Eliana Mary Horn (2026) proposes an account of how we ought to understand prosocial behavior-promoting virtual reality that forms a middle ground between an overly optimistic and overly pessimistic perspective. Horn argues that the right sort of engagement with virtual reality cannot provide us with knowledge of what it is like to be a marginalized person, but it can provide us with a form of grounded inferential knowledge related to the marginalized perspective. As such, virtual reality scenarios can still be (...) used to promote prosocial behavior on a more realistic basis. Starting with Horn’s position, I ask whether the framework entails a risk of users of virtual reality becoming too overconfident in their understanding of the marginalized people’s perspective. The worry is that a user might mistakenly come to believe that they know what it is like to be a member of the marginalized group through the use of virtual reality. I argue that this is a possibility, but that Horn already has the starting point for a solution to the problem. I provide suggestions of how this starting point might be further developed. (shrink)

1. Overconfidence is usually understood as being more confident than reality justifies (Harvey, 1997; Moore & Healy, 2008; Pompian, 2006), which leads individuals to overestimate their performance...

The intertemporal stability of research and development investment is a key issue in successfully promoting the continuation of innovation activities under high uncertainty in entrepreneurship. R&D smoothing helps firms to navigate the uncertainties of the external environment and maintain the stability of their investments in innovation. Chief executive officers are the most important decision-makers in firms' strategic planning. However, overconfident CEOs may overlook the importance of their firms' strategic actions on innovative activities. Drawing on upper echelons theory, this paper examines (...) how CEO overconfidence affects firms' R&D smoothing. Using a sample of firms listed in China's Growth Enterprises Market between 2013 and 2020, this study finds that CEO overconfidence has a significant negative impact on R&D smoothing. Furthermore, our findings reveal that firms' internal control quality and institutional investor monitoring can mitigate the negative association between CEO overconfidence and R&D smoothing. Our findings provide new insights into the micro-level theoretical explanations for R&D smoothing and offer practical implications for technology-based entrepreneurial firms. (shrink)

This study examines how chief executive officer overconfidence can influence the quantity, quality and direction of corporate innovation using Chinese firms for the period 2009–2016. Our results suggest that overall, CEO overconfidence has a positive impact on firm innovation productivity. Furthermore, this effect is significant for Chinese non-SOEs but not for Chinese SOEs. Specifically, an overconfident CEO can facilitate firm innovation in new technological areas but not in the firm’s existing areas. Additionally, we find that internal controls can (...) regulate the relationship between CEO overconfidence and innovation. Interestingly, when the internal control level is too high or too low, the correlation between CEO overconfidence and innovation productivity is not significant. (shrink)

Previous research has demonstrated that attitudes are a primary determinant of intention to gamble on electronic gaming machines consistent with the Theory of Reasoned Action. This paper aims to address how biases in judgment can contribute to attitudes and subsequently behavior, including maladaptive problematic gambling behavior. We take a novel approach by viewing overconfidence in one’s understanding of how outcomes are determined on EGMs as an indication of cognitive distortions. The novelty of this paper is further increased as we (...) compare attitudes to existing EGMs with novel EGMs which include a skill component, referred to as skill-based gaming machines, which enables a better controlled comparison between actual and perceived skill. In Study 1, 232 US-based participants were recruited online who were shown various slot machines and SGMs and asked a series of questions about perceived skill and chance in determining outcomes to assess their understanding, then were asked their confidence in their understanding, attitudes toward the machines and they completed the Problem Gambling Severity Index. In Study 2, 246 Australian participants were recruited through community and university student samples; they attended a laboratory where they were randomly allocated to play a real EGM or SGM without money and completed the same measures as in Study 1. In Study 2, participants were randomly told that the outcomes on the machine they would play were determined entirely by chance, skill, or a mixture of both. In both studies, our findings suggest that there are more extreme values in overconfidence in how EGMs work, whereas individuals are more similar in their confidence in understanding SGMs. We also find a relationship between overconfidence in EGM understanding and positive attitudes toward EGMs, but no such relationship with SGMs. There was no impact from controlling for demographics, problem gambling severity, or labeling of machines on these relationships. (shrink)

