Protagoras was an important Greek thinker of the fifth century BC, the most famous of the so called Sophists, though most of what we know of him and his thought comes to us mainly through the dialogues of his strenuous opponent Plato. In this book, Ugo Zilioli offers a sustained and philosophically sophisticated examination of what is, in philosophical terms, the most interesting feature of Protagoras' thought for modern readers: his role as the first Western thinker to argue (...) for relativism. Zilioli relates Protagoras' relativism with modern forms of relativism, in particular the 'robust relativism' of Joseph Margolis, gives an integrated account both of the perceptual relativism examined in Plato's Theaetetus and the ethical or social relativism presented in the first part of Plato's Protagoras and offers an integrated and positive analysis of Protagoras' thought, rather than focusing on ancient criticisms and responses to his thought. This is a deeply scholarly work which brings much argument to bear to the claim that Protagoras was and remains Plato's subtlest philosophical enemy. (shrink)

Reassesses the philosophical and pedagogical contributions of Protagoras Protagoras and Logos brings together in a meaningful synthesis the contributions and rhetoric of the first and most famous of the Older Sophists, Protagoras of Abdera. Most accounts of Protagoras rely on the somewhat hostile reports of Plato and Aristotle. By focusing on Protagoras's own surviving words, this study corrects many long-standing misinterpretations and presents significant facts: Protagoras was a first-rate philosophical thinker who positively influenced the (...) theories of Plato and Aristotle, and Protagoras pioneered the study of language and was the first theorist of rhetoric. In addition to illustrating valuable methods of translating and reading fifth-century B.C.E. Greek passages, the book marshals evidence for the important philological conclusion that the Greek word translated as rhetoric was a coinage by Plato in the early fourth century. -/- In this second edition, Edward Schiappa reassesses the philosophical and pedagogical contributions of Protagoras. Schiappa argues that traditional accounts of Protagoras are hampered by mistaken assumptions about the Sophists and the teaching of the art of rhetoric in the fifth century. He shows that, contrary to tradition, the so-called Older Sophists investigated and taught the skills of logos, which is closer to modern conceptions of critical reasoning than of persuasive oratory. Schiappa also offers interpretations for each of Protagoras's major surviving fragments and examines Protagoras's contributions to the theory and practice of Greek education, politics, and philosophy. In a new afterword Schiappa addresses historiographical issues that have occupied scholars in rhetorical studies over the past ten years, and throughout the study he provides references to scholarship from the last decade that has refined his views on Protagoras and other Sophists. (shrink)

Protagoras u Sekstusa Empiryka (PH I 216) a platoński Teajtet Dzieła Sekstusa Empiryka stanowią ważne źródło doksograficzne, zawierając m. in. fragmenty i przekazy poświęcone sofistyce. Są wśród nich omówienia poglądów Protagorasa. W świetle problemów, jakie stwarza rekonstrukcja myśli tego sofisty, warto poddać badaniu źródła i perspektywę Sekstusa, zwracając szczególną uwagę na krótkie przedstawienie tez Protagorasa zawarte w Zarysach Pyrrońskich (PH I 216). Porównując omówienie Sekstusa i przedstawienie Platona w Teajtecie, dostrzec możemy podobieństwo prezentowanych poglądów. W przekazie Seksusa podobnie jak (...) w Teajtecie główny akcent położony jest na tezę homo-mensura, z którą wiąże się dwa inne podstawowe dla platońskiego dialogu wątki: zmienności rzeczy oraz "prywatności" spostrzeżeń. Mimo charakterystycznej dla sceptycyzmu modyfikacji strony pojęciowej, nadinterpretacji oraz wyrwania tez z dialogowego kontekstu przedstawienia obu wątków wykazują daleko idące paralele z Teajtetem. Bez względu na to, czy omówienie to jest dziełem samego Sekstusa, czy zaczerpnięte zostało z jakiegoś wcześniejszego źródła mającego charakter sceptycznej "ściągawki", możemy na jego podstawie wnioskować, że dialog Teajtet uważany był w późnej starożytności za wiarygodne źródło informacji na temat poglądów Protagorasa. Należy jednak podkreślić, że przekaz Sekstusa stanowi jedynie interpretację treści zawartych w platońskim Teajtecie i – wbrew praktyce wielu uczonych - nie może być brany pod uwagę jako niezależne źródło wiedzy o myśli Protagorasa. (shrink)

