Increasing privacy concerns are arising from expanding use of aggregated personal information in health practices. Conversely, in light of the promising benefits of data driven healthcare, privacy...

Privacy must be protected for social reasons. That is what was argued in “Privacy and Health Practices in the Digital Age” (Pyrrho, Cambraia, and de Vasconcelos 2022). Versalovic, Goering, and Klei...

I argue that Pyrrho was an epistemological skeptic, rather than the possessor of a positive metaphysical view.

The detail and quality of argument is high, and Bett is never less than scrupulous and clear in his exposition, so this book deserves to be read and thought about seriouslyRichard Bett presents a ground-breaking study of Pyrrho of Elis, the supposed originator of Greek scepticism, active around 300 BC. Against the standard scholarly view, Bett argues that Pyrrho's philosophy was significantly different from the long later tradition which called itself 'Pyrrhonism', and that this was not a monolithic (...) tradition but had two distinct phases. Bett also investigates the origins and antecedents of Pyrrho's ideas. The result is the first comprehensive picture of this key figure in the development of ancient philosophy. (shrink)

Pyrrho of Elis advises us not to trust our sensations and opinions, but instead to be without opinions about individual things. He suggests that such a state is to be achieved by saying, concerning each individual thing, that it is “no more” a certain way than it is not. This paper argues that the current metaphysical reading of Pyrrho’s views falls short of explaining why we should not trust our sensations and opinions; in addition, it does not explain (...) how to achieve the state of being “without opinions” about individual things. It is argued that a Fregean analysis of Pyrrho’s views can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. The purpose of the paper, however, is to refine, rather than rebut, the metaphysical reading. (shrink)

Encyclopedia entry on Pyrrho's life, doctrines (and debates thereover), and influence.

This paper attempts a reconstruction of the views of Pyrrho of Elis. Many recent commentators, most notably Richard Bett, have made Pyrrho out to a metaphysical dogmatist who thinks the world is fundamentally indeterminate. Despite some criticisms of this view by Brennan and others, this metaphysical reading has continued to gain adherents. But there are serious textual and logical problems with these dogmatic interpretations. According to the evidence we have, a better view is that Pyrrho was an (...) agnostic skeptic, i.e. one who refused to make assertions about the world outside of perceptual or intellectual appearances. But this does not mean that the traditional view of Pyrrho is correct either: the kind of skepticism Pyrrho endorsed is not Pyrrhonian, because it is grounded in the nature of our epistemic faculties rather than opposition between equally plausible theories, arguments, beliefs, or appearances. A secondary thesis of this paper is about methodology. Rather than focus on the most ambiguous and contentious passages in isolation, we should base our interpretation on the whole corpus, beginning with the easiest passages. Faulty interpretations of Pyrrho go wrong, I argue, partly by failing to follow this method. (shrink)

