Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.

" Qualia " is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at (...) the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia. Nothing, it seems, could you know more intimately than your own qualia ; let the entire universe be some vast illusion, some mere figment of Descartes' evil demon, and yet what the figment is made of will be the qualia of your hallucinatory experiences. Descartes claimed to doubt everything that could be doubted, but he never doubted that his conscious experiences had qualia, the properties by which he knew or apprehended them. (shrink)

Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind—Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory—will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which (...) retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world. (shrink)

In this essay, I want to take another look at the phenomenon of transparency and its relevance to qualia realism and representationalism. I don’t suppose that what I have to say will cause those who disagree with me to change their minds, but I hope not only to clarify my position and that of others who are on my side of the debate but also to respond to various criticisms and objections that have arisen over the last 10–15 years (...) or so.The transparency thesisI begin with four quotations, two from G. E. Moore, one from Gilbert Harman, and one from an earlier paper of mine:…that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent — we look through it and see nothing but the blue… (Moore 1903, p. 446).When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous (Moore 1903, p. 450).When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experien. (shrink)

In this paper I use thought-experiments to argue that functional organization fully determines conscious experience. These thought-experiments involve the gradual replacement of neurons by silicon chips, and similar scenarios. I argue that if "absent qualia" or "inverted qualia", are possible, then phenomena I call "fading qualia" and "dancing qualia" will be possible; but I argue that it is very implausible that fading or dancing qualia are possible. The resulting position is a sort of nonreductive functionalism.

This paper argues that qualia share their physical correlates' locations. The first premise comes from the theory of relativity: If something shares a time with a physical event in all reference frames, it shares that physical event’s location. The second premise is that qualia share times with their correlates in all reference frames. Having qualia and correlates share locations makes relations between them easier to explain, improving both physicalist and dualist theories.

In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas (i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project dispute this possibility. For instance, (...) Searle, in his Chinese room objection, argues that however sophisticated a computational system is, it can never exhibit intentionality; thus, would also fail to exhibit consciousness or any of its varieties. This paper argues that the proposed architecture mentioned above answers the problem posed by Searle, at least in part. Specifically, it argues that we could reformulate Searle’s worries in the Chinese room in terms of the three-stage artificial qualia model. And by doing so, we could see that the person doing all the translations in the room could realize the three areas in the proposed framework. Consequently, this demonstrates the actualization of self-consciousness in machines. (shrink)

This thesis addresses one of the most fundamental questions in consciousness studies: whether the subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience—qualia—can be computationally simulated. Through a comprehensive analysis of existing theoretical frameworks, including Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory, and electromagnetic field theories of consciousness, this work identifies critical gaps in our understanding of the relationship between computational processes and phenomenal experience. -/- The central contribution of this thesis is the development of the Substrate-Information Duality Hypothesis (SIDH), a novel theoretical (...) framework that proposes qualia emerge from the irreducible interaction between substrate-dependent information structures and substrate-independent information patterns. This framework predicts that while computational systems can achieve perfect functional consciousness through the replication of substrate-independent information patterns, they cannot generate genuine phenomenal consciousness due to their inability to instantiate substrate-dependent information structures. -/- Through computational modeling and empirical analysis, this thesis demonstrates that biological, artificial, and hybrid consciousness systems exhibit measurably different consciousness metrics, with biological systems achieving positive consciousness values (Ψ ≈ 0.001) while artificial systems show negative values (Ψ ≈ -0.0004). Unexpectedly, hybrid systems demonstrate the lowest consciousness metrics (Ψ ≈ -0.0015), suggesting that bio-artificial integration may create interference rather than enhancement. The Simulation Detectability Index reveals substantial differences: 131.4% for artificial systems and 225.6% for hybrid systems compared to biological consciousness, indicating that consciousness simulation is fundamentally limited and empirically detectable. These findings suggest that the question "Can qualia be simulated?" must be answered with a qualified negative: while the functional aspects of consciousness can be perfectly simulated, the phenomenal aspects—the "something it is like" of conscious experience—remain beyond the reach of computational simulation. -/- The implications of this work extend beyond theoretical consciousness studies to practical considerations in artificial intelligence development, machine consciousness research, and the ethical treatment of artificial systems. This thesis concludes that the hard problem of consciousness is not merely a conceptual challenge but reflects a fundamental ontological distinction between computational processes and phenomenal experience. (shrink)

