Ruth Millikan’s teleological theory of mental content is complex and often misunderstood. This paper motivates and clarifies some of the complexities of the theory, and shows that paying careful attention to its details yields answers to a number of common objections to teleological theories, in particular, the problem of novel mental states, the problem of functionally false beliefs, and problems about indeterminacy or multiplicity of function.

This paper explores Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach (NCA) and offers an elaboration of the often overlooked ‘Other Species Capability’ (OSC), which addresses human flourishing in relation to the natural world. While NCA offers detailed descriptions for several capabilities, the OSC remains underdeveloped, limiting its practical application. Drawing from environmental ethics and Nussbaum’s emphasis on Practical Reason, this paper proposes a framework to specify the OSC at a threshold level. It highlights how clearer guidance for governments can enable more effective protection (...) of this capability, ensuring its alignment with NCA’s broader goal of fostering justice and human dignity across diverse contexts. (shrink)

Grounded procedures of separation are conceptualized as a learned concept. The simultaneous cultural universality of the general idea and immense diversity of its implementations might be better understood through the lens of dual inheritance theories. By drawing on examples from developmental psychology and emotion theorizing, we argue that an innate blueprint might underlie learned implementations of cleansing that vary widely.

Since the role of the Asian countries is increasing in the modern world, their philosophical traditions attract more and more attention. Due to this trend, a more complete panoramic view of the development of world philosophy as a whole is accessible, and it has become possible to understand that any constructions of the human mind that have arisen in a particular cultural field of experience cannot be regarded as exemplary and absolute. The researchers of Asian philosophies concentrate mostly on studying (...) the texts of individual thinkers. As a rule, they do not set themselves the task of examining these texts from the point of view of intercultural interactions and transformations of significant ideas and concepts in various cultural and historical contexts, defining the direction and mechanisms of cultural borrowing, as well as revealing new approaches and growth points. To achieve these goals, the research should focus at the problem of the self-determination and development of philosophy as a separate science in non-Western cultures, which are based on intellectual traditions with different origin than Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions. This article deals with the consideration of some topics that elucidate the features of the development of philosophical science in Japan, including the emergence of the concept of “philosophy” in this country, the definition of its subject, the formation of philosophical terminology, and various interpretations of what the term “Japanese philosophy” means. The author pays special attention to the characteristic of the main periods of progress of Japanese philosophical thought. In the conclusion, the author argues that the most important characteristic feature of the Japanese philosophy is its involvement in intercultural dialogue throughout its history. (shrink)

There is a fairly general consensus that names are Millian (or Russellian) genuine terms, that is, are singular terms whose sole semantic function is to introduce a referent into the propositions expressed by sentences containing the term. This answers the question as to what sort of proposition is expressed by use of sentences containing names. But there is a second serious semantic problem about proper names, that of how the referents of proper names are determined. This is the (...) question that I will discuss in this paper. Various views consistent with Millianism have been proposed as to how the semantic referents of proper names are determined. These views can be classified into (1) description theories and (2) causal theories, but they can also be classified into (3) social practice theories, on which a name’s referent is determined by a social practice involving the referent, and (4) individualistic theories, on which the referent of the use of a name is determined by the speaker’s state of mind. Here I argue against social practice theories of the sorts proposed by Kripke and Evans and in favor of an individualistic approach to name reference. I argue that social practice is irrelevant to determining name reference and that, as a consequence, names have no meanings in natural languages. In the second part of the paper I motivate and propose a new form of individualistic theory which incorporates features of both description theories and Evans’s social practice theory. (shrink)

This paper argues that, from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy, the study of intersubjectivity is closely tied to questions of the representational mind. It focuses on developmental studies of children's understanding of the human mind, setting out some of the main findings and theoretical explanations. It then takes up Husserl's idea of looking at persons in the 'personal attitude'. Understanding motivational connections among a person's subjective experiences is an essential feature of this attitude. Proposing a unified theoretical interpretation (...) of children's representational achievements, the paper suggests that understanding motivational connections among one's representations requires an ability for reflection that children apply in progressively more refined ways to themselves and others. (shrink)

We present an exposition of Section VI.1 and most of Section VI.2 from Shelah’s book Proper and Improper Forcing. These sections offer proofs of the preservation under countable support iteration of proper forcing of various properties, including proofs that ωω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\omega^\omega}$$\end{document} -bounding, the Sacks property, the Laver property, and the P-point property are preserved by countable support iteration of proper forcing.

