Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it – that particular object – looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been claimed that naïve realist views (...) cannot account for the generality of visual experiences, and that the naïve realist explanation of particularity has unacceptable implications for self- knowledge: the knowledge we have of the character of our own experiences. We argue in this paper that neither claim is correct: naïve realism can explain the generality of experiences, and the naïve realist explanation of particularity raises no problems for our self-knowledge. (shrink)

Standard accounts of object perception force us to choose between the unity of objects and the particularity of objects. The unity of objects is explained in terms of general, repeatable representations and a mental act of predication that binds those representations. The particularity of objects is explained in terms of particular, unrepeatable representations and a pre-predicational mode of perceptual consciousness. Generalists argue that particularists cannot explain the structure of perception while particularists argue that generalism makes perception indifferent to (...) the objects themselves. Here, I show how Susanna Schellenberg’s capacitism can capture the motivations for both views. According to capacitism, perception is the result of exercises of perceptual capacities to discriminate concrete perceptual particulars. The trouble is that Schellenberg’s capacitism struggles to explain the structure of object perception without resorting to a further contribution from non-perceptual capacities. I propose that these problems can be avoided by positing a capacity to discriminate unity. Successful exercises of this capacity result in a representation of an object bound with its properties and make us directly aware of an object’s unity. (shrink)

Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay “Playfulness,‘World’-Travelling, (...) and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy. (shrink)

(1986). Sport, Art, and Particularity; The Best Equivocation. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport: Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 49-63. doi: 10.1080/00948705.1986.9714441.

John Martin Fischer’s Death, Immortality, and Meaning in Life puts forth a view that individual experiences could provide us with sources of endless fascination, motivation, and value if only we could live forever to continue to enjoy them. In this article I advocate for more caution about embracing this picture by pointing to three points of tension in Fischer's book. First, I argue that taking meaningfulness in life to be holistic is not compatible with the view immortal lives would be (...) recognizably humanlike. Next, I interrogate Fischer’s claim that that worries about boredom in immortal lives are predicated on the false view that our pursuits are compelling to us because we value them instrumentally, showing that he relies on a more controversial view of the value of our pursuits. Finally, I argue that Fischer’s naturalistic reinterpretation of the value of Near-Death experiences falls somewhat short of capturing their poignancy. Given Fischer’s seeming acknowledgment that what we get from an experience is sometimes ineffable, I argue that he ought to be less skeptical that a genuine Near-Death Experience would give the person experiencing it some (defeasible) evidence of the supernatural. (shrink)

The justification debate has always been a major issue within philosophy of education. In this study Wittgensteinian interpretation of this matter is offered. It is argued that in using his framework justification itself has to be thought of differently, i.e. as making explicit the bedrock of the form of life the educator finds him or herself in. But Wittgenstein's insights highlight too the particularity of the ethical and therefore also of the educational situation. The paper argues that educators cannot (...) but take a stance, cannot but act in accordance with what appeals to them in the midst of the irreconcilable desires of others. It is therefore considered that the demand for particularity reveals itself here as a demand for authenticity. (shrink)

This paper responds to critical comments by Christopher Hill, Ram Neta, and Nico Orlandi on my book The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence (OUP 2018). It addresses questions about why analyzing mental states in terms of capacities is more explanatory powerful than analyzing them in terms of processes. It further develops my view of functions and their relation to mental capacities. It clarifies the internalist commitments of my externalist view of content, consciousness, and evidence. The topics addressed include further (...) the many-properties problem, the relation between what is perceived and what is represented, as well as the evidential transparency principle. (shrink)

This study examines the sources of human divergence as arise from Wilhelm Dilthey’s writings. While Dilthey assigns a central role to the human subject, he never synthesizes his major ideas on subjectivity into a unified theory of subjective uniqueness. I will show that such a theory can be derived from his writings through the combination of three ideas that appear in them. These ideas are: (1) the thesis that human understanding is possible because of psychological content that is shared by (...) both the creator and the interpreter; (2) the belief that this shared content is the only content that exists within human beings, meaning that there is no unique psychological content; and (3) the perception of this inner universal content as an accumulation of life-possibilities. When joined together, these ideas create an inspiring theory of human divergence, according to which the uniqueness of an individual is determined through partial realization of universal possibilities. (shrink)

The essays in this collection examine the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgment, perception, and group identifications, and explore how all these psychic capacities contribute to a morally good life. They examine moral exemplars and the "moral saints" debate, the morality of rescue during the Holocaust, role morality as lying between "personal" and "impersonal" perspectives, Carol Gilligan's theory of women and morality, Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy, and moral responsiveness in young children.

