Numerous studies have revealed that health care transitions for chronically ill older adults are frequently poorly managed, often with devastating human and economic consequences. And poorly managed transitions and their consequences also occur among younger, relatively healthy individuals who have adequate resources and are prepared to advocate on their own behalf. Despite the rich base of research confirming that evidence‐based transitional care enhances patients’ experiences, improves health and quality of life, and reduces costs, organizational, regulatory, financial, and cultural barriers have, (...) until recently, prevented widespread adoption of these proven approaches. Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, such as reductions in Medicare payments to hospitals with very high thirty‐day rehospitalization rates, have reduced barriers, but uptake of evidence‐based transitional care beyond demonstration projects continues to be sporadic and far too slow. With a rich understanding about how to better anticipate and respond to the compelling problems experienced by patients, family caregivers, and health care professionals throughout episodes of acute illness, the time has come to frame transitional care as a system's ethical responsibility in an aging society. Embedding transitional care within the ethical obligations of a health care system requires the perspectives and involvement of nurses and nursing because of this profession's integral role in every aspect of care transitions. (shrink)

Importance Informed consent is essential to ethical, rigorous research and is important to recruitment and retention in cancer trials.Objective To examine cancer clinical trial (CCT) participants’ perceptions of informed consent processes and variations in perceptions by cancer type.Design and Setting and Participants Cross-sectional survey from mixed-methods study at National Cancer Institute–designated Northeast comprehensive cancer center. Open-ended and forced-choice items addressed: (1) enrollment and informed consent experiences and (2) decision-making processes, including risk-benefit assessment. Eligibility: CCT participant with gastro-intestinal or genitourinary, hematologic-lymphatic (...) malignancies, lung cancer, and breast or gynecological cancer (N = 334).Main Outcome Measures Percentages satisfied with consent process and information provided; and assessing participation’s perceptions of risks/benefits. Multivariable logistic or ordinal regression examined differences by cancer type.Results Most patient-participants felt well informed by the consent process (more than 90% overall and by cancer type) and. most (87.4%) reported that the consent form provided all the information they wanted, although nearly half (44.8%) reported that they read the form somewhat carefully or less. More than half (57.9%) said that talking to research staff (i.e., the consent process) had a greater impact on participation decisions than reading the consent form (2.1%). A third (31.1%) were very sure of joining in research studies before the informed consent process (almost half of lung cancer patients did—47.1%). Most patients personally assessed the risks and benefits before consenting. However, trust in physicians played an important role in the decision to enroll in CCT.Conclusions and Relevance Cancer patients rely less on written features of the informed consent process than on information obtained from the research staff and their own physicians. Research should focus on information and communication strategies that support informed consent from referring physicians, researchers, and others to improve patient risk-benefit assessment and decision-making. (shrink)

Harry g frankfurt gave what has been taken to be a counter-Example to the principle that, "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise." I argue that in his case the agent cannot be morally responsible for what he did, Because it was not within his power not to be compelled to do it. So frankfurt's case is not a counter-Example to this principle.

Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one’s memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) (...) memory that q. Bernecker’s account of non-inferentially remembering that is shown to be inadequate. A remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading. (shrink)

The role of editorial staff in shaping early climate change narratives has been underexplored and deserves more attention. During the 1970s, the epistemological underpinnings of the production of knowledge on climate change were contested between scientists who favoured computer-based atmospheric simulations and those who were more interested in investigating the long-term history of climatic changes. Although the former group later became predominant in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change during the 1980s, the latter had a sizable influence over climate discourse (...) during the 1970s. Of these, one of the key popularizers of climate discourse during the 1970s was the British climatologist Hubert Lamb (1913–97). The correspondence between Lamb and journal editors who gatekept and curated different audiences helped craft resonant messages about climate change and its potential effects, and we explore Lamb's interactions with editors of Nature, the UNESCO Courier, The Ecologist and Development Forum in the 1973–4 period. Through understanding how climate change discussion was influenced by editors, we gain an insight into how such narratives had to be adjusted to fit into pre-existing discourses before their importance was more widely established, and how these adjustments helped shape conceptualizations of climate change as a global, human-caused phenomenon and a source of universal threat. (shrink)

For cases in which to remember that p is to have (strict) nonbasic, unmixed memory knowledge that p; in which there is at most one prior time, t, from which one remembers; in which one knew at t that p; and in which there can arise a sensible question whether one remembers that p from t — a person, B, remembers that p from t if and only if: (1) There is a set of grounds a subset of which consists (...) of (i) only those grounds B has at both t and the present for B to be sure that p, and (ii) enough such grounds to make it reasonable at both t and the present for B to be sure that p (I call any such subset a set of “adequate original grounds dating from t”), and (2) there is no time prior to t such that B has a set of adequate original grounds dating from that time. The way in which the crucial terms in this explication are being used is explained. And the explication is defended by showing how it can deal with cases that are counterexamples to explications recently offered by Malcolm and by Munsat. (shrink)

Beginning with an overview of Galileo's earliest work on free fall, the paper examines the relationship between experiment and theory in his study of motion in the period immediately before and after 1604. The possible role of experiment is assessed in relation to the manuscript evidence and by means of reconstructed experiments.

