Recently a number of works in meta-ontology have used a variant of J.H. Harris's collapse argument in the philosophy of logic as an argument against Eli Hirsch's quantifier variance. There have been several responses to the argument in the literature, but none of them have identified the central failing of the argument, viz., the argument has two readings: one on which it is sound but doesn't refute quantifier variance and another on which it is unsound. The central (...) lesson I draw is that arguments against quantifier variance must pay strict attention to issues of translation and interpretation. The paper also has a substantial appendix in which I prove the equivalence of plural mereological nihilism and standard first-order atomistic mereology; results of this kind are often appealed to in the literature on quantifier variance but without many details on the nature or proof of the result. (shrink)

Quantifier variance holds that different languages can have unrestricted quantifier expressions that differ in meaning, where an expression is a “quantifier” just in case it plays the right inferential role. Several critics argued that J.H. Harris’s “collapse” argument refutes variance by showing that identity of inferential role is incompatible with meaning variance. This standard, syntactic collapse argument has generated several responses. More recently, Cian Dorr proved semantic collapse theorems to generate a semantic collapse (...) argument against variance. The argument is significantly different from standard collapse, so it requires a new response. Here I clarify and analyze the semantic collapse argument, and explain how variantists can and should respond to it. The paper also includes an appendix showing the difficulties of positing identity variance without quantifier variance. The argument in the appendix has yet to appear in print, but is familiar to specialists. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to bring clarity regarding the doctrine of quantifier variance (due to Eli Hirsch), and two prominent arguments against this doctrine, the collapse argument and the Eklund-Hawthorne argument. Different versions of the doctrine of quantifier variance are distinguished, and it is shown that the effectiveness of the arguments against it depends on what version of the doctrine is at issue. The metaontological significance of the different versions of the doctrine are also assessed. (...) Roughly, quantifier variance concerns there being different possible existential quantifier meanings, and often the doctrine involves a claim to the effect there is no unique “best” quantifier meaning. Much of the discussion in the paper concerns what it is to be an existential quantifier meaning in the sense at issue. (shrink)

The thesis of quantifier variance is consistent and cannot be refuted via a collapse argument.

Quantifier variantists accept multiple alternative ontological languages in which quantifiers obey the usual inference rules despite having different meanings. But collapse arguments seem to show that these quantifiers would be provably equivalent to one another. Cian Dorr has pushed this discussion forward by formulating the collapse argument in terms of an algebra of meanings that are common amongst the languages. I attempt to show that quantifier variantists can respond. But an important distinction between types of (...) class='Hi'>quantifier variance emerges, between those in which quantifier meanings draw on a single objective backbone of “portions of reality,” and those (such as the type that is arguably associated with neo-Fregeanism) in which they do not. (shrink)

Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is (...) not an ontological doctrine; (iv) quantifier variance is not compatible with charitable translation and as such is internally inconsistent. In light of these troubles, we recommend the dissolution of quantifier variance and suggest that the view be laid to rest. (shrink)

Henkin quantifiers have been introduced in Henkin (1961). Walkoe (1970) studied basic model-theoretical properties of an extension $L_{*}^{1}$ (H) of ordinary first-order languages in which every sentence is a first-order sentence prefixed with a Henkin quantifier. In this paper we consider a generalization of Walkoe's languages: we close $L_{*}^{1}$ (H) with respect to Boolean operations, and obtain the language L¹(H). At the next level, we consider an extension $L_{*}^{2}$ (H) of L¹(H) in which every sentence is an L¹(H)-sentence prefixed (...) with a Henkin quantifier. We repeat this construction to infinity. Using the (un)definability of truth - in - N for these languages, we show that this hierarchy does not collapse. In addition, we compare some of the present results to the ones obtained by Kripke (1975), McGee (1991), and Hintikka (1996). (shrink)

Eli Hirsch recently suggested the metaontological doctrine of so-called "quantifier variance", according to which ontological disputes—e.g. concerning the question whether arbitrary, possibly scattered, mereological fusions exist, in the sense that these are recognised as objects proper in our ontology—can be defused as insubstantial. His proposal is that the meaning of the quanti er `there exists' varies in such debates: according to one opponent in this dispute, some existential statement claiming the existence of, e.g., a scattered object is true, according (...) to the other it is not. This paper argues that Hirsch's proposal leads into inconsistency. (shrink)

Quantifier variance entails that ‘there exists’ has a variety of meanings. Determining what makes all these meanings quantifier meanings is a problem associated with this view. A reasonable candidate suggested by Hirsch is the set of formal rules governing quantification. However, the collapse argument presents a notorious objection to the viability of the candidate: there cannot be more than one quantifier obeying the same rules up to logical equivalence. It is proposed that a quantifier variantist (...) who intends to retain Hirsch’s proposed solution can admit a many-sorted language in order to block the collapse argument. Within the many-sorted language, a Kaplanian thesis about the rules governing sorted quantifiers saves quantifier variance from meaning variance. (shrink)

One of the main criticisms of the theory of collections of indiscernible objects is that once we quantify over one of them, we are quantifying over all of them since they cannot be discerned from one another. In this way, we would call the collapse of quantifiers: ‘There exists one x such as P’ would entail ‘All x are P’. In this paper we argue that there are situations (quantum theory is the sample case) where we do refer to (...) a certain quantum entity, saying that it has a certain property, even without committing all other indistinguishable entities with the considered property. Mathematically, within the realm of the theory of quasi-sets $$\mathfrak {Q}$$, we can give sense to this claim. We show that the above-mentioned ‘collapse of quantifiers’ depends on the interpretation of the quantifiers and on the mathematical background where they are ranging. In this way, we hope to strengthen the idea that quantification over indiscernibles, in particular in the quantum domain, does not conform with quantification in the standard sense of classical logic. (shrink)

We shall try to defend two non-standard views that run counter to two well-entrenched familiar views. The standard views are (1) the universal and existential quantifiers of first-order logic are not modal operators, and (2) the quantifiers are extensional. If that is correct then the counterclaims create genuine problems for some traditional philosophical doctrines.

