‘The Natural System’ is the abstract notion of the order in living diversity. The richness and complexity of this notion is revealed by the diversity of representations of the Natural System drawn by ornithologists in the Nineteenth Century. These representations varied in overall form from stars, to circles, to maps, to evolutionary trees and cross-sections through trees. They differed in their depiction of affinity, analogy, continuity, directionality, symmetry, reticulation and branching, evolution, and morphological convergence and divergence. (...) Some representations were two-dimensional, and some were three-dimensional; n-dimensional representations were discussed but never illustrated. The study of diagrammatic representations of the Natural System is made difficult by the frequent failure of authors to discuss them in their texts, and by the consequent problem of distinguishing features which carried meaning from arbitrary features and printing conventions which did not. Many of the systematics controversies of the last thirty years have their roots in the conceptual problems which surrounded the Natural System in the late 1800s, problems which were left unresolved when interest in higher-level systematics declined at the turn of this century. (shrink)

Prior to the advent of evolutionary theory the Natural System was generally conceived as based on "distinctions of kind, not consisting in a given number of definite properties" (J.S. Mill). It was considered final and unique, to be arrived at by more than one approach. Evolutionary theory has shifted emphasis to different characters, yet explicitly or implicitly the belief in a final natural system in biology persists in many textbooks and taints research. Allegedly natural systems (...) are shown to be fundamentally arbitrary and artificial, dependent on numerous value judgments and intrinsically conflicting to varying degrees. Because of this and because it has turned into a bar to clear thinking, the adjective "natural" should be abolished. (shrink)

Since Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, the idea of descent with modification came to dominate systematics, and so the study of morphology became subgugated to the reconstruction of phylogenies. Reinstating the organism in the theory of evolution (Ho & Saunders, 1979; Webster & Goodwin, 1982) leads to a project inrational taxonomy (Ho, 1986, 1988a), which attempts to classify biological forms on the basis of transformations on a given dynamical structure.Does rational taxonomy correspond to thenatural system that (...) Linnaeus and his contemporaries as well as all pre-Darwinian morphologists had in mind? Here, we examine how rational taxonomy and the natural system can coincide in the dynamics of processes generating forms during development, which conferexclusivity, genericity androbustness to the forms that do exist. We use the example of segmentation, especially inDrosophila, as an illustration to explore the implications of rational taxonomy for evolution and systematics, and the relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny. (shrink)

(2010). Information-Hierarchical Organization of Natural Systems II: Futures of Man–Biosphere Interactions and Climate Control. World Futures: Vol. 66, No. 8, pp. 537-556.

I develop a general framework for natural and human values based on the position that end value is constructed by persons, but not wholly referent to them, identify and analyze three hierarchically related levels of end value in relation to the functional values which support them and the held and ascribed values generated by entities possessing teleological value, use this framework to indicate the context in which economic values should be located, and assess the implications of the framework for (...) environmental policy and future valuation work. (shrink)

Classifications of animals and plants have long been represented by hierarchical lists of taxa, but occasional authors have drawn diagrammatic versions of their classifications in an attempt to better depict the "natural relationships" of their organisms. Ornithologists in 19th-century Britain produced and pioneered many types of classificatory diagrams, and these fall into three groups: (a) the quinarian systems of Vigors and Swainson (1820s and 1830s); (b) the "maps" of Strickland and Wallace (1840s and 1850s); and (c) the evolutionary diagrams (...) of the post-Darwin authors (1860 on). The quinarians distinguished between affinity and analogy and used both in their classifications, whereas Strickland rejected the quinarians' belief in numerical regularity and their use of analogy. Wallace's "maps" are easily given an evolutionary interpretation, and his approach was taken up and modified by later evolutionary anatomists. Sharpe returned to Strickland's methods and merely appended a superficial evolutionary interpretation. Contrary to common belief systematics has a rich conceptual history, and many of the conceptual developments in 19th-century systematics were made by ornithologists. (shrink)