The distinction between explanation and understanding was foundational to Jaspers’ ‘phenomenological’ approach to psychiatry. It makes sense that those now calling for a phenomenological approach to psychiatry would look to Jaspers for inspiration, and that in doing so, they would take up this distinction. However, I argue that it is and was a mistake to use the distinction in work on psychiatry: adhering to the distinction now would undermine, rather than support, the goals of those advocating a phenomenological approach (...) to psychiatry; furthermore, if the distinction had been adhered to, then contemporary psychiatry and its patients would be worse off. (shrink)

BackgroundLack of proper understanding on the part of researchers about public understanding of research and informed consent will increase the potential for malpractice. As a part of a larger study on ethics and informed consent in Sri Lanka, this study aimed to ascertain the level of understanding of 'research' by exploring the views of the public and professionals.MethodsConvenience sampling and snow ball technique were used for recruitment with an emphasis on balanced age and gender representation, diverse (...) educational, socio-cultural and professional backgrounds, and previous research experience, either as researchers or participants. Content analysis of the data was carried out.Results66 persons (37 males, 29 females) participated. Although fundamentally a qualitative study, themes were also quantitatively analysed for informative results. Most participants thought that the word 'research' meant searching, looking, inquiring while some others thought it meant gathering information, gaining knowledge and learning.A third of participants did not offer an alternative word for research. Others suggested the words survey, exploration, search, experiment, discovery, invention and study as being synonymous. Doctors, health professionals, health institutions, scientists, professionals, businessmen, pharmaceutical companies, students, teachers were identified as people who conduct research.Participants indicated that crucial information on deciding to participate in research included objectives of the research, project importance and relevance, potential benefits to individuals and society, credibility & legitimacy of researchers, what is expected of participant, reason for selection, expected outcome, confidentiality and ability to withdraw at any time. A majority (89%) expressed their willingness to participate in future research.ConclusionsThe results show that with or without prior experience in research, participants in this study had a reasonable understanding of research. The findings show that a decision about taking part in research is dependent on knowledge, education and also on social networks.The results demonstrate that the majority were supportive of health research and believe that research is beneficial to the welfare of society. (shrink)

While social epistemologists have recently begun addressing questions about whether groups can possess beliefs or knowledge, little has yet been said about whether groups can properly be said to possess understanding. Here I want to make some progress on this question by considering two possible accounts of group understanding, modeled on accounts of group belief and knowledge: a deflationary account, according to which a group understands just in case most or all of its members understand, and an inflationary (...) account, according to which a group’s understanding does not depend solely on whether its members understand. I argue that both accounts face problems. The deflationary account has two such problems: aggregation problems that are familiar from discussions of group belief, and the problem of different bases, wherein members possess understanding for different but consistent reasons. The inflationary account faces what I call the problem of distributed grasping: while it is widely accepted that understanding requires a kind of “grasping”, it is hard to make sense of how this requirement could be met at the group level while not necessarily being met by any individual member. Despite its problems, I make a case for the inflationary account. This will require addressing the problem of distributed grasping: to do this, I propose a different way of thinking about the grasping relation at the group level, such that it is constituted by a dependency relationship between members. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, I will examine the question why it is so difficult to understand madness. First, I will examine what the third-person approach of psychosis or madness has to offer, and where its limitations lie with respect to its proper understanding. Next I will examine if and how the first-person perspective on madness contributes to our understanding. I will demonstrate that there is a stalemate between third- and first-person perspectives, which on the one hand hinders (...) a free sight on madness, but which is on the other hand exemplary of the problem that is presented by madness. This turns out to be a paradox that haunts both the concept and experience of madness itself, as well as those who try to understand it. In the fourth section, I will unpack some of the operations of the paradox as it is found both in philosophy and madness, both by their producers as by their consumers. In the fifth section, I will tentatively sketch (im)possibilities of escaping paradoxes. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that understanding (particularly regarded in terms of iintelligible explanation) and prediction are distinct and possibly competing objectives in scientific theorizing and modeling. Here I leverage Wilkenfeld’s notion of “understanding as compression” along with the link between prediction and compression from algorithmic information theory to establish that prediction and understanding are instead intimately linked. I clarify the definition of understanding as compression to address unclear aspects of Wilkenfeld’s original definition, and I propose that (...) the oft-discussed conflict may result in part from confusion between understanding proper and vehicles of understanding (such as statistical or computational models). I exemplify the unification of prediction and understanding through compression via a discussion of the role of large neural network models as tools for understanding brain function in neuroscience. (shrink)

The article presents the question of understanding divine causality and its analogical character in the context of Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on Divine Providence. Analyzing Aquinas’s texts concerning the relation of God’s action towards nature and its activities it is necessary to emphasize the proper understanding of mutual relations between secondary causes and the primary cause which are not on the same level. Influenced by the reflection of M. Dodds and I Silva, the author of the article refers (...) to Aquinas’s biblical commentaries which have not been discussed so far from the perspective of the character of God’s action. In the final part of the article, metaphors used by Thomas in reference to the relation of God towards the world will be presented. (shrink)

(2) There is significant cultural variation in the way people reason, categorize, and react to various aspects of the world. A proper understanding of such variation has implications for theories about human nature – and cognitive architecture – and its malleability. In turn, these theories have implications for theories about the status and generalisability of psychological explanations (see Nisbett 2003), for theories about the extent to which social engineering and social reform is possible (see Singer 2000), etc.