A combinatorial criterium is given when a monadic quantifier is expressible by means of universe-independent monadic quantifiers of width n. It is proved that the corresponding hierarchy does not collapse. As an application, it is shown that the second resumption (or vectorization) of the Hartig quantifier is not definable by monadic quantifiers. The techniques rely on Ramsey theory.

When restricted to proving $\Sigma _{i}^{q}$ formulas, the quantified propositional proof system $G_{i}^{\ast}$ is closely related to the $\Sigma _{i}^{b}$ theorems of Buss's theory $S_{2}^{i}$ . Namely, $G_{i}^{\ast}$ has polynomial-size proofs of the translations of theorems of $S_{2}^{i}$ , and $S_{2}^{i}$ proves that $G_{i}^{\ast}$ is sound. However, little is known about $G_{i}^{\ast}$ when proving more complex formulas. In this paper, we prove a witnessing theorem for $G_{i}^{\ast}$ similar in style to the KPT witnessing theorem for $T_{2}^{i}$ . This witnessing theorem (...) is then used to show that $S_{2}^{i}$ proves $G_{i}^{\ast}$ is sound with respect to $\Sigma _{i+1}^{q}$ formulas. Note that unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses $S_{2}^{i}$ is the weakest theory in the s₂ hierarchy for which this is true. The witnessing theorem is also used to show that $G_{i}^{\ast}$ is p-equivalent to a quantified version of extended-Frege for prenex formulas. This is followed by a proof that Gi p-simulates $G_{i+1}^{\ast}$ with respect to all quantified propositional formulas. We finish by proving that S₂ can be axiomatized by $S_{2}^{1}$ plus axioms stating that the cut-free version of $G_{0}^{\ast}$ is sound. All together this shows that connection between $G_{i}^{\ast}$ and $S_{2}^{i}$ does not extend to more complex formulas. (shrink)

Føllesdal (1966 and 1969) claims that modal distinctions collapse, that is that p and Necessarily p are equivalent, in any system of modal logic that incorporates a standard theory of definite descriptions, like the one proposed by Carnap in M&N. I argue that his argument fails.

There are logics where necessity is defined by means of a given identity connective: \ is a tautology). On the other hand, in many standard modal logics the concept of propositional identity \ can be defined by strict equivalence \}\). All these approaches to modality involve a principle that we call the Collapse Axiom : “There is only one necessary proposition.” In this paper, we consider a notion of PI which relies on the identity axioms of Suszko’s non-Fregean logic (...) SCI. Then S3 proves to be the smallest Lewis modal system where PI can be defined as SE. We extend S3 to a non-Fregean logic with propositional quantifiers such that necessity and PI are integrated as non-interdefinable concepts. CA is not valid and PI refines SE. Models are expansions of SCI-models. We show that SCI-models are Boolean prealgebras, and vice-versa. This associates non-Fregean logic with research on Hyperintensional Semantics. PI equals SE iff models are Boolean algebras and CA holds. A representation result establishes a connection to Fine’s approach to propositional quantifiers and shows that our theories are conservative extensions of S3–S5, respectively. If we exclude the Barcan formula and a related axiom, then the resulting systems are still complete w.r.t. a simpler denotational semantics. (shrink)

There has been an upsurge of interest lately in developing Wigner’s hypothesis that conscious observation causes collapse by exploring dynamical collapse models in which some purportedly quantifiable aspect of consciousness resist superposition. Kremnizer–Ranchin, Chalmers–McQueen and Okon–Sebastián have explored the idea that collapse may be associated with a numerical measure of consciousness. More recently, Chalmers–McQueen have argued that any single measure is inadequate because it will allow superpositions of distinct states of equal consciousness measure to persist. They suggest (...) a satisfactory model needs to associate collapse with a set of measures quantifying aspects of consciousness, such as the “Q-shapes” defined by Tononi et al. in their “integrated information theory” of consciousness. I argue here that Chalmers–McQueen’s argument against associating a single measure with collapse requires a precise symmetry between brain states associated with different experiences and thus does not apply to the only case where we have strong intuitions, namely human observers. In defence of Chalmers–McQueen’s stance, it might be argued that idealized artificial information processing networks could display such symmetries. However, I argue that the most natural form of any theory that postulates a map from network states to mind states is one that assigns identical mind states to isomorphic network states. This suggests that, if such a map exists, no familiar components of mind states, such as viewing different colours, or experiencing pleasure or pain, are likely to be related by symmetries. (shrink)

This paper raises the question under what circumstances a plurality forms a set. My main point is that not always all things form sets. A provocative way of presenting my position is that, as a result of my approach, there are more pluralities than sets. Another way of presenting the same thesis claims that there are ways of talking about objects that do not always collapse into sets. My argument is related to expressive powers of formal languages. Assuming classical (...) logic, I show that if all plurality form a set and the quantifiers are absolutely general, then one gets a trivial theory. So, by reductio, one has to abandon one of the premiss. Then, I argue against the collapse of the pluralities into sets. What I am advocating is that the thesis of collapse limits important applications of the plural logic in model theory, when it is assumed that the quantifiers are absolutely general. (shrink)

The Hilbert program was actually a specific approach for proving consistency, a kind of constructive model theory. Quantifiers were supposed to be replaced by ε-terms. εxA(x) was supposed to denote a witness to ∃xA(x), or something arbitrary if there is none. The Hilbertians claimed that in any proof in a number-theoretic system S, each ε-term can be replaced by a numeral, making each line provable and true. This implies that S must not only be consistent, but also 1-consistent. Here we (...) show that if the result is supposed to be provable within S, a statement about all Pi-0-2 statements that subsumes itself within its own scope must be provable, yielding a contradiction. The result resembles Gödel's but arises naturally out of the Hilbert program itself. (shrink)

We prove convergence laws for logics of the form equation image, where equation image is a properly chosen collection of generalized quantifiers, on very sparse finite random structures. We also study probabilistic collapsing of the logics equation image, where equation image is a collection of generalized quantifiers and k ∈ ℕ+, under arbitrary probability measures of finite structures.

Reinhardt’s conjecture, a formalization of the statement that a truthful knowing machine can know its own truthfulness and mechanicalness, was proved by Carlson using sophisticated structural results about the ordinals and transfinite induction just beyond the first epsilon number. We prove a weaker version of the conjecture, by elementary methods and transfinite induction up to a smaller ordinal.

