will be considered. Quite contrary to a time-honoured prejudice, the ancient metaphysics turns out to have been furnished with a powerful device in order to avoid the traps of reification. (shrink)

This work sought to carry out a comparative analysis of in vitro fertilization (IVF) vis-à-vis St. Thomas Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory. Both of them emanated from problem of infertility. IVF makes use of artificial insemination for fertilization which is quite contrary to the natural process of sexual reproduction. This work makes use of analytic method to analyse comparatively in vitro fertilization and St. Thomas Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory. Thus, this work conceives that IVF is one of the assisted (...) reproductive technologies in the scientific exploration of genetic engineering and bio-technology which emanated to tackle the problem of genetic inheritance outside marriage. It contravenes the coital or natural reproduction which conforms to St. Thomas Aquinas’ second precept of natural law. Again, IVF is artificial as such it is pruned to many complications. There is no adequate information given by the medical practitioners or providers of this service on the health hazards or risks involve in IVF. In addition, in vitro fertilization makes provision for donor gamete and surrogate motherhood which may have many negative implications both for the couples, off-spring, gestation mother, and society at large. (shrink)

That the legacy of Berkeley's philosophy has been a largely sceptical one is perhaps rather surprising. For he himself took it as one of his objectives to undermine scepticism. He roundly denied that there were ‘any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down’. Yet Hume was to write of Berkeley that ‘most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, Bayle not excepted’. And it has become something of a commonplace (...) to say that Berkeley's philosophy is sceptical in direction, if not in intention. He is represented as a half-hearted sceptic, applying radical empiricist principles in his treatment of matter but baulking at their implications when he came to consider spirits. Hume is credited with being the more thoroughgoing of the two. Berkeley had denied the substantiality of extended things. Hume felt obliged, by parity of reasoning, to deny the substantiality of the self. On his account of the mind there is ‘properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different’. It is commonly supposed that Berkeley, in maintaining the quite contrary view that we know ourselves to be simple, undivided beings, showed a lack of rigour or consistency. (shrink)

This chapter investigates two paragons of quantitative approaches to the philosophy of freedom: Friedrich August von Hayek and John Rawls. While they are typically portrayed as occupying opposing spaces on a spectrum from conservative to progressive liberal thinking, they resemble each other much more than meets the eye. On closer inspection, one can see, though, how either thinker assiduously tries to avoid any and all metaphysical underpinnings of his theory and aims to make do with a merely quantitative conception of (...) freedom. These endeavors, however, fail to accomplish their respective – and quite contrary – political goals. Both Hayek and Rawls can only realize their concrete liberal aspirations by tacitly taking recourse to qualitative arguments. The chapter concludes by suggesting that one better give up the pretense that a philosophy of liberty could stand on quantitative grounds alone. Rather, the covert qualitative dimensions of liberal philosophy should be rendered overt so as to facilitate a productive as well as critical engagement with its tenets. (shrink)

The recent book from Marc Le Glatin Internet, un séisme dans la culture?, performs three intellectual acts. First, it resumes the main facts concerning the evolution of cultural practices on the Internet, particularly the multiplication of « free » downloading of works that are in principle protected by intellectual property. Second, it interrogates the notions of intellectual property and cultural diversity in relation to the new possibilities opened up by the Net. Third, it proposes some tentative solutions for legal and (...) economic problems, mainly the artists remuneration, related to current media transformations. Facts are correctly outlined and questions are worth asking. But the proposed solutions – inspired by a mix of centralizing jacobinism, socialism and post-modernism – sound deceptive because they are based on philosophical and political presuppositions that are quite contrary to the current stream of cultural mutation. I discuss the author’s thesis from the standpoint of a philosophy of collective intelligence and proposes some solutions oriented toward the best exploitation of the new technical possibilities in the service of human development and emancipation. (shrink)