In his monograph _Semantic Relationism_, Kit Fine proposes two characterizations of coordination between proper names: an intuitive test and a technical definition. The intuitive characterization is grounded in a notion of understanding distinct from the familiar notion of linguistic competence. Three prima facie appealing proposals to characterize this notion of understanding are examined in the present chapter and then dismissed as intrinsically implausible or as incompatible with Fine’s semantics. Not even his technical characterization of coordination, involving the (...) notion of semantic requirement, enable us to escape the impasse. Ultimately, the question of what exactly coordination between names is will remain open. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that, in his famous discussion of the natural law in ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, Thomas borrowed the three “inclinations” he mentions there from Cicero’s De officiis 1.4.11-13. I argue that Thomas uses them as a structuring device to catalogue and distinguish different levels or kinds of natural law. This is his version of the lists of the different kinds or levels of ius naturale that were ubiquitous in the works of the canon (...) lawyers in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Reading Thomas’s text in the context of Cicero’s discussion in book 1 of De officiis and in the context of the discussions of ius naturale among the decretists of the twelfth century and theologians of the thirteenth helps us to understand his concern to establish the proper sense of “nature” appropriate to any proper understanding of human natural law. It also helps us understand why it is wrong to try to turn the natural law into a separate moral system apart from consideration of grace, the cardinal and theological virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. (shrink)

Can we gain understanding from speakers who themselves fail to understand? At first glance, this looks counter-intuitive. How could a hearer with a poor understanding of a certain subject matter, or none at all, non–accidentally extract information relevant to understanding from a speaker’s testimony if the speaker does not understand what she is talking about? In this chapter I show that, when there are theories or representational systems working as epistemic mediators, speakers can intentionally generate understanding (...) in their hearers by engaging in relevant speech acts without understanding the topic of these speech acts themselves. More specifically, I argue that testifiers can intentionally elicit understanding ofphenomena in their hearers even if they themselves lack such understanding—provided that they properly understand the epistemic mediators involved. (shrink)

Can we gain understanding from testifiers who themselves fail to understand? At first glance, this looks counterintuitive. How could a hearer who has no understanding or very poor understanding of a certain subject matter non-accidentally extract items of information relevant to understanding from a speaker’s testimony if the speaker does not understand what she is talking about? This paper shows that, when there are theories or representational devices working as mediators, speakers can intentionally generate understanding (...) in their hearers by engaging in relevant speech acts without understanding the topic of these speech acts themselves. More specifically, I argue that testifiers can intentionally elicit understanding of empirical phenomena in their hearers even if they themselves lack such understanding – granted that they properly understood the epistemic mediators involved. (shrink)

It is argued that a popular way of accounting for the distinctive value of knowledge by appeal to the distinctive value of cognitive achievements fails because it is a mistake to identify knowledge with cognitive achievements. Nevertheless, it is claimed that understanding, properly conceived, is a type of cognitive achievement, and thus that the distinctive value of cognitive achievements can explain why understanding is of special value.

The article is written in response to a recent flurry of studies on international practices. In investigating this theme, International Relations scholars have drawn on diverse traditions in sociology, philosophy and organisational theory such as Bourdieu’s theory of practice, Dewey’s and James’ pragmatism, communities of practice approach and actor-network theory. One preliminary question presupposed by these investigations however is, what standpoint (if any) enables us to make sense of international practices? Our central thesis is that the proper understanding (...) of practices – including international ones – requires the internal point of view (practice internalism). To make our case, we develop an analytic distinction between two basic standpoints: practice externalism, represented by Adler and Pouliot’s approach to international practices, and practice internalism, represented by Wittgensteinian philosopher Peter Winch. Following Winch, we argue that the practice of social science is externalist, and point to the limitations of an analysis of international practices predicated on externalist, social scientific premises. (shrink)