Presents a history of early Buddhism based solely on dateable artefacts and archaeology rather than received tradition, much of which data is provided by studying Pyrrho's history.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 116-118 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics Richard Bett. Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. x + 264. Cloth, $60.00. Charles Brittain. Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. (...) Pp. xii + 406. Cloth, $60.00. These two books demonstrate once again that the ancient skeptics could indeed live their skepticism. In recent decades Myles Burnyeat, Benson Mates, and too many others have retailed the old canard that the skeptic cannot live his skepticism, but here we have two branches of ancient skepticism that sound quite liveable. Both books are subtle and brilliant examples of the genre of reconstructing philosophy from meager and fragmentary evidence.Bett's book follows up on the case he made in his 1997 translation of Sextus Empiricus's Against the Ethicists for three stages in ancient Pyrrhonism. The first is that of Pyrrho (ca. 360-ca. 270 B.C.), a dogmatist who held what Bett labels the indeterminacy thesis: we do not know anything because the world is indeterminate and thus we cannot know it. The second is a similarly dogmatic stage under Aenesidemus (first century B.C.), also followed by Sextus in Against the Ethicists. The third is the more thoroughly skeptical suspension of judgment of the mature Sextus of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (second century A.D.). Bett points out that it would indeed be odd if Pyrrhonism had not evolved in any way in five hundred years. What was unique throughout the tradition was the connection drawn between indeterminacy or suspension of judgment and the goal of ataraxia or tranquility (179, 220).Bett tries to avoid reading later concerns back into the earlier materials, and reevaluates the later materials based on his new reading of the earlier. He argues that Pyrrho's indeterminacy thesis was a metaphysical claim, not an epistemological one. One benefit of [End Page 116] understanding Pyrrho this way is that he does not make a self-refuting exception to his epistemological skepticism for his own claims. Rather, he can just admit to being a kind of dogmatist. Then, Pyrrho's ethical dogmatism is also perfectly consistent. Bett draws a picture of Pyrrho's practical life that rejects the walking-off-of-cliffs apocrypha, but accepts evidence of a quasi-Cynic, anti-theoretical lifestyle. Pyrrho's rejection of social norms puts him at odds with Sextus's later use of laws and customs as guides to behavior. There are still further questions here: why was Pyrrho in particular such a hero to philosophers, if most (or at least many) people are resolutely non-theoretical?Bett points out that Pyrrho gives us no reason to think that the abandonment of theories and opinions must always lead to tranquility (81). But in another connection, he recognizes that temperament may be decisive (111), and that may be the deciding factor here, too. There is no answer to people who say that abandoning theories makes them nervous: the Pyrrhonians simply say that it makes them tranquil. Irreducible differences in temperament may also explain why Pyrrho did not bother with theoretical controversy and Sextus revelled in it.Among other points, Bett discourages all but the most general case for an influence from India on Pyrrho. Bett's thumbnail comparisons between Pyrrho and each of Aristotle, Plato, the Eleatics, Xenophanes, and others show that Pyrrho's philosophy was not at all extraordinary for its time and place. Most philosophers expected claims about nature to be invariable and without qualification (118). Bett says this is odd by modern standards (197), but even today scientific laws are said to apply to all times and all places.The title of Bett's book will mislead some readers. If you are a specialist and your world revolves around ancient philosophy, you will be satisfied that Pyrrho's "legacy" includes Aenesidemus and ends... (shrink)

Today’s understanding of time remains mostly Aristotelian and Newtonian/Einsteinian: time is what has been abstracted from the mundane realities of life and reduced to its measurement. Any somatic, psychological, or other experience of time is deemed either irrelevant or secondary. The history of the attempts to provide alternatives to time as measurement is infinite, most of which focuses on understanding time as an inner-temporal phenomenon for which a subject temporalizes him or herself through remembrance, experience, or anticipation (including death). Amidst (...) this vast field, one argument by an enigmatic figure in ancient Greek thought stands out for the way it abides by neither the conventional view that time is clock time nor that it is an inner temporal phenomenon: Aenesidemus’ overlooked way of apprehending time by qualifying it as similar to air. To make sense of such an unusual statement, it is necessary to reconsider what informs such an unusual idea. Aenesidemus’ teacher was Pyrrho (often dubbed the Greek Buddha) who advocated for a non-differential approach to reality, one for which nothing is fixed or stable. With this perspective in mind, Aenesidemus’ idea then becomes clear: time or air knows no differentiae, whether that of the unit of measure or of the subject breathing it and sheltering from it. Both are radically unstable. While these ideas had no purchase for over 2000 years, they can now be revealed in all their magnitude. In the last 120 years, we have indeed become aerial beings. We no longer scuttle around on the ground floor below an unsuspected ocean of air. We no longer aspire to shin a tree or scale a peak. We have now made a habitation of the air. Such a new dwelling has its own unique time, a time that strangely does not agree with the abstracted and/or calculated time that was formulated when we only had sundials and water-clocks at our disposal. Against time as measure and against time as inner-temporal phenomenon comes time as total instability. Can revisiting the few fragments that Pyrrho and his disciple left us help once again articulate our relation to time and give us a renewed sense of reality and who we are within it? This monograph focuses on early Pyrrhonism (as distinguished from the sceptical work of Sextus Empiricus), Pali Buddhism, as well as contemporary interpretations of time and reality in both science and philosophy. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s portrayal of Pyrrho is predominately contained in two of his notebooks from 1888, and they present a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward him. In this article, I offer an explanation for Nietzsche’s variegated observations, and contend that his interest in Pyrrho is not really founded upon his radical scepticism as one might expect. Rather, it is Nietzsche’s preoccupation with decadence in general – and its ancient Greek philosophical incarnations in particular – that drives his scrutiny of Pyrrho. (...) I describe Nietzsche’s evolving depiction of Pyrrho as one that ultimately develops into a critique, whereby Pyrrho is associated with a number of types of decadence, as well as exhibiting the characteristic traits of a decadent. I close by examining the cogency and soundness of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Pyrrho as a specific exemplar of decadence. (shrink)

