– We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural (...) way for them to receive imprecise probabilities. The mathematics of non-measurable sets is arcane, but its epistemological import is far-reaching; even apparently mundane propositions are liable to be affected by non-measurability. The phenomenon of non-measurability dramatically reshapes the dialectic between critics and proponents of imprecise credence. Non-measurability offers natural rejoinders to prominent critics of imprecise credence. Non-measurability even reverses some of the critics’ arguments—by the very lights that have been used to argue against imprecise credences, imprecise credences are better than precise credences. (shrink)

Laver [L] and others [G-S] have shown how to make the supercompactness or strongness of κ indestructible by a wide class of forcing notions. We show, alternatively, how to make these properties fragile. Specifically, we prove that it is relatively consistent that any forcing which preserves $\kappa^{<\kappa}$ and κ+, but not P(κ), destroys the measurability of κ, even if κ is initially supercompact, strong, or if I1(κ) holds. Obtained as an application of some general lifting theorems, this result is (...) an "inner model" type of theorem proved instead by forcing. (shrink)

I propose and motivate a new account of fundamental physical laws, the Measurability Account of Laws (MAL). This account has a distinctive logical form, in that it takes the primary nomological concept to be that of a law relative to a given theory, and defines a law simpliciter as a law relative to some true theory. What makes a proposition a law relative to a theory is that it plays an indispensable role in demonstrating that some quantity posited by (...) that theory is measurable. In Section 1, I motivate the project of seeking a philosophical account of fundamental physical laws, as opposed to laws of nature in general. In Section 2, I motivate seeking an account with the distinctive logical form of the MAL. In Section 3, I present the MAL and illustrate the way it works by applying it to a simple example. (shrink)

One of the most challenging questions surrounding subjective animal welfare is whether these states are measurable: that is, is subjective welfare an appropriately quantifiable target for scientific enquiry and ethical and deliberative calculation? The availability of several different types of measurement scale raises important questions regarding whether subjective experience has the right properties to be meaningfully represented on the types of scale required for different applications. This methodological question has so far received scant attention in the animal welfare literature. In (...) this paper, I address this omission by examining the types of measurement scale we can reasonably expect to apply to animal welfare measurements, and which we will actually need for our applications. I argue that our different applications will require variously ordinal, interval, and ratio scales, and that we have sufficient reason to believe that subjective welfare is a target with the appropriate characteristics to justify the practice of representing it using each of these types of scales. (shrink)

We prove, relative to suitable hypotheses, that it is consistent for there to be unboundedly many measurable cardinals each of which possesses a large degree of strong compactness, and that it is consistent to assume that the least measurable is partially strongly compact and that the second measurable is strongly compact. These results partially answer questions of Magidor on the relationship of strong compactness to measurability.

I argue that the key to understand many fundamental issues in philosophy of science lies in understanding the subtle relation between the non-empirical cognitive values used in science and the constraints imposed by measurability. In fact, although we are not able to fix the interpretation of a scientific theory through its formulation, I show that measurability puts constraints that can at least exclude some implausible interpretations. This turns out to be enough to define at least one cognitive value (...) that is able to penalize, without damages, precisely those bad features that deceive purely empirical assessments. This leads to the formulation of a simple model of scientific progress, that is based only on empirical accuracy and conciseness. The model is confronted here with many possible objections and with challenging cases of real progress. Although I cannot exclude that the model might be incomplete, it includes all the cases of genuine progress examined here, and no spurious one. In this model, I stress the role of the state of the art, which is the collection of all the theories that are the only legitimate source of scientific predictions. Progress is a global upgrade of the state of the art. (shrink)

One of the most challenging questions surrounding subjective animal welfare is whether these states are measurable: that is, is subjective welfare an appropriately quantifiable target for scientific enquiry and ethical and deliberative calculation? The availability of several different types of measurement scale raises important questions regarding whether subjective experience has the right properties to be meaningfully represented on the types of scale required for different applications. This methodological question has so far received scant attention in the animal welfare literature. In (...) this paper, I address this omission by examining the types of measurement scale we can reasonably expect to apply to animal welfare measurements, and which we will actually need for our applications. I argue that our different applications will require variously ordinal, interval, and ratio scales, and that we have sufficient reason to believe that subjective welfare is a target with the appropriate characteristics to justify the practice of representing it using each of these types of scales. (shrink)

We present some results about the burgeoning research area concerning set theory of the “κ‐reals”. We focus on some notions of measurability coming from generalizations of Silver and Miller trees. We present analogies and mostly differences from the classical setting.