This paper draws upon the meta-ethical insights of Bernard Lonergan and Raimond Gaita to bolster the foundational claims of Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory. I aim to refine Zagzebski’s approach by pointing out how a community’s inevitable prioritization of a given paradigm of moral exemplarity plays a decisive role in the trajectory of its ethical reasoning. I conclude by arguing that within the Christian community, encounters with sanctity should determine the identification of virtues rather than vice versa.

Taking “capitalism itself as the ultimate horizon of the political situation” enables us to reframe binationalism and the Palestinian question. It helps to underscore binationalism as a universalist project, engaged in a fight against domination and exploitation. Seeking economic justice at home invariably links the Palestinian plight to other labor movements in Israel and elsewhere in the region. The solidarity of workers can effectively challenge the interests of the few, de naturalize their exploitation, and foreground binationalism as a socio-economic project, (...) not limited to its own particularist interests, but “grounded in the ‘part of no-part,’ the singular universality exemplified in those who lack a determined place in the social totality, who are ‘out of place’ in it”. If decoloniality and others fetishize the enemy, over-emphasizing his or her exceptionality, and thus always risk reifying the antagonism, binationalism, if it is to be transformative, must embrace its role as a supplement to the Palestinian/Israeli antagonism, taking the task of co-existence, of living together with each other’s neighbor, as an urgent ethico-political challenge, fully cognizant that there is no guarantee of success. And each is killing the other by the window. (shrink)

Most contemporary moral philosophy is concerned with issues of rationality, universality, impartiality, and principle. By contrast Laurence Blum is concerned with the psychology of moral agency. The essays in this collection examine the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgment, perception, and group identifications, and explore how all these psychic capacities contribute to a morally good life. Blum takes up the challenge of Iris Murdoch to articulate a vision of moral excellence that provides a worthy aspiration for human beings. Drawing on (...) accounts of non-Jewish rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust Blum argues that impartial principle can mislead us about the variety of forms of moral excellence. (shrink)

Examining nationalism in two ways, this study first draws out the ideological connections and associations of nationalism by analyzing its relationship to a series of key political concepts, theories and practices: sovereignty, the nation state, citizenship, liberal theory, patriotism, communitarianism, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Secondly, it looks at the drift to particularity in political debates by assessing nationalism as a key example of particularity.

Many theorists maintain that perceptual experience exhibits the what is often called the phenomenology of particularity: that in perceptual experience it phenomenally seems that there are particular things. Some urge that this phenomenology demands special accounts of perception on which particulars somehow constitute perceptual experience, including versions of relationalism, on which perception is a relation between perceivers and particular perceived objects, or complex forms of representationalism, on which perception exhibits demonstrative or special particular-involving types of content. I argue here (...) that no such account required. I develop and defend a novel account of such phenomenology, grounded in the higher-order theory of consciousness. In short, this view holds that the phenomenology of particularity arises because suitable higher-order states make it appear to one that one is in perceptual relations to particulars, even if perception is not in any way constituted by particulars. I argue that this account has many advantages and avoids problems that other theories of such phenomenology face. (shrink)

This paper is a brief reply to Henry Simoni's ‘Divine passibility and the problem of radical particularity: does God feel your pain?’ in Religious Studies, 33 (1997). I treat his discussion of my paper entitled ‘Hartshorne and Creel on impassibility’, Process Studies, 21 (1992). I argue that Simoni's examples used to illustrate the purportedly contradictory nature of the experiences of a God who universally feels creaturely states fail. For Simoni tacitly employs an inadequate notion of the law of non-contradiction, (...) and thereby misses the relevant phenomenological fact that it is possible for human beings to have integrated mental states that contain spatially distinctive but conflicting hedonic properties. Thus, it is possible for God (at least under Hartshornean descriptions) to have such experiences. I also argue that I have not ‘exploited an isolated passage’ in Hartshorne to make his views seem more palatable. The point of the passage in question is in fact repeated by Hartshorne and is systematically connected with his doctrine of the ‘objective and subjective form of feeling’. (shrink)