Towards the end of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s fragment ‘The Triumph of Life’ there are some famous lines which raise most of the questions that will concern me in this essay. Never mind, for the moment, the context: the lines I have in mind are these: “I rose; and, bending at her sweet command, Touched with faint lips the cup she raised, And suddenly my brain became as sand “Where the first wave had more than half erased The track of deer (...) on desert Labrador, Whilst the fierce wolf from which they fled amazed “Leaves his stamp visibly upon the shore Until the second bursts—so on my sight Burst a new Vision never seen before.—1[…]Two kinds of things are happening here which I want to point out. The first is that even as the poem is attempting to represent the mind as passive and the experience of the mind as an empty succession of events, it is also making a quite contrary attempt to represent the mind as active and the succession as a structure. The lines dramatise how a play of mental events, as they are represented in language, may be reprocessed in such a way that some of them come to be classified as interruptions or breaks in the otherwise meaningful sequence composed by the others. As my first paraphrase suggested, it seems to make sense to recast Shelley’s narrative into the story of deer chased by a wolf, a story which is then interrupted by the wave which bursts on the shore and which threatens the coherence of the story by threatening to efface all sin that the deer have passed across the beach, have crossed the mind. 1. Percy Bysshe Shelley, ‘The Triumph of Life,’ in Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, ed. Donald H. Reiman and Sharon B. Powers, II. 403-11. The most illuminating reading of these lines is Paul de Man’s in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, pp. 99-100. John Barrell is professor of English at the University of Sussex and author of a number of books on literature and the visual arts, most recently Poetry, Language and Politics. The Infection of Thomas De Quincey and The Birth of Pandora will be published next year. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 130-131 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future The Invention of Dionysus: An Essay on 'The Birth of Tragedy.' James I. Porter. Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 449. Cloth, $60.00. Paper, $19.95. James I. Porter. The Invention of Dionysus: An Essay on 'The Birth of (...) Tragedy.' Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 224. Cloth, $45.00. Paper, $16.95. Every year an astonishing number of books are published on Nietzsche. Here are two more from a single author. James I. Porter's thesis--in both of them--is that "The Birth of Tragedy does not mark a break in Nietzsche's thinking, whether away from his philological understanding of antiquity or toward... emancipation from metaphysics" (Philology of the Future, 2). Perhaps to lend drama to his case, he assumes an unwarranted degree of unanimity among those who see a break between the philological writings of the young Nietzsche and the philosophical ones written later. But Porter's elaboration of his own thesis is quite persuasive nonetheless. He shows that essential tenets of Nietzsche's later philosophy can be found in his early philological writings, and that Nietzsche's interpretations of the ancient Greeks were as ambiguous, "mythological," and self-critical as his later books. In this way, Porter extensively reinterprets Nietzsche's early writing.The Invention of Dionysus is the shorter and more closely argued of the two books. Here Porter attempts to show that in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche both began his exposé of the fictional nature of all metaphysics and recognized that metaphysics would forever haunt the human mind. Porter asserts--more forcefully than earlier authors--that Nietzsche was decisively influenced by Friedrich Albert Lange in this; indeed he ascribes much of what is thought most characteristic of Nietzsche's philosophy to Lange! But what Porter takes away from Nietzsche and awards to Lange in originality, he returns to Nietzsche in subtlety.Porter contends that throughout his career Nietzsche defended an "embattled position" (18), attempting to preserve both appearance and metaphysics as necessary dimensions of human consciousness. This is perhaps Porter's contribution: to assert that Nietzsche never thought he had abolished metaphysics in favor of appearance, as so many writers have claimed. According to Porter, Nietzsche understood in The Birth of Tragedy and throughout his career that metaphysics could never be abolished; that the act of trying to abolish metaphysics is itself inevitably metaphysical, and that any philosophy of appearances including his own must also be metaphysical. Porter characterizes Nietzsche's rhetorical stance as "mythological."Porter quotes a passage from The Birth of Tragedy to show that Nietzsche was both eager to reveal the mythological status of Greek metaphysics, and fully aware that his own efforts to reveal it were mythological as well: "It is the fate of every myth to creep by degrees into the narrow limits of some alleged historical reality, and to be treated by some later generation as a unique fact with historical claims"(45). So if readers take Nietzsche's arguments at face value, that is understandable; but it does not make them any less mythological. According to Porter, this stance gives the lie to claims that The Birth of Tragedy was "still" metaphysical. And it should establish that from the first Nietzsche had a more subtle view of his project than previously acknowledged.Porter makes this enduring mythological stance the central issue for interpreting Nietzsche's oeuvre. Interesting as this is, it makes Nietzsche out to be impossibly consistent and prescient about his later writing. And it leaves him an oddly disembodied thinker--quite contrary to his own understanding of the philosophical career. The obvious contortions [End Page 130] in Nietzsche's early writing--rooted in his attempt to be true to his own best insights while maintaining a strenuous discipleship to Richard Wagner--are entirely glossed over. While this might be... (shrink)