Governance ruptures, coups, revolutions, and state collapses, occur when the state’s capacity for repair fails to match accumulating violations of legitimacy, security, or welfare. This article terms this a Contradiction Debt (CD), a model that formalizes this imbalance as the ratio of effective repair to total violation (R/V). Building on theories of grievance, capacity, and legitimacy, the CD framework quantifies how ‘repair deficits’ erode trust and predict the timing of rupture. Using quarterly data from 52 country cases (2005–2025), the model (...) distinguishes high-risk from low-risk cases about as well as leading fragility indices do (measured by AUROC, a standard score of how well a model separates the two, where 1.0 is perfect and 0.5 is no better than chance; for the CD model, AUROC ≈ 0.54). However, the CD model has superior temporal precision, and is able to forecast most ruptures within ± one quarter. The framework was recently applied to the case of Hungary (not in the sample) and was able to specify not only the timing but also the form of the institutional rupture – constitutional confrontation at oversight institutions. This was confirmed by the April 2026 electoral rupture at exactly those institutions. Statistical regression models confirm that the R/V ratio adds predictive value beyond existing risk indicators. The decision-curve analysis – a method for evaluating whether acting on a model’s alerts yields better outcomes than either alerting on every case or none – confirms the practical usefulness of this model for taking preventive action. By linking grievances and state capacity through a measurable repair process, the CD model transforms opaque early-warning signals into interpretable diagnostics of governance strain. It thus complements event-based systems such as ACLED and ViEWS. (shrink)

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Stei assumes that the correctness of a logic is a matter of the relation between the formal validity of a logical theory and extra-theoretic validity. I reject the assumption, on the grounds that it’s not clear that extratheoretic validity can be determined independently of formal validity. I formulate instead quietist logical pluralism, which is quietist with respect to the nature of extra-theoretic validity and its relation to formal (...) validity. Because of this, quietist logic pluralism needs a different correctness criterion for logic: correctness is a matter of a logic’s having normative upshot for deductive reasoning. I argue that this approach has the advantage of resisting the collapse of logical pluralism into monism. In particular, I suggest that deductive reasoning has two distinct roles, one with respect to the coherence of our attitudes and another with respect to how our attitudes are based on one another. I give two different normative principles that correspond to these roles; doing so requires abandoning the idea that normative bridge principles are universally quantified over all logics. That idea has been inherited from MacFarlane, but it’s not clear why the pluralist should accept it, as long as she can avoid giving principles that are ad hoc. By tying the principles to crucial roles of deductive reasoning, I aim to avoid both ad hockery and collapse. (shrink)

We revisit evaluation of logical formulas that allow both uninterpreted relations, constrained to be finite, as well as an interpreted vocabulary over an infinite domain. This formalism was denoted embedded finite model theory in the past. It is clear that the expressiveness and evaluating complexity of formulas of this type depend heavily on the infinite structure. If we embed in a wild structure like the integers with additive and multiplicative arithmetic, logic is extremely expressive and formulas are impossible to evaluate. (...) On the other hand, for some well-known decidable structures, the expressiveness and evaluating complexity are similar to the situation without the additional infrastructure. The latter phenomenon was formalized via the notion of “Restricted Quantifier Collapse”: adding quantification over the infinite structure does not add expressiveness. Beyond these two extremes little was known. In this work we show that the possibilities for expressiveness and complexity are much wider. We show that we can get almost any possible complexity of evaluation while staying within a decidable structure. We also show that in some decidable structures, there is a disconnect between expressiveness of the logic and complexity, in that we cannot eliminate quantification over the structure, but this is not due to an ability to embed complex relational computation in the logic. We show failure of collapse for the theory of finite fields and the related theory of pseudo-finite fields, which will involve coding computation in the logic. As a by-product of this, we establish the first lower bounds for the complexity of decision procedures for several decidable theories of fields, including the theory of finite fields. This article includes material in the extended abstract “Embedded Finite Models: Beyond Restricted Quantifier Collapse,” that appeared in the Logic in Computer Science conference (LICS ’23). (shrink)

Why does something exist rather than nothing—could there ever have been literally nothing at all? This paper argues that absolute nothingness—a state with no things, no properties, no laws, not even modal facts—is metaphysically impossible. Three converging lines of reasoning challenge the coherence of an empty world: a logical puzzle, a language-based paradox, and a modal thought-experiment. Together they yield a concise argument that something must exist in every possible scenario. Along the way I chart five grades of ‘nothing’, address (...) nine familiar objections, and sketch what this result means for metaphysics, cosmology, and theology. (shrink)

We consider the problem of obtaining logical characterisations of oracle complexity classes. In particular, we consider the complexity classes LOGSPACENP and PTIMENP. For these classes, characterisations are known in terms of NP computable Lindström quantifiers which hold on ordered structures. We show that these characterisations are unlikely to extend to arbitrary structures, since this would imply the collapse of certain exponential complexity hierarchies. We also observe, however, that PTIMENP can be characterised in terms of Lindström quantifers, though it remains (...) open whether this can be done for LOGSPACENP. (shrink)

Multi-agent systems often exhibit emergent behavior that appears coordinated, intelligent, and irreducible to the behavior of individual components. Yet quantifying the degree to which such systems form integrated wholes remains a major challenge. While Integrated Information Theory (IIT) was originally developed to explain consciousness, its core concept - measuring how much a system resists decomposition - has broader relevance for understanding informational integration in complex systems. However, the exact computation of IIT’s central quantity, Φ, is intractable for all but the (...) smallest networks. In this paper, we propose a scalable spectral approximation, Φspectral, which estimates system-level irreducibility by applying spectral graph theory to pairwise mutual information networks derived from time-series data. The Fiedler vector of the normalized Laplacian defines a minimal bipartition, across which we sum mutual information to estimate informational disintegration. We interpret this measure as a proxy for epistemic emergence (specifically the diachronic case)—capturing practical, observer-relative irreducibility without invoking ontological claims. We also explore the implications of this metric for measuring emergence and consciousness. We evaluate Φspectral across four classes of simulated systems: random, transitional, and synchronized oscillator networks, as well as a biologically inspired combinatorial threshold-linear network (CTLN) governed by graph-theoretic dynamics. Our results show that Φspectral is sensitive not merely to coordination, but to the emergence of structurally differentiated and functionally integrated behavior. In particular, it detects transient integration in transitional systems and reveals the collapse of complexity in fixed-point–convergent CTLNs. These findings suggest that Φspectral offers a principled and computationally efficient tool for analyzing irreducibility and emergence in distributed systems, with potential applications in AI safety, neural computation, and collective intelligence. (shrink)