In moving away from the objective, property-based theories of earlier periods to a subject-based aesthetic, Kant did not intend to give up the idea that judgments of beauty are universalizable. Accordingly, the “Deduction of Judgments of Taste” (KU, §38) aims to show how reflective aesthetic judgments can be “imputed” a priori to all human subjects. The Deduction is not successful: Kant manages only to justify the imputation of the same form of aesthetic experience to everyone; he does not show that (...) this experience will universally occur in response to the same objects. This is what I call Kant’s problem of particularity. After critiquing Anthony Savile’s attempt to overcome this problem by linking Kant’s aesthetics to the theory of rational ideas, I elucidate the concept of (the oft-unnoticed) aesthetic attributes (§49) in a way that suggests a possible resolution to the problem of particularity. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:What lessons can Catholic theology learn from Shinran (1173–1263), one of the leading Japanese proponents of Pure Land Buddhism, in matters regarding the universality and particularity of religions? How can Catholic theology move from Christological and ecclesiological exclusivism to a position that acknowledges religious pluralism? This essay attempts an answer to these questions by comparing the shift in Catholic pre-Vatican II theology of religion from exclusivism to pluralistic inclusivism to Shinran's abandonment of his monastic life and its practices at (...) the Tendai monastery of Enryakuji on Mount Hiei in 1201 at the age of twenty-nine and adoption of the teaching of Hōnen (1133–1212) on the recitation of the Nembutsu is all that is required for rebirth in the Pure Land.Part I of the essay gives an exposition of the Catholic theology of Christ as the unique and universal Savior, the church as the necessary and universal sign and instrument of salvation, the reversal of ecclesiological exclusivism by Vatican II's affirmation of the possibility of salvation for non-Christians, and the theological developments in Catholic theology that lead to Vatican II's inclusivist theology of religion.Part II begins with a narrative of Shinran's journey toward religious pluralism starting from his rejection of the monastic tradition and its practices to gain rebirth in the Pure Land and his six-year discipleship of Hōnan from whom he learned that salvation cannot be earned by one's effort and that salvation is available to all. Next follows an exposition of Shinran's teaching under four expressions: kyō, gyō, shin, and shō. Central to Shinran's teaching and three-stage conversion is the Amida Buddha's Primal Vow or Eighteenth Vow to save all sentient beings, which is the "other-power" and not the "self-power" that saves. Finally, attention is drawn to the kind of people that followed Shinran's teaching.Part III studies the areas where Catholic theology can learn from Shinran and Shin Buddhism by drawing the parallels between Shinran's context and that of Catholic theologians that require a new interpretation of traditional teachings on Christ and the church, between the Primal Vow and the Holy Spirit, and between Shinran's targeted audience and the "poor" for whom God has a preferential love. (shrink)

Natural duty theorists of political obligation try to base a moral duty to obey the law on some natural duty, such as the duty to promote justice. Their critics say they confront an insurmountable obstacle in the particularity problem: Since natural duties do not bind us to some persons and institutions more strongly than to others, they cannot support a duty to one particular state or society. I solve the particularity problem, by developing a version of the political (...) obligation thesis, giving a natural duty argument for it and showing that the particularity problem does not arise for the argument. I reply to some likely objections to my view. (shrink)

A poem is not particular in the way a painting is particular. A copy of a poem is still the poem, while a copy of a painting is not the painting. But a poem is still particular, since it seems to be constituted by a specific set of words in a specific order such that to alter that order or any of those words is to make a new poem. Marianne Moore begins her poem “An Egyptian Pulled Glass Bottle in (...) the Shape of a Fish” in the following way: She might have revised this and replaced “perpendicularity” with “verticality.” This says the same thing, but it is not the same poem. The particularity of a poem, relative to the words that make it up, constitutes a... (shrink)

This paper is a response to particularist critics of the normative force of moral principles. The particularist critique, as I understand it, is a rejection not only of principle‐based accounts of moral deliberation and justification, but also of accounts of character in which principles play a central role. I focus on the latter challenge and counter it with a view I call character‐principlism. I begin by discussing in a general way what motivates the particularity objection to principles and then (...) contrast two views – both of which insist on the importance of attentiveness to particularity – about the relative normative status of principles and particular cases. I present some reasons for believing that we need a more normatively robust conception of the role of moral principles than the particularists provide. In the main portion of the paper, I discuss how character‐principlism sees principles functioning in our lives and the lives we lead with others. I contrast this with some other accounts of desirable character that particularists can embrace, and argue that these are seriously flawed because, unlike character‐principlism, they cannot satisfactorily explain how a person could possess the constancy of character that moral integrity requires. (shrink)