This paper argues that a behavioral or functional analysis of human action is compatible with human freedom. This thesis is quite contrary to what behaviorists such as B. F. Skinner as well as their critics such as D. C. Dennett have assumed to be the case. The essential argument involves three steps. First, the paper proceeds by presenting a novel analysis of intentional or mental states in terms of the principles of reinforcement. It is argued that with the (...) acquisition of language humans are able to think about, plan for, and make rational choices about the future. Second, the paper, while not trying to define freedom, nonetheless argues that freedom is essentially a function of three conditions. These include our power over the environment, our will power, and the ability to rationally determine our value priorities. Third, and finally, it is shown that there is nothing in a behavioral or functional analysis to prevent our satisfying these three basic conditions of which our freedom is a function. (shrink)

Irish Supreme Court upholds paramountcy of parental right to determine a child's best interests at the expense of the rights of children themselvesCan a court force on parents who are careful and conscientious a view of their child's welfare which is rational, but quite contrary to the parents sincerely held but non-rational beliefs? The Supreme Court of Ireland has recently held that it cannot do so, and that the Irish Constitution requires that the right of the family to (...) determine its own direction must be respected except in the most narrow of circumstances, such as an immediate threat to the life of the child or risk of serious injury. The ruling leaves the assessment of a child's best interests to the wide discretion of parents, but at the same time fails to offer a means to resolve potential conflicts between the rights of the family and the rights of the child.FACTS OF THE CASEIn North Western Health Board v W 1 an action was brought by a local health board against the parents of 14 month old Paul, seeking a declaration that their refusal to submit their son to the heel prick test for phenylketonuria was a failure to vindicate their son's rights and that it would be lawful to proceed without parental consent. Phenylketonuria is a metabolic condition which can lead to severe and untreatable mental impairment if not detected in its early stages, but a simple variation in diet can stave off this outcome. While Paul's parents did not doubt the veracity of this medical opinion, nor indeed the importance of the test, they refused to subject their son to the invasive heel prick, offering instead samples of urine or hair, such that the test could be carried out by non-invasive means. These means, however, are considerably …. (shrink)

BOOK REVIEWS 463 awareness is included in every thought without need for a second thought of the first. Awareness of the object of thought could be connected with the volition, or judgment, that the thought represents some particular thing. Nadler's article deals with a related issue by concentrating on Malebranche, propos- ing that he is a kind of "direct realist." This is, of course, quite contrary to the spirit of most interpretations of Malebranche. The relevance of Nadler's thesis (...) in this context is that it makes it harder to characterize clearly what philosophical points might have been at issue between Arnauld and Malebranche aside from the dispute over the ontological status of ideas. There is, finally, a second article by Kremer on "Grace and Free Will in Arnauld." Arnauld himself attached much more importance to his work in theology than his better remembered work in philosophy. Kremer's article, however, shows that Arnauld sometimes intertwined philosophical and theological concerns such that it is not neces- sary to be a theologian to appreciate the issues. If the current surge of interest in Arnauld's distinctive, original contributions to philosophy stimulates further work, much of it will probably engage his own overarching theological concerns. ALAN NELSON University of California, Irvine Margaret Atherton, editor. Women Philosophers of the Early Modern Period. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994. Pp. ix + 166. Cloth, $29.95... (shrink)

The paper discusses certain aspects of Buddha’s and Confucius’ philosophy that could be relevant for the general philosophical discussion on the problem of freedom, free action and related philosophical themes. Although their philosophical thinking was shaped in a rather different linguistic, cultural and philosophical milieu and background, both thinkers are in agreement at least twofold. Firstly, the possibility of freedom and free action is not opposed to the natural order of things, quite contrary, it is enabled by this (...) order. Secondly, this possibility is being realised through never-ending self-cultivation and attunement to the world as it is. In the context of contemporary discussions on the problem of the relationship between free will and determinism, it could hence be said that both thinkers are on the position of “compatibilism”, nay, on the position that free action is possible only in the context of determinism that sees nature as ever-changing and conditioning circumstances and “patterns”, and not bound to strict and linear deterministic causality. (shrink)

This paper emphasizes the place and the role of the aesthetic quality and the role of the erotic in Levinas?s project that deals with ethical an-archaeology. Despite Levinas?s categorical statements that there are irreconcilable differences between ethics and aesthetics, i.e. between ethics and the erotic, above all, it is emphasized here that these differences do not represent a stark or sharp contrast, but quite contrary, they often constitute a subversive ontological element. On the other hand, somewhat unexpectedly, with (...) its ethical anti-aestheticism Levinas?s?noncontemporary? thought appears to be, at the same time, both significant and critical, elementary, emancipatory and contemporary in relation to present-day reactionary reactualization and revitalization of the aesthetic quality which mechanically proceeds to develop on the margins of Levinas?s emancipatory past. nema. (shrink)