This article relates to the CJEU’s understanding of the concept of the spouse in Case C-673/16 and its effect on the process of law application by Polish administrative courts. The authors considerations are based on the assumption that the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law in Coman and Others is of a dynamic-deliberative nature, based on functional rules, and that at the same it time takes into account a specific legal and socio-cultural context in which one of the fundamental freedoms (...) guaranteed by EU law is implemented. This judgment, as authors underline, confirms that a proper understanding of the current legal context of the concept of a spouse requires that the social and cultural context and the plurality of values arising from different lifestyles be taken into account in the application and interpretation of the law, all with a view to empowering the individual in his or her relationship with the State and raising the level of protection of human rights. Authors observe in the practice od Polish administrative courts that this CJEU’s judgment is important in the argumentative layer, but not decisive for the resolution of the case in specific situations where there is a need to address the effect of same-sex marriage in a case related to the implementation of the EU right to free movement. In this context authors consider whether the justification for rulings of administrative courts may be sought in John Gray’s concept of modus vivendi liberalism. (shrink)

This paper argues that a proper understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical issue of dualism can only be attained through a thoroughgoing analysis of human emotion. Indeed, it is no coincidence that three main thinkers on dualism, whether they were apparent proponents, opponents, or had a somewhat ambiguous status, were also heavily involved in understanding emotion. Ultimately, a proper comprehension of emotion shows the issue of dualism to be moot when it comes to our pre-reflective, everyday (...) lives; dualism is a theoretical interest that shows how we must necessarily posit two essential realms – one of nature and one of consciousness – that are nevertheless always already entwined in pre-reflective and immediately lived experiences like emotion. In this manner, a proper understanding of emotion shows that dualism is not an issue on the everyday lived level, but certainly is on epistemological and metaphysical ones. On these levels, dualism is an essential tool that must be understood and used properly if one is to give a thoroughgoing account of human nature from a theoretical standpoint, where avoiding conflations between immediate and reflective experiences, as well as first-person and third-person standpoints, is crucial. Here, one needs to be aware not only of our dual nature of matter and mind, but also of our dual – which is to say scientific and phenomenological ways – of tackling theoretical problems. In short, one may give a proper, dynamic account of human emotion and simultaneously recognize the advantage of thinking in dual – but not “dualistic” – registers. (shrink)

Understanding Torture surveys the massive literature surrounding torture, arguing that, once properly understood, there can be no defence of torture in any circumstances.

In today's globalized world, we need to communicate values clearly and constructively across cultures and religions to avoid misunderstanding and conflict and to find shared solutions to the issues affecting human communities across the world. This communication is not easy to implement and requires a considerable amount of commitment and empathy. To be effective, intercultural and interreligious dialogues on ethics demand, first of all, an accommodation of different epistemologies coupled with a sincere respect for their richness and internal coherence. Furthermore, (...) our values are so closely rooted in our identity that expressing them becomes a cultural act—even an act of faith in the case of interreligious dialogue. In this paper, I argue that we need to reiterate or embrace this act of faith in the other's values if we are to properly understand them. How is this possible? The answer calls for a theoretical discussion of the hermeneutics of interreligious dialogue. When applied to intercultural and interreligious dialogues, I contend that the theory of hermeneutics needs a specific epistemological dimension—namely that of "appropriation"—that entails that we borrow the other's epistemological outlook, adopt the other's ad hoc modes of communication or transmission of values, and integrate the other's values into the constellation of our sources of meaning. (shrink)

The health benefits of practising mindfulness are well documented, yet the phenomenological mechanisms of such practice remain under-theorised from both ontogenetic and social perspectives. By leveraging an enactive perspective on selfhood, these lacunae can be addressed: firstly, it is argued that proper understanding of mindfulness – and the health benefits that mindfulness practices seek – relies on recognising the socio-embodied nature of the self; consequently, occasions in which the therapeutic need for mindfulness are most pressing will be shown (...) to be inextricably tied to socio-embodied fluctuations across different stages of life. What emerges is a phenomenological understanding of mindfulness as allowing one to dwell in the sensuous density of the present and, through this, remain connected to the social world of open possibilities. (shrink)

The etiology of a perceptual belief can seemingly affect its epistemic status. There are cases in which perceptual beliefs seem to be unjustified because the perceptual experiences on which they are based are caused, in part, by wishful thinking, or irrational prior beliefs. It has been argued that this is problematic for many internalist views in the epistemology of perception, especially those which postulate immediate perceptual justification. Such views are unable to account for the impact of an experience’s etiology on (...) its justificational status, McGrath, Siegel, and Vahid ). Our understanding of what we have been told can also be affected by, for example, wishful thinking or irrational background beliefs. I argue that testimonial beliefs based on such states of understanding can thus be rendered unjustified. This is problematic not only for internalist immediate justification views of testimony, but also for some externalist views, such as the form of proper functionalism endorsed by Burge, and Graham. The testimonial version of the argument from etiology, unlike the perceptual variant, does not rest on the controversial hypothesis that perception is cognitively penetrable. Furthermore, there is a stronger case for the claim that testimonial justification can be undermined by etiological effects since, I argue, testimonial beliefs can be based on the background mental states which affect our understanding of what is said, and our states of understanding are rationally assessable. (shrink)