Most theoretical approaches in bioethics begin with a theory that articulates and defends basic principles or rules that are more or less systematically related and that seek to yield more or less precise conclusions with regard to specific acts, cases, or policies. Concerns about the agent and descriptions of the context of action stand on the margins of the theory. This is ironic, given the overwhelming importance and impact the training of health care professionals has upon them and upon the (...) practice of health care as a whole, and given the fact that many advocates of the theories themselves concede that one's beliefs and how one describes a situation and weighs "facts" and values relevant to the case strongly determine one's conclusions. While morality may not lead ineluctably to religion, as Kant believed, bioethics does appear inevitably to involve particularity. I examine the work of James M. Gustafson and Stanley Hauerwas to analyze two views of the role of particularity in bioethics. I then show the relevance of their work for addressing some problems with the practicality and concreteness of current models in bioethics. Keywords: applied ethics, bioethics, casuistry, community, discernment, principlism, theological ethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Three writers who utilize a similar metaphysics to understand the relationship between Ultimate Reality and conventional reality are compared. The metaphysics of what I call an inclusive Infinity is the common thread employed in comparing the thought of Hegel, Hartshorne and Nishida. I contrast the concept of inclusive Infinity with that of radical particularity and argue that people are private centers of conscious awareness who cannot be encompassed within an infinity or totality. Because of the individuality and uniqueness of (...) particulars, there can be no absolutely inclusive Infinite. (shrink)

The sensibilities suggested by the notion tianrenheyi have pervaded the Chinese philosophical narrative since, at the earliest, the Spring and Autumn Period, triggering ever novel and enriching interpretations. This paper, far from searching for some ostensible essence of the notion, engages tianrenheyi philosophically from a contemporary perspective. Investigating, inter alia, the kind of unity stipulated by the notion, its moral and spiritual entailments, as well as its relation to transcendence clears the way - now freed from some metaphysical barriers - (...) to a fresh outlook on the interplay of oneness and particularity in Chinese natural cosmology. The relation between oneness and particularity will thereby emerge as necessarily vague and as mutually co-implicative, and resist any assertion of a preference for the one over the other. (shrink)

This article examines how emerging technologies – particularly artificial intelligence – disrupt the moral and institutional foundations of contemporary military practice. While strategic documents from the United States, NATO, and other major actors anticipate profound institutional transformation driven by AI, their treatment of ethics largely confines itself to legal compliance and technical safeguards, leaving the ethical role of military leadership in managing disruptive change underexamined. Drawing on Seumas Miller’s distinction between social institutions that are merely instrumental to collective goods and (...) those whose defining ends are constitutive of such goods, the article argues that the military belongs to the latter category. Because the military’s core function – defending the sovereignty of a polity – is itself morally significant, technological disruption of its organizational structures simultaneously constitutes ethical disruption. The article thus reconceives change management during periods of technological transition as calling for a specific kind of military prudence, a practical wisdom exercised within and through the institution’s role-mediated ethical practices. By analyzing three concrete modes of techno-moral disruption, the article shows how AI may reshape ethical standards, redistribute professional knowledge, and alter organizational ethos, and why navigating these transformations responsibly is a central task of military virtue. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness holds that no structural or functional description can logically entail the qualitative character of experience. Qualia appear to be the paradigm case of entities that resist structural reduction. This paper applies Constraint Theory — the thesis that constraint is the transcendental condition of determinacy and existence as such — to the problem of phenomenal presence. I argue for three interconnected claims. First, qualia are not ontological residuals supplementing a structural account but are constituted by the (...) maximal closure of constraint: they are what a system’s state is when its internal constraint structure has exhausted all remaining degrees of freedom at a given level of integration. Second, the privacy and ineffability of qualia are structural consequences of this maximal particularity, not mysterious properties requiring a separate metaphysical explanation. Third, this framework provides a novel individuation principle — the Constraint Individuation Principle — that locates the explanatory gap with greater formal precision than standard physicalist or functionalist accounts, revealing the residual problem to be the question of constraint presence to itself rather than the broader question of why consciousness exists at all. The paper engages with the inverted spectrum objection, explicitly differentiates the account from both property dualism and Integrated Information Theory, and maintains that while constraint presence remains a foundational limit, the framework substantially dissolves the explanatory gap rather than merely displacing it. (shrink)

Understanding Hegel's account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida's analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, (...) ‘illustration’, or (2) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel's neologismbeiherspielen, in whichBeispielis understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). ABeispielin the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida's view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou's concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel's claim that the movement of the concept is play. (shrink)

A philosophical critique of George Grant's use of Heidegger that refers in detail to Reiner Schurmann to distinguish the terms "particularity" and "singularity.".