The famous dispute between Protagoras and Euathlus concerning Protagoras’s tuition fee reportedly owed to him by Euathlus is solved on the basis of practical argumentation concerning actions. The dispute is widely viewed as a kind of a logical paradox, and I show that such treating arises due to the double confusion in the dispute narrative. The linguistic expressions used to refer to Protagoras’s, Euathlus’s and the jurors’ actions are confused with these actions themselves. The other confusion is (...) the collision between the pairs of incompatible actions ambiguously expressed by two different pairs of sentences, one of which is a propositionally consistent pair whereas the other is an inconsistent one. The actional paradox solution aims to clear up these confusions by means of two core borderlines, propositional and expressive, drawn between the actions and the propositions. The propositional distinction says that actions are empirical facts and they lack truth values unlike propositions, which are mental entities and are often employed for referring to the actions. This distinction helps to avoid the confusion between the empirical incompatibility of actions and the truth-functional inconsistency of propositions. The expressive distinction claims that although the same linguistic sentences can be used to refer both to actions and propositions, two empirically incompatible actions can be expressed both by a pair of inconsistent propositions as well as by a pair of consistent ones. Therefore, the action of Protagoras’s being paid may be linguistically symbolized in four different ways: Protagoras gets paid due to the verdict, Protagoras gets paid due to the contract that amount to Protagoras does not get paid by the contract and Protagoras does not get paid by the verdict respectively, and likewise for Euathlus’s actions. The two distinctions are used for classifying the two groups of paradox solutions, legal and logical, proposed so far depending on which of the two confusions they purport to escape from. The actional reconstruction of the paradox suggests that there is only one single agent in the dispute, Protagoras, while the other named Euathlus is a ‘phantom,’ which most probably was invented by Protagoras himself for the sake of creating this challenging sophism. (shrink)

The Protagoras is one of Plato's most entertaining dialogues. It represents Socrates at a gathering of the most celebrated and highest-earning intellectuals of the day, among them the sophist Protagoras. In flamboyant displays of both rhetoric and dialectic, Socrates and Protagoras try to out-argue one another. Their arguments range widely, from political theory to literary criticism, from education to the nature of cowardice; but in view throughout this literary and philosophical masterpiece are the questions of what part (...) knowledge plays in a successful life, and how we may acquire the knowledge that makes for success. This edition contains the first commentary in English on the Greek text for almost a hundred years. The commentary provides the assistance with linguistic, literary and philosophical detail that will enable students and scholars to savour to the full the pleasures of the Protagoras. (shrink)

According to a fragment of Porphyry (410 F Smith = 80 B 2 DK), containing a dialogue on the theme of plagiarism, Plato made use of the same arguments as Protagoras’ Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος against monistic thinkers, most likely the Eleatics. My paper aims to analyse Porphyry’s testimony to assess some aspects of Protagoras’ reflection on being through a comparison with parallel sources, in particular Plato’s dialogues (Theaetetus, Euthydemus, Sophist, Parmenides). I conclude that it is plausible to suppose (...) that, within the framework of a more general reflection on ὀρθοέπεια, Protagoras viewed the notion of being in Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος from a linguistic perspective. (shrink)

The present work aims to show how, in the Protagoras, Plato distances himself from Socratic intellectualism toward an intellectualism of justification that does not exclude the role played by the irrational in human conduct. Unlike Socratic intellectualism, which maintains that aretê is solely knowledge, this shift lays the groundwork for the mixed life described in the Philebus, where Plato includes both the rational and the irrational in the pursuit of the good life (Phlb., 61b).