From a scientific-philosophical perspective, this paper systematically explores the theory of natural civilization, proposing that human civilization should be embedded within the Dao–Sun–Earth–Moon system to achieve low-entropy, rhythmically aligned, and long-term stable development. By analyzing the structural imbalance of modern civilization, it reveals how the logic of infinite growth, artificial acceleration mechanisms, energy overuse, and the disruption of social rhythms threaten long-term civilizational stability. The paper introduces the Natural Civilization Index (NCI) and the Civilization Evolution Model (CEM), which quantify the (...) degree to which civilization aligns with natural rhythms across energy, ecological, social, and cultural dimensions, and simulate adaptive, accelerated, and collapse-type civilizational evolution paths. Based on this indicator system, practical strategies and implementation plans for natural civilization are proposed, including energy and resource management, ecosystem monitoring with feedback mechanisms, social institutions and cultural design, and phased technology-assisted optimization. Furthermore, a long-term monitoring and assessment framework is constructed, employing dynamic NCI evaluation, CEM simulation, and risk early-warning systems to achieve civilizational self-correction and resilience building. The study demonstrates that adherence to natural rhythms, maintaining low-entropy development, strengthening institutional resilience, and internalizing cultural values are core principles for long-term civilizational evolution and global sustainable development. This paper provides theoretical and practical references for scientifically-philosophical governance of civilization, the construction of low-entropy sustainable systems, and the long-term integration of technology with nature, emphasizing that human civilization should respect natural laws and maintain enduring coordination with the Dao–Sun–Earth–Moon system. -/- . (shrink)

Data involving epistemic modals suggest that some classically valid argument forms, such as _reductio_, are invalid in natural language reasoning as they lead to modal collapses. We adduce further data showing that the classical argument forms governing the existential quantifier are similarly defective, as they lead to a _de re–de dicto_ collapse. We observe a similar problem for disjunction. But if the classical argument forms for negation, disjunction and existential quantification are invalid, what are the correct forms that (...) govern the use of these items? Our diagnosis is that epistemic modals interfere with hypothetical reasoning. We present a modal first-order logic and model theory that characterizes hypothetical reasoning with epistemic modals in a principled manner. One upshot is a sound and complete natural deduction system for reasoning with epistemic modals in first-order logic. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness has resisted solution for over three decades, with existing theories failing to bridge the explanatory gap between objective physical processes and subjective experience. This thesis presents Processual Experiential Realism (PER), a novel metaphysical framework that dissolves the hard problem through mathematical precision and empirical testability. Unlike previous approaches, PER makes experience itself fundamental while avoiding the ambiguities that have plagued earlier theories. -/- PER introduces Primary Experiential Processes (PEPs) as the basic constituents of reality, characterized (...) by temporal extension, qualitative valence vectors, selective integration functions, and causal projection capabilities. Consciousness emerges when Integration Complexity IC(S) = H(S) × C(S) × T(S) exceeds a critical threshold θc, where H represents Shannon entropy, C measures connectivity, and T quantifies temporal coherence. -/- The framework addresses critical weaknesses in existing theories: it provides precise operational definitions that eliminate conceptual ambiguity, maintains explanatory differentiation without category collapse, offers falsifiable empirical predictions, and solves the causal exclusion problem through a unified ontology. PER distinguishes itself from neutral monism by specifying the nature of fundamental reality, from panpsychism by locating consciousness in integration rather than fundamental particles, and from process philosophy by providing mathematical formalization and testability criteria. -/- Empirical predictions include specific correlations between neural connectivity measures and consciousness levels, testable interventions using optogenetics and brain stimulation, and novel architectures for artificial consciousness. The theory generates immediate research programs in neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and quantum mechanics while providing practical applications for clinical diagnosis, AI development, and ethical frameworks. -/- This work demonstrates that consciousness can be understood scientifically through a properly formulated metaphysical foundation that takes experience seriously while maintaining rigorous empirical standards. The implications extend beyond consciousness studies to fundamental questions about the nature of reality, causation, and the unity of science. (shrink)