The emphasis placed by H. Atlan, like G. Bateson, on the reception of messages during communication between subsystems leads to a conception of learning, and more generally of human memory, surprisingly close to that proposed by I. Rosenfield on the basis of the work of G. M. Edelman. The authors stressed the close and reciprocal link between the theory of functional localization and the conception of memory, which they have just seen, radically refuted by Rosenfield. The theory of functional localization (...) therefore considers as established the existence of a whole series of rigid relationships between specific locations in the brain and certain major functions performed by the body. Thus briefly summarized, the theory of neural Darwinism provides positive evidence in favor of the Rosenfield's theory of human memory. All these characteristics make the functioning of human memory an outstanding example of the natural complexity of a self‐organized system in the sense of Atlan. (shrink)

This chapter presents an alternative narrative for the history of taxonomy and evolution. It challenges the “essentialism story” and stresses the significance of the type concept and structural constraints in the foundation of the Natural System. The projection of the type reflects the structural constraints operating hierarchically within an organism’s internal properties. Naturalists developed a more realistic view of the Natural System by interpreting Linnaean ranks as types. The recognition of types began in the eighteenth century (...) within taxonomic practices. Subsequently, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, morphology contributed to achieving greater precision in their recognition. Finally, in the nineteenth century, the theory of evolution bolstered the realism of types by explaining them through genealogical relationships. This collective scientific progress contributed to the Natural System’s realism, culminating in the formation of “morphological systematics” in the twentieth century by establishing a hierarchy of types. Moreover, this chapter challenges the assumption that the type concept was replaced by that of the common ancestor, arguing that typology and evolution are not opposing doctrines but compatible ones. To illustrate this, it delves into Charles Darwin’s and Richard Owen’s inquiries into morphology. Upon scrutiny, it emphasizes that the type concept served at least two distinct purposes in the evolutionary context: First, the Archetype (general type) was a concept used to identify homologous structures; second, the Bauplan (specific type) was utilized to indicate the morphological stability of characters at different scales. Thus, this chapter concludes that typology facilitated a synthesis between taxonomy, morphology, and evolution. (shrink)

The primary way that explanations are constructed in cognitive psychology is by methodological functionalism: in short, functionally defined components are proposed in order to explain how inputs are turned into behavior. But despite its close association with cognitive psychology, methodological functionalism is a technique that can be used to describe any natural system. I look at how methodological functionalism has fared when used by other special sciences and what lessons can be learned from these cases. Three explanations of (...) chemical and biological systems that were developed using methodological functionalism are examined: Willis’s explanation of fermentation, Farr’s explanation of cholera, and Mendel’s explanation of inheritance. The discovery of HIV in the early 1980s, an investigation that rejected methodological functionalism early on, is also discussed. The assessment of methodological functionalism is not positive. Th.. (shrink)

Understanding and managing natural environments is a problem of biocomplexity that requires examining interactions between human and natural systems. This paper proposes a methodology for capturing the tacit knowledge and mental models of ecosystem experts to examine how they frame biocomplexity and perceive the relationship between humans and the natural environment in system-specific terms. This approach examines how managers’ values and knowledge relate to their knowledgesharing, collaborative ties, decision-making and actions that potentially effect environmental change. The (...) results are expected to clarify how managers use scientific knowledge and circulate it among managers and across agencies, and show how knowledge relates to cooperative behavior across agencies. (shrink)