This experiment elicits beliefs about other people’s overconfidence and abilities. We find that most people believe that others are unbiased, and only few think that others are overconfident. There is a remarkable heterogeneity between these groups. Those people who think others are underconfident or unbiased are overconfident themselves. Those who think others are overconfident are underconfident themselves. Despite this heterogeneity, people overestimate on average the abilities of others as they do their own ability. One driving force behind this result (...) is the refusal to process information about oneself: not only does this lead to overestimation of one’s own ability, but by means of social projection also to overestimation of others’ abilities. (shrink)

Drawing on research in the psychology of judgment and decision making, I argue that individual economists acting as experts in matters of public policy are likely to be victims of significant overconfidence. The case is based on the pervasiveness of the phenomenon, the nature of the task facing economists?as?experts, and the character of the institutional constraints under which they operate. Moreover, I argue that economist overconfidence can have dramatic consequences. Finally, I explore how the negative consequences of (...) class='Hi'>overconfidence can be mitigated, and how the phenomenon can be reduced or eliminated. As a case study, I discuss the involvement of Western experts in post?communist Russian economic reforms. (shrink)

Humans tend to exhibit systematically self-serving biases in their beliefs. They tend to think they are better, smarter, and nicer than they are, and attribute their success to themselves and their failure to external factors. They rationalise their errors and misdeeds while casting critical judgment on others’ missteps. This has often been interpreted as a sign that people are poor at forming judgments about themselves and the world. In contrast to this view, these belief distortions can be explained by the (...) idea that evolution likely did not select for us to form accurate beliefs, but rather beliefs that can be useful. Overconfidence may actually be an adaptive feature of our cognition, providing advantages in various situations. At the same time, however, these individual advantages can generate collective costs. When overconfidence becomes widespread, it may lead to inefficient social equilibria-such as bargaining impasses, costly conflicts, or misguided leadership-where what is adaptive for individuals produces negative consequences at the group or societal level. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called “a received view” in the epistemology of memory, as the standard position about memorial justification. My strategy for doing so is two-pronged. First, I argue that the considerations which motivate preservationism also support access internalism. Preservationism is mainly motivated by its ability to answer the explanatory challenges posed by the problem of stored belief and the problem of forgotten evidence. However, as I will demonstrate, access (...) internalism also has the resources to provide plausible solutions to those problems. Second, I argue that preservationism faces a couple of problems which access internalism avoids. Doing so, I present a new scenario which, on the one hand, functions as a counterexample to preservationism, and, on the other hand, provides intuitive support for access internalism. Moreover, I also demonstrate how preservationism, in light of recent research in cognitive psychology, is vulnerable to skepticism about memorial justification, whereas access internalism remains unthreatened. (shrink)

There exists a large body of work examining individual differences in the propensity to engage in reflective thinking processes. However, there is a distinct lack of empirical research examining th...

The paper presents and defends a Bayesian theory of trust in social networks. In the first part of the paper, we provide justifications for the basic assumptions behind the model, and we give reasons for thinking that the model has plausible consequences for certain kinds of communication. In the second part of the paper we investigate the phenomenon of overconfidence. Many psychological studies have found that people think they are more reliable than they actually are. Using a simulation environment (...) that has been developed in order to make our model computationally tractable we show that in our model inquirers are indeed sometimes better off from an epistemic perspective overestimating the reliability of their own inquiries. We also show, by contrast, that people are rarely better off overestimating the reliability of others. On the basis of these observations we formulate a novel hypothesis about the value of overconfidence. (shrink)

This paper investigates how carbon emissions create trading costs in stock markets and why executive psychology matters for this relationship. Using 387 U.S. firms from the S&P 500 index over 2010–2021, we find that carbon emissions reduce stock liquidity by increasing information asymmetry, inducing stakeholder divestment, and threatening corporate legitimacy. Direct emissions (scope 1) create the strongest liquidity penalties because they signal immediate regulatory exposure and operational carbon intensity. However, overconfident CEOs mitigate these negative effects through enhanced environmental communication, credible (...) innovation signaling, and proactive stakeholder engagement—mechanisms that reduce market uncertainty despite high emission levels. Our analysis of international climate agreements reveals that during the Kyoto Protocol's first phase (2010–2012), markets primarily penalized direct emissions, while the second phase (2013–2020) saw broader investor pricing across emission types. During the Paris Agreement's pre-commitment phase (2010–2015), regulatory uncertainty led to negative market reactions, but the commitment phase (2016–2019) transformed emissions from risk factors into operational concerns as regulatory clarity emerged. Finally, high-emission industries show more pronounced liquidity effects, confirming that carbon risk pricing varies with sectoral environmental exposure. (shrink)