Suppose that κ is indestructibly supercompact and there is a measurable cardinal λ > κ. It then follows that A1 = {δ < κ∣δ is measurable, δ is not a limit of measurable cardinals, and δ is not δ+ supercompact} is unbounded in κ. If in addition λ is 2λ supercompact, then A2 = {δ < κ∣δ is measurable, δ is not a limit of measurable cardinals, and δ is δ+ supercompact} is unbounded in κ as well. The large cardinal (...) hypotheses on λ are necessary, as we further demonstrate by constructing via forcing two distinct models in which either equation image or equation image. In each of these models, there is an indestructibly supercompact cardinal κ, and a restricted large cardinal structure above κ. If we weaken the indestructibility requirement on κ to indestructibility under partial orderings which are both κ-directed closed and -distributive, then it is possible to construct a model containing a supercompact cardinal κ witnessing this degree of indestructibility in which every measurable cardinal δ < κ is δ+ supercompact. (shrink)

We show that Σ1 4-Amoeba-absoluteness implies that $\forall a \in \mathbb{R}(\omega^{L\lbrack a \rbrack}_1 < \omega^V_1)$ and, hence, Σ1 3-measurability. This answers a question of Haim Judah (private communication).

The density matrix ρ describing a decaying system can be expressed in terms of correlations among observables belonging to the subsystems. Due to this structure and to the difficulties in measuring higher rank tensors of decay products for a single decay event, it is found that the mean value of ρ cannot be determined, in general, from measurements on the decay products. We also discuss the consequences of this conclusion as far as tests of quantum mechanics are concerned.

Postoperaists extrapolate from the advent of contemporary ‘immaterial labour’ a crisis of measurability synonymous with a crisis in the law of value. This chapter reveals such claims to deny the Marxian theory of value only through recourse to its most traditional interpretation, holding value to relate not the social validation of abstract labour but the quantification of direct labour-time. Drawing on existing critiques by Michael Heinrich and George Caffentzis, the chapter interrogates three assumptions present in theorisations of immaterial labour: (...) its novelty, its ‘immediately abstract’ character, and its immeasurable productiveness. The chapter concludes that the new conditions captured in the concept of immaterial labour do not pose a crisis for the law of value, because value has never related to the measurement of immediate labour. (shrink)

We generalize Solovay's unfolding technique for infinite games and use an Unfolding Theorem to give a uniform method to prove that all analytic sets are in the $\sigma$ -algebras of measurability connected with well-known forcing notions.

For sharp quantum observables the following facts hold: (i) if we have a collection of sharp observables and each pair of them is jointly measurable, then they are jointly measurable all together; (ii) if two sharp observables are jointly measurable, then their joint observable is unique and it gives the greatest lower bound for the effects corresponding to the observables; (iii) if we have two sharp observables and their every possible two outcome partitionings are jointly measurable, then the observables themselves (...) are jointly measurable. We show that, in general, these properties do not hold. Also some possible candidates which would accompany joint measurability and generalize these apparently useful properties are discussed. (shrink)

We prove three theorems concerning Laver indestructibility, strong compactness, and measurability. We then state some related open questions.

Solovay’s random-real forcing [R.M. Solovay, Real-valued measurable cardinals, in: Axiomatic Set Theory , Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, R.I., 1971, pp. 397–428] is the standard way of producing real-valued measurable cardinals. Following questions of Fremlin, by giving a new construction, we show that there are combinatorial, measure-theoretic properties of Solovay’s model that do not follow from the existence of real-valued measurability.

In this article we study the theories of the infinite-branching tree and the r-regular tree, and show that both of them are pseudofinite. Moreover, we show that they can be realized by infinite ultraproducts of polynomial exact classes of graphs, and provide a characterization of the Morley rank of definable sets in terms of the degrees of polynomials measuring their non-standard cardinalities. This answers negatively some questions from [2], where it is asked whether every stable generalised measurable structure is one-based.