In this dialogue Plato shows the pretensions of the leading sophist, Protagoras, challenged by the critical arguments of Socrates. The dialogue broadens out to consider the nature of the good life and the role of intellect and pleasure.

The presocratic philosopher Protagoras of Abdera (490–420 BC), founder of the sophistic movement, was famously agnostic towards the existence and nature of the gods, and was the proponent of the doctrine that 'man is the measure of all things'. Still relevant to contemporary society, Protagoras is in many ways a precursor of the postmodern movement. In the brief fragments that survive, he lays the foundation for relativism, agnosticism, the significance of rhetoric, a pedagogy for critical thinking and a (...) conception of the human being as a social construction. -/- This accessible introductory survey by Daniel Silvermintz covers Protagoras' life, ideas and lasting legacy. Each chapter interprets one of the surviving fragments and draws connections with related ideas forwarded by other sophists, showing its relevance to an area of knowledge: epistemology, ethics, education and sociology. (shrink)

Plato's Theaetetus discusses and ultimately rejects Protagoras's famous claim that "man is the measure of all things." The most famous of Plato's arguments is the Self-Refutation Argument. But he offers a number of other arguments as well, including one that I call the 'Future Argument.' This argument, which appears at Theaetetus 178a−179b, is quite different from the earlier Self-Refutation Argument. I argue that it is directed mainly at a part of the Protagorean view not addressed before , namely, that (...) all beliefs concerning one's own future sensible qualities are true. This part of the view is found to be inconsistent with Protagoras's own conception of wisdom as expertise and with his own pretenses at expertise in teaching. (shrink)

Protagoras of Abdera, Socrates’ older contemporary, is regarded as one of the most prominent representatives of the so-called sophistic movement. Instead of simply accepting the biased reports given by Plato and Aristotle about this sophist, the contributors to this volume review the complicated doxographical situation and make a case for Protagoras as a philosopher in his own right. Two major themes of this volume are Protagoras’ relativism and his case for a moral and political ideal, both of (...) which are contrasted with the metaphysical idealism of his future opponents in the Academy and the mundane conventionalism typically associated with the sophists. It turns out that rather than a parasitic force of intellectual subversion, Protagoras may have been a prolific and original thinker aiming at a coherent and comprehensive view of man’s place in the world. (shrink)

In both Metaphysics Γ 4 and 5 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed to the view that all contradictions are true. Yet Aristotle’s arguments are not transparent, and later, in Γ 6, he provides Protagoras with a way to escape contradictions. In this paper I try to understand Aristotle’s arguments. After examining a number of possible solutions, I conclude that the best way of explaining them is to (a) recognize that Aristotle is discussing a number of Protagorean opponents, (...) and (b) import another of Protagoras’ views, namely the claim that there are always two logoi opposed to one another. (shrink)

This article aims at reconstructing the logic and assessing the force of Socrates' argument against Protagoras' 'Measure Doctrine' at Theaetetus 171a–c. I examine and criticise some influential interpretations of the passage, according to which, e.g., Socrates is guilty of ignoratio elenchi by dropping the essential Protagorean qualifiers or successfully proves that md is self-refuting provided the missing qualifiers are restored by the attentive reader. Having clarified the meaning of MD, I analyse in detail the broader section 170a–171d and argue, (...) against an extensive scholarly consensus, that it contains two slightly different formulations of the same argument, and not two distinct arguments, that Socrates does not highlight his own strategy at 171a–c as especially clever, and that his argument successfully shows that md turns out to be untenable for Protagoras himself when submitted to scrutiny in dialectical contexts, without aiming at proving its absolute falsehood. Finally, I clarify the philosophical import of the final image of Protagoras' momentary return from the underworld. (shrink)