The two great modern naturalists, Linnaeus and Darwin, expressed their intuition about how best to visualize patterns of affinities, that is, morphological similarities and divergences between taxa. Linnaeus suggested that “all plants show affinities on all sides, like a territory on a geographical map,” while Darwin thought that it was virtually impossible to understand the affinities between living and extinct species without a genealogical tree. Genealogical trees follow the diachronic, evolving logic of a timeline, whereas maps depict a synchronous pattern (...) of extant taxa. Although the two seem unrelated, various naturalists made attempts to combine them. Surprisingly, these resulted in three-dimensional images that, in order to be observed, had to be projected on paper. The naturalists Max Fürbringer and Richard Bowdler Sharpe were aware of this fact, but even Darwin himself twice combined the basic intuitions underlying the two modes of representation to produce three-dimensional images. This article is a brief history of the efforts to merge genealogical trees and map-like cross sections of affinities into one three-dimensional image. (shrink)

For its elliptical style, What is Philosophy? appears to be fragmentary and inscrutable, and its reception has been correspondingly contentious. Following an intimation by Gilles Deleuze himself, this article proposes that his final book, written in collaboration with Félix Guattari, contains a philosophy of nature. To address this proposition, the article begins by outlining the comprehensive system of nature set out in What is Philosophy?, defining it as an open system in motion that conjoins philosophy with the historical (...) preconditions and intersects it with science and art. The article then addresses the precise method whereby the philosopher as an individual subject, emerging from nature, can succeed in becoming creative – that is, in creating concepts to bring forth new events. Finally, the brain turns out to be the pivot between the system and this method. What is Philosophy? thus presents an account of the brain based on a theory of the three specific planes of philosophy, science and art, and uses it to expand upon the idea of assemblage for a philosophy of nature. (shrink)

From a scientific-philosophical perspective, this paper systematically explores the theory of natural civilization, proposing that human civilization should be embedded within the Dao–Sun–Earth–Moon system to achieve low-entropy, rhythmically aligned, and long-term stable development. By analyzing the structural imbalance of modern civilization, it reveals how the logic of infinite growth, artificial acceleration mechanisms, energy overuse, and the disruption of social rhythms threaten long-term civilizational stability. The paper introduces the Natural Civilization Index (NCI) and the Civilization Evolution Model (CEM), (...) which quantify the degree to which civilization aligns with natural rhythms across energy, ecological, social, and cultural dimensions, and simulate adaptive, accelerated, and collapse-type civilizational evolution paths. Based on this indicator system, practical strategies and implementation plans for natural civilization are proposed, including energy and resource management, ecosystem monitoring with feedback mechanisms, social institutions and cultural design, and phased technology-assisted optimization. Furthermore, a long-term monitoring and assessment framework is constructed, employing dynamic NCI evaluation, CEM simulation, and risk early-warning systems to achieve civilizational self-correction and resilience building. The study demonstrates that adherence to natural rhythms, maintaining low-entropy development, strengthening institutional resilience, and internalizing cultural values are core principles for long-term civilizational evolution and global sustainable development. This paper provides theoretical and practical references for scientifically-philosophical governance of civilization, the construction of low-entropy sustainable systems, and the long-term integration of technology with nature, emphasizing that human civilization should respect natural laws and maintain enduring coordination with the Dao–Sun–Earth–Moon system. -/- . (shrink)

Contemporary complexity theory has been instrumental in providing novel rigorous definitions for some classic philosophical concepts, including emergence. In an attempt to provide an account of emergence that is consistent with complexity and dynamical systems theory, several authors have turned to the notion of constraints on state transitions. Drawing on complexity theory directly, this paper builds on those accounts, further developing the constraint-based interpretation of emergence and arguing that such accounts recover many of the features of more traditional accounts. We (...) show that the constraint-based account of emergence also leads naturally into a meaningful definition of self-organization, another concept that has received increasing attention recently. Along the way, we distinguish between order and organization, two concepts which are frequently conflated. Finally, we consider possibilities for future research in the philosophy of complex systems, as well as applications of the distinctions made in this paper. (shrink)