The task of distinguishing universals from particulars is difficult twice over. It faces a host of first order challenges, since first order proposals about the distinction (e.g. only universals are instantiable, or only universals can be multi-located) tend to be threatened by counterexamples. But it also faces formidable methodological challenges, such as how to decide whether the distinction ought to be exclusive and exhaustive. After discussing the relationships between the distinction and several pairs of pre-philosophical notions, this chapter aims to (...) provide an instructive—albeit non-exhaustive—examination of some principal first order approaches and methodological challenges, respectively. (shrink)

Reflections on moral discourse and its contexts are provided and the authors discuss the nature and tasks of moral philosophy. The collection creates a dialogue between different philosophical views.

By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular (...) works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant's view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant's view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects. This last point is worth emphasizing, in order to correct an interpretation of Kant's account of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment that wrongly reads Kant as claiming that aesthetic judgments do not have to satisfy the same basic requirements of judgment that any other kind of judgment also must satisfy, such as the synthetic subsumption of such objects under certain necessary and hard-wired concepts of understanding, the internal coherence of such judgments with other, non-aesthetic ones of a more abstract and comprehensive character, the unified consciousness within which such judgments are intelligibly made, and the like. Of course Kant recognizes the special character of aesthetic judgments and unpacks it in the... (shrink)

Our ordinary conception of time has it that there are temporal particulars: not only do people do things, but there are particular doings by people; not only are we born, but the birth of each one of us was a particular event, and each of us will have our own particular death. Temporal particulars in this sense are individuated, fundamentally, by their temporal locations or relations, rather than by their intrinsic or qualitative characteristics. In this respect they are unrepeatable, not (...) just de facto, but as a matter of their very nature. However, there is a tradition in philosophy that seriously downplays this aspect of our thinking about time. According to this tradition, the fundamental unit of temporal representation is _tensed truth_; the notion of an unrepeatable particular, individuated by its temporal location, is at best an abstraction from a complex of tensed truths. The aims of this paper are, first, to argue that the representation of temporal particulars is deeply implicated in our ordinary conception of the past as fixed and unalterable; and, secondly, to argue that the theorist of tensed truth is able to provide only a pale imitation of this aspect of our thinking. I will then reflect on the consequences of this for debates about the metaphysics of tense. (shrink)

Liberal nationalists advance two claims: (1) an empirical claim that nationalism is functionally indispensable to the viability of liberal democracy (because it is necessary to social integration) and (2) a normative claim that some forms of nationalism are compatible with liberal democratic norms. The empirical claim is often supported, against postnationalists’ view that social integration can bypass ethnicity and nationality, by pointing to the inevitable ethnic and cultural particularities of all political institutions. I argue that (1) the argument that ethno-cultural (...) particularity demonstrates the need for nationalist integration depends on an implausible reification of national identity at the level of social theory, and that (2) this reification ironically serves to undermine liberal nationalists’ normative claim. (shrink)

본 논문은 인간존엄을 크게 두 측면으로 구분하였다: 우리가 일반적으로 수용하는 불변의 요소들을 반영하는 보편적인 인간존엄과 개개의 문화, 종교, 역사에 따라 가변적일 수 있는 특수한 인간존엄. 그리고 이러한 구분이 한국의 생명윤리안전법과 황우석 사태를 분석하는 데 유용한 틀이 될 수 있으리란 전제 하에 논의를 시작하였다. 하지만, 황우석 사태는 이러한 틀로 설명하기에는 극히 혼란스러운 측면이 존재한다. 이 사건의 특수성은 논문조작이 아니라 한국사회의 남달랐던 대응방식에 있다. 하지만, 이 특이한 대응방식을 특수한 인간존엄을 형성하는 데 기반이 되는 한국의 생명문화라고 볼 수는 없다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 생명윤리안전법에서 제시하고 (...) 있는 두 개의 입법목적, 배아의 이중적인 정의방식, 국가생명윤리심의위원회를 통한 심의와 기관위원회를 통한 심의·조사·감독 등의 규정은 최근 생명윤리 논쟁에서 제시되고 있는 권한으로서 인간존엄 논거와 제한으로서 인간존엄 논거가 공존가능하다는 것을 보여주는 규제방식으로서 의미를 가진다. 여기서 제한으로서 인간존엄 개념이 한국 특유의 인간존엄으로서 적절한 자리를 잡을 수 있으려면, 무엇보다도 생명윤리안전법에서 규정하고 있는 기관생명윤리위원회가 실질적으로 활성화될 수 있어야 한다. 개개 기관생명윤리위원회의 충실한 운영이야말로 한국의 생명문화와 인간존엄의 지역적 특수성을 건전하게 형성해 나갈 수 있는 단초가 될 것이다. (shrink)