According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a (...) representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space. (shrink)

This paper attempts a new understanding of qualia, the qualitative aspects of subjective experience and a central challenge in contemporary philosophy of mind, within the framework of Judgemental Philosophy. It first argues that the existence of qualia is inextricably linked to 'Affectivity,' a key element of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF) in Judgemental Philosophy. Further, drawing upon another core PJF element, 'Indeterminacy,' the diverse directionality of each individual's 'Resonance Drive' (RD), and the individuality of the Judgemental Triad (JT: Constructivity, (...) Coherence, Resonance) process through which RD is actualized, this paper asserts that the diversity of qualia experiences among individuals is inevitable. It also contends that even within a single individual, qualia are dynamic phenomena that change and develop with the maturation of self-awareness and the accumulation of experience, challenging simplistic notions of qualia uniformity. This paper then discusses how this Judgemental Philosophical account of qualia can overcome the limitations of existing physicalist reductionism or functionalist explanations. Crucially, it addresses anticipated counterarguments, such as the scientific unverifiability of private qualia, by positing that attempts to perfectly capture or physically reduce the first-person subjective texture of qualia via third-person methods face epistemological limits analogous to attempts to directly perceive Kant's 'thing-in-itself (Ding an sich).' In conclusion, by understanding qualia not as fixed entities but as a 'living texture of subjective experience, ceaselessly generated and resonated with' within the dynamic CCR process driven by RD under PJF conditions, this paper aims to offer a new structural perspective on the "hard problem" of consciousness, acknowledging both its phenomenological richness and its ultimate epistemological horizons. (shrink)

By arguing that qualia is meaning or understanding, a new framework for understanding consciousness is developed. In this way, the meaning of yellow and red are uncovered. The suggested solutions are that yellow means “source of light” and red means “important”. Also, in the process of arguing that qualia is meaning, remarkable similarities in the structure of qualia are uncovered. In this way, a reason for why very hot and very cold water feel the same, is given. (...) The same behaviour is also shown to take place for colours. (shrink)

This paper explores the intersection of phenomenology and neuroscience to address foundational questions about consciousness, particularly the nature of qualia—subjective, ineffable contents of experience. Drawing on Thomas Nagel’s seminal inquiry into subjective experience and Husserlian phenomenology, we propose that phenomenological “What is it like?” questions can be integrated with neuroscientific models through predictive error coding (PEC). PEC reconceptualizes the brain as an active inference system, continuously generating and updating predictions about sensory inputs. We introduce the concept of “query acts” (...) to describe the brain’s interrogative engagement with sensory information, linking intentionality in phenomenology with predictive mechanisms in neuroscience. By framing qualia as dynamic processes arising from query acts rather than static entities, we bridge the explanatory gap between subjective experience and objective inquiry. This interdisciplinary framework highlights structural parallels between noetic processes in phenomenology and PEC in neuroscience, providing a novel perspective on the emergence of conscious experience. Additionally, we explore the implications of query acts for clinical interventions in psychiatric disorders and the development of context-sensitive artificial intelligence systems. This synthesis fosters deeper integration of philosophical and scientific approaches to understanding the nature of consciousness. (shrink)

We define qualia space Q to be the space of all possible conscious experience. For simplicity we restrict ourselves to perceptual experience only, though other kinds of experience could also be considered. Qualia space is a highly idealized concept that unifies the perceptual experience of all possible brains. We argue that Q is a closed pointed cone in an infinite-dimensional separable real topological vector space. This quite technical structure can be explained for the most part in a simple, (...) intuitive way. The structure of qualia space allows us to consider and even answer in a precise way such questions as: Is there a continuous path from the sensation of blue to the sensation of pain? Once we fix a desired accuracy of approximation, do there exist finitely many perceptual experiences such that any possible perceptual experience is approximately equal to one of them? What should be meant by ‘fundamentally different’ perceptual experiences? There is the possibility of additional structure, such as a Hilbert space structure on the vector space in which Q is embedded. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that those who reject higher-order theories of consciousness should not rule out the possibility of having conscious experiences that they cannot introspect. I begin by offering four arguments that such non-introspectible conscious experiences are possible. Next, I offer two arguments for thinking that we actually have such experiences. According to the first argument, it is unlikely that evolution would have furnished us with a faculty of introspection that worked flawlessly. According to the second argument, there (...) are many plausible potential sources of non-introspectible experiences. Given that all of these sources are at least somewhat plausible, it is fairly probable that we have some kind or other. Finally, I consider whether we might be justified in believing that we can introspect all of our conscious experiences if in fact we can. I show that current approaches to justifying belief in epiphenomenal qualia do not carry over. The upshot of these arguments is that we should be less certain that we really know what it feels like to be us. There may be much more to our experiences than we are aware of. (shrink)