This paper emphasizes the place and the role of the aesthetic quality and the role of the erotic in Levinas’s project that deals with ethical an-archaeology. Despite Levinas’s categorical statements that there are irreconcilable differences between ethics and aesthetics, i.e. between ethics and the erotic, above all, it is emphasized here that these differences do not represent a stark or sharp contrast, but quite contrary, they often constitute a subversive ontological element. On the other hand, somewhat unexpectedly, with (...) its ethical anti-aestheticism Levinas’s “noncontemporary” thought appears to be, at the same time, both significant and critical, elementary, emancipatory and contemporary in relation to present-day reactionary reactualization and revitalization of the aesthetic quality which mechanically proceeds to develop on the margins of Levinas’s emancipatory past. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gainsborough’s WitAmal Asfour and Paul WilliamsonBeginning with their earliest recipients, readers of Gainsborough’s letters have been struck by the vivacity with which he handles the language. William Jackson of Exeter, one of Gainsborough’s closest correspondents, compares his writing style with Sterne’s: “He detested reading; but was so like Sterne in his Letters, that, if it were not for an originality that could be copied from no one, it might (...) be supposed that he had formed his style upon a close imitation of that author.”1 The aptness of Jackson’s comparison should be understood in the broader context of his own summary of contemporary ideas about wit contained in his essay “On Wit.”2 Jackson writes after Locke’s theory of knowledge and Hume’s philosophy of sentiment had transformed an older understanding of wit as a primary creative power.3 Gainsborough’s letters show his affinity with aspects of eighteenth-century wit and reveal his awareness of the [End Page 479] long-running argument about wit and judgment. This is also evident in his paintings. There is an aspect of Gainsborough’s portraiture which may, in an eighteenth-century sense, be termed witty, and developments in Gainsborough’s portrait style register a shift that can be clarified with reference to the main development in ideas about wit that runs from Locke to Hume.Commentators from Addison to Jackson regarded Locke’s separation of wit and judgment and his deprecation of wit as the starting point for the eighteenth-century debate:Men who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest Judgement, or deepest Reason. For Wit lying most in the assemblage of Ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy: Judgement, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from the other, Ideas, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of Wit, which strikes so lively on the Fancy, and therefore so acceptable to all People; because its Beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought, to examine what Truth or Reason there is in it. The Mind without looking any farther, rests satisfied with the agreeableness of the Picture, and the gayety of the Fancy:4Wit creates pleasing conjunctions, while judgment consists in the careful discriminations that assist reason. According to Locke, wit is a mere ornamental adjunct to the more fundamental action of judgment. Locke’s definition is inimical to the arts in general and to literature in particular. In making wit responsible for figurative language, for example, Locke disparages poetry’s inability to approach the most important truths:we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative applications of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat.5 [End Page 480]Citing Locke in The Spectator, Addison quietly expunges his disparagement of wit, rescuing its products from Locke’s stern disapproval by introducing the distinction between true and false wit: “true Wit consists in the Resemblance of Ideas, and false Wit in the Resemblance of Words.”6 True wit is true because it works with ideas; false wit, by contrast, plays with the mere forms in which ideas are clothed:Anagrams, Chronograms, Lipograms, and Acrosticks... Ecchos and Doggerel Rhymes... Punns and Quibbles... Nay some carry the Notion of Wit so far, as to ascribe it even to external Mimickry; and to look upon a Man as an ingenious Person, that can resemble the Tone, Posture, or Face of another.7Addison places special emphasis on the element of surprise. Wit lies in surprising juxtapositions: “every Resemblance of Ideas is not that which we call Wit, unless... (shrink)

The paradox is brought out of blondel's philosophy's claim to be at once a true philosophy respecting the autonomy of human reason in investigating the problem of human destiny with full objectivity, Without being prejudiced ahead of time by the christian answer, And at the same time its openness to the christian answer as one that must necessarily be considered by reason itself. This was quite contrary to the rationalistic temper of the university philosophical world in blondel's time (...) and awakened strong resistance. His claim that action itself is an essential ingredient for the clarification of thought and the revelation of truth was also contrary to and ahead of the spirit of his time. The author shows how the combination of intellectual rigor with openness and respect for the role of action go hand in hand throughout this unique type of philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to reveal how care workers in the home-help services handle the process when older people’s relocation to a residential home is under consideration. Since the care workers are engaged daily in defining care receivers’ needs and yet have no formal influence on care decisions in Sweden, the focus is on how they solve this dilemma. In this inductive study, the theoretical framework is based on occupational alliances, relationship-based practice, and discretion. Thirty-three care workers in (...) home-help services are included in open semi-structured interviews. Prominent features in the findings are that the care workers take their stand at the borderland of care management, when they know or try to find out what is right. The conclusions drawn are that care workers find ways to informally influence the decision-making process, quite contrary to the idea of approaches referred to as purchaser/provider models. The implications for social work policy and practice are that a distinction between assessment and intervention may not benefit the field of eldercare and should therefore be regarded as an area in need of thorough reconsideration. (shrink)