In addition to its interest as one of Plato's most brilliant dramatic masterpieces, the Protagoras presents a vivid picture of the crisis of fifth-century Greek thought, in which traditional values and conceptions of man were subjected on the one hand to the criticism of the Sophists and on the other to the far more radical criticism of Socrates. The dialogue deals with many themes which are central to the ethical theories which Plato developed under the influence of Socrates, notably (...) the nature of human excellence, the relation of knowledge to right conduct, and the place of pleasure in the good life. This translation of the Protagoras was originally published in 1976. In this revised edition, C. C. W. Taylor has made a number of changes in the translation and commentary, and has added a new Preface and Introduction. The Bibliography has also been extended to include titles published up to 1990. (shrink)

This is a collection of the late Heda Segvic's papers in ancient moral philosophy. At the time of her death at age forty-five in 2003, Segvic had already established herself as an important figure in ancient philosophy, making bold new arguments about the nature of Socratic intellectualism and the intellectual influences that shaped Aristotle's ideas. Segvic had been working for some time on a monograph on practical knowledge that would interpret Aristotle's ethical theory as a response to Protagoras. The (...) essays collected here are those on which her reputation rests, including some that were intended to form the backbone of her projected monograph. The papers range from a literary study of Homer's influence on Plato's Protagoras to analytic studies of Aristotle's metaphysics and his ideas about deliberation. Most of the papers reflect directly or indirectly Segvic's idea that both Socrates' and Aristotle's universalism and objectivism in ethics could be traced back to their opposition to Protagorean relativism. The book represents the considerable achievements of one of the most talented scholars of ancient philosophy of her generation. (shrink)

Protágoras de Abdera, conhecido sofista da Grécia antiga, é compreendido em seus dizeres no decorrer da história da filosofia principalmente devido às contribuições de Platão. O ateniense não apenas dedicou uma obra com seu nome, como também apresentou sua famosa tese do homem-medida no diálogo Teeteto, contribuindo imensamente para elucidar questões importantes sobre seu relativismo. O quão seria pertinente afirmar que é possível saber na íntegra o que queria dizer Protágoras nesse fragmento quando seguimos apenas os testemunhos de Platão. No (...) presente trabalho, iremos propor algumas interpretações dos fragmentos de Protágoras de Abdera com a finalidade de percebermos se há divergências com a interpretação platônica, acima de tudo sobre o fragmento do homem-medida. Traremos, para a análise de Protágoras, o livro de Edward Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos, fazendo as devidas considerações sobre suas conclusões, para, ao final da pesquisa, nos posicionar devidamente diante do que Platão, de fato concordou e acertou sobre o homem-medida. (shrink)

Protagoras believes that all beliefs are true. Since Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true is itself a belief, it follows from Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true that Protagoras' belief is true. But what about the belief that Protagoras' belief is false? Doesn't it follow, by parallel reasoning and not at all trivially, that if all beliefs are true and there is a belief that Protagoras' belief is false, then Protagoras' belief (...) is false? (shrink)

We have far less evidence for Aristotle’s reception of Protagoras than we like to think, and the evidence we do have is somewhere we hardly ever look. With one exception, every reference Aristotle makes to the Measure Doctrine—Protagoras’ claim that humans are the ‘measure of all things —concerns the Doctrine as amplified in Plato’s Theaetetus, and the ‘Protagoras’ in question is Plato’s fictional character as fictional. Metaph. I 1, 1053a35–b3 provides the only exception, where Aristotle offers an (...) anomalous reading of the Doctrine incompatible with the others. The chapter interprets I 1, 1053a35–b3 and concludes that Aristotle attributes the anomalous reading to Protagoras himself. The chapter argues further that every other reference to the Doctrine derives from the Theaetetus. Aristotle formulates ‘the theory of Protagoras’ according to Plato’s self-refutation argument, and his argument that it denies the Principle of Non-contradiction (PNC) includes premisses from Plato’s argument that are out of place in Aristotle’s own. He moreover attributes to ‘Protagoras’ arguments and dialectical demands that the fictional Protagoras makes in his so-called ‘apology’, so his target is specifically a Platonic invention and not the historical person. This leaves only Metaph. I 1 1053a35–b3 to join his six other references to the historical Protagoras, which makes it Aristotle’s only engagement with the Measure Doctrine as the actual view of his predecessor. (shrink)