In this article, the philosophical (critical) continuity between ancient Greek skepticism (Pyrrhonism) and postmodern political theory is pointed out. This continuity (philosophical reincarnation) is demonstrated by referring to Sextus Empiricus’ writings on Pyrrhonism, as well as two different approaches that are considered to reflect postmodern political theory in its most salient features, such as anti-fundamentalism: Chantal Mouffe’s “project of radical democracy” and the “art of doubt” in Ulrich Beck’s “reflexive” modernity. The content of the identified continuity is basically the following: (...) Just as the Pyrrhonian philosopher aspires to achieve serenity of spirit by suspending judgment through doubt (“epoche” and “ataraksia”) [epəkē –αταραξία], the postmodern theorist aims to end organized political violence by doubting all modern truth allegations. In other words, the individual hope of the Pyrrhonian philosopher is reproduced in the postmodern mind as a socio-political ideal. In Michel Foucault’s terms, the “regime of truth” or the “politics of truth” is an option that often leads to the “terror of truth”. The politics of doubt, on the other hand, is a peaceful, tolerant alternative. According to the postmodern theorist, skepticism is a highly strategic element of a pluralist (libertarian) democratic order. The intellectual way to make modern democracy even more democratic is, first and foremost, through a skepticism that makes absolutely no concessions to truth allegations. In this respect, the most uncompromising skeptic in the history of philosophy is the Pyrrhonian philosopher. Pyrrhonism is the summit of anti-dogmatism. This means that the postmodern theorist is not so much a postmodern agent. In other words, postmodern political theory is the theory of an innovation that is already obsolete. (shrink)

Was Pyrrho a sceptic according to the later Pyrrhonist mould? It must be admitted that some evidence seems to support this verdict; some texts do speak of Pyrrho and Sextus in the same breath, and a number do attribute to Pyrrho himself very much the same kind of outlook as this book finds in later Pyrrhonism. On the other hand, none of these texts predates the revival of Pyrrho by Aenesidemus; thus it is at least possible (...) that this interpretation of Pyrrho results from anachronistically reading back onto Pyrrho himself ideas that in fact appeared only much later. This chapter argues that this can indeed be done, and that this untainted evidence, derived from Timon, suggests that Pyrrho's own position was by no means the same as the later Pyrrhonism familiar to us from Sextusʼ Outlines of Pyrrhonism. (shrink)

An important addition to the study of ancient skepticism, this book argues that there were three schools of thought associated with the name of Pyrrho in antiquity, and that although they are distinct from one another on crucial philosophical points they are similar enough to be linked genealogically. First comes Pyrrho himself in the fourth and third centuries B.C.E., who took the metaphysical position that “reality is inherently indeterminate” and therefore chose a way of life characterized by distrust (...) of sensory experience, avoidance of theoretical inquiry, and freedom from emotional disturbance. In a cautiously argued chapter entitled “Forerunners,” Bett argues for Pyrrho’s originality; some earlier philosophers distrusted theory and some sought freedom from disturbance, but Pyrrho was the first Greek thinker to connect the two themes, so far as we can tell. (shrink)

The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. R. Bett (Ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press 2010, pp. 380+xii, ISBN 780521697545. -/- The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, edited by Richard Bett, consists of an Introduction and fifteen papers written by international authors (three of them have been diligently translated into English by the editor). The volume presents the major figures of ancient skepticism and the major interpretational problems. Separate papers are devoted to Pyrrho of Elis (Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson), Arcesilaus and (...) Carneades (Harald Thorsrud), Aenesidemus (R.J. Hankinson) and Sextus Empiricus (Pierre Pellegrin). Agrippa seems to be the only missing figure on the list. Moreover, we can also find a lot of information about the minor figures of ancient skepticism. Mi-Kyoung Lee presents skeptical ideas in early Greek philosophy and Carlos Levy writes about the later academic skeptics, especially Clitomachus, Philo of Larissa and Cicero. Richard Bett in his Introduction lists the most important problems in interpreting ancient skepticism: What kinds of belief, if any, are open to a skeptic? Can a skeptic allow for choice and action and if so, then how? Is skepticism compatible with an ethical outlook? Is there a real difference between the Academic and Pyrrhonist varieties of skepticism? Casey Perin takes on the first one, Katja Maria Vogt—the second, Richard Bett—the third, and Gisela Striker—the last one. We also have the next five papers presenting other important aspects of ancient skepticism. Paul Woodruff writes about skeptical modes, James Allen about the relation between Pyrrhonism and medical schools, Emidio Spinelli about the critique of specialized sciences, Luciano Floridi about the modern rediscovery of ancient skepticism, and Michael Williams about its Cartesian transformation. The Companion is very rich in content and very up-to-date, presenting the latest hypotheses. Here I would like to discuss the problem of Pyrrho’s place within the skeptical tradition. (shrink)

