In 1819, Maine de Biran wrote an article entitled Exposition du système de Leibniz. This text gives a central place to virtuality by linking three key elements of Leibniz's system: the monad mirror representing the universe ‘virtually’; the dynamic concept of the substance made up of a