While defending the principle of non-contradiction in Metaphysics 4, Aristotle argues that the Measure Doctrine of Protagoras is equivalent to the claim that all contradictions are true; given all appearances are true (as the Protagorean maintains), anytime people disagree we get a true contradiction. This argument seems clearly invalid: nothing guarantees that actual disagreement occurs over every matter of fact. The argument in fact works perfectly, I propose, because the Protagorean view falls prey to a version of Fitch's “paradox” (...) of knowability. The proposed reading shows how Aristotle treats the Protagorean view at issue as an epistemic theory of truth distinct from the mere claim that all appearances are true (which other opponents put forward on different grounds) and reveals Aristotle's underlying concern with the modal collapse of possibility into actuality. The revised Protagorean view Aristotle confronts in a subsequent chapter is furthermore best understood as an attempt to avoid this Fitch-style result. (shrink)

Cet article examine le fragment de l’homme-mesure de Protagoras, tout d’abord en exposant les grands courants de son interprétation, ensuite et surtout en présentant les positions respectives et antagonistes de Nietzsche et Heidegger. Heidegger, contre Nietzsche, fait reposer l’homo-mensura sur un arrière-fond ontologique et platonicien, où la mesure n’est possible que depuis l’ouverture ontologique qui la précède. Cette interprétation a sa légitimité historique et philologique. Mais Nietzsche comprend le fragment comme entièrement irréductible au platonisme : Protagoras aurait pensé (...) la connaissance comme l’étude de types psychologiques, non pas selon une norme épistémique stable, mais selon les variations d’intensité qui touchent toute psychè mais aussi toute communauté sociale. Je prends appui sur cette dernière intuition pour dégager ce qui me semble l’interprétation la plus riche du fragment de l’homme-mesure, à partir des remarques d’Eugène Dupréel – une interprétation sociale et normative où Protagoras est le penseur d’une praxis qui, dans une situation et dans une communauté données, est capable d’améliorer les impressions subjectives du plus grand nombre. (shrink)

This article examines the fragment on homo-mensura by Protagoras, first by summarizing its possible interpretations, then by presenting the respective and antagonistic positions of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Heidegger, against Nietzsche, places the fragment on an ontological and Platonic background, where measurement is only possible from the ontological opening that precedes it. This interpretation has its historical and philological legitimacy. But Nietzsche understands the fragment as entirely irreducible to Platonism: Protagoras (with Thucydides) conceived knowledge as the study of psychological (...) types, not according to a stable epistemic norm, but according to the variations in intensity that affect every psyche but also every social community. I draw on this last intuition to defend what seems to me to be the richest interpretation of the fragment of the homo-mensura, based on the remarks of Eugène Dupréel – a social and normative interpretation in which Protagoras is the thinker of a praxis (medicine, politics...) which, in a given situation and community, is capable of improving the subjective impressions of the greatest number. (shrink)

Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw—the soul’s domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms (...) of ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant. (shrink)

From humble beginnings to celebrated teacher -- Protagoras and Pericles -- Protagoras' secret teaching.

In this contribution, I explore the treatment that Plato devotes to Protagoras’ relativism in the first section of the Theaetetus (151 E 1–186 E 12) where, among other things, the definition that knowledge is perception is put under scrutiny. What I aim to do is to understand the subtlety of Plato’s argument about Protagorean relativism and, at the same time, to assess its philosophical significance by revealing the inextric¬ability of ontological and epistemological aspects on which it is built (for (...) this latter aspect, I refer to contemporary discussions of relativism, mainly to Margolis’ robust relativism). I then turn to Aristotle’s treatment of Protagoras’ relativism in Metaphysics Γ, sections 5 and 6, in order to show that Plato and Aristotle surprisingly share the same view as regards the philosophical content of Protagoras’ relativism (in doing so, I take position against the standard opinion among scholars that Plato and Aristotle understand Protagoras’ relativism in different, even incompatible, ways). What I ultimately aim to demonstrate is that Protagoras’ relativism, as understood by both Plato and Aristotle, is a coherent, even attractive, philosophical position. (shrink)

PLATO: PROTAGORAS, trans, with Notes by C. C. W. Taylor. Clarendon Press: O.U.P., 1976. vii+230 pp. £7.50 cloth, £3.75 paper.