In a recent paper, Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek, and John Hawthorne argue for the rational permissibility of "credal imprecision" by appealing to certain propositions associated with non-measurable spatial regions: for example, the proposition that the pointer of a spinner will come to rest within a certain non-measurable set of points on its circumference. This paper rebuts their argument by showing that its premises lead to implausible consequences in cases where one is trying to learn, by making multiple observations, whether a (...) certain outcome is associated with a non-measurable region or a measurable one. (shrink)

The investigation of computational properties of discontinuous functions is an important concern in computable analysis. One method to deal with this subject is to consider effective variants of Borel measurable functions. We introduce such a notion of Borel computability for single‐valued as well as for multi‐valued functions by a direct effectivization of the classical definition. On Baire space the finite levels of the resulting hierarchy of functions can be characterized using a notion of reducibility for functions and corresponding complete functions. (...) We use this classification and an effective version of a Selection Theorem of Bhattacharya‐Srivastava in order to prove a generalization of the Representation Theorem of Kreitz‐Weihrauch for Borel measurable functions on computable metric spaces: such functions are Borel measurable on a certain finite level, if and only if they admit a realizer on Baire space of the same quality. This Representation Theorem enables us to introduce a realizer reducibility for functions on metric spaces and we can extend the completeness result to this reducibility. Besides being very useful by itself, this reducibility leads to a new and effective proof of the Banach‐Hausdorff‐Lebesgue Theorem which connects Borel measurable functions with the Baire functions. Hence, for certain metric spaces the class of Borel computable functions on a certain level is exactly the class of functions which can be expressed as a limit of a pointwise convergent and computable sequence of functions of the next lower level. (© 2004 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

I describe a problem about the relations among symmetries, laws and measurable quantities. I explain why several ways of trying to solve it will not work, and I sketch a solution that might work. I discuss this problem in the context of Newtonian theories, but it also arises for many other physical theories. The problem is that there are two ways of defining the space-time symmetries of a physical theory: as its dynamical symmetries or as its empirical symmetries. The two (...) definitions are not equivalent, yet they pick out the same extension. This coincidence cries out for explanation, and it is not clear what the explanation could be. The Puzzle: Symmetries, Measurability and Invariance 1.1 The symmetries and the measurable quantities of Newtonian mechanics 1.2 The puzzle Two Easy Answers Another Unsuccessful Solution: Appeal to Geometrical Symmetries Locating the Puzzle The Relation between Laws and Measurability A Possible Solution CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Given a cardinal κ $\kappa $ kappa and filters F α $\mathcal {F}_\alpha $ script upper F Subscript alpha on ω $\omega $ omega for α ∈ κ $\alpha \in \kappa $ alpha element of kappa, we will show that if ∏ α ∈ κ F α $\prod _{\alpha \in \kappa }\mathcal {F}_\alpha $ product Underscript alpha element of kappa Endscripts script upper F Subscript alpha is countable dense homogeneous then κ < p $\kappa <\mathfrak {p}$ kappa less than German (...) p and each F α $\mathcal {F}_\alpha $ script upper F Subscript alpha is a non-meager P $\mathsf {P}$ sans serif upper P -filter. This partially answers a question of Michael Hrušák. Along the way, we will show that the product of fewer than p $\mathfrak {p}$ German p non-meager P $\mathsf {P}$ sans serif upper P -filters has the Miller property ( MP $\mathsf {MP}$ sans serif upper M upper P ). We will also describe explicitly the connection between Miller-measurability and the MP $\mathsf {MP}$ sans serif upper M upper P. As a corollary, we will see that the intersection of fewer than add ( m 0 ) $\mathsf {add}(m^0)$ sans serif add left parenthesis m Superscript 0 Baseline right parenthesis non-meager P $\mathsf {P}$ sans serif upper P -filters is a non-meager P $\mathsf {P}$ sans serif upper P -filter, where m 0 $m^0$ m Superscript 0 denotes the ideal of Miller-null sets. We will conclude by investigating the preservation of the MP $\mathsf {MP}$ sans serif upper M upper P under intersections and products. (shrink)