The chapter argues that Pyrrho and ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism (specifically, Sextus Empiricus) are plausibly interpreted as accepting a self-cultivation philosophy, though in somewhat different senses and with some qualification. For both, the existential starting point is an emotionally troubled life rooted in beliefs about the world, and the ideal state of being is a life of tranquility without these beliefs and guided by appearances. It is difficult to say what spiritual exercises Pyrrho thought were needed to achieve the (...) ideal state: perhaps learning his philosophy and habituating ourselves to follow it. However, for Sextus, employment of skeptical arguments was the primary exercise. Since neither Pyrrho nor Sextus supposed we could make assertions about the specific nature of things, neither had a philosophy of human nature in a straightforward sense. Nonetheless, presentations of their outlooks betray some perspective on this (e.g., about the relationship between absence of belief and tranquility). (shrink)

This chapter begins with a discussion of the origins of Pyrrho's philosophical views. It then considers Pyrrho's epistemological nihilism and the fiction of an unbroken Pyrrhonean succession. It argues that the nature of the connection between Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonism espoused by Sextus remains unexplained. If Sextus would have classified anyone holding the views ascribed to Pyrrho by Timon as a negative dogmatist rather than a sceptic, and it is also clear that Sextus' position did not (...) emerge from Pyrrho's by means of a process of incremental evolution, how do we explain Sextus' willingness to refer to sceptics as Pyrrhonists? Part of the answer to this question lies in the history of Plato's Academy after Plato's death in 347 bc. (shrink)

This article examines Nietzsche’s evaluations of silence and laughter as Pyrrho’s two responses to the dilemma caused by doubts about truth in aphorism 213 of ‘The Wanderer and His Shadow’ (WS 213). Contrary to the common belief that speechlessness leads Pyrrho to tranquillity (ataraxia), in WS 213, it is a symptom of his intellectual impotence caused by logical impasse. Silence proves to be subject to the same traps as speeches. In his later period, Nietzsche deems Pyrrho’s impotent (...) will to truth and pursuit of tranquility nihilism. He contends that Pyrrho’s impotence triggers his ressentiment of dogmatists and labels Pyrrho as a Greek Buddhist in unpublished sections writtenin 1888. For Nietzsche, the only antidote to dogmatism and even nihilism is laughter, a way of overcoming Pyrrho’s obstinate will to truth embodied in the form of logical argumentation. Nietzsche seems to attribute the Democritean cheerfulness (euthumia) to Pyrrho, a manifestation of healthy skepticism and a dynamicconstellation of drives that embrace and overcome suffering. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche claims that laughter is a sign of recovery from a spirit of excessive seriousness, which is embodied by the free-spirited Zarathustra, an antipode to Pyrrho ‘the fanatic of mistrust.’. (shrink)

This article examines Nietzsche’s evaluations of silence and laughter as Pyrrho’s two responses to the dilemma caused by doubts about truth in aphorism 213 of ‘The Wanderer and His Shadow’ (WS 213). Contrary to the common belief that speechlessness leads Pyrrho to tranquillity (ataraxia), in WS 213, it is a symptom of his intellectual impotence caused by logical impasse. Silence proves to be subject to the same traps as speeches. In his later period, Nietzsche deems Pyrrho’s impotent (...) will to truth and pursuit of tranquility nihilism. He contends that Pyrrho’s impotence triggers his ressentiment of dogmatists and labels Pyrrho as a Greek Buddhist in unpublished sections writtenin 1888. For Nietzsche, the only antidote to dogmatism and even nihilism is laughter, a way of overcoming Pyrrho’s obstinate will to truth embodied in the form of logical argumentation. Nietzsche seems to attribute the Democritean cheerfulness (euthumia) to Pyrrho, a manifestation of healthy skepticism and a dynamicconstellation of drives that embrace and overcome suffering. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche claims that laughter is a sign of recovery from a spirit of excessive seriousness, which is embodied by the free-spirited Zarathustra, an antipode to Pyrrho ‘the fanatic of mistrust.’. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida’s use of “non-concepts” such as the trace and différance shifts the practice of philosophy away from the presuppositions of Western metaphysics, which he sought to deconstruct. This essay contends that this inspires a dialogue with ancient India’s skeptical tradition that flourished from Carvaka to Pyrrho. Following Heidegger’s question of being, Derrida’s deconstruction rethought time, consciousness, perception, etc., in ways that give it a secure footing in ancient skepticism’s usage of epochē, nominalism, etc., to steer between the extremes (...) of nihilism and teleological overdetermination. In both, the meaning of being has to be understood through the “play of the trace,” not the reverse. (shrink)