Illocutionary acts are best looked upon as being communicative acts. Reasons are eiven for this thesis) which is quite contrary to what classical Speech Act Theory (SAT) holds to be true. It is proposed to define illocutionary intentions via (some very special sort of) perlocutionary intentions. This is not to deny the importance of this central SAT- aistmction, to the contrary, it is suggested that this distinction be reconcilable with the basic concepts of a theory of communicative (...) actions. (shrink)

Paul Gilbert has written a fascinating, stimulating book, one that offers a strong challenge to whoever might believe that the progress of scientific thought has rendered classical metaphysics obsolete, meaningless, or worthy only of historical scholarship. His work, based on the notion that a modern experimental science such as physics is not chiefly grounded on empirical evidence, is quite contrary to that naive empiricist conception already in jeopardy owing to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the present day prevalence of (...) statistical explanation. Physics' distinguishing trait is, in fact, the mathematical form given to its laws. However, mathematics is still awaiting a solid and complete foundation since Gödel's incompleteness theorem and the failure of Hilbert's metamathematical program. Such foundational difficulties are no surprise to Gilbert. Like those encountered by modern science's metaphysical predecessors, such difficulties are necessary consequences of the insuperable gap between reality and its discursive representation, between the unity of being, the multiplicity of its sensible appearances, and its analytical and synthetic reconstruction in thought. They reflect the "ontological differences" and conceptual separations that can be properly reunified only in action and not in words, that is, by means of a specific human action performed mentally when one is thinking that he is effectively thinking about something. Now, this type of solution is of course precluded by the prevailing quest for "objectivity" or "knowledge without a subject." For Gilbert, there can be no such thing as knowledge that is not animated by a subject's desire to fulfill the need to know, by doubts and astonishment at the recognition that reality is far more complex than its sensible appearances by which one immediately conceptualizes it. Even one's emotions, passions, freedom, the will to transcend oneself, to build a viable society, and to join with others while respecting their otherness must be taken into account. Any solid foundation for human knowledge must then encompass an ethical dimension. This is the major conclusion which the author wished to arrive at in this book and which had to be established first, before proceeding to the ultimate foundation aimed at by metaphysics. (shrink)

Contrary to the Aristotelian interpretation of Empedocles' views about cognition, according to which all cognition, like perception, is due to the compositional likeness between subject and object of cognition, this paper argues that when Empedocles says that we know one thing 'by' another (e.g. earth by earth or love by love), he is characterizing analogical reasoning, an intellectual activity quite different from perception (which is explained by the fit between effluences and pores). The paper also explores the idea (...) that strife and love describe, in addition to physical separation and composition, the mental activities of analyzing and composing. (shrink)

Contrary to common misconceptions, today's logic is not devoid of existential import: the universalized conditional ∀ x [S→ P] implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction ∃ x [S & P], not in all cases, but in some. We characterize the proexamples by proving the Existential-Import Equivalence: The antecedent S of the universalized conditional alone determines whether the universalized conditional has existential import, i.e. whether it implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction.A predicate is an open formula having only x free. An existential-import (...) predicate Q is one whose existentialization, ∃ x Q, is logically true; otherwise, Q is existential-import-free or simply import-free.How abundant or widespread is existential import? How abundant or widespread are existential-import predicates in themselves or in comparison to import-free predicates? We show that existential-import predicates are quite abundant, and no less so than import-free predicates. Existential.. (shrink)

Quite a few scholars claim that many implicata are propositions about the speaker's epistemic or doxastic states. I argue, on the contrary, that implicata are generally non-epistemic. Some alleged cases of epistemic implicature are not implicatures in the first place because they do not meet Grice's non-triviality requirement, and epistemic implicata in general would infringe on the maxim of quantity. Epistemic implicatures ought to be construed as members of a larger family of implicature-like phenomena.