In a paper "The intentionality of memory," Jordi Fernández (2006) proposes a way of distinguishing between episodic and semantic memory. I identify three difficulties with his proposal and provide a way of drawing the distinction that avoids these shortcomings.

The definition of memory knowledge that p put forward in this paper is nontraditional in that the justification for the belief that p which constitutes that knowledge is not located in any memory-impression or other present state of the subject. Rather it is the subject's actual past justification for p, or a proper part thereof, that justifies this present belief that p. It is argued (1) that the notion under definition is that of knowing straight from memory, (2) that an (...) adequate definition here must take into account a difference, as to conflicting evidence one does not possess, between evidence one has forgotten and evidence one has never had, (3) that compared to Ginet's traditional definition (1975), the definition has several advantages, and (4) that the definition handles at least one type of situation where there can be memory knowledge that p without previous knowledge that p. (shrink)

I aim to clarify the moral authority of an advance directive that pertains to one’s later dementia-afflicted self. I develop the principle of Unity-Relative Autonomy, according to which the basis of self-governance is psychological unity rather than personal identity, and, on these grounds, argue that such advance directives have minimal weight grounded in respect for autonomy. I, nonetheless, suggest that bodily sovereignty should be distinguished sharply from autonomy, and maintain that one has a moral claim to decide the fate of (...) one’s later body. Lastly, I consider but reject the idea that such advance directives could have surrogate decision-making authority. (shrink)

Abstract: A person who remembers having done something has a belief that she did it from having done it. To have a belief that one did something from having done it is to believe that one did the action on the (causal) basis of having done it, where this belief (in order for one to have it) need not be (causally) based even in part on any contributor to the belief other than doing the action. The notion of a contributor (...) to a belief (as opposed to a mere facilitating cause of the belief) is explicated through a series of examples. The account of having a belief that one did something from having done it is then deployed in criticising Ginet's account of ‘memory connection’, in assessing Martin and Deutscher's causal theory of remembering, in indicating how diachronic justification functions in a nontraditional theory of memory, and in setting forth one type of psychological connectedness which, according to advocates of a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, may be employed (noncircularly) in formulating the theory, and which, according to opponents of the theory, provides a target for criticising the theory. (shrink)

This article sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism . MJP presupposes a nontraditional notion of memorial justification according to which what makes one's present belief that p prima facie justified is that which provided one with prima facie justification to believe that p originally . The article offers support for MJP by examining a series of cases that involve forgetting, and in doing (...) so, criticizes views of Jennifer Lackey, David Owens, Michael Huemer, and George Pappas. (shrink)

Multiverse theorists provide controversial, unique but unified accounts of divine creation that result in the Anselmian God creating a best world. On what conditions should theists endorse this or any account of divine creation? One available way is to evaluate how well they resolve some intractable problems in philosophical theology. I argue that multiverse accounts do not resolve these problems to a greater degree than some alternative account of divine creation. I conclude that we should endorse the alternative account over (...) multiverse accounts. (shrink)

Recent study of Galileo's surviving manuscript notes on motion has revealed that by 1609 he had developed the major part of his theory of projectile motion. During the period of these theoretical advances Galileo was engaged in important related experimental investigations; this has become clear from the study of folios 114r and 116v of the manuscript on motion. This paper provides an interpretation of a manuscript not previously discussed—folio 81r. The analysis provided indicates that it is evidence of an important (...) early experiment of the series in which Galileo studied the projectile trajectory. The reconstruction of the experiment concerned reveals relationships with the enquiries suggested by folio 114r and 116v and indicates that Galileo examined the form of projectile trajectories with some care. (shrink)

Summary One aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of the recent attempts to interpret the development of Galileo's theory of motion in the late Paduan period 1604?1610. In addition to this a new interpretation of this process of development is advanced. This interpretation is the first that proves able to provide a full account of all the features on folio 152r of volume 72 of the Galilean manuscripts which has been claimed to be of crucial significance. The (...) major feature of the interpretation is that it is the first to account for the relationship between Galileo's theoretical and experimental work in the period 1604?1610. (shrink)

K. Lehrer and J. Richard’s analysis of remembering that p is shown to be deficient, particularly because it fails to treat factual memory as an epistemic concept. Adding a requirement concerning the subject’s past justification accommodates instances of factual memory without factual knowledge, helps explain the role of justification in remembering that p, and strengthens the analysis against certain counterexamples. The paper includes an assessment of A. Cusmariu;s definition of impure memory.