Understanding what it means toconsent is of considerable importance sincesignificant moral issues depend on how this actis defined. For instance, determining whetherconsent has occurred is the deciding factor insexual assault cases; its proper occurrence isa necessary condition for federally fundedhuman subject research. Even though mosttheorists recognize the legal and moralimportance of consent, there is still littleagreement concerning how consent should bedefined, or whether different domains involvingconsent demand context-specific definitions.Understanding what it means to consent isfurther complicated by the (...) fact that currentlegal conceptions are not necessarily groundedin argument; they typically depend on appealsto authority and precedent. The purpose ofthis paper is to use speech act theory toprovide a theoretically grounded conception ofconsent; such a conception can aid in the justresolution of legal and moral disputes thathinge on whether an act of consent occurred. (shrink)

Affordances are possibilities for action offered by the environment. Recent research on affordances holds that there are differences in how people experience such possibilities for action. However, these differences have not been properly investigated. In this paper I start by briefly scrutinizing the existing literature on this issue, and then argue for two claims. First, that whether an affordance solicits action or not depends on its relevance to the agent’s concerns. Second, that the experiential character of how an affordance solicits (...) action depends on the character of the concern to which it is relevant. Concerns are conceived of as bodily forms of responsiveness, and solicitations are experienced through this responsiveness. The main aim of this paper is to make clear that an understanding of experiential differences in solicitations has to be based on a phenomenological appreciation of how one experiences one’s responsiveness to those solicitations. In the remainder of the paper I show how such a phenomenological appreciation reveals several characteristics of our responsiveness and I briefly explore three of them: valence, force and mineness. In the final section I discuss the self-referentiality of affordances in light of the current proposal, and argue that this self-referentiality is broader than is typically acknowledged. (shrink)

I defend the novel thesis that structural rationality just is applied rational understanding. Applied rational understanding involves our grasping, appreciating, or being sensitive to the basic structure or “logic” of our attitudes, where such sensitivity leads us to properly maintain or revise our attitudes so as to achieve coherence among them. This approach addresses two main issues. First, it explains why there exists a puzzling dualism in our rational psychology: namely, that clear-eyed structural irrationality is unintelligible to us (...) and resists first-personal accounts of behavior in ways that substantive irrationality doesn’t. Second, this approach shows (i) that, given plausible reliabilist intuitions, there’s no necessary connection between the first-person and structural rationality; and (ii) that there is a necessary connection between the first-person and what Tyler Burge calls “fully realized rational agency.” In this paper, I provide a new way of defending this important Burgean claim. (shrink)

Kant holds that the human cognitive power is divided into two "stems", understanding and sensibility. This doctrine has seemed objectionably dualistic to many critics, who see these stems as distinct parts, each able on its own to produce representations, which must somehow interact, determining or constraining one another, in order to secure the fit, requisite for cognition, between concept and intuition. This reading cannot be squared, however, with what Kant actually says about theoretical cognition and the way understanding (...) and sensibility cooperate in it. Such cognition, as Kant conceives of it, satisfies two conditions: it has unity, and it depends on the existence of its object. The first of these conditions entails that the cognitive power must lie in spontaneity, or understanding, while the second implies that this spontaneity depends on receptivity, or sensibility, to be the cognitive power that it is. Consideration of how these capacities must be conceived as cooperating in cognition reveals them to be related, not as interacting parts, but as form and matter. Such a conception of their relation may at first glance seem to be merely another version of dualistic thinking; in fact, however, a proper appreciation of it eliminates the appearance of dualism and helps allay an associated concern that Kant's distinction would taint our cognition with an unacceptable subjectivism. (shrink)

My interest is in an apparent tension between two epistemological theses. The first is veritism, which is roughly the claim that truth is the fundamental epistemic good. The second is the idea that understanding is the proper goal of inquiry. The two theses seem to be in tension because the former seems to imply that the proper goal of inquiry should be truth rather than understanding. And yet there is a strong prima facie case to be (...) made for thinking that properly conducted inquiry aims at an elevated epistemic standing like understanding rather than merely true belief. I suggest that this putative tension is one of the reasons why veritism is these days not widely endorsed. As I show, however, there is in fact no tension between these two claims, at least once they are each properly understood. Indeed, I will be suggesting that there is a plausible conception of veritism which would explain why intellectual exemplars seek out understanding in inquiry. (shrink)