Contrary to one possible interpretation of my title, this paper will not advocate any scepticism or ontological deflation. My concern will rather be with how we should best think about a realm of phenomena the existence of which is in no doubt, what has traditionally been referred to as the genetic. I have no intention of questioning a very well established scientific consensus on this domain. It involves the chemical DNA, which resides in almost all our cells, which is (...) capable of producing copies of itself that accurately reproduce a very long sequence of components, and which plays a role in the physiology of the cell which in certain basic respects is quite well understood. This substance has also achieved a remarkable iconic status in contemporary culture. It is seen as fundamental to personal identity both in the practical sense of providing a criterion of identity through DNA testing, and in the much deeper sense of being seen as, somehow, defining who we are. The latter role is illustrated, for example, by the recent debate about the right of children conceived by sperm donation to know who are their fathers. Such people, it is passionately argued, must be able to find out where they came from, who they really are. On a daily basis we are confronted with claims about the discovery of the genetic basis of—or in fact very often the ‘gene for’—all manner of psychological and physical characteristics, and all kinds of disorders. This holds out apparent possibilities. (shrink)

Contrary to what is generally said about the reception of Epicurus in the Middle Ages, many medieval authors agreed on his great wisdom, even if he made some philosophical and theological errors. From the 12th century to the 14th century on can find several "Lives of Epicurus" in which the best sayings of Epicurus are gathered from ancient sources (Seneca, Cicero, Lactantius, etc.). In this paper, we follow these quite unknown sources about Epicureanism in the Middle Ages. We (...) try to show that if Epicurus was considered as a wise man in the MIddle Ages, Epicureans are condemned because after the Revelation of God's word, Christians can only accept Epicurus's ascetic ethics, not his errors about the eternity of the world, the mortality of the soul et the subordination of happiness to pleasure. (shrink)

Contrary to what is stated in Lemma 7.1 of [8], it is shown that some Boolean algebras of finitary logic admit finitely additive probabilities that are not σ-additive. Consequences of Lemma 7.1 are reconsidered. The concept of a C-σ-additive probability on B (where B and C are Boolean algebras, and $\mathscr{B} \subseteq \mathscr{C}$ ) is introduced, and a generalization of Hahn's extension theorem is proved. This and other results are employed to show that every S̄(L)-σ-additive probability on s̄(L) can (...) be extended (uniquely, under some conditions) to a σ-additive probability on S̄(L), where L belongs to a quite extensive family of first order languages, and S̄(L) and s̄(L) are, respectively, the Boolean algebras of sentences and quantifier free sentences of L. (shrink)

Contrary to our immediate and vivid sensation of past, present, and future as continually shifting non-relational modalities, time remains as tenseless and relational as space in all of the established theories of fundamental physics. Here an empirically adequate generalized theory of the inertial structure is discussed in which proper time is causally compelled to be tensed within both spacetime and dynamics. This is accomplished by introducing the inverse of the Planck time at the conjunction of special relativity and Hamiltonian (...) mechanics, which necessitates energies and momenta to be invariantly bounded from above, and lengths and durations similarly bounded from below, by their respective Planck scale values. The resulting theory abhors any form of preferred structure, and yet captures the transience of now along timelike worldlines by causally necessitating a genuinely becoming universe. This is quite unlike the scenario in Minkowski spacetime, which is prone to a block universe interpretation. The minute deviations from the special relativistic effects such as dispersion relations and Doppler shifts predicted by the generalized theory remain quadratically suppressed by the Planck energy, but may nevertheless be testable in the near future, for example via observations of oscillating flavor ratios of ultrahigh energy cosmic neutrinos, or of altering pulse rates of extreme energy binary pulsars. (shrink)

Contrary to social shame, ontological shame is quite distinct from guilt. Guilt refers to what we do (or to what we are thought to have done), whereas ontological shame refers to what we are (or to what we feel we are). This shame can be expressed in different ways: failures maintained involuntarily, aggressiveness, denial. Ontological shame is often linked to handicap because of what handicap represents to oneself (not being oneself after the accident), or to one’s family (the (...) birth of a child that is different from what was expected). But the shame of being is not limited to people with a handicap, nor will they necessarily feel it. To believe this could be a means to hide our own incapability to acknowledge our embarrassment towards handicap. This embarrassment is an altogether different type of shame – the type that an ordinary person may feel when encountering a handicap. That shame seems minimal compared to ontological shame, but its consequences on a day-to-day basis can be formidable. Therefore, we should not evade it but rather ponder about ways of recognition to fight against the devastating effects of the shame of being. (shrink)