A theory of occurrent factual memory is sketched out. The theory represents an alterative to the traditional theory in John L. Pollock’s Knowledge and Justification, in that it analyzes occurrently remembering that p without employing the notion of ostensible recollection that p. The latter notion, it is argued, can be understood in terms of occurrently believing (or being inclined to believe) that p. In defending his theory against nontraditional alternatives, Pollock employs arguments that conflict with his own principle of implicit (...) reasons. That principle, it is shown, sanctions cross-temporal justification of the sort presupposed by the alternative nontraditional theory. [CORRIGENDUM: Line 6 at the top of page 137 should read: memory, then if S occurrently remembers that p at t, then S, at t, has a justified (occurrent) belief that p such that (a) this belief that p constitutes, at t, S’s In lines 7–9 at the top of page 140, the sentence beginning with “For” and ending with “way” should be deleted, and in line 11 “fact” should be “face”.] . (shrink)

Despite his demanding religious responsibilities, Paolo Sarpi maintained an active involvement in science between 1578 and 1598 – as hisPensierireveal. They show that from 1585 onwards he studied the Copernican theory and recorded arguments in its favour. The fact that for 1595 they include an outline of a Copernican tidal theory resembling Galileo'sDialoguetheory is well known. But examined closely, Sarpi's theory is found to be different from that of theDialoguein several important respects. That Sarpi was a Copernican by 1592 is (...) revealed by other of hispensieri, whereas at that time we know that Galileo was not. The examination of Sarpi's tidal theory and of the work of Galileo in this period indicates that the theory Sarpi recorded in 1595 was of his own creation. The appreciation that the theory was Sarpi's and that Galileo subsequently came to change his views on the Copernican theory and adopted the tidal theory has major implications for our understanding of the significance of Sarpi's contribution to the Scientific Revolution. Moreover, it appears that several of the most significant theoretical features of the tidal theory published by Galileo in theDialogue –and which proved of lasting value – were in reality Sarpi's. (shrink)

At the same time as fair trade certified products are capturing an increasing market share, a growing number of scholars and practitioners are raising serious questions about who benefits from certification. Through a critique of north–south narratives, this paper draws on contemporary themes in fair trade scholarship to draw out different ways of thinking about fair trade outside of the dichotomous north–south framing. I argue that, through the creation of fair trade subjects of the “global north” and “global south,” certification (...) has normalized and naturalized dichotomous power relations. The primary concern of this paper is to demonstrate the problems with situating certification and scholarship in the north–south binary and to push examination toward a more nuanced analysis of how certification and development are shaped in-place. This intervention is important for assisting with stepping away from long-standing debates regarding the effectiveness of certification, and additionally in contributing to critical thinking on economic development more broadly. (shrink)

A large body of information and opinion related to COVID-19 is being shared via social media platforms. Recent reports have raised concerns about the reliability and verifiability of said information being disseminated and the way systems, processes and design of the platforms facilitates such spread. This, alongside other areas of concern, has resulted in several social media platforms taking steps towards tackling the spread of mis- and dis-information. Here we discuss approaches to online public health messaging from a range of (...) sources during COVID-19, with a focus on official and non-official sources in the United Kingdom (UK). We highlight issues for ongoing public health decisions, and the potential impact for the future course of the pandemic. (shrink)

ArgumentDuring the first half of the 1970s, climate research gained a new significance and began to be perceived within political and academic circles as being worthy of public support. Conventional explanations for this increased status include a series of climate anomalies that generated awareness and heightened concern over the potentially devastating effects of climate change. Controversial climatologist Reid Bryson was one of the first to publicly promote what he saw as a definitive link between these climate anomalies and unidirectional climate (...) change in the fall of 1973, and rising food prices in the same year gave him a platform on which to air his views to receptive senior members of the US Congress. Bryson’s testimony before a US Senate subcommittee offers a unique glimpse into how he was able to successfully resonate his agenda with that of senior politicians in a time of crisis, as well as the immediate responses of those senior US politicians upon first hearing climate change arguments. Bryson was one of the most prominent US climatologists to break a taboo against making bold climatological predictions and de-facto policy recommendations in public. As a result, although Bryson was criticized by many in the climatological community, his actions instigated the involvement of other scientists in the public arena, leading to an important elevation in US public climate discourse. (shrink)