A ubiquitous argument against mental-state accounts of well-being is based on the notion that mental states like happiness and satisfaction simply cannot be measured. The purpose of this paper is to articulate and to assess this “argument from measurability.” My main thesis is that the argument fails: on the most charitable interpretation, it relies on the false proposition that measurement requires the existence of an observable ordering satisfying conditions like transitivity. The failure of the argument from measurability, however, (...) does not translate into a defense of mental-state accounts as accounts of well-being or of measures of happiness and satisfaction as measures of well-being. Indeed, I argue, the ubiquity of the argument from measurability may have obscured other, very real problems associated with mental-state accounts of well-being – above all, that happiness and satisfaction fail to track well-being – and with measures of happiness and satisfaction – above all, the tendency toward reification. I conclude that the central problem associated with the measurement of, e.g., happiness as a subjectively experienced mental state is not that it is too hard to measure, but rather that it is too easy to measure. (shrink)

We deal with the consistency strength of ZFC + variants of MA + suitable sets of reals are measurable (and/or Baire, and/or Ramsey). We improve the theorem of Harrington and Shelah [2] repairing the asymmetry between measure and category, obtaining also the same result for Ramsey. We then prove parallel theorems with weaker versions of Martin's axiom (MA(σ-centered), (MA(σ-linked)), MA(Γ + ℵ 0 ), MA(K)), getting Mahlo, inaccessible and weakly compact cardinals respectively. We prove that if there exists r ∈ (...) R such that ω L[ r] 1 = ω 1 and MA holds, then there exists a ▵ 1 3 -selective filter on ω, and from the consistency of ZFC we build a model for ZFC + MA(I) + every ▵ 1 3 -set of reals is Lebesgue measurable, has the property of Baire and is Ramsey. (shrink)

We study $$\omega $$ ω -categorical MS-measurable structures. Our main result is that a certain class of $$\omega $$ ω -categorical Hrushovski constructions, supersimple of finite SU-rank is not MS-measurable. These results complement the work of Evans on a conjecture of Macpherson and Elwes. In constrast to Evans’ work, our structures may satisfy independent n-amalgamation for all n. We also prove some general results in the context of $$\omega $$ ω -categorical MS-measurable structures. Firstly, in these structures, the dimension in (...) the MS-dimension-measure can be chosen to be SU-rank. Secondly, non-forking independence implies a form of probabilistic independence in the measure. The latter follows from more general unpublished results of Hrushovski, but we provide a self-contained proof. (shrink)

Measuring the effectiveness of medical interventions faces three epistemological challenges: the choice of good measuring instruments, the use of appropriate analytic measures, and the use of a reliable method of extrapolating measures from an experimental context to a more general context. In practice each of these challenges contributes to overestimating the effectiveness of medical interventions. These challenges suggest the need for corrective normative principles. The instruments employed in clinical research should measure patient-relevant and disease-specific parameters, and should not be sensitive (...) to parameters that are only indirectly relevant. Effectiveness always should be measured and reported in absolute terms (using measures such as 'absolute risk reduction'), and only sometimes should effectiveness also be measured and reported in relative terms (using measures such as 'relative risk reduction')-employment of relative measures promotes an informal fallacy akin to the base-rate fallacy, which can be exploited to exaggerate claims of effectiveness. Finally, extrapolating from research settings to clinical settings should more rigorously take into account possible ways in which the intervention in question can fail to be effective in a target population. (shrink)

The need for quantitative measurement represents a unifying bond that links all the physical, biological, and social sciences. Measurements of such disparate phenomena as subatomic masses, uncertainty, information, and human values share common features whose explication is central to the achievement of foundational work in any particular mathematical science as well as for the development of a coherent philosophy of science. This book presents a theory of measurement, one that is "abstract" in that it is concerned with highly general axiomatizations (...) of empirical and qualitative settings and how these can be represented quantitatively. It was inspired by, and represents a generalization and extension of, the last major research work in this field, Foundations of Measurement Vol. I, by Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky published in 1971. (shrink)

We show that in contrast with the Cohen version of Solovay's model, it is consistent for the continuum to be Cohen-measurable and for every function to be continuous on a non-meagre set.