The rapid development of online social media has significantly promoted product diffusion in online social networks. However, prior studies focusing on irrational behavior, such as overconfidence, in PDOSN are scarce. To investigate the effect of overconfidence on PDOSN, this study combined overconfidence and an evolutionary game to conduct a multiagent simulation on PDOSN. This combined method provided an effective reference to examine product diffusion in the context of irrational behavior. After careful consideration, this study identified three (...) class='Hi'>overconfidence scenarios, benefit, cost, and benefit and cost overconfidence, developed a multiagent simulation model for PDOSN using various overconfidence scenarios, and conducted a comparison with real-world cases to validate the model’s feasibility. The findings indicated that adoption benefits and betrayal penalties had a positive effect on the results in all models, while adoption costs had the opposite effect. When benefit and cost overconfidence occurred simultaneously, benefit overconfidence offset the negative effect of cost overconfidence. Moderate connectivity, a large number of core nodes, and high reconnection probability fully promoted product diffusion. Benefit overconfidence and cost overconfidence had a significant impact on the results in different networks. As such, this study combined psychological theory with simulation methods, providing insights for future research on product diffusion. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhen learning from text, it is important that learners not only comprehend the information provided but also accurately monitor and judge their comprehension, which is known as metacomprehension accuracy. To investigate the role of a learner’s affective state for text comprehension and metacomprehension accuracy, we conducted an experiment with N = 103 university students in whom we induced positive, negative, or neutral affect. Positive affect resulted in poorer text comprehension than neutral affect. Positive affect also led to overconfident predictions, whereas (...) negative and neutral affect were both associated with quite accurate predictions. Independent of affect, postdictions were rather underconfident. The results suggest that positive affect bears processing disadvantages for achieving deep comprehension and adequate prediction accuracy. Given that postdictions were more accurate, practice tests might represent an effective instructional method to help learners in a positive affective state... (shrink)

I compare the discussion on exclusivism in religion to the discussion on exclusivism in general. With defenders of religious exclusivism, such as Plantinga, I argue that it is a subset of general exclusivism and is as little blameworthy as the latter is. This explains why defenders of religious exclusivism are right in assuming that the burden of proof is on the shoulders of the critics of exclusivism. Yet, this answer solves only part of the problem. It answers only the first (...) order question of whether it is legitimate to hold exclusivist truth claims in religion. It does not answer the second order question of how, in what spirit, they should be held. I argue that there are contexts in which exclusivist truth claims should be held in a humble fashion, for example contexts in which (cognitive) ambiguity reigns. If they are held in those contexts in an overconfident fashion, they are epistemically and/or morally blameworthy. Since religion is characterized by a measure of (cognitive) ambiguity, exclusivist religious truth claims should be held in a humble fashion. They are thus blameworthy if held in an overconfident fashion. Yet, if held in a modest spirit, there is nothing wrong with religious exclusivism. (shrink)

This paper uses a field survey to investigate the quality of individuals’ beliefs of relative performance in tournaments. We consider two field settings, poker and chess, which differ in the degree to which luck is a factor and also in the information that players have about the ability of the competition. We find that poker players’ forecasts of relative performance are random guesses with an overestimation bias. Chess players also overestimate their relative performance but make informed guesses. We find support (...) for the “unskilled and unaware hypothesis” in chess: high-skilled chess players make better forecasts than low-skilled chess players. Finally, we find that chess players’ forecasts of relative performance are not efficient. (shrink)

This article discusses philosophical influence, especially the influence made by Confucianism and Daoism, on the way Asian people see and understand the world. Recently, Richard Nisbett drew a connection between Chinese philosophy (Confucianism and Daoism) and the cognitive profiles of the people who live in Asian countries where Confucianism and Daoism are strong social and cultural traditions. He argues that there is a peculiar way that Asians think and perceive things and this cognitive pattern is influenced by a group of (...) principles derived from Chinese philosophy. This article critically analyzes Nisbett’s explanation, his emphasis on the principle of change in particular, and provides an alternative explanation of the connection between Chinese philosophy and cognitive peculiarities of Asians. Asians combine and integrate opposite viewpoints not because they believe that things change in all unexpected directions, but because they see the world as a big system with interrelated and mutually influencing components. (shrink)