In the mid-twentieth century, the identity of those who oversaw the UK electricity grid tentatively and slowly began to shift from those who joined the electricity industry directly from secondary school to a university-educated elite with a higher level of technical education. At the same time, electricity infrastructure became increasingly centralised, leading to the creation of a national grid in 1938, meaning that control of electricity became concentrated in the hands of an ever-smaller group and increasing the stakes in debates (...) over strategy. By using the case studies of power engineer Paul Schiller and mathematician Maurice Davies, this paper traces how the boundaries of what mathematics could or could not be used for were renegotiated between factions within the UK electricity industry. Schiller unsuccessfully attempted to use mathematics, including the authority of academic mathematicians, to reinforce controversial arguments about the strategic direction of the industry in the 1940s. Such arguments failed to resonate with a class of, as Schiller put it, “practical men” that still held considerable influence. Davies on the other hand was employed by the industry in the 1950s to improve efficiency, and was able to implement lasting measures in this effort by using the weather to forecast electricity demand, and successfully defended the usefulness of his work in the 1970s against colleagues who felt that forecasting could be done better with mathematical models without weather inputs. The contrast between these two stories shows how the influence of mathematical thinking was contingent upon existing power dynamics, and reinforce how the history of mathematics should be socially embedded. (shrink)

One difference between traditional and contemporary nontraditional theories of memory is that the former would affirm, whereas the latter would deny, that a person can be correctly described as having remembered that p solely in virtue of having knowledge the certainty of which is grounded upon the person’s present remembering. I argue that there cannot be such a case, and that what may appear to be such a case—as presented in Don Locke’s book Memory—can be explicated by a contemporary nontraditional (...) theorist without making any concessions to the traditional theorist. (shrink)

The aim of Galileo’s tidal theory was to show that the tides were produced entirely by the earth’s motion and thereby to demonstrate the physical truth of Copernicanism. However, in the Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems Galileo did not explain some of the most significant aspects of the theory completely. As a consequence, the way the theory works has long been disputed. Though there exist a number of interpretations in the literature, the most widely accepted are based on (...) ideas that are not explicitly articulated by Galileo in the Dialogue. This essay attempts to understand the way the theory functions in terms of Galilean physics. It is an interpretation of the theory based solely on Galileo’s arguments—and one that reveals it to have had some unrecognized consequences. This interpretation indicates that Galileo’s theory would not have worked in the manner he described in the Dialogue. (shrink)

This paper makes use of an example of Williams’s, an example involving so-called psychological deprogramming–reprogramming, in arguing that procedures such as Teletransportation would not provide what matters to us in our self-interested concern for the future. This is so because the beliefs and other psychological states of a resultant person would not be appropriately causally dependent on any beliefs or other psychological states of the original person.

This paper examines a leading traditional account of memory knowledge. (A “traditional” account of memory knowledge locates whatever positive justification there may be for the belief which constitutes that knowledge in a present memory-impression.) The paper (1) presents a pair of cases designed to show that Carl Ginet’s four-part defeasibility-type definition of memory knowledge that p is either too weak or too strong, and (2) suggests how these cases could be handled by one sort of non-traditional account.

The paper presents considerations that weigh against one or another version of the psychological continuity theory of personal identity over time. Such Locke-like theories frequently go wrong, it is argued, in not formulating precisely how the psychological states of an individual person are related diachronically, in failing to capture a truly appropriate causal connection between later and earlier psychological states, and in claiming support from particular cases. In addition, the paper offers examples and other considerations that support an alternative, biological (...) continuity theory according to which you and I are each identical with a human organism. (shrink)

Professor Tucker in the C.R. vol. xi. pp. 341 sqq. has revolutionized our notions of ‘doubtful syllables’: we have now learned that such syllables are normally short, and that lengthening is the licence.

ABSTRACT Martin Hollis, in Market Equality and Social Freedom [1], used the Dewsbury case to illustrate the tension between individual freedom and the public good. Like others engaged in the public debate on multicultural education in general, and Dewsbury in particular, Hollis avoided the main issue: “What should be the curriculum in a school attended by pupils from different cultural backgrounds?’’Rational debate in this highly controversial area requires an analysis of two fundamental concepts—multicultural education and respect. The former can take (...) three forms, each corresponding with a distinctive curriculum model. One—the Equality option—is inimical to parental rights as guaranteed under the European Convention, but it attracts support because of a widespread failure to recognise that one can respect someone's right to hold and propagate a particular faith (or opinion) without necessarily respecting that faith (or opinion). It is shown that this failure has come about through very lax usage of ‘respect’. It is argued that by respecting persons whatever their values the potential conflict between liberty and equality can be resolved in a free society. (shrink)