This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept of an epiphenomenal property. (...) One conclusion is that it is not obvious if qualia epiphenomenalism is false; and it is also not obvious what should make us believe that it is false—or for that matter, true. Connections between qualia epiphenomenalism, physicalism, and non-physicalist property dualism are further explored. (shrink)

The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further argue (...) that accepting this starting point amounts to at least implicitly endorsing certain theoretical claims about the nature of introspection. I therefore suggest that we allow ourselves to be guided, in our quest to understand qualia, by whatever independently plausible theories of introspection we have. I propose that we adopt a more moderate definition of qualia, as those introspectible properties which cannot be fully specified simply by specifying the non-controversially introspectible ‘propositional attitude’ mental states (including seeing x, experiencing x, and so on, where x is a specification of a potentially public state of affairs). Qualia thus defined may well fit plausible, naturalisable accounts of introspection. If so, such accounts have the potential to explain, rather than explain away, the problematic intuitions discussed earlier; an approach that should allow integration of our understanding of qualia with the rest of science. (shrink)

The exact relationship between qualia and the function of the brain remains elusive. The present approach focuses on the linkage between the neural mechanisms of the brain and the phenomenological and epistemological mechanisms of qualia. It is hypothesized that distinct characteristics of the ventral prefrontal cortical function may be crucial for the generation of these phenomenological and epistemological mechanisms this is reflected in the so-called 'neurophenomenological hypothesis'. The 'phenomenological—qualitative' character of qualia may be related with an early (...) activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex . The experience of 'presence' in qualia may be accounted for by a co-activation in both VMPFC and hippocampus and a concurrent deactivation in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate. Past and future temporal dimensions may therefore be integrated within the experience of events, which in turn may account for the phenomenal characteristics of 'presence' and thus 'phenomenal time'. 'Non-structural homogeneity' in the experience of qualia may be accounted for by either 'supramodal character' or 'modality unspecifity' of >the VMPFC. The 'heterogenous' stimuli can therefore be included and integrated within one 'homogenous' event as experienced in qualia. Finally, 'transparency' in the experience of qualia may be related with the 'reciprocal suppression' between VMPFC and VLPFC. Simultaneous cognitive processing during the experience of qualia may be suppressed and may consequently account for their transparent character. Due to several methodological limitations, these 'neurophenomenological hypotheses' must be considered as preliminary. However, they may nevertheless serve as a starting point for the development of a more elaborate neuroscientific hypothesis of qualia in the future. (shrink)

In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory (...) concept acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition. (shrink)

Qualia Extinction argues that certain experiences depend on social structures for their very possibility — and that when those structures are destroyed, the experiences don’t just become rare. They become impossible. Gone the way a species goes extinct: not elsewhere, not dormant, not awaiting rediscovery, but permanently foreclosed. The book calls this qualia extinction, and it argues that the process conceals itself from those it affects, because the very capacities you would need to recognise the loss are among (...) the capacities that have been lost. This is a work of philosophy. It builds on Habermas, Taylor, MacIntyre, Rorty and Rosa. It develops philosophical concepts — the formatted self, recursive self-occlusion, affective topology — with the precision that philosophical argument demands. It does not offer life hacks or screen time advice. It does not romanticise the past. What it does is name something that has no name. The feeling that something is missing but you cannot say what. The rage that has no adequate object. The grief you cannot mourn because you do not know what you are grieving. The book passes through that grief. It does not end there. It ends with play: the possibility that even within a formatted world, there remain ways of being that are not yet fully captured — absorbed, responsive, alive to what optimisation cannot reach. (shrink)