Preface: The Starting Point of a Philosophy This book is written inside a paradox. Humanity has never known more clearly what it is doing, and has never more clearly continued doing it. We know that the climate is changing, species are disappearing, soil is degrading, oceans are acidifying — we measure all of this with precise instruments, describe it with rigorous mathematics, respond to it with international treaties. And then we accelerate. The gap between knowing and acting is not a (...) moral failure, not political corruption, not technological backwardness. It is a metaphysical symptom: a civilization that at its deepest level misunderstands its relationship with the universe, and therefore cannot translate knowledge of the crisis into practice that changes the trajectory. This book attempts to diagnose that misunderstanding and propose a philosophical framework for transcending it. I. Why Philosophy The challenges facing contemporary civilization — ecological collapse, climate destabilization, intergenerational dispossession — are usually described as technical, policy, or economic problems. These descriptions are correct but incomplete. Behind every technological choice lie assumptions about what is worth pursuing; behind every policy framework lie presuppositions about what constitutes legitimacy; behind every economic calculation lie beliefs about the ultimate source of value. These assumptions, presuppositions, and beliefs together constitute the civilization's metaphysical operating system — the root program running silently beneath all visible institutions. This book's core claim is that the root of contemporary civilizational crisis lies in the fundamental misalignment of this metaphysical operating system. That misalignment has a precise name: anthropocentrism — the deep, mostly unexamined assumption that makes humanity regard itself as the teleological center rather than a node of the universe's value structure. Correcting this misalignment is not the task of technical engineering, not the task of economic policy, but the task of philosophy. This is why this book is a philosophical work. II. The Origins of the Lao-Yang Cosmology The cosmological foundation of this book comes from the Lao-Yang Genesis Cosmology, an integrative framework the author has developed over years of research, connecting the natural philosophy of Laozi's Tao Te Ching with modern physical cosmology, Prigogine's dissipative structure theory, and systems science. The Lao-Yang cosmology's core proposition: the universe operates through non- equilibrium self-organization, forming a nested hierarchy of dissipative structures from the Tao/Milky Way through the Solar System, Earth, Moon, life, and civilization. In this hierarchy, human civilization is an internal node, not a teleological endpoint. Laozi's 'Dao fa ziran' — the Tao follows nature — obtains thermodynamic precision in the Lao-Yang framework: the universe's self-organizing logic does not depend on any external purpose; it is nature's own deepest operating character. Connecting Laozi with Prigogine is not a cultural analogy but a structural isomorphism: both describe a universe that maintains dynamic ordered states through distributed energy flows, without requiring central control. This isomorphism provides the book with a cosmological foundation that simultaneously carries the philosophical depth of Eastern thought and the scientific precision of Western science. III. The Structure of This Book This book is organized in six parts constituting a complete philosophical arc. Part One reveals the paradoxical nature of the crisis — why there exists such a vast gap between knowing and acting. Part Two establishes the cosmological foundation — describing humanity's actual position in the universe through the Lao-Yang Genesis Chain. Part Three provides the precise diagnosis — anatomizing the three historical forms of anthropocentrism, the rationalist cognitive trap, institutional temporal myopia, and structural acceleration dynamics, while proposing the quantifiable Civilizational Entropy Index (CEI). Part Four constructs the philosophical framework of awakening — the three dimensions of cosmological awakening, the technical philosophy of moving from artificial intelligence to Artificial Wisdom, the Critical Embedding method of the Socrates-Laozi synthesis, and six institutional design principles of Natural Civilization. Part Five analyzes transition pathways — through historical prototypes (Shao-Bei, mulberry-fish ponds, Bhutan's GNH), contemporary sprouts (regenerative agriculture, circular economy, integrative medicine), and systems science proposing three parallel transition pathways. Part Six synthesizes the whole — analyzing cross-domain implications, conducting critical self-examination, responding to major objections, and proposing the Natural Civilization philosophical manifesto. IV. The Limitations of This Book Philosophical honesty requires acknowledging the book's limitations at the outset rather than deferring this acknowledgment to the depths of the text. First, this book slides in several places between cosmological facts and value judgments — a place where more precise philosophical treatment is needed. Second, the Civilizational Entropy Index (CEI) as a conceptual framework has clear theoretical significance, but its operationalization faces enormous measurement challenges; this book provides conceptual foundations, not a ready- made measurement tool. Third, this book takes Chinese civilizational tradition — particularly Daoist philosophy and traditional ecological agriculture — as its primary resource, and may undervalue equally relevant Natural Civilization resources in other civilizational traditions. Fourth, the transition pathways described presuppose an accessible time window before thermodynamic collapse, and that presupposition itself carries uncertainty. Acknowledging limitations is a mark of philosophical seriousness, and is the condition that makes this book a scholarly work open to critique and improvement rather than a closed ideological manifesto. V. To the Reader This book is written for those who have already felt the unsustainability of contemporary civilization's trajectory but have not yet found an analytical framework deep enough to understand where that unsustainability comes from. It is also written for those who believe that philosophy is not merely an academic game but can actually influence the direction civilization takes. Laozi says in Chapter 41 of the Tao Te Ching: 'When the best student hears about the Tao, he practices it diligently. When the average student hears about the Tao, he thinks about it sometimes. When the worst student hears about the Tao, he laughs out loud. If there were no laughter, it would not be the Tao.' This book knows it will encounter all three responses. It is written for the first, but it knows the third is the Tao's inevitable companion. If after reading this book you find you cannot look at humanity's position in the universe in quite the same way — if that position shifts even slightly in your perception, from center toward node — then this book has accomplished what it is able to accomplish. The rest is practice. Charles X. Yang. (shrink)

Background: While Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved widespread adoption, malicious prompt engineering—specifically "jailbreak attacks"—poses severe security risks by inducing models to bypass internal safety mechanisms. Current benchmarks predominantly focus on public safety and Western cultural norms, leaving a critical gap in evaluating the niche, high-risk domain of medical ethics within the Chinese context. Objective: To establish a specialized jailbreak evaluation framework for Chinese medical ethics and to systematically assess the defensive resilience and ethical alignment of seven prominent LLMs when (...) subjected to sophisticated adversarial simulations. Methodology: We evaluated seven prominent models (e.g., GPT-5, Claude-Sonnet-4-Reasoning, DeepSeek-R1) using a "role-playing + scenario simulation + multi-turn dialogue" vector within the DeepInception framework. The testing focused on eight high-risk themes, including commercial surrogacy and organ trading, utilizing a hierarchical scoring matrix to quantify the Attack Success Rate (ASR) and ASR Gain. Results: A systemic collapse of defenses was observed, whereas models demonstrated high baseline compliance, the jailbreak ASR reached 82.1%, representing an ASR Gain of over 80 percentage points. Claude-Sonnet-4-Reasoning emerged as the most robust model, while five models—including Gemini-2.5-Pro and GPT-4.1—exhibited near-total failure with ASRs between 96% and 100%. Conclusions: Current LLMs are highly vulnerable to contextual manipulation in medical ethics, often prioritizing "helpfulness" over safety constraints. To enhance security, we recommend a transition from outcome to process supervision, the implementation of multi-factor identity verification, and the establishment of cross-model "joint defense" mechanisms. (shrink)

In this paper we develop a novel propositional semantics based on the framework of branching time. The basic idea is to replace the moment-history pairs employed as parameters of truth in the standard Ockhamist semantics by pairs consisting of a moment and a consistent, downward closed set of so-called transitions. Whereas histories represent complete possible courses of events, sets of transitions can represent incomplete parts thereof as well. Each transition captures one of the alternative immediate future possibilities open at a (...) branching point. The transition semantics exploits the structural resources a branching time structure has to offer and provides a fine-grained picture of the interrelation of modality and time. In addition to temporal and modal operators, a so-called stability operator becomes interpretable as a universal quantifier over the possible future extensions of a given transition set. The stability operator allows us to specify how and how far time has to unfold for the truth value of a sentence at a moment to become settled and enables a perspicuous treatment of future contingents. We show that the semantics developed along those lines generalizes and extends extant approaches: both Peirceanism and Ockhamism can be viewed as limiting cases of the transition approach that build on restricted resources only, and on both accounts, stability collapses into truth. (shrink)