Pollock (2004) argues in favour of Wittgenstein’s (1953) claim that the standard metre bar in Paris has no metric length: Because the standard retains a special status in the system of measurement, it cannot be applied to itself. However, we argue that Pollock is mistaken regarding the feature of the standard metre which supports its special status. While the unit markings were arbitrarily designated, the constitution, preservation and application of the bar have been scientifically developed to optimize stability, and hence (...) predictive accuracy. We argue that it is the ‘hard to improve’ quality of stability that supports the standard’s value in measurement, not any of its arbitrary features. And because the special status of the prototype is tied to its ability to meet this external criterion, the possibility always exists of identifying an alternative, more stable, standard, thereby allowing the original standard to be measured. (shrink)

The measurement of sensory intensity has had a long history, attracting the attention of investigators from many disciplines including physiology, psychology, physics, mathematics, philosophy, and even chemistry. While there has been a continuing doubt by some that sensation has the properties necessary for measurement, experiments designed to obtain estimates of sensory intensity have found that a general rule applies: Equal stimulus ratios produce equal sensory ratios. Theories concerning the basis for this simple psychophysical rule are discussed, with emphasis given to (...) the physical correlate theory, which considers judgments of subjective magnitudes to be based upon estimates of physical dimensions that vary regularly with changes in degree of stimulation. For the most thoroughly investigated sensory scales, brightness and loudness, the physical correlate is considered to be distance. Our “tacit knowledge” of the sensory effects of changing distance plays an essential role in matching motor activities to environmental conditions and in ensuring accurate perceptual evaluations through brightness and loudness constancies. In psychophysical experiments, subjects apparently use this same tacit knowledge when required to estimate relative subjective magnitudes. The evidence related to the physical correlate theory is summarized, and it is concluded that, while under appropriate conditions we demonstrate considerable skill in evaluating environmental relationships, we are quite unable to estimate the neurophysiological nature or quantity of sensory response. A psychophysics devoted to studying conditions required for accuracy and conditions producing errors in the perception of environmental relationships would seem to be more valuable than one devoted to subjective magnitudes. (shrink)

Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. In each framework we use extensive measurement to introduce novel domain restrictions, independence (...) conditions, and constraints on social evaluation. We prove a welfarism theorem for these domains and characterize the social welfare functions that satisfy the axioms of extensive measurement at both the individual and social levels. The main results are simple axiomatizations of strong dictatorship in the Arrovian framework and classical utilitarianism in the generalized framework. (shrink)

There is a common argument form in the metaphysics of natural laws literature: a theory of natural law is attacked by offering a claim L as a law of scientific field F (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.), and from this law metaphysical implications contrary to the theory are drawn. Quite often however, L would not be regarded as a law by a scientist of F. Roberts' "measurability account of laws" offers a new and interesting way to more reliably identify the (...) laws of a field F and to eliminate the L that are not laws of F from the literature. (shrink)

Starting from cardinals κ κ is measurable, we construct a model for the theory “ZF + n < ω[DCn] + ω + 1 is a measurable cardinal”. This is the maximum amount of dependent choice consistent with the measurability of ω + 1, and by a theorem of Shelah using p.c.f. theory, is the best result of this sort possible.

This paper examines the role existence plays in measurement validity. I argue that existing popular theories of measurement and of validity follow a correspondence framework, which starts by assuming that an entity exists in the real world with certain properties that allow it to be measurable. Drawing on literature from the sociology of measurement, I show that the correspondence framework faces several theoretical and practical challenges. I suggested the validity-first framework of measurement, which starts with a practice-based validation process as (...) the basis for a measurement theory, and only posits objective existence when it is scientifically useful to do so. (shrink)

The debate on probabilistic measures of coherence flourishes for about 15 years now. Initiated by papers that have been published around the turn of the millennium, many different proposals have since then been put forward. This contribution is partly devoted to a reassessment of extant coherence measures. Focusing on a small number of reasonable adequacy constraints I show that (i) there can be no coherence measure that satisfies all constraints, and that (ii) subsets of these adequacy constraints motivate two different (...) classes of coherence measures. These classes do not coincide with the common distinction between coherence as mutual support and coherence as relative set-theoretic overlap. Finally, I put forward arguments to the effect that for each such class of coherence measures there is an outstanding measure that outperforms all other extant proposals. One of these measures has recently been put forward in the literature, while the other one is based on a novel probabilistic measure of confirmation. (shrink)