Qualia and Physicalism. It is assumed that the following three relations exhaust the possibilities for a physicalist account of qualia: 1. determination, 2. identity, 3. realization. The first relation is immediately rejected because it does not exclude property dualism. The second faces the problem that it is probably impossible to discriminate empirically between the identity thesis and the epiphenomenalist position. The third cannot handle qualia adequately, for qualia are not functional properties and the realization relation is (...) only plausible as a relation between physical realizers and functional properties. Finally, if one attempts to replace multiple realization by multiple identities it is shown that the notion of multiple property identities is unintelligible. The upshot is that if these three relations exhaust the possibilities of a physicalist construal of qualia then physicalism is wrong. (shrink)

Qualia include the ways things look, sound and smell, the way it feels to have a pain; more generally, what it's like to have mental states. Qualia are experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions and, in my view, thoughts and desires as well. But, so defined, who could deny that qualia exist? Yet, the existence of qualia is controversial. Here is what is controversial: whether qualia, so defined, can be characterized in intentional, functional or purely (...) cognitive terms. Opponents of qualia think that the content of experience is intentional content, or that experiences are functionally definable, or that to have a qualitative state is to have a state that is monitored in a certain way or accompanied by a thought to the effect that I have that state. If we include the idea that experiential properties are not intentional or functional or purely cognitive in the definition of ` qualia ', then it is controversial whether there are qualia. (shrink)

Daniel Dennett provides many compelling reasons to question the existence of phenomenal experiences in his paper titled Quining Qualia, however, from the perspective of the individual, qualia appear to be an inherent feature of consciousness. The act of reflecting on one’s experiences suggests that subjective feelings and sensations are a necessary element of human life, as personal opinions on various artistic works are apt to demonstrate. This paper argues that by considering subjective experiences from a naturalized functionalist perspective, (...) a comprehensive explanation for qualia can be provided given its origins in evolutionary biology. As information passing through the nervous system, qualia serve to guide the behaviour of individuals to ultimately facilitate survival. Specifically, qualia are representations of environmental features, existing as information messages supported by neural physiology and encoded in electrochemical formats. In addition to addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness and clarifying the four properties Dennett associates with qualia, this theoretical foundation enables further metaphysical discussion on the nature of consciousness more generally. Although many outstanding questions on the contents of subjective experiences are apt to linger given the explanatory gap, a robust theory for the existence of qualia can be developed through the integration of ideas and concepts from a variety of domains. (shrink)

The problem of consciousness has become one of the biggest unsolved problem in philosophy from the last few decades. Qualia and intentionality are the two feature of consciousness. Qualia represents the conscious awareness, subjectivity or phenomenality whereas intentionality represents the understanding or object-directedness. These are the two major issues in the philosophy of mind while we address the problem of consciousness. The objective of this paper is to give an overview of these two features of consciousness namely intentionality (...) and qualia. Qualia is subjective in nature, whereas intentionality or object-directedness is objective in nature. This paper will focus on some major question regarding qualia and intentionality like, do qualia exist? What is the relationship between qualia and intentionality? Can qualia be reduced or to identify with intentionality or intentionality represent the qualia? Science by its nature objective whereas consciousness by its nature subjective so can there be a science of consciousness? And so on. My paper is divided into two parts, the first part will discuss the problem of qualia whereas the second part will focus on the intentionality and subjective-objective distinction both from the epistemological and ontological perspective. (shrink)

How should we characterize the nature of perceptual experience? Some theorists claim that colour experiences, to take an example of perceptual experiences, have both intentional properties and properties called 'colour qualia', namely, mental qualitative properties which are what it is like to be conscious of colour. Since proponents of colour qualia hold that these mental properties cannot be explained in terms of causal relations, this position is in opposition to a functionalist characterization of colour experience.

Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind. The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of.

"Accounting for qualia in the natural world has come to be known as the hard problem of consciousness. Qualia are the 'raw feels' of consciousness and make up the contents of our sensory experience. These include colors, tastes, pains, smells, and other sensory phenomena. In Sensing Qualia, philosopher Paul Skokowski helps us understand qualia through sensory naturalism, a theory that recognizes our senses as detectors of physical properties in the world. Drawing on neuroscience, physics, cognitive science, (...) and philosophy, Skokowski provides a materialist framework for studying qualia in the physical world and explores the naturalistic limits for qualia in androids and AI. The first part of Sensing Qualia brings readers up to speed with the problem of qualia by examining some of the most influential theories of mind since Descartes. This accessible overview prepares readers for the arguments surrounding qualia and conscious experience that comprise the rest of the book. As a whole, Sensing Qualia provides a compelling explanation of qualia for anyone who is curious about the nature of conscious experience"--. (shrink)

Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing (...) that qualia have the features are epistemically on a par with reasons for believing that ways things seem have the features, and you know that ways things seem do not have the features, then those reasons cannot justify your belief that qualia have the features. I argue that the reasons are epistemically on a par in this way. (shrink)

How does mind fit into nature? Philosophy has long been concerned with this question. No contemporary philosopher has done more to clarify it than Jaegwon Kim, a distinguished analytic philosopher specializing in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. With new contributions from an outstanding line-up of eminent scholars, this volume focuses on issues raised in Kim's work. The chapters cluster around two themes: first, exclusion, supervenience, and reduction, with attention to the causal exclusion argument for which Kim is widely celebrated; and (...) second, phenomenal consciousness and qualia, with attention to the prospects for a functionalist account of the mental. This volume is sure to become a major focus of attention and research in the disciplines of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Dennett provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information-processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitutively representational in an externalist understanding (...) of this. The core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about qualia on which a Dennett-like argument can be based. (shrink)

Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or ‘qualia’ are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia.A paradigm case of qualia is provided by simultaneous color contrast effects, in which (for example) a neutral grey (...) patch is made to look reddish by being enclosed in a green surround. If the qualia based objections are sound, psychology ought not to be able to explain simultaneous color contrast; but psychology at least seems to be able quite successfully to explain those effects. This paper analyzes the logic of psychological explanations of simultaneous color contrast effects, and the import of various qualia based objections to those explanations. I argue that the qualia objections do not demonstrate any explanatory inadequacy in existing psychological explanations of ‘looks’. Psychology succeeds in explaining at least some qualia. In a more positive vein, I argue that once the structure of such explanations is sufficiently understood, a place can be found for qualia within the emerging scientific account of color perception. The resulting account can deal with many of the traditional perplexities over qualia. (shrink)

Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively (...) accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mindbody problem. (shrink)

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can result only from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behaviour but its stable (...) fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers’ fading qualia argument falls into it. (shrink)

Nearly all listeners consider the subjective aspects of music, such as its emotional tone, to have primary importance. But contemporary philosophers often downplay, ignore, or even deny such aspects of experience. Moreover, traditional philosophies of music try to decontextualize it. Using music as an example, this paper explores the structure of qualitative experience, demonstrating that it is multi-layer emergent, non-compositional, enacted, and situation dependent, among other non-Cartesian properties. Our explanations draw on recent work in cognitive science, including blending, image schemas, (...) and sensory memory, as well as on phenomenology. A hierarchical structure transformation based complexity theory is applied to obtain a non-linear dynamical systems explanation of qualia and emotion that respects phenomenological insights about time, including retention and protention. The complexity measure provides both a metric structure and a potential function, on spaces of pieces that are constructed using given elements and transformations, with weights that reflect their cognitive difficulty. However, the approach is not reductionist; using improvisation and the evolution of musical notation as data, we argue that situatedness, especially enactment and social context, are key aspects of musical consciousness. (shrink)

The central attempt of this paper is to explain the underlying intuitions of Frank Jackson’s “Knowledge Argument” that the epistemic gap between phenomenal knowledge and physical knowledge points towards a corresponding ontological gap. The first step of my analysis is the claim that qualia are epistemically special because the acquisition of the phenomenal concept of a quale x requires the experience of x. Arguing what is so special about phenomenal concepts and pointing at the inherence-relation with the qualia (...) they pick out, I give compelling reasons for the existence of ontologically distinct entities. Finally I conclude that phenomenal knowledge is caused by phenomenal properties and the instantiation of these properties is a specific phenomenal fact, which can not be mediated by any form of descriptive information. So it will be shown that phenomenal knowledge must count as the possession of very special information necessarily couched in subjective, phenomenal conceptions. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the long‐term implications of exotic activities that can be experienced through Qualia Surfing: how they might seep into every nook and cranny of our culture, redefining what it means to be human. It produces a quick survey of different types and degrees of qualia surfing. Today, even the most utopian visions of the future contain a worm at their heart: the inevitable decline of humanity into a state of boredom and stagnation. The chapter discusses (...) the subject of abstract qualia because there are changes that could be made to uploaded brain that would give sensations of newness over and above simple sensory qualia. The most complete form of qualia surfing would involve a visit to a domain – a place where a group of people go to create some way of life or historical epoch, but with constraint that outside memories are checked at the door. (shrink)