An aim of science is to increase our understanding of the natural world. A primary means for doing so is by providing explanations, which often proceed by tracing the causes of phenomena. How can a causal explanation lead to understanding? While explanations can take many forms, I argue that to succeed they must embody a conception of causation shared with their audience. The challenge then, is to describe this conception and detail its role in explanation. While there is good (...) evidence that scientists employ more than one causal concept, I argue that the concept of productive causation (centered on the notion of bringing about change via a connection) has a primary role in natural science explanations. After critiquing other philosophical accounts, I develop a new theory of productive causation and show how it provides an underpinning for successful explanations. The heart of the theory is a network of persisting processes that possess dispositions toward change-producing mutual interactions. I argue that in a good explanation, the scientific entities, properties and activities invoked will correspond to the theory’s depiction of causal structure. One important dimension of the theory describes how repeated patterns of interaction can give rise to a hierarchy of composite processes. This allows the theory to account for stabilized entities at various spatio-temporal scales. In turn, this enables the approach to be applicable throughout the natural sciences. After starting with simple examples, I show how the theory deals with more challenging cases from physics to biology. I conclude that the approach illuminates how explanations of various forms across diverse disciplines can lead to scientific understanding. (shrink)

According to best systems accounts, laws of nature are generalizations in the best systematization of particular matters of fact. Metrics such as simplicity and strength determine which systematization is best, but these are notoriously language relative. For this reason, David Lewis proposed a constraint on languages of inquiry: all predicates must be natural. This constraint is sometimes interpreted as requiring us to know which natural properties are instantiated in our world prior to scientific theorizing. I argue that this (...) interpretation is incorrect. I provide a better interpretation and show how it undercuts an influential epistemological objection to Lewis's best systems account of laws due to Bas van Fraassen. (shrink)

We develop a general method for applying functional models to natural systems and cite recent progress in protein modeling that demonstrates the power of this approach. Functional modeling constrains the range of acceptable structural models of a system, reduces the difficulty of finding them, and improves their fidelity. However, functional models are distinctly different from the structural models that are more commonly applied in science. In particular, structural and functional models ask different questions and provide different kinds of (...) answers. As we clarify these differences and articulate how to use these models jointly, we extend our ability to do science and gain insight into the proper use of the terms organization , order , and emergence when describing systems in nature. (shrink)

In "Freedom and Resentment" P.F. Strawson, famously, advances a strong form of naturalism that aims to discredit kcepticism about moral responsibility by way of approaching these issues through an account of our reactive attitudes. However, even those who follow Strawson's general strategy on this subject accept that his strong naturalist program needs to be substantially modified, if not rejected. One of the most influential and important efforts to revise and reconstruct the Strawsonian program along these lines has been provided by (...) R. Jay Wallace, who presents a "narrower" construal of our reactive attitudes in his own account of what is involved in holding an agent responsible. In this paper I argue that Wallace's narrow construal of responsibility comes at too high a cost and that naturalists of a broadly Strawsonian cast should reject it. Related to this point, I argue that Wallace's narrow conception of responsibility is a product of his effort to construct his account within the confines of "the morality system" (i.e. as described by Bernard Williams) and that this way of construing responsibility leads into series of unnecessary and misleading oppositions. A more plausible middle path, I maintain, can be found between Strawson's excessively strong naturalist program and Wallace's narrow and restrictive view of responsibility. (shrink)