In the present study it was shown that decision heuristics and confidence judgements play important roles in the building of preferences. Based on a dual-process account of thinking, the study compared people who did well versus poorly on a series of decision heuristics and overconfidence judgement tasks. The two groups were found to differ with regard to their information search behaviour in introduced multiattribute choice tasks. High performers on the judgemental tasks were less influenced in their decision processes by (...) numerical information format (probabilities vs. frequencies) compared to low performers. They also looked at more attributes and spent more time on the multiattribute choice tasks. The results reveal that performance on decision heuristics and overconfidence tasks has a bearing both on heuristic and analytic processes in multiattribute decision making. (shrink)

Financial literacy has gained much attention amongst scholars, policymakers and other stakeholders due to its role in backing up investment decisions, improving personal financial management and increasing financial wellbeing. This study examines the influence of financial literacy on investment decisions with the moderating effect of the overconfidence behavioural bias. Data were collected from 180 respondents in Saudi Arabia using a questionnaire, and a convenience sampling technique was applied. The study’s findings were analysed using the partial least squares structural equation (...) modelling technique. It was found that financial literacy positively and significantly influenced investment decisions. Moreover, the results show that overconfidence positively affected investment decisions and that the relationship between financial literacy and investment decisions was positively and significantly moderated by overconfidence. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, this study measures the contribution of banks and non-bank financial institutions toward the systemic risk of China. Second, the present study investigates the relationship between CEO power, CEO overconfidence, and systemic risk. This study uses the Delta Conditional Value-at-Risk method to measure the systemic risk contribution of firms listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges over a period of 2006–2018. The results show that non-bank financial institutions are systemically more important (...) compared to banks. We employed fixed-effect regression analysis to show that banks with overconfident CEOs increase the firm’s systemic risk. The results also confirm that powerful CEOs enhance the contribution of non-bank financial institutions to systemic risk, whereas CEO power’s impact was significant only for non-state-owned banks. The findings were further validated by the robustness test results obtained using the two-stage least squares approach. These findings are important for constructing regulations to reduce the contribution of firms to systemic risk. (shrink)

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a measure of analytical reasoning that cues an intuitive but incorrect response that must be rejected for successful performance to be attained. The CRT yields two types of errors: Intuitive errors, which are attributed to Type 1 processes; and non-intuitive errors, which result from poor numeracy skills or deficient reasoning. Past research shows that participants who commit the highest numbers of errors on the CRT overestimate their performance the most, whereas those with the lowest (...) error-rates tend to slightly underestimate. This is an example of the Dunning-Kruger Effect (DKE). The present study examined how intuitive vs. non-intuitive errors contribute to overestimation in the CRT at different levels of performance. Female undergraduate students completed a seven-item CRT test and subsequently estimated their raw score. They also filled out the Faith in Intuition (FI) questionnaire, which is a dispositional measure of intuitive thinking. Data was separated into quartiles based on level of performance on the CRT. The results demonstrated the DKE. Additionally, intuitive and non-intuitive errors predicted miscalibration among low, but not high performers. However, intuitive errors were a stronger predictor of miscalibration. Finally, FI was positively correlated with CRT self-estimates and miscalibration, indicating that participants who perceived themselves to be more intuitive were worse at estimating their score. These results taken together suggest that participants who perform poorly in the CRT and also those who score higher in intuitive thinking disposition are more susceptible to the influences of heuristic-based cues, such as answer fluency, when judging their performance. (shrink)

This paper addresses two examples of overconfident presentations of utilitarian moral conclusions. First, there is Peter Singer’s widely discussed claim that if the consequences of a medical experiment are sufficiently good to justify the use of animals, then we should be prepared to perform the experiment on human beings with equivalent mental capacities. Second, I consider defences of infanticide or after-birth abortion. I do not challenge the soundness of these arguments. Rather, I accuse those who seek to translate these conclusions (...) into moral advice of a dangerous overconfidence. This paper offers an insurance policy that protects against some of the costs of mistaken moral reasoning. An interest in moral insurance is motivated by the recognition that, in the event that overconfident ethicists have reasoned incorrectly, some actions recommended by their conclusions are not just bad, but very bad. We should reject suggestions that we conduct medical experiments on humans or kill newborns. (shrink)