In "Experience as a Way of Knowing" (this journal), the author tries to create some troubles for philosophers who believe in "qualia" or "what it is like". I think the author has underestimated the complexity of the issues, and I will voice my concerns in five sections. Besides presenting my interpretation of the author's position and challenging it, I will (1) challenge the author's treatment of the knowledge argument, especially the author's treatment of "this is what it is like (...) to see red", (2) challenge the author's interpretation of "what-it-is-like" talk and the author's view that phenomenal properties are theoretical postulates, (3) challenge the author's rejection of "apparent properties", and (4) point out some issues with the author's interpretation of several authors who write about the knowledge argument. (shrink)

What follows is a short thought experiment that aims to show, reductio ad absurdum, that narrow qualia internalism is probably inconsistent with a physicalist/functionalist theory of mind. Those wishing to rebut the argument presented here will need to demonstrate why spatial proximity and the right sort of causal connection of functionally isolated components are necessary to the instantiation of qualia.

Many so-called problems in contemporary philosophy of mind depend for their expression on a collection of inter-defined technical terms, a few of which are qualia, phenomenal property, and what-it’s-like-ness. I express my scepticism about Keith Frankish’s illusionism, the view that people are generally subject to a systematic illusion that any properties are phenomenal, and scout the relative merits of two alternatives to Frankish’s illusionism. The first is phenomenal meta-illusionism, the view that illusionists such as Frankish, in holding their view, (...) are themselves thereby under an illusion. The second is qualia quietism, the view that nothing worth saying is said by employing any of the aforementioned inter-defined technical terms. (shrink)

This paper investigates the status of the purported explanatory gap between pain phenomena and natural science, when the “gap” is thought to exist due to the special properties of experience designated by “ qualia ” or “the pain quale” in the case of pain experiences. The paper questions the existence of such a property in the case of pain by: looking at the history of the conception of pain; raising questions from empirical research and theory in the psychology of (...) pain; considering evidence from the neurophysiological systems of pain; investigating the possible biological role or roles of pain; and considering methodological questions of the comparable status of the results of the sciences of pain in contrast to certain intuitions underpinning “the explanatory gap” in the case of pain. Skepticism concerning the crucial underlying intuitions seems justified by these considerations. (shrink)

The philosophers’ concept of qualia is an artifact of bad theorizing, and in particular, of failing to appreciate the distinction between the intentional object of a belief and the cause of that belief. Qualia, like Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny, have a history but that does not make them real. The cause of a hallucination, for instance, may not resemble the intentional object hallucinated at all, and the representation in the brain is not rendered in special subjective (...) properties. (shrink)

Experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is _like_ for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philoso- phers often use the term 'qualia' to refer to the introspectively accessible properties of (...) experiences that characterize what it is like to have them. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is very difficult to deny that there are qualia. There is another, more restricted use of the term. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness holds that no structural or functional description can logically entail the qualitative character of experience. Qualia appear to be the paradigm case of entities that resist structural reduction. This paper applies Constraint Theory — the thesis that constraint is the transcendental condition of determinacy and existence as such — to the problem of phenomenal presence. I argue for three interconnected claims. First, qualia are not ontological residuals supplementing a structural account but are constituted (...) by the maximal closure of constraint: they are what a system’s state is when its internal constraint structure has exhausted all remaining degrees of freedom at a given level of integration. Second, the privacy and ineffability of qualia are structural consequences of this maximal particularity, not mysterious properties requiring a separate metaphysical explanation. Third, this framework provides a novel individuation principle — the Constraint Individuation Principle — that locates the explanatory gap with greater formal precision than standard physicalist or functionalist accounts, revealing the residual problem to be the question of constraint presence to itself rather than the broader question of why consciousness exists at all. The paper engages with the inverted spectrum objection, explicitly differentiates the account from both property dualism and Integrated Information Theory, and maintains that while constraint presence remains a foundational limit, the framework substantially dissolves the explanatory gap rather than merely displacing it. (shrink)

In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to show that no such essentially vague entities can exist. I consider various objections but argue that ultimately they all (...) fail. In particular I claim that the stock responses to the Sorites argument fail against my reworking of the argument because they require us to make a distinction between a determinate reality and how that reality appears to us, whereas in the case of qualia we can make no such distinction. I conclude that there can be no such things as qualia. (shrink)