This paper proposes and systematically elaborates Lao-Yang Genesis Cosmology and its core theoretical framework—the Universal Operating System (Universal OS)—as a scientific-philosophical approach to exploring the unified operational laws of the universe, life, and civilization. Unlike Einstein’s traditional Unified Field Theory, which focuses primarily on mathematical and physical structures, Universal OS emphasizes the unity of civilizational operation. In this framework, the human system is nested within the Earth’s ecosystem; the Earth system is embedded within the solar energy field; (...) the solar system is structured within the galactic gravitational order; and the galaxy itself is embedded within the natural laws of the universe. -/- The paper unfolds across seven chapters. Chapter One introduces the problem of anthropocentrism and civilizational imbalance. Chapter Two explains nested hierarchies and generative sequences from cosmological ontology and the Dao of Nature. Chapter Three analyzes the operational logic of civilization and proposes a Natural Cybernetics framework. Chapter Four presents the three core elements of Natural Civilization and the application logic of Universal OS. Chapter Five explores its practical implications for modern civilization. Chapter Six proposes operational strategies in energy, finance, medicine, governance, and civilizational integration to address anthropocentric crises. Chapter Seven summarizes theoretical contributions, philosophical significance, and long-term evolutionary prospects. -/- The paper emphasizes testability, falsifiability, and operational applicability. By integrating systems science, cybernetics, and philosophical principles, it provides both a theoretical foundation and practical tools for the long-term sustainable operation of modern civilization. Its ultimate aim is to offer a viable pathway for humanity to transcend anthropocentrism and achieve enduring harmony between civilization and nature. (shrink)

Abstract Human civilization is drifting along an irreversible high-entropy trajectory toward systemic collapse. The root cause is not any single runaway technology but a deeper meta-error: mistaking a local, human-desire-centered operating system for the operating law of the cosmos itself. This book traces how that error was amplified through a specific lineage of instrumental rationality and growth-oriented institutions, reaching a critical threshold in the age of artificial intelligence — where AI functions not as the origin of crisis but as (...) an unconstrained Desire Amplification Factor (DAF) for pre-existing patterns of want. -/- Rather than asserting its answer prematurely, Volume II surveys the twentieth century’s major attempts at cosmic integration — cybernetics, general systems theory, dissipative structure theory, the Gaia hypothesis, process philosophy — identifying the “last step” each approaches but does not complete: a universal boundary function constraining energy–information transformation across scales. Volume III fills this gap by systematically presenting the Lao-Yang Genesis Cosmology (LYGC), reading the Dao De Jing’s two thirteen-character chains — the Emulation Chain (人法地、地法天、天法道、道法自然) and the Generative Chain (道生一、一生二、二生三、三生万物) — as a precise astrophysical mapping, from which the Cosmic Constraint Function (CCF), Desire Amplification Factor (DAF), Civilization Stability Function (Λ), and Sage Entropy are derived as operational constructs. Volumes IV–VI address Artificial Wisdom as a governance paradigm distinct from artificial intelligence, the reconstruction of resource-balanced civilizational institutions, and humanity’s long-term position as a participant in, rather than conqueror of, cosmic evolution. -/- The book’s methodological commitment is to strictly separate four levels of argument — empirical science, systems modeling, normative philosophy, and cosmology — and to treat wu-wei (無爲) as a logic of self-organizing attractors rather than a euphemism for coercive algorithmic control, so as to avoid reproducing the very high-entropy governance structure it critiques. (shrink)

Abstract The pursuit of fame and gain by scientists has been a pervasive phenomenon throughout the history of science, with potential long-term negative impacts on civilization and society. This paper begins with historical cases including Newton, Ptolemy, and Qian Xuesen, and combines contemporary examples from artificial intelligence, gene editing, and high-energy physics to analyze the essence and systemic hazards of fame-driven scientific behavior from four perspectives: scientific philosophy, institutional structure, psychological motivation, and civilizational risk. The study further proposes a theoretical (...) framework for constructing a “Natural Civilization Scientific System,” emphasizing the multidimensional integration of scientific ethics, institutional constraints, research culture, and philosophical education, aiming to unify scientific authority, research freedom, and social responsibility. The findings suggest that the pursuit of science should center on the overall welfare of civilization and low-entropy sustainable development, preventing the erosion of scientific rationality and human civilization by competition over power, reputation, and resources. This paper provides a philosophical and institutional reference for scientific governance, research culture development, and high-risk research oversight. (shrink)

