The goal of this book is to usher in the next--and third--stage of philosophical action theory. This stage is similar to the second in that the focus is systemic theorizing about human action. But it differs from its predecessors in being continuous with nonphilosophical work on human action. Through the second stage philosophers generally ignored the scientific study of action. Of course, passing mention of related psychological theories was made; but there was no serious attempt to integrate philosophical action theory (...) with the relevant scientific theories. My contention is that future progress in action theory depends on the integration of the philosophical with the scientific. Put another way, I advocate the naturalization of philosophical action theory. (shrink)

Twelve original papers by Daniel Dennett, Noam Chomsky, and others at the forefront of cognitive research.

Imagine a deep philosophical conversation about a beautiful shot by a college player in a Final Four basketball game!

In our paper "Surface and Deep Interpretation," we sought to provide detail and texture to Arthur Danto's views on interpretation, thereby explicating and defending them (as published in Mark Rollins, ed., Danto and His Critics (Blackwell, originally published 1993; second edition 2012). Leddy objects to our views; in the end, Danto's view, given our explication of it, remains tenable.

There are least two general notions of having the opportunity to perform an action, one that concerns what is permitted on the basis of rules, regulations, or customs and another that concerns what is possible according to the physical or mental circumstances. The notion of having the opportunity within a set of circumstances is investigated and analysis in terms of physical possibility is proposed. A distinction is then made between a strong, person-dependent sense of ‘opportunity’ and a weak, person-independent sense. (...) It is also observed that care must be taken to distinguish the proposed analyses from criteria for determining whether someone has an opportunity. (shrink)

In 'on the analysis of causation' ("synthese", Volume 21, 1970), We argued that any analysis of causation entailing that "a" caused "b" only if "a" is the set of conditions necessary and sufficient for "b" yields a formal contradiction. In 'causal necessity and logical necessity' ("philosophical studies", Volume 28, 1975), David sanford objects to that argument, Concentrating his attack on the notions of causal necessity and total sets of antecedent conditions. We reply in this paper that, Although sanford's objections help (...) clarify the issues, They are not telling. (shrink)

In “Reasons for Trying” (JPR, 1995), Jennifer Homsby rejects several views about trying, including the volitional account, which identifies trying with an ‘inner’ uniform mental occurrence leading to action and the instrumental view, which explicates trying as doing one thing in order to accomplish something else. She proffers, rather, an explication, which I label ‘the capacity view,’ that identifies trying with the agent doing all that she can to accomplish the goal. In this note, I argue, first, that Hornsby’s approach (...) more nearly captures our intuitions on trying, but, second, only if it is amended and expanded in critical ways. In particular, trying also involves overcoming perceived resistance. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Analogy with Human Action The Dependency Theses Are Deep Interpretations Weakly Dependent on Surface Interpretations? Consequences for the Constitutive Dependency Thesis.

According to one version of the Causal Theory, an action is a mental or bodily event caused by an intention to act. Deliberate action requires prior planning. The practical syllogism is interpreted as a summary description of the planning process, where the conclusion reports the agent's intention. Social action differs from individual action in that only the former requires coordination of one's action with members of a group. This difference is reflected in the intention with which we act, labeled 'we-intention' (...) by Raimo Tuomela. Reports of we-intentions are the conclusions of interpersonal practical syllogisms. We-intentions differ from individual intentions both cognitively and conatively. The cognitive component of a we-intention includes a representation of the pattern of group activity into which one's action fits, as well as expectations of other's actions; the conative component includes at least one socially generated motive. These cognitive and conative components of we-intention find their explication in cognitive and motivational psychology and related fields. (shrink)

This paper recommends a framework for explaining largescale, complex actions. Philosophers have concentrated on simple actions — on hand raisings — far too long. Large-scale actions are the normal objects of legal and moral responsibility, as well as the kmd of activity for which the question of freedom is most pertinent. I focus on that part of the causal sequence constituting an action that begins after the decision and continues through the bodily movements: I call this part of the sequence (...) 'the output system'. In particular, I am concerned to explain the cognitive attitude associated with planned, intentional action.I contend that the human output system is best explained through the judicious combination of folk psychology and scientific psychology, broadly understood. Folk psychology sets the agenda, as it were. But it has its limitations; the key one being that its conceptual foundations are insufficiently rich or precise. Scientific psychology serves, in part, to articulate these conceptual foundations. This conception of the philosophical task — to adjudicate between folk and scientific psychology — contrasts with that of some philosophers. Stephan Körner, for one, has argued that the primary function of philosophy is to exhibit the structure and form of commonsense. (shrink)

This volume is the second of a projected series of studies in applied philosophy. The papers in this volume, with the exception of Castandeda's, were originally presented at the conference on action and responsibility held at Bowling Green State University on May 2-3, 1980. The conference, the second in an annual series, was held under the auspices of the Applied Philosophy Program at Bowling Green State University. They keynote paper by Myles Brand addressed the significance of philosophical analyses of action (...) for motivational psychology. Brand urged that philosophers and psychologists should carry on their tasks in concert. Jaegwon Kim, commenting on Brand's paper, raised questions about the usefulness of the philosophical program advocated by Brand for empirical psychology. The rest of the papers fall into four categories: three papers on determinism and action, four papers on intentional action, three papers on responsibility and consent, and three papers on applied action theory. (shrink)

Events are unstructured particulars and their identity conditions are to be stated in terms of necessary spatiotemporal coincidence. In contrast, Davidson says that events are unstructured particulars, with their identity conditions to be given in terms of sameness of causes and effects; and Kim says that events are structured particulars, with their identity conditions to be given in terms of sameness of their constituents. The consequences of my view are then traced for mental events.

Approximately three decades ago, philosophers actively turned their attention to the study of human action. Ryle, Austin and others led us to believe that solutions to problems about the relationship between mind and body, the free will issue, and the attribution of responsibility depended on a precise understanding of action. Since that time, an enormous amount of work has been produced on the nature of human action. But it seems to have emerged, contrary to expectations, that a thorough understanding of (...) action is not required for progress on these perennial philosophical problems: all that is needed is a modicum of knowledge. However, during this period, it also happened that human action became a topic of interest for its own sake. (shrink)

This essay discusses Arthur Danto's distinction between "surface" (the artist's intentions) and "deep" interpretation (multiple possibilities not dependent upon the artist's intentions) that utilizes an analogy between action and art. Ultimately, the authors argue that there must be an accurate surface interpretation for something to be a work of art, but there can be correct deep interpretations that contradict it.

This volume is intended to introduce the reader to the problems involved in analyzing causation. It contains statements of the classical theories that attempt to assimilate causation to recurrent change, to human activity, and to logical relatedness. Recently, philosophers have challenged the claim that causation can be assimilated to some other sorts of phenomena. Several attempts to clarify the nature of causation internally, so to speak, are also included. The introduction to the volume first gives a methodological framework in which (...) to classify and examine analyses of causation and then investigates the success of these attempted analyses. It may be best to read the introduction after reading some or all of the reprinted material. A careful reading of this volume will put one in a position to understand and evaluate the contemporary debate about causation. (shrink)