Contrary to the received opinion, the fundamentals of Newton's dynamics can be set forth quite simply. In the first edition of the Principia, Newton employs a device that relates to Galileo's analysis of uniform rectilinear motion. In the second and third editions, Newton introduces an alternate device that relates to Huygens's analysis of uniform circular motion. A third device is also introduced but is hidden away as a corollary to a problem rather than set forth clearly as a (...) theorem. Following the appearance of the first edition, Newton proposed, but never published, a grand new scheme for revising his dynamics in which he clearly set forth each dynamics ratio with a complementary set of solutions to the problems. As published, however, the alternate methods are not clear and are a source more of confusion than of clarification. (shrink)

Two thought experiments are provided which elicit whatappear to be opposing judgments about the demands of morality.One Unger-inspired thought experiment suggests that a personmust give up four decades of earnings just to save a singlelife. The other evokes the contrary intuition that onedoesn't have to labor forty years without compensation inorder to prevent the death of an individual. However,considerations of consistency do not demand that weabandon one of our intuitive responses. This is becausethere is a morally significant difference between (...) thetwo burdens that the people suffer in the respectivethought experiments. The difference is a result of humanpsychology being such that it is easier to bear theaftermath of an event that renders one's earlier effortsfutile than it is to suffer identical efforts goingunrewarded in the future. A conclusion that can bedrawn from this temporal asymmetry is that while moralityis not quite as demanding as Unger and many consequentialistsmaintain, it is much more demanding than many of their opponents realize. (shrink)

Hidalgo1 argues that, contrary to widespread belief, active recruitment of health workers ‘generally refrains from enabling harm or facilitating wrongdoing’. In this commentary, I argue that the case is not yet convincing. There are a number of problems with the argument, only some of which I can sketch here. These include: Hidalgo gives an insufficient account of the relevant harms that are inflicted when healthcare workers emigrate. Relatedly, he does not take account of the underlying causes of migration and (...) what might assist in remedying the situation. He thus fails to catalogue a wide range of losses that are born when health workers emigrate from developing countries and fails to appreciate how his recommendations undermine some of the constructive initiatives that might assist poor, developing countries. Hidalgo misrepresents the situation in developing countries, incorrectly describing government funding of tertiary education as some kind of gift, rather than an investment in creating important human capital to provide for citizens’ needs, which can mean that fair returns on investment are quite justified. With the correct descriptions in place, the grounding for various duties to reciprocate is rendered secure. There are some important problems with the empirical studies cited such that they do not provide support for Hidalgo's argument.I begin with the case for. There are large disparities in life prospects between developing and developed countries. Indeed, this wide disparity is one of the main reasons healthcare workers want to leave in the first place. If that is the main reason healthcare workers seek to exit, it is not insignificant what would address the causal, underlying problems. How do we promote prosperity in developing countries? A lively debate on this topic flourishes. However, one factor that has widespread support from all sides of the debate is that the quality of …. (shrink)

This paper argues that, contrary to most interpretations, e.g., those of Reid, Popkin and Passmore, Hume is not a sceptic with regard to reason. The argument of Treatise I, IV. i, of course, has a sceptical conclusion with regard to reason, and a somewhat similar point is made by Cleanthes in the Dialogues. This paper argues that the argument of Treatise I, IV. i is parallel to similar arguments in Bentham and Laplace. The latter are, as far as they (...) go, sound, and so is Hume’s. But the limitations of all mean that they cannot sustain a general argument against reason. Hume the historian is quite aware of these limitations. So is Hume the philosopher. A careful examination of the other references in the Treatise to the argument of I, IV. i reveals that Hume not only rejects but constructs a sound case against accepting the sceptical conclusion, arguing that reason can indeed show the sceptic’s argument to be unreasonable. A close reading of the Dialogues shows that Hume there also draws the same conclusion. The thrust of the paper is to go some way towards showing that it is a myth that Hume is a pyrrhonian sceptic. (shrink)

Is it quite all right to shake hands with murder in your heart? The view that our feelings do not concern morality, that we have no duties about them, that it does not matter what we feel, so long as we act correctly, is often attributed to Kant. I am sure he did not hold it, and shall argue as much presently. Certainly it is not surprising that people have credited Kant with such a view. He did lay himself (...) open to that suspicion, because he was too busy shooting at contrary errors to resist it. (shrink)