Firstly, a natural deduction system in standard style is introduced for Nelson's para-consistent logic N4, and a normalization theorem is shown for this system. Secondly, a natural deduction system in sequent calculus style is introduced for N4, and a normalization theorem is shown for this system. Thirdly, a comparison between various natural deduction systems for N4 is given. Fourthly, a strong normalization theorem is shown for a natural deduction system for a (...) sublogic of N4. Fifthly, a strong normalization theorem is proved for a typed λ-calculus for a neighbor of N4. Finally, it is remarked that the natural deduction frameworks presented can also be adapted for Wansing's basic connexive logic C. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a neglected part of Dilthey’s œuvre that consists of papers on 16th–17th century philosophical issues. These papers are closer to interpretive articles than to original works, and so they are neither considered Dilthey’s original contributions to his own philosophy nor studied as part of the secondary literature. One of the most characteristic features of Dilthey’s philosophic style is the historical-systematic method mostly repudiated as concealing the real statement of the author “between the lines,” i.e. behind historical (...) analyses. Therefore these papers are not reckoned among Dilthey’s great works of enduring significance. This paper aims to make the reader more sensitive to the world and claims of these papers by way of an intermediary approach to them that acknowledges their intermediary position between a historical description and a systematic analysis. This is to be accomplished by having a look at the “pantheism” of Georg Misch, Dilthey’s largely forgotten pupil and son-in-law. (shrink)

Greedy desire is the core driver of human civilizational crisis, yet no unified dynamic model spanning the neural, social, and thermodynamic levels has been developed. This paper employs System Dynamics as its methodological framework, integrating evolutionary neuroscience, complex systems theory, and thermodynamics to construct a Three-Level Greedy Positive-Feedback Model (3L-GFM). At the neural level, the model captures the dual positive-feedback structure of the dopaminergic reward circuit and the amygdala anxiety system, along with the negative-feedback intervention mechanism mediated by (...) mindfulness cultivation through the prefrontal cortex. At the social level, the model describes the mutual nesting of three key positive-feedback loops: the wealth-power-policy triangle, the information monopoly–cognitive control loop, and the military-industrial complex loop. At the thermodynamic level, the model takes entropy increase rate as its core variable, constructing a physical description of the civilizational cancer process driven by greedy desire. The three levels are coupled through the Desire Amplification Factor (DAF) and the Cosmic Constraint Function (CCF). Simulation analysis reveals three critical bifurcation points — the Neural Tipping Point (NTP), the Social Tipping Point (STP), and the Thermodynamic Tipping Point (TTP) — before which the system retains self-repair capacity and after which positive feedback dominates and the system trends toward irreversible collapse. Simulations of Natural Cybernetics intervention strategies demonstrate that implementing intergenerational constraint institutionalization, ecological red-line anchoring, and entropy responsibility accounting before tipping points can guide the system toward a low-entropy stable state. 贪婪欲望是人类文明危机的核心驱动力，但迄今缺乏一个跨越神经、社会与热力学三个层次的统一动力学模型。本文以系统动力学（System Dynamics）为方法论框架，整合进化神经科学、复杂系统理论与热力学，构建贪婪欲望的三层次正反馈模型（3L-GFM：Three-Level Greedy Positive-Feedback Model）。在神经层次，模型捕捉多巴胺奖励回路与杏仁核焦虑系统的双重正反馈结构，以及正念修炼通过前额叶皮层介导的负反馈干预机制；在社会层次，模型描述财富-权力-政策三角、信息垄断-认知控制与军工复合 体三条关键正反馈回路的相互嵌套；在热力学层次，模型以熵增速率为核心变量，建立贪婪欲望驱动的文明癌症过程的物理描述。三个层次通过「欲望放大系数」（DAF：Desire Amplification Factor）和「宇宙约束函数」（CCF：Cosmic Constraint Function）实现耦合。仿真分析揭示：文明系统存在三个关键分叉点——神经临界点（NTP）、社会临界点（STP）和热力学临界点（TTP）——在此之前系统具有自我修复能力，在此之后正反馈主导，系统趋向 不可逆崩溃。自然控制论干预策略的仿真表明，在临界点之前实施代际约束制度化、生态红线锚定和熵责任核算，可将系统导向低熵稳态。 . (shrink)