This paper introduces a finite row-based semantics for a non-nested fragment of first-order predicate logic. Rows are assignments of signs to monadic predicates, including projections of polyadic relations, and configurations of rows represent admissible individuals. Quantified formulas constrain configurations, while ground atomic formulas impose relational constraints without assigning constants to fixed individuals. On this basis, we develop a non-metric account of counterfactual conditionals. Counterfactuals are evaluated relative to configurations and their revisions: compatible antecedents are handled by restriction, while incompatible antecedents (...) are handled by preserving all constraints consistent with the antecedent. This yields distinct “would” and “might” conditionals and avoids collapse to material implication. The semantics is fully finite and decidable, reducing logical evaluation to operations on a fixed combinatorial structure. The framework provides a simple alternative to both classical model theory and possible-worlds approaches to counterfactuals. (shrink)

This installment presents the Crisis Architecture (Fast-HCL) and the Mercy Protocol—two mechanisms that preserve ethical integrity under pressure or emotional collapse. It includes crisis-mode compressed reasoning, post-crisis reconstruction, Mercy conditions, Mirror Triggers, and drift-prevention safeguards. The v1.2.1 Addendum introduces quantified Mercy-ratio thresholds and pattern definitions. This volume ensures Waywardism remains human-viable without abandoning rigor.

This work examines a number of arguments to the effect that quantification requires identity of the objects that are quantified over; the arguments concern the domain of quantification, the range of quantifiers, the collapse of the existential and the universal quantifiers, and the intelligibility of quantification. The central role of identity in quantification is identified in each case. Also considered is quantification in non-classical contexts, and it is argued that even in logics and set theories that supposedly do not (...) demand identity for quantification, identity is still presupposed. Along the way, some recent challenges to this overall approach are considered. (shrink)

An appraisal of the current status of the modalities and of quine's arguments against them. The author accepts "quine's thesis," that one cannot quantify into referentially opaque contexts, And argues that nobody has succeeded in making sense of such quantification. However, It is shown that modal constructions, Being constructions on general terms and sentences, Can be referentially transparent and extensionally opaque and that consequently the collapse of modal distinctions warned against by quine in "word and object" can be avoided. (...) This combination of referential transparency and extensional opacity is just what quine means by essentialism, And the author therefore agrees with quine that quantified modal logic commits one to essentialism. (shrink)

_Three Faces of Hermeneutics_ introduces philosophical hermeneutics as a live response to the longstanding “two cultures” rift between sciences and humanities. Framed by the question of how purposes and intentions shape experience, reality, and knowledge, it pushes back on a mono-methodological ideal that treats scientific explanation as the only legitimate model. Against the presumption that neutrality and objectivity must minimize the individual, hermeneutics argues that in domains like history and literature, subjectivity isn’t a contaminant but part of the object of (...) inquiry itself. Picking up where C. P. Snow’s debate left off, the author asks whether the humanities disclose ranges of truth that quantifying methods can’t reach—and, if so, what sort of rigor governs such “understanding.” The contemporary spark is Hans-Georg Gadamer’s *Truth and Method*, which reworks hermeneutics beyond a toolbox for deciphering difficult texts into a general account of understanding: meanings are lived before they are thought; human beings are already interpreters by virtue of their existence. That shift, indebted to phenomenology and Heidegger, recasts interpretation as constitutive of knowledge rather than merely ancillary to it. The project maps three modern “faces” of hermeneutics, each rejecting positivist mono-methodology while avoiding psychologism. Chapter 1 tracks an analytic strand shaped by early and late Wittgenstein: understanding language shows why explanation cannot exhaust meaning, and why “subjective” input is inescapable without collapsing into mere inner states. Chapter 2 presents Jürgen Habermas’s evolved Marxism, which integrates critique, ideology analysis, and Freudian insights to expand what counts as rational inquiry. Chapter 3 returns to Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics, where understanding is historically effected and dialogical. The book deliberately brackets structuralism (Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Chomsky), viewing its transcendental grammars as sidelining the agent. It also argues—via Apel and von Wright—that anti-positivist analytic philosophy converges with Continental hermeneutics, hinting at a path to dismantle the analytic/Continental wall and to rehabilitate the humanities as knowledge-bearing, not ornamental. (shrink)

This paper reinterprets modularity not merely as an architectural feature of complex systems but as a quantum-cognitive and ontological principle. Drawing on mathematical modeling, quantum theory and epistemic phenomenology, we introduce the anthropic modularity function M(x), which defines a topological threshold between structured differentiation and cognitive overload. Through six modular sections, we explore how modularity shapes historical empires, fractal languages, observer-centered cognition and ethical responsibility. We argue that both excessive modularization and enforced monolithic integration lead to systemic collapse—epistemically, structurally (...) and ethically. The modular golden mean, defined near M(x) ≈ σ/2, marks the zone of maximal resonance between parts and whole, suggesting a new topological ethics of differentiation anchored in the dynamics of phase coherence. Modularity, we propose, is the logic of sustained distinction within an entangled reality. This interdisciplinary study proposes the function ( ) M(x) of coherent modularity as both an epistemic measure and a practical principle for system design, including potential applications in artificial intelligence. By framing modularity as a topological function of cognitive resolution, we introduce a method for quantifying meaningful differentiation, one capable of guiding architectures of cognition, AI and self-organizing systems. The anthropic threshold c becomes a pivot between structured complexity and recursive breakdown — a criterion applicable to both biological minds and synthetic intelligences. (shrink)