I offer reasons against reading Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. I argue that Hume's scepticism is motivated differently, that his sceptical strategies are not analogous to Pyrrhonism's, and that it is profitable to read Hume as a critic of Pyrrhonism. I hold that the most informative point of comparison between Hume and Sextus Empiricus is a point of difference, namely, their stands on the connection between suspension of judgement (epochê) and tranquillity (ataraxia). For Sextus, tranquillity flows naturally from suspending judgement (...) on all opinions. Hume, by contrast, consistently treats radical suspension of judgement as resulting in despair and social detachment. I take a firmer stance than past commentators on this issue by affirming that Hume and Sextus do not merely disagree on this issue, but that Hume's view is more plausible. Reading Hume's sceptical crisis, I propose, reveals an insightful criticism of Pyrrhonism, one that sheds light on human nature's response to radical doubt. (shrink)

We offer a sceptical examination of a thesis recently advanced in a monograph published by Princeton University Press, entitled Greek Buddha: Pyrrho’s Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia. In this dense and probing work, Christopher I. Beckwith, a professor of Central Eurasian studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, argues that Pyrrho of Elis adopted a form of early Buddhism during his years in Bactria and Gandhāra, and that early Pyrrhonism must be understood as a sect of early Buddhism. (...) In making his case Beckwith claims that virtually all scholars of Greek, Indian, and Chinese philosophy have been operating under flawed assumptions and with flawed methodologies, and so have failed to notice obvious and undeniable correspondences between the philosophical views of the Buddha and of Pyrrho. In this study we take Beckwith’s proposal and challenge seriously, and we examine his textual basis and techniques of translation, his methods of examining passages, his construal of problems and his reconstruction of arguments. We find that his presuppositions are contentious and doubtful, his own methods are extremely flawed, and that he draws unreasonable conclusions. Although the result of our study is almost entirely negative, we think it illustrates some important general points about the methodology of comparative philosophy. (shrink)

Pyrrhonism was one of the two main ancient skeptical traditions. In this second paper of the three‐part series devoted to ancient skepticism, I present and discuss some of the issues on Pyrrhonian skepticism which have been the focus of much attention in the recent literature. The topics to be addressed concern the outlooks of Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus.

pKuzminski’s bookem Pyrrhonian Buddhism: A Philosophical Reconstruction/em presents a comparative study of Buddhism and Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonian Buddhism, Kuzminski’s novelty, designates a synthesis of Greek and Indian influences on Pyrrho’s thought—namely Democritean atomism and Buddhist phenomenalism. It is a philosophical construct that reveals the similarities between the Buddhist and Pyrrhonian models of enlightenment (viz. bodhi and ataraxia). The book examines striking similarities between both Pyrrhonism and Buddhism, suggesting their virtual identity. In Kuzminski’s opinion, it is essentially the Buddhist practice and (...) the description of the Buddhist experience adopted by Pyrrho of Elis that resulted in the original synthesis he calls Pyrrhonian Buddhism. Putting Pyrrhonism in the setting of Buddhism and its practice brings a new understanding of Pyrrhonism as the ancient Greek school influencedbrby the east./p. (shrink)

Overview of the philosophy of this atomist, sophist, and compatriot of Pyrrho.

Pyrrho's philosophical affiliations and antecedents are far from clear and a bewildering variety of claims has been made on the topic, in both ancient and modern times. In the ancient period, these frequently take the form of locating Pyrrho in a certain ‘succession’ of philosophers — that is, a chronological sequence of philosophers, each member of which is alleged to have been the teacher of the next member. Such ‘succession’ stories deserve consideration. More clearly worthy of serious attention (...) are the verdicts on other philosophers offered by Timon in his poem _Silloi_, ‘Lampoons’. This chapter casts doubt on a number of such claims of influence — claims that have received a large measure of acceptance in the literature on Pyrrho. It discusses the indeterminacy thesis, Pyrrho's predecessors such as Plato and Aristotle, Xenophanes, Protagoras, Democritus, Anaxarchus, and the megarians and the Indians. (shrink)