I argue that Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda differed in their conclusions regarding the status of Indigenous persons at least partly because las Casas had significant, yet incomplete, understanding of Indigenous persons, culture and societies and Sepúlveda had mere knowledge of them. To this end, I show that the epistemic state of understanding explains why Las Casas properly concluded that Indigenous persons deserve the same moral status afforded to Europeans. And I show how las (...) Casas’ understanding of Indigenous persons, culture and societies related to what he got wrong about Indigenous persons. (shrink)

In this book, Bryan Wesley Hall breaks new ground in Kant scholarship, exploring the gap in Kant’s Critical philosophy in relation to his post-Critical work by turning to Kant’s final, unpublished work, the so-called _Opus Postumum._ Although Kant considered this project to be the "keystone" of his philosophical efforts, it has been largely neglected by scholars. Hall argues that only by understanding the _Opus Postumum _can we fully comprehend both Kant’s mature view as well as his Critical project. In (...) letters from 1798, Kant claims to have discovered a "gap" in the Critical philosophy that requires effecting a "transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics"; unfortunately, Kant does not make clear exactly what this gap is or how the transition is supposed to fill the gap. To resolve these issues, Hall draws on the _Opus Postumum_, arguing that Kant’s transition project can solve certain perennial problems with the Critical philosophy. This volume provides a powerful alternative to all current interpretations of the _Opus Postumum_, arguing that Kant’s transition project is best seen as the post-Critical culmination of his Critical philosophy. Hall carefully examines the deep connections between the _Opus Postumum_ and the view Kant develops in the _Critique of Pure Reason_, to suggest that properly understanding the post-Critical Kant will significantly revise our view of Kant’s Critical period. (shrink)

Rational intuitions involve a particular form of understanding that gives them a special epistemic status. This form of understanding and its epistemic efficacy are not explained by several current theories of rational intuition, including Phenomenal Conservatism (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception, 2001 ; Ethical intuitionism, 2005 ; Philos Phenomenol Res 74:30–55, 2007 ), Proper Functionalism (Plantinga, Warrant and proper function, 1993 ), the Competency Theory (Bealer Pac Philos Q 81:1–30, 2000 ; Sosa, A virtue (...) epistemology, 2007 ) and the Direct Awareness View (Conee, Philos Phenomenol Res 4:847–857, 1998 ; Bonjour, In defense of pure reason, 1998 ). Some overlook it; others try to account for it but fail. We can account for the role of understanding in rational intuition by returning to the view of some of the early Rationalists, e.g. Descartes and Leibniz. While that view carries a prohibitive cost, it does contain an insight that may help us solve the problem of giving understanding its due. (shrink)

This paper offers a normative account of the speech act of explanation with understanding as its norm. The previous accounts of the speech act of explanation rely on the factive notion of understanding and maintain that proper explanations require knowledge. I argue, however, that such accounts are too demanding and do not reflect the everyday practice of explanation and the attribution of understanding. Instead, I argue that the non-factive, objectual attitude of understanding is sufficient for (...) a proper explanation. On the normative level, explanations are governed by an audience-centred norm, i.e., they are sensitive to the epistemic position of the audience. According to the proposed account, an explanation is a communicative act in which one puts the audience in a position to understand the explained phenomenon. This proposal fits into the recent wave of applications of the normative account and makes space for the pluralism of illocutionary acts. (shrink)

Kant holds that the human cognitive power is divided into two “stems”, understanding and sensibility. This doctrine has seemed objectionably dualistic to many critics, who see these stems as distinct parts, each able on its own to produce representations, which must somehow interact, determining or constraining one another, in order to secure the fit, requisite for cognition, between concept and intuition. This reading cannot be squared, however, with what Kant actually says about theoretical cognition and the way understanding (...) and sensibility cooperate in it. Such cognition, as Kant conceives of it, satisfies two conditions: it has unity, and it depends on the existence of its object. The first of these conditions entails that the cognitive power must lie in spontaneity, or understanding, while the second implies that this spontaneity depends on receptivity, or sensibility, to be the cognitive power that it is. Consideration of how these capacities must be conceived as cooperating in cognition reveals them to be related, not as interacting parts, but as form and matter. Such a conception of their relation may at first glance seem to be merely another version of dualistic thinking; in fact, however, a proper appreciation of it eliminates the appearance of dualism and helps allay an associated concern that Kant's distinction would taint our cognition with an unacceptable subjectivism. (shrink)

Children are surrounded by a lot of problems here and there, and they often show any tendency to answer them promptly. In this paper, I argue that helping children understand their problems properly before answering them is one of the good ways of meta-thinking teaching in philosophy for children, and then I suggest how teachers help them do so.