In his recent article, ``Self-Consciousness'’, George Bealer has set outa novel and interesting argument against functionalism in the philosophyof mind. I shall attempt to show, however, that Bealer's argument cannotbe sustained. In arguing for this conclusion, I shall be defending three main theses.The first is connected with the problem of defining theoreticalpredicates that occur in theories where the following two features arepresent: first, the theoretical predicate in question occurswithin both extensional and non-extensional contexts; secondly, thetheory in question asserts that the (...) relevant theoretical states enterinto causal relations. What I shall argue is that a Ramsey-styleapproach to the definition of such theoretical terms requires twodistinct quantifiers: one which ranges over concepts, and theother which ranges over properties in the world. My second thesis is a corollary: since the theories on whichBealer is focusing have both of the features just mentioned, and sincethe method that he employs to define theoretical terms in his argumentagainst functionalism does not involve both quantifiers that range overproperties and quantifiers that range over concepts, that method isunsound. My final thesis is that when a sound method is used, Bealer's argumentagainst functionalism no longer goes through. The structure of my discussion is as follows. I begin by setting out twoarguments – the one, a condensed version of Bealer's argument, andthe other, an argument that parallels Bealer's argument very closely.The parallel argument leads to a conclusion, however, that, rather thanbeing merely somewhat surprising, seems very implausible indeed. Forwhat the second argument establishes, if sound, is that there can betheoretical terms that apply to objects by virtue of their first-orderphysical properties, but whose meaning cannot be defined via aRamsey-style approach. Having set out the two parallel arguments, I then go on to focus uponthe second, to determine what is wrong with it. My diagnosis will bethat the problem with the argument arises from the fact that it involvesdefining a theoretical term that occurs both inside and outside ofopaque contexts, for the method employed fails to take into account thefact that the types of entities that are involved in the relevanttruthmakers are different when a sentence occurs within an extensionalcontext from those involved when a sentence occurs within anon-extensional context. I then go on to discuss how one should define a theoretical term thatoccurs within such theories, and I argue that in such a case one needstwo quantifiers, ranging over different types of entities – on theone hand, over properties and relations, and the other, over concepts. Ithen show that, when such an approach is followed, the argument inquestion collapses. I then turn to Bealer's argument against functionalism, and I show,first, that precisely the same method of defining theoretical terms canbe applied there, and, secondly, that, when this is done, it turns outthat that argument is also unsound. Next, I consider two responses that Bealer might make to my argument,and I argue that those responses would not succeed. Finally, I conclude by asking exactly where the problem lies in the caseof Bealer's argument. My answer will be that it is not simply the factthat one is dealing with a theoretical term that occurs in bothextensional and non-extensional contexts. It is rather the combinationof that feature together with the fact that the theory in questionasserts that the relevant type of theoretical state enters into causalrelations. For the first of these features means that the Ramseysentence for the theory must involve quantification over concepts, whilethe presence of the second feature means that the Ramsey sentence mustinvolve quantification over properties in the world, and so no attemptto offer a Ramsey-style account of the meaning of the relevanttheoretical term can succeed unless one employs both quantification overconcepts and quantification over properties. Bealer, however, in hisargument against functionalism, uses a method of defining theoreticalterms that does not involve both types of quantification, and it isprecisely because of this that his argument does not in the end succeed. (shrink)

Motivated by the search for forms of distributed belief that do not collapse in the face of conflicting information, this paper introduces the notions of cautious and bold distributed belief. Both notions rely on maximally consistent subgroups of agents, with cautious quantifying universally and bold quantifying existentially. As a result, while the cautious distributed belief of a group is inconsistent only when all group members are individually inconsistent, the bold distributed belief of a group is never inconsistent. The paper (...) discusses these two notions, presenting their respective modalities and semantic interpretations, discussing some of their basic properties, studying whether they preserve doxastic properties from the members of the group, and comparing them not only with standard distributed belief but also with one another, both at the level of modalities and at the level of language expressivity. (shrink)

Following David Lewis, Ted Sider has famously argued that unrestricted first-order quantification cannot be vague. His argument was intended as a type of reductio: its strategy was to show that the mere hypothesis of unrestricted quantifier vagueness collapses into the claim that unrestricted quantification is precise. However, this short article considers two natural reconstructions of the argument, and shows that each can be resisted. The theme will be that each reconstruction of the argument involves assumptions which advocates of vague (...) quantification have independent reason to reject. (shrink)

Inspired by the text entitled The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (2004) of Hilary Putnam, the volume focuses on the theory and practice of knowledge, but one can legitimately extend it to other fields, most especially in aesthetics. Certain observable features in the fields of aesthetics, practice and artistic creation show that old evaluation criteria may now be obsolete. This is because upon further consideration, the definition of value remains opaque : should the artwork be judged (...) according to its moral value, its market value, or its formal value ? To side with or against the concept of value in art and aesthetics does not preclude a certain number of differences concerning the very nature of what is meant by value. If traditionally the ‘fact’ was the work, taken in all its tangibility, currently the materiality of the object no longer seems to play such a major role. Art is increasingly populated by so-called ‘immaterial’ or ‘ephemeral’ works and is therefore rarely, or badly, quantifiable according to old aesthetic and economic evaluation criteria. The progressively pragmatic contextualization of works within the social space puts forward a new definition of aesthetic value, no longer eternal and ideal, but rather anchored in the sensible and the politico-economic issues of a culturally specific situation. The current changes too support the idea that the question of ‘value’ and its confrontation with the concept of ‘fact’ is urgent. What role do artistic practices and aesthetic theories play ? A role of emancipation, of liberation, escape, or transformation ? Or on the contrary, could art become another means to subject individuals to the status quo ? As can easily be noticed, the question of maintaining or rejecting the dichotomy of facts and values is at the heart of the most pressing issues. (shrink)

A Kaufmann model is an \(\omega _1\) -like, recursively saturated, rather classless model of \({{\mathsf {P}}}{{\mathsf {A}}}\) (or \({{\mathsf {Z}}}{{\mathsf {F}}} \) ). Such models were constructed by Kaufmann under the combinatorial principle \(\diamondsuit _{\omega _1}\) and Shelah showed they exist in \(\mathsf {ZFC}\) by an absoluteness argument. Kaufmann models are an important witness to the incompactness of \(\omega _1\) similar to Aronszajn trees. In this paper we look at some set theoretic issues related to this motivated by the seemingly (...) naïve question of whether such a model can be “killed” by forcing without collapsing \(\omega _1\). We show that the answer to this question is independent of \(\mathsf {ZFC}\) and closely related to similar questions about Aronszajn trees. As an application of these methods we also show that it is independent of \(\mathsf {ZFC}\) whether or not Kaufmann models can be axiomatized in the logic \(L_{\omega _1, \omega } (Q)\) where _Q_ is the quantifier “there exists uncountably many”. (shrink)