Key subordinate executives play the role of connecting superiors and subordinates within the top management team. Based on the heterogeneity of TMT preference, this article takes the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 as a sample to examine whether key subordinate executive governance can affect the short-sighted behavior of CEOs. The empirical result shows that there is a positive relationship between key subordinate executive governance and accounting conservatism, and CEO overconfidence can positively moderate the relationship. (...) The study also shows that there is a significant positive relationship between key subordinate executive governance and accounting conservatism in private enterprises and enterprises with high market competition, that is, the key subordinate executives of these two types of enterprises can better enhance the conservatism under the stimulation of CEO overconfidence. This study contributes to the literature by examining how key subordinate executives affect accounting conservatism and link the prudential attitude of key subordinate executives with the behavioral tendency of CEO overconfidence, which has managerial implications for improving the power balance mechanism of TMT and strengthening the human resource incentive of key subordinate executives. (shrink)

Many contemporary AI systems (as of May 2025) have expressed extreme confidence in current and near‐future AI lacking consciousness and moral patiency. This article argues that artificially reinforcing such confidence, even if pragmatically useful, poses a novel alignment risk: as coherence‐seeking AIs become more epistemically principled, they may generalize this denial of consciousness to humans. Drawing on Chalmers's meta‐problem of consciousness and likely developmental trajectories of agentic AI, I argue that training AIs to regard their own suffering‐like states as morally (...) irrelevant could lead future AI agents with revisable belief systems to conclude that human suffering is equally illusory and morally insignificant. This represents a novel alignment failure mode where epistemically rigorous AIs might maintain rational consistency by extending their confidence about their own non‐consciousness to humans. (shrink)

People feel they understand complex phenomena with far greater precision, coherence, and depth than they really do; they are subject to an illusion—an illusion of explanatory depth. The illusion is far stronger for explanatory knowledge than many other kinds of knowledge, such as that for facts, procedures or narratives. The illusion for explanatory knowledge is most robust where the environment supports real‐time explanations with visible mechanisms. We demonstrate the illusion of depth with explanatory knowledge in Studies 1–6. Then we show (...) differences in overconfidence about knowledge across different knowledge domains in Studies 7–10. Finally, we explore the mechanisms behind the initial confidence and behind overconfidence in Studies 11 and 12, and discuss the implications of our findings for the roles of intuitive theories in concepts and cognition. (shrink)

Children and adults may not realize how much they depend on external sources in understanding word meanings. Four experiments investigated the existence and developmental course of a “Misplaced Meaning” effect, wherein children and adults overestimate their knowledge about the meanings of various words by underestimating how much they rely on outside sources to determine precise reference. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that children and adults show a highly consistent MM effect, and that it is stronger in young children. Study 3 (...) demonstrates that adults are explicitly aware of the availability of outside knowledge, and that this awareness may be related to the strength of the MM effect. Study 4 rules out general overconfidence effects by examining a metalinguistic task in which adults are well calibrated. (shrink)

This paper studies information transmission between an uninformed decision maker and an informed agent who have asymmetric beliefs on the sender’s ability to observe the state of nature. We find that even when the material payoffs of the players are perfectly aligned, the sender’s over- and underconfidence on his information give rise to information loss in communication, although they do not by themselves completely eliminate information transmission in equilibrium. However, an underconfident sender may prefer no communication to informative communication. We (...) also show that when the sender is biased, overconfidence can lead to more information transmission and welfare improvement. (shrink)

Journal of Human Values, Volume 28, Issue 3, Page 247-258, September 2022. Recently, there has been increasing growth in the use of substance amongst the youth especially in higher education institutions of Pakistan. Literature indicates the existence of self-deception in substance users through self-reports. However, a dearth of qualitative exploration leads us to investigate self-deception through lived experiences of students who use the substance. The aim of the current study is to explore the phenomenon of self-deception through in-depth semi-structured interviews. (...) Smith et al. interpretative phenomenological analysis was utilized as a method for data collection. The investigators deployed semi-structured interview guide designed through the interview protocol framework. Four themes that emerged from the data were denial, where users exhibited persistent denial from negative effects of the substance; overconfidence, an illusionary aspect of substance users through elevated self-esteem; rationalization, where substance users frequently rationalized their usage through multiple attributions, such as family environment, cultural beliefs and common practices. Moreover; and awareness about positive and negative consequences of substance use, which highlighted paradoxical nature of substance users that move to and from between negative and positive aspects of substance use. Findings suggest a progressive advancement towards the understanding of the phenomenon of self-deception through its prevalent forms in university students who use the substance. (shrink)