In Protagoras 351b3‑358d4, Socrates apparently admits the use of pleasure and pain as criteria for distinguishing between good and bad. Focusing on this passage, my paper outlines three problems, raising from : the contradiction between Socrates’ objection to pleasure in other platonic dialogues and his assent here to a hypothesis which identifies good with pleasure ; the petitio principii apparently involved in Socrates’ argument to support the thought that knowledge is more powerful than emotions ; the compatibility of his (...) “ hedonist ” hypothesis with his “intellectualist” thought. My paper undertakes to reconstruct Socrates’ argument, in order to answer problem. I contend that this argument makes the humans admit they are deprived of the knowledge both of good and evil and of pleasant and painful, a point sufficient to silence them when they speak of “knowledge being defeated by pleasure”. This contention helps answering problem, through a distinction between so‑called pleasures and real ones. My conclusion answers problem, by showing that, held together, both the “hedonist” hypothesis and the “intellectualist” thought lead to not take pleasure for granted, as required to secure a philosophical approach. (shrink)

This is a collection of the late Heda Segvic's papers in ancient moral philosophy. At the time of her death at age forty-five in 2003, Segvic had already established herself as an important figure in ancient philosophy, making bold new arguments about the nature of Socratic intellectualism and the intellectual influences that shaped Aristotle's ideas. Segvic had been working for some time on a monograph on practical knowledge that would interpret Aristotle's ethical theory as a response to Protagoras. The (...) essays collected here are those on which her reputation rests, including some that were intended to form the backbone of her projected monograph. The papers range from a literary study of Homer's influence on Plato's Protagoras to analytic studies of Aristotle's metaphysics and his ideas about deliberation. Most of the papers reflect directly or indirectly Segvic's idea that both Socrates' and Aristotle's universalism and objectivism in ethics could be traced back to their opposition to Protagorean relativism. The book represents the considerable achievements of one of the most talented scholars of ancient philosophy of her generation. (shrink)

I advocate an ad hominem reading of the hedonism that appears in the final argument of the Protagoras. I that attribute hedonism both to the Many and to Protagoras, but my focus is on the latter. I argue that the Protagoras in various ways reflects Plato’s view that the sophist is an inevitable advocate for, and himself implicitly inclined toward, hedonism, and I show that the text aims through that characterization to undermine Protagoras’ status as an (...) educator. One of my objectives in the course of my arguments is to explore connections between the final argument of the Protagoras and the Man-Measure Doctrine as it is developed in the Theaetetus. (shrink)

Ancient Greek Philosopher Protagoras’ famous statement, “Man is the measure of all things,” is traditionally interpreted as a doctrine of epistemological relativism. This paper proposes a mathematical reinterpretation connecting Protagorean observer-dependence, Einsteinian relativity, quantum measurement theory, and the Ibaguner Fractal Operator (IFO). A generalized observer geometry is introduced in which reality emerges through recursive observer projections. Within this framework, truth, measurement, and observation become manifestations of a single holographic principle.

At Protagoras 353de, Socrates gives three possible reasons for calling some pleasures `wrong'. Scholarly attention has focused on the second of these, according to which pleasures are `wrong' when they have negative consequences. This paper argues that the first reason (the pleasures are fleeting) corresponds to beliefs held by Democritus, among others; and that the third reason (the pleasant things “give pleasure in whatever way and for whatever reason“) is the view adopted by Socrates in the dialogue.