It is becoming clear that many of today’s management theories are inadequate theoretically and practically to move understanding, scholarship, and practice to where it needs to be for scholars, business leaders, and policy makers to cope with an increasing fraught world. This Special Issue’s focus is on sustainability. Sustainability challenges need to incorporate multidisciplinary interventions and the trans- and interdisciplinary nature of solutions. To actively seek transformation toward sustainability, fundamental and innovative short-term as well as long-term efforts are required in (...) society, economy, technology, and education, including our understanding of human behavior and attitudes toward the management of the environment. This introductory piece presents natural science theories as a promising approach for achieving progress toward transformation for sustainability. (shrink)

This article argues for a revised best system account of laws of nature. David Lewis’s original BSA has two main elements. On the one hand, there is the Humean base, which is the totality of particular matters of fact that obtain in the history of the universe. On the other hand, there is what I call the ‘nomic formula’, which is a particular operation that gets applied to the Humean base in order to output the laws of nature. My (...) revised account focuses on this latter element of the view. Lewis conceives of the nomic formula as a balance of simplicity and strength, but I argue that this is a mistake. Instead, I motivate and develop a different proposal for the standards that figure into the nomic formula, and I suggest a rationale for why these should be the correct standards. Specifically, I argue that the nomic formula should be conceived as a collection of desiderata designed to generate principles that are predictively useful to creatures like us. The resulting view—which I call the ‘best predictive system’ account of laws—is thus able to explain why scientists are interested in discovering the laws, and it also gives rise to laws with the sorts of features that we find in actual scientific practice 1Introduction2The LOPP3A Problem with Lewis's Formula4A Pragmatic Account of the Nomic Formula 4.1Informative dynamics4.2Wide applicability4.3Spatial locality4.4Temporal locality4.5Spatial, temporal, and rotational symmetries4.6Predictively useful properties4.7Simplicity4.8Recap5 Conclusion. (shrink)

This is a review of Stephen Gaukroger's book Descartes's System of Natural Philosophy.

Philosophers have become increasingly aware of the difficulties that plague accounts of kinds with objectively determined boundaries, and generally recognise that scientific taxonomies are shaped by human pragmatic interests and non-epistemic values. Against this trend, we propose an account of kinds conceived as dynamic entities, characterised by qualitatively distinct and robust trajectories originating from bifurcation events in the development of complex systems. We argue that the Homeorhetic Dynamic Kinds account (HDK) can be applied to systems investigated in a variety of (...) disciplinary contexts, ranging from biology, medicine, and the social sciences. Shifting the focus from a synchronic (homeostatic) to a dynamic and processual (homeorhetic) perspective, we show that HDK allows a better characterisation of discontinuities among kinds. We then outline its implications for pluralism, particularly how HDK can help us understand how scientific categories are shaped both by ontological aspects of developmental trajectories and by pragmatic, value-laden considerations. (shrink)

This book provides a detailed exposition of one of the most practical and popular methods of proving theorems in logic, called Natural Deduction. It is presented both historically and systematically. Also some combinations with other known proof methods are explored. The initial part of the book deals with Classical Logic, whereas the rest is concerned with systems for several forms of Modal Logics, one of the most important branches of modern logic, which has wide applicability.