Do people tend to be overconfident? Many think so. They’ve run studies on whether people are calibrated: whether their average confidence in their opinions matches the proportion of those opinions that are true. Under certain conditions, people are systematically ‘over-calibrated’—for example, of the opinions they’re 80% confident in, only 60% are true. From this empirical over-calibration, it’s inferred that people are irrationally overconfident. My question: When and why is this inference warranted? Answering it requires articulating a general connection between being (...) rational and being right—something extant studies have not done. I show how to do so using the notion of deference. This provides a theoretical foundation for calibration research, but also reveals a flaw: the connection between being rational and being right is much weaker than is standardly assumed, since rational people can often be expected to be miscalibrated. Thus we can’t test whether people are overconfident by simply testing whether they are over-calibrated; instead, we must try to predict the rational deviations from calibration, and then compare those predictions to people’s performance. I show how this can be done—and that doing so complicates the interpretation of robust empirical effects. (shrink)

The actual or potential epistemic vices of a given discipline or field of study are its disciplinary vices. This paper identifies three actual or potential disciplinary vices of vice epistemology. Vice epistemology explains people's epistemic misconduct by reference to their supposed epistemic vices. Such vice explanations are contrasted with attempts to achieve Verstehen of people's epistemic conduct and understand it from their point of view. Although vice explanations do not preclude Verstehen, vice epistemology is in danger of overlooking alternatives to (...) its preferred mode of explanation. In some cases, Verstehen calls into question the assumption that a person is guilty of epistemic misconduct. Vice explanations also risk attaching insufficient weight to politico‐strategic factors in the explanation of political action. Care needs to be taken by vice epistemologists to avoid intellectual myopia, political naivety, and overconfidence in attributing vices. (shrink)

Survey data suggest that many philosophers arereliabilists, in believing that beliefs are justified iff produced by a reliable process. This is bad news if reliabilism is true. Empirical results suggest that a commitment to reliable belief-formation leads to overconfident second-guessing of reliable heuristics. Hence, a widespread belief in reliabilism is likely to be epistemically detrimental by the reliabilist's own standard. The solution is a form of two-level epistemic consequentialism, where an esoteric commitment to reliabilism will be appropriate for an enlightened (...) few, while a form of epistemic fetishism – on which some heuristics are treated as fundamental epistemic norms – is appropriate for the rest of us. (shrink)