I have written quite a bit on British structural-functionalist anthropology, an old-fashioned kind of anthropology which interests various (mainly American) analytic philosophers today, preoccupied with defining social structures. I take my main contribution to be in my 2023 journal publication "Are individuals a problem for British structural-functionalist anthropology?" There I consider the problem of what to make of an individual who does not appear to fit in their role, given the official role structure of an institution. The traditional approach (...) of British structural-functionalist anthropology is to assume that individuals fit into their official roles; one does not get involved with what does not fit! Contrary to this approach, I introduce the option of specifying an alternative social structure of roles to the official social structure. (That is my innovation!) In the alternative structure (hopefully), the individual is not out of place: given this alternative understanding of the roles, they play their role well. Recently I started rereading Alice Munro's famous story Voices and I think this story is encouraging for my departure from tradition (though it is a dangerous departure - see "My dangerous social anthropology (and Lacanian psychiatry)"). Munro writes, "The square dancing had complicated patterns or steps, which a person known for a special facility would call out at the top of his voice (it was always a man) and in a strange desperate sort of haste which was of no use at all unless you knew the dance already. As everybody did, having learned them all by the time they were ten or twelve years old." He is the instructor, given the official roles, but he is no good for this purpose: you need to know the steps already, which everyone but the anthropologist does. I think the anthropologist should wake up now. If he is no good at this, maybe his role is not best described as dance instructor (or whatever the term is in the small town Canadian setting)? But if you ask about this, you might just be told: of course he is the instructor, he calls out the steps! (shrink)

This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in (...) other academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)

It is undeniable that the assumption of sincerity is important to assertion, and that assertion is central to the transmission of beliefs through human testimony. Discussions of testimony, however, often assume that the epistemic importance of sincerity to testimony is that of a (fallible) guarantee of access to the actual beliefs of the speaker. Other things being equal, we would do as well or better if we had some kind of unmediated access to the beliefs of the other person, without (...) the risks involved in the overt act of speaking, and the assumption of sincerity in speech is the closest we can come to this access. Contrary to this picture, I argue that sincerity has a quite different epistemic role to play in testimony than that of an indicator of the speaker's beliefs. The epistemology of testimony requires reference to the speaker as agent, and not just the speaker's beliefs, as well as a sense of 'expression of belief' that links it to the specifically addressive relation to another person. (shrink)

Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols advance the debate over folk psychology with their vivid depiction of the contest between the simulation theory and the theory-theory (Stich & Nichols, this issue). At least two aspects of their presentation I find highly congenial. First, they give a generally fair characterization of the simulation theory, in some respects even improving its formulation. Though I have a few minor quarrels with their formulation, it is mostly quite faithful to the version which I have (...) found attractive (Goldman, 1989).Second, I concur with Stich and Nichols in their assertion that the theory-theory and the simulation theory are the only two games in town. Where I disagree, of course, is in Stich and Nichols’s contention that their arguments so dim the prospects of the simulation theory that it should no longer be taken seriously. On the contrary, I shall maintain, the simulation theory remains a very plausible contender, and should receive careful and respectful consideration in the continuing investigation. (shrink)

Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulates a new "Qualified Reflection" principle, which states that an agent should obey Reflection only if he or she is (...) certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a "Distorted Reflection" principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence. In response to the second question, the essay argues that contrary to a common misconception, not all Dutch books dramatize incoherence—some dramatize a less blameworthy sort of epistemic frailty that the essay calls "self-doubt." The distinction between Dutch books that dramatize incoherence and those that dramatize self-doubt cross-cuts the distinction between synchronic and diachronic Dutch books. The essay explains why the Dutch book for conditionalization reveals true incoherence, whereas the Dutch book for Reflection reveals only self-doubt. (shrink)

This book explores Kant's philosophy of the human sciences, their status, their relations and prospects. Contrary to widespread belief, he is not dogmatic about the question of whether these disciplines are proper sciences. Instead, this depends on whether we can rationally adjust assumptions about the methods, goals, and subject matter of these disciplines - and this has to be done alongside of ongoing research. Kant applies these ideas especially in lectures on "pragmatic antropology" given from 1772-1796. In doing so, (...) he refines his conception of anthropology and clarifies its relation to physiology, psychology, history, and ethics. He also discusses then leading approaches in the human sciences, from Wollfian psychology over Bonnet's attempt to explain the mind in terms of the brain up to Hume's naturalism and Herder's historicism. Only against the background of these arguments can we understand and assess Kant's view of the human being as a social and rational being, capable of creating its own laws of conduct. He moreover argues that and why we can view ourselves as free agents even from an empirical point of view. This is quite a fresh perspective on the human sciences, their goals, potentials and limits - and fresh not only in the 18th century. (shrink)