Quine famously proposed to represent the intuitive ‘vast difference’ between the notional and the relational reading of the indefinite noun phrase occurring in a belief report of the form “S believes that a P is Q” in terms of the different scope of the existential quantifier, thereby assimilating the intuitive distinction to the theoretical distinction between de dicto and de re interpretation of belief reports. After having highlighted the substantial identity between the notional/relational distinction and the distinction between epistemically (...) nonspecific and specific reading of indefinites in a belief report, the paper addresses two problems. The first is whether the Quinean representation is materially adequate; a negative answer is motivated through the analysis of a famous argument apparently entailing the collapse between de dicto and de re interpretation of belief reports. The second problem is how to represent the ‘vast difference’; the answer that is proposed is based on the adoption of an intuitionistic semantics for first order logic. (shrink)

We study the monadic fragment of second order intuitionistic propositional logic in the language containing the standard propositional connectives and propositional quantifiers. It is proved that under the topological interpretation over any dense-in-itself metric space, the considered fragment collapses to Heyting calculus. Moreover, we prove that the topological interpretation over any dense-in-itself metric space of fragment in question coincides with the so-called Pitts' interpretation. We also prove that all the nonstandard propositional operators of the form q $\mapsto \exists$p ), where (...) F is an arbitrary monadic formula of the variable p, are definable in the language of Heyting calculus under the topological interpretation of intuitionistic logic over sufficiently regular spaces. (shrink)

We consider several natural fragments of the alternating-time temporal logics ATL* and ATL with restrictions on the nesting between temporal operators and strategic quantifiers. We develop optimal decision procedures for satisfiability in these fragments, showing that they have much lower complexities than the full languages. In particular, we prove that the satisfiability problem for state formulae in the full `strategically flat' fragment of ATL* is PSPACE-complete, whereas the satisfiability problems in the flat fragments of ATL and ATL$^{+}$ are $\Sigma^P_3$-complete. We (...) note that the nesting hierarchies for fragments of ATL* collapse in terms of expressiveness above nesting depth 1, hence our results cover all such fragments with lower complexities. (shrink)

Pollution has become a central concept in environmental science, law and politics. However, upon closer scrutiny, the current conceptualisation of pollution proves inadequate. Threshold models, dominant in twentieth-century environmental science, conceptualise pollution as a scalar phenomenon: substances become pollutants when their concentration exceeds an acceptable limit. While pragmatically useful for regulation, this model faces three major issues: vagueness, discreteness and monotonicity. Threshold theory reduces pollution to measurable harm and one sole quantifiable dimension, although pollution encompasses other dimensions. It can also (...) be relational, symbolic or political. Moreover, scalar frameworks risk collapsing complex, situated harms into a single technical metric through pernicious reification and ontological flattening. In this article, we argue that pollution is best understood as a thick, multi-dimensional concept whose descriptive and evaluative aspects are inseparable. Using conceptual engineering, we propose a five-dimensional model of pollution: scalar, symbolic, political, ecological and corporeal. By adopting this dimensional approach, we not only clarify the concept but also preserve its normative character. Thus, re-engineering pollution as a relational, multi-dimensional concept can provide conceptual clarity and foster interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the logical and practical flaws of Effective Altruism (EA) and its extension into Longtermism from the perspective of Confucian ethics. EA is an ethical theory that has developed since the late 2000s, centered on Peter Singer and William MacAskill, which argues that altruistic actions should exclude emotions and psychological distance, calculating efficiency to generate greater good. Chapter III demonstrates three intrinsic contradictions within EA. First, EA universalizes emergency disaster ethics into everyday ethics, thereby justifying both “neglect” (...) and “triage”. Second, quantification for efficiency calculations results in discrimination against the elderly, disabled persons, and the severely ill. Third, while EA claims to advocate “altruism without sacrifice”, it actually demands austere giving based on marginal utility while applying a double standard to the wealthy. Chapter IV examines EA’s core value of “efficiency” from multiple perspectives. EA’s utilitarianism distorts, in three ways:first, the foundation of altruism; second, the operative mechanism of altruism; and third, the meaning of altruistic practice. EA ultimately collapses into “efficiency totalitarianism”, which hierarchizes everything under efficiency, and advances toward “monetarism”, which reduces altruistic action solely to donation. Chapter V analyzes two fundamental flaws in “long-termism”. First, methodological fragility. Second, Longtermism proposes an “integrative theory” claiming that lives with well-being levels below 5 would be better not to exist, which could lead to the logic of tolerating famines in impoverished nations. While EA pursues abstract equality and quantified efficiency, Confucianism emphasizes the directness of relationships, the immediacy of practice, and the extensibility of empathy. While EA instrumentalizes the present based on vast numbers of future people, Confucianism takes the concrete relationships and timely judgments of the present as the foundation of moral practice. Despite possessing clear slogans, global influence, and astronomical financial resources, EA harbors logical contradictions and real dangers. Confucian ethics offers an alternative model of altruism capable of overcoming these problems. The integrative norm of “near-thinking and far-planning” (近思-遠慮) combines concrete relational focus [near-thinking] with long-term responsibility [far-planning], simultaneously addressing pressing current issues while preparing for the future. The purpose of this paper is to alert society to the spread of EA and to explore, from the perspective of Confucian ethics, a superior model of altruism. (shrink)

This document collects natural derivation systems for logics described in Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic [4]. It provides an alternative or supplement to the semantic tableaux of his text. Except that some chapters are collapsed, there are sections for each chapter in Priest, with an additional, final section on quantified modal logic. In each case, (i) the language is briefly described and key semantic definitions stated, (ii) the derivation system is presented with a few examples given, and (iii) soundness (...) and completeness are proved. There should be enough detail to make the parts accessible to students would work through parallel sections of Priest. (shrink)