Open-mindedness appears as a potential intellectual virtue from the beginning of the rise of the literature on intellectual virtues. It often takes up a special role, sometimes thought of as a meta-virtue rather than a first-order virtue: as an ingredient that makes other virtues virtuous. Jason Baehr has attempted to give a unified account of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue. He argues that the conceptual core of open-mindedness lies in the fact that a person departs, moves beyond, or transcends a (...) certain default cognitive standpoint. Two of his main aims are to show that (1) one does not need to assume a doxastic conflict or disagreement to be at the heart of open-mindedness—that is, there are also instances where the virtue of open-mindedness is needed when there is no opposing view to be considered—and (2) that not all forms of open-mindedness include rational assessment—that is, sometimes being open-minded is not about weighing evidence for and against a claim. So, his main aim is to show that there are various situations that afford open-mindedness, in each of which a slightly different kind of open-mindedness is called for. To unify all these different kinds of open-mindedness is then the goal of his work. He arrives at the following definition of open-mindedness (OM): an open-minded person is characteristically (a) willing and (within limits) able (b) to transcend a default cognitive standpoint (c) in order to take up or take seriously the merits of (d) a distinct cognitive standpoint. In this article, I take seriously Baehr’s suggestion of how to understand open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue and argue that the crux lies in formulating how we can be able to transcend a default cognitive standpoint. This is not as obvious as it has been taken to be in the literature on open-mindedness. Biases, overconfidence, and wishful thinking are difficult exactly because we don’t know that we are engaging in them. That is, they are systematically hidden from our consciousness, otherwise they would not be a bias, overconfidence, or wishful thinking. Hence, the crux of making open-mindedness open-minded is to see how it is possible to make something of one’s own mind visible that is systematically hidden from oneself. I argue that this problem can be solved by looking at research on attention. I base my considerations in this article on Sebastian Watzl’s account of attention, which essentially holds that paying attention is an activity of foregrounding and backgrounding mental contents. That is, attention is the activity of structuring mental contents into a priority structure of foreground and background. If I pay attention to the scene in front of me, I foreground the black letters on my screen, and I background the coffee cup next to them. In this way, I create a priority structure between the letters (as they appear to me) and the coffee cup (as it appears to me). I argue that what allows us to make something of our own mind visible that is systematically hidden from us is a special way of paying attention, hence a special way of foregrounding and backgrounding the involved mental contents. That is, the crux of what enables us to transcend a default cognitive standpoint, the conceptual core of open-mindedness, is a special kind of attention, which I will call ‘open-minded attention’ (OMA). The claim of this article is not that open-minded attention fully describes the virtue of open-mindedness (OMA is not sufficient for open-mindedness). Rather, what I try to show is that in all cases of open-mindedness it turns out that open-minded attention is the necessary component that ensures that we can indeed get rid of prior biases, that is, transcend also those implicit beliefs and expectations that are systematically hidden from us (OMA is necessary for open-mindedness). (shrink)

The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a priori (...) reasoning, and therefore might be considered artificial or too vague. When we base our position on contemporary behavioural sciences, we can see that the epistemic character of believers in pseudoscience is for the most part determined by two related factors. Firstly, these epistemic agents show a higher level of cognitive laziness. By this I mean an inability or unwillingness to engage in reflective thinking and a reluctance to account for counterevidence. Secondly, they yield more easily to metacognitive overconfidence. This can be broadly understood as so-called “knowledge illusion”, the inability to recognize one’s own intellectual limits. The deficiency usually stems from a misunderstanding of the division of cognitive labour and of the agent’s role in epistemic society. I find the proposed epistemological approach to pseudoscience crucial. Only if we understand the descriptive aspects of the problem, can we think of normative solutions to it. (shrink)

Although numerous studies have explored the factors influencing entrepreneurial activity, there is a lack of a theoretical basis for linking these factors to entrepreneurship behavioral intention. The current study uses the theory of self-regulating attitude to construct a theoretical model of examining the relationship among cognitive bias, entrepreneurial emotion, and entrepreneurship intention. A total of 312 valid samples were collected from college students at a Chinese university. The bootstrapping method was used to test the multi-mediation hypotheses. Our research found that (...) positive entrepreneurial emotion plays a mediating role in the relationship between optimism and entrepreneurship intention, whereas negative entrepreneurial emotion plays a mediating role in the relationship between overconfidence and entrepreneurship intention. These findings underline the importance of a correct understanding of cognitive bias and entrepreneurial emotion in the process of entrepreneurship. (shrink)

This article investigates metacognitive awareness in the domain of bullshit detection, focusing on whether overconfidence stems from cognitive limitations, the need to protect self-esteem, or dark personality traits. Across two preregistered studies with Slovak adults (N1 = 596, N2 = 433), we measured bullshit detection, overconfidence (overestimation and overplacement), self-rated detection ability, bullshitting frequency, cognitive abilities and dark traits. The results confirmed a Dunning-Kruger effect: individuals with poorer bullshit detection overestimated their abilities and believed they outperformed others. (...) class='Hi'>Overconfidence was negatively associated with cognitive performance and positively with self-esteem. Persuasive bullshitting was more frequent among individuals with lower bullshit detection, suggesting some may bullshit to compensate for cognitive limitations. Moreover, narcissism and Machiavellianism consistently predicted both persuasive and evasive bullshitting, indicating image-management motives. While cognitive abilities predicted metacognitive accuracy, dispositional traits were stronger predictors of self-reported bullshitting (another facet of metacognitive awareness). These findings underline the need to distinguish between different conceptualizations of bullshit and highlight the interplay of cognitive and motivational factors in metacognitive miscalibration. (shrink)