Recent accounts of the life of Protagoras differ widely from one another in their treatment of the ancient sources, and in the conclusions which they draw from them. A re-examination of the evidence, undertaken in 1949–50 as part of a study of the Prometheus trilogy, has convinced me that a new discussion is urgently needed if we are to place the earlier stages of the sophistic movement in the right context historically; and the purpose of this paper is to (...) lay at least a part of the foundation for such a discussion. Since the evidence for the life of Protagoras includes some allusions to his relations with Democritus, and there are some obvious affinities between the careers of Protagoras and Anaxagoras, I have added a short account of the relevant points in the biography of Democritus and a more detailed study of the evidence for the life of Anaxagoras. (shrink)

Jowett's Protagoras has been revised extensively for this new edition, and helpful section titles have been provided. The editor's fifty-page introduction could stand alone; it is a solid and scholarly examination, with footnotes, cross-references, and logical analyses, of the great Socrates-Protagoras quarrel.--V. C. C.

Der Dialog Protagoras gehort zu den "kunstlerisch vollendetsten und sorgfaltigst gearbeiteten Dialogen," so Rudolf Hirzel. Von den Werken Platons hat Protagoras neben Der Staat am starksten die staatspolitische Theorie seit der Antike beeinflusst.".

In this dialogue Plato shows the pretensions of the leading sophist, Protagoras, challenged by the critical arguments of Socrates. The dialogue broadens out to consider the nature of the good life and the role of intellect and pleasure.

The character Protagoras in Plato's Protagoras holds similar views to the one in the Theaetetus, and faces similar problems. The dialogue considers issues in epistemology and moral epistemology, as a central theme. The Protagorean position is immune from Socrates' attacks, and Socrates needs Protagorean methods to make any impact.

This paper explores the crucial role of difference in the development of philosophy and education across Western and Eastern traditions. It argues that while philosophies like Platonism and Confucianism initially embraced dialogue and ambiguity, they often hardened into orthodoxies that suppressed diversity. Drawing on figures such as Protagoras and practices like kaidoku in Tokugawa Japan, the study highlights alternative models that celebrate multiperspectivism and autonomous learning. Protagoras’ relativism, embodied in his theory of logos and defense of democracy, challenged (...) foundationalist assumptions and anticipated later liberal thought, including that of John Stuart Mill. Meanwhile, kaidoku, a collaborative reading method, fostered critical inquiry and free interpretation even within a rigidly hierarchical society. The convergence of these traditions reveals how multiperspectival reasoning not only enriches individual judgment but also sustains democratic discourse. In an era increasingly dominated by demands for unity and efficiency, revisiting these traditions reminds us of the enduring power of playful, critical dialogue. This paper ultimately advocates for the conscious preservation of difference as a vital force for cultural vitality, innovation, and human freedom. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs Paul Feyerabend’s dialogue with two other representatives of allegedly self-contradictory relativism: Protagoras and Nietzsche. I argue that such a comparison mutually clarifies Feyerabend’s arguments in favor of a certain kind of relativist anti-dogmatism. Unlike the widely accepted image, a closer reading reveals that neither Feyerabend nor Nietzsche or Protagoras adopt the so-called equality-thesis. All three authors argue against the absolutism and dogmatism of their time. They subject human reason and scientific activity to a critical analysis (...) and strive for a fundamental conceptual and cultural transformation. They share the suspicion that the concrete scientific practice and its theoretical self-understanding are not identical, and that it could be possible and useful to enlighten science about certain prejudices about itself. (shrink)

This article will contrast two portrayals of Protagoras: one in the "Theaetetus," where Socrates discusses Protagorean theory and even comes to his defense by imitating the deceased sophist; and another in the "Protagoras," where Socrates recounts his encounter with the sophist. I suggest that Plato wants listeners and readers of the dialogues to hear the dissonance between the two portraits and to wonder why Socrates so distorts Protagoras in the "Theaetetus." Protagoras in the "Protagoras" behaves (...) and speaks in ways that are incompatible with the Protagorean position presented in the "Theaetetus.". (shrink)