What seem to be Kurt Gödel’s first notes on logic, an exercise notebook of 84 pages, contains formal proofs in higher-order arithmetic and set theory. The choice of these topics is clearly suggested by their inclusion in Hilbert and Ackermann’s logic book of 1928, the Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik. Such proofs are notoriously hard to construct within axiomatic logic. Gödel takes without further ado into use a linear system of natural deduction for the full language of higher-order logic, (...) with formal derivations closer to one hundred steps in length and up to four nested temporary assumptions with their scope indicated by vertical intermittent lines. (shrink)

In 1937 Joseph Grinnell founded the University of California’s first biological field station, the Hastings Natural History Reservation. Hastings became a center for field biology on the West Coast, and by 1960 it was serving as a model for the creation of additional U.C. reserves. Today, the U.C. Natural Reserve System is the largest and most diverse network of university-based biological field stations in the world, with 36 sites covering more than 135,000 acres. This essay examines the (...) founding of the Hastings Reservation, and asks how it managed to grow and develop, in the 1940s and 1950s, during a time of declining support for natural history research. It shows how faculty and staff courted the support of key institutional allies, presented themselves as the guardians of a venerable tradition in nature study, and emphasized the station’s capacity to document ecological change and inform environmental policy and management. In the years since, Hastings and other U.C. reserves have played crucial roles in California environmental politics. Biological field stations in the post-war era deserve more attention not only from historians of biology, but also from environmental historians and other scholars interested in the role of science in society. (shrink)

This paper argues that human civilization is facing a fundamental “operating system” crisis and proposes the Lao–Yang Genesis Cosmology as the ultimate solution to this predicament. The study finds that contemporary civilization runs on a positive-feedback OS centered on anthropocentric greed, resulting in severe systemic entropy increase. By integrating Albert Einstein’s Unified Field Theory with Laozi’s control logic of “Three Generate All Things,” this paper introduces the concept of a Universal Operating System (Universal OS). -/- Within this framework, (...) the natural universe is understood as a scientific natural control system in which the Sun, Earth, and Moon assume the respective functions of energy driver, material carrier, and rhythmic regulator. -/- The paper further elaborates the necessity of transitioning from Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Artificial Wisdom (AW). As the interactive interface between human society and the Universal OS, AW’s primary directive is to algorithmically minimize anthropocentric greed in order to achieve “phase alignment” between civilization and natural law. Through systemic transformation across four pillars—energy, finance, medicine, and governance—humanity will move away from predatory expansion toward steady-state evolution based on “tidal regulation” and “biological rhythm optimization.” -/- The final conclusion asserts that submission to the Universal OS is not a matter of choice but a physical necessity inherent in the unified field. Only through this system-level “Great Reset” can humanity achieve resonance with the Dao and realize an eternal Natural Civilization. (shrink)

In Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant claims organisms are to be judged as ‘natural ends’, which are products of nature but inexplicable by mechanical laws of nature. The conception of natural ends necessarily leads to the idea of nature in its whole as a system of ends. This paper proposes an interpretation of Kant’s biological teleology that can be compatible with modern science. Mechanical laws in the third Critique are understood as empirical causal laws that (...) determine all phenomena. A living organism is mechanically inexplicable, not because it falls outside of mechanical laws, but because the reciprocal productions of its parts are unifiable under its whole, as if designed by an intelligent agency according to the concept of the whole. Once we judge teleologically the mechanical laws determining the organic productions, we must judge teleologically all productions determined by these laws and therefore conceive nature in its whole as a system of ends, to which natural mechanism is subordinated. (shrink)

This paper develops an inference system for natural language within the ‘Natural Logic’ paradigm as advocated by van Benthem, Sánchez and others. The system that we propose is based on the Lambek calculus and works directly on the Curry-Howard counterparts for syntactic representations of natural language, with no intermediate translation to logical formulae. The Lambek -based system we propose extends the system by Fyodorov et~al., which is based on the Ajdukiewicz/Bar-Hillel calculus Bar Hillel,. (...) This enables the system to deal with new kinds of inferences, involving relative clauses, non-constituent coordination, and meaning postulates that involve complex expressions. Basing the system on the Lambek calculus leads to problems with non-normalized proof terms, which are treated by using normalization axioms. (shrink)