Understanding has often been regarded as a kind of knowledge. This paper argues that this view is very implausible for understanding words. Instead, a proper account will be of the “analytic-genetic” variety: it will describe immersion in the practice of using a word in such a way that even those not previously equipped with the concepts the word expresses can become immersed. Meeting this condition requires attention to findings in developmental psychology. If you understand a declarative utterance, (...) you thereby know what the speaker said in uttering the words she did. The converse is close to true: if you come to know what a speaker of a declarative utterance has said, then normally you understand the utterance. An example of an abnormal situation would be one in which the speaker’s utterance is in a language you do not understand, but you are authoritatively informed, and so know, what the speaker said. The connection between understanding a whole utterance and knowing something can be preserved by alluding to the basis of the knowledge: it should arise from understanding the words in the utterance, and how they are put together. This leads to a fairly uncontroversial conditional equivalence: (1) If an utterer of an utterance, U, thereby says that p then: (X knows this, on the basis of understanding the words in U and how they are put together) iff (X understands U). The relevant knowledge has no mysteries: it is propositional, typically fully explicit, and is invoked in memory and in reports of speech. The question to be addressed in this paper is whether we can apply this kind of connection between understanding and knowledge to explain what is taken for granted in the equivalence 2 above, namely, the understanding of words. I will suggest that we cannot. Under some idealizations, one can formulate necessarily true equivalences between understanding a word and knowing something, but these equivalences are unilluminating. The knowledge is not of the straightforward kind invoked in connection with whole utterances, and it is mysterious how one might come to possess it. An account of understanding words requires an “analytic-genetic” story, an analysis which offers some philosophical illumination while being consistent with what is known about the genesis of participation in linguistic practices. (shrink)

Among Thomas Aquinas’s 13th and 14th century critics, some of them targeted his Aristotelian view that the human intellect does not cognize individuals of a material nature. To many of his readers, Aquinas’s stance on this point seems to be indefensible for it is an obvious fact that we think about individuals. In this essay, I argue Aquinas’s view has been misunderstood, both by his critics and by many Thomists that have come to his defense. I distinguish two impor- tant (...) aspects of Aquinas’s approach to this problem. First, I highlight the co-operative function different cognitive powers perform with respect to the unified cognitive operations of the human being. Second, I examine in detail Aquinas’s account of human sensing, perceiving, understanding, reasoning, thinking, and cognizing individuals by the co-operative cognition of their ex- ternal senses, the cogitative power (vis cogitativa), and the possible intellect. I show that a proper understanding of the coordinated operations of the pos- sible intellect and cogitative power reveals that Aquinas in fact has a complex and coherent account of how the human being – but not the possible intellect – perceives, thinks, understands, and reasons about individuals. (shrink)

The proper interpretation of Hume’s argument against miracles in Section 10 of An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding has been heavily debated. In this paper, I argue that Hume’s main argument has the intended conclusion that there can never be a sufficient justification for believing that a miracle has occurred on the basis of testimony sufficient to make it a basis for a religion. I also consider and argue against other common readings.

Understanding what it means to consent is of considerable importance since significant moral issues depend on how this act is defined. For instance, determining whether consent has occurred is the deciding factor in sexual assault cases; its proper occurrence is a necessary condition for federally funded human subject research. Even though most theorists recognize the legal and moral importance of consent, there is still little agreement concerning how consent should be defined, or whether different domains involving consent demand (...) context-specific definitions. Understanding what it means to consent is further complicated by the fact that current legal conceptions are not necessarily grounded in argument; they typically depend on appeals to authority and precedent. The purpose of this paper is to use speech act theory to provide a theoretically grounded conception of consent; such a conception can aid in the just resolution of legal and moral disputes that hinge on whether an act of consent occurred. (shrink)

This article discusses the thesis that a subject can have a concept, think thoughts containing it, that she incompletely understands. The central question concerns how to construe the distinction between having a concept and understanding it. Two important versions of the thesis are distinguished: a metasemantic version and an epistemic version. According to the first, the subject may have concept C without being a fully competent user, in virtue of deference to other speakers or to the world. According to (...) the second, the subject may have a concept without being able to provide a proper explication of it. It is argued that whereas the epistemic version is plausible, the metasemantic version faces some challenges. First, it needs to be explained precisely how deference enables a speaker to have C. Second, metasemantic incomplete understanding is in tension with the idea that concepts serve to capture the subject’s cognitive perspective. (shrink)

The trauma and anguish professional people encounter in their work over time can lead to losses in competence and occupational burnout. However, the practice of detachment designed to avoid these outcomes can tip over into losses in the ability to connect with clients, and even to alienation from the professional role itself. Some have thought that the proper regulation of levels of empathic concern ensures a balance between these two poles. I argue against this and instead advocate for a (...) stance I call compassionate understanding. I contend that this best achieves sustained professionalism while remaining morally attuned to the norms of one’s occupation. I focus on health care to illustrate what is at stake in compassionate understanding, though the position I defend has applications across a significant range of professions. (shrink)

Recent developments, both in the cognitive sciences and in world events, bring special emphasis to the study of morality. The cognitive sciences, spanning neurology, psychology, and computational intelligence, offer substantial ad- vances in understanding the origins and purposes of morality. Meanwhile, world events urge the timely synthesis of these insights with traditional ac- counts that can be easily assimilated and practically employed to augment moral judgment, both to solve current problems and to direct future action. The object of the (...) following paper is to present such a synthesis in the form of a model of moral cognition, the ACTWith model of conscience. The purpose of the model is twofold. One, the ACTWith model is intended to shed light on personal moral dispositions, and to provide a tool for actual human moral agents in the refinement of their moral lives. As such, it relies on the power of personal introspection, bolstered by the careful study of moral exemplars available to all persons in all cultures in the form of literary or religious fig- ures, if not in the form of contemporary peers and especially leadership. Two, the ACTWith model is intended as a minimum architecture for fully func- tional artificial morality. As such, it is essentially amodal, implementation non-specific and is developed in the form of an information processing control system. There are given as few hard points in this system as necessary for moral function, and these are themselves taken from review of actual human cognitive processes, thereby intentionally capturing as closely as possible what is expected of moral action and reaction by human beings. Only in satisfying these untutored intuitions should an artificial agent ever be properly regarded as moral, at least in the general population of existing moral agents. Thus, the ACTWith model is intended as a guide both for individual moral develop- ment and for the development of artificial moral agents as future technology permits. (shrink)

In this essay, I attempt to assess Henk de Regt and Dennis Dieks recent pragmatic and contextual account of scientific understanding on the basis of an important historical case-study: understanding in Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and Huygens’ reception of universal gravitation. It will be shown that de Regt and Dieks’ Criterion for the Intelligibility of a Theory (CIT), which stipulates that the appropriate combination of scientists’ skills and intelligibility-enhancing theoretical virtues is a condition for scientific understanding, (...) is too strong. On the basis of this case-study, it will be shown that scientists can understand each others’ positions qualitatively and quantitatively, despite their endorsement of different worldviews and despite their convictions as what counts as a proper explanation. (shrink)

The detrimental impact of fraud on organisations, the economy, and society makes the fight against it imperative. The objective of this article is to show that a proper understanding of the phenomenon of fraud is required in order to be able to undermine it. Such an understanding required firstly a sufficient definition of fraud that can distinguish it clearly from the related phenomenon of corruption. Secondly, a theoretical framework for understanding and explaining fraud is needed. After (...) providing both such a definition and a theoretical framework, the latter is then used in the analysis of interviews conducted with persons who were convicted on chargesof fraud in South Africa. The findings of this analysis are then used to suggest various avenues for fighting fraud. Among these suggestions are proposals indicating the role that ethical values can play in undermining fraud. (shrink)

Aesthetic cognitivism is best thought of as a conjunction of an epistemic and an aesthetic claim. The epistemic thesis is that artworks have cognitive functions, the aesthetic thesis that cognitive functions of artworks partly determine their artistic value. In this article, my first aim is to defend the epistemic thesis of aesthetic cognitivism. Since it seems undeniable that artworks have cognitive functions, yet less clear whether they have them as artworks, I will focus on cognitive functions that plausibly belong to (...) the proper functions of artworks. My second aim is to sketch a suitable epistemological framework for aesthetic cognitivism. I will pursue my first aim by realizing my second aim and hence argue for the thesis that artworks have cognitive functions by sketching a suitable epistemological framework. In Section 1, I present reasons for conceiving of epistemology as a theory of understanding rather than a theory of knowledge. Art enters the stage only in Section 2, where I show that an epistemology of understanding can and should accommodate the cognitive functions aesthetic cognitivists claimed for artworks, hence providing a suitable epistemological framework. To argue in this way in favour of the claim that artworks have cognitive functions does not beg the question since my argument for an epistemology of understanding does not depend on my aim to defend the epistemic thesis of aesthetic cognitivism. In Section 3, I will answer some of the most pressing non-cognitivist objections within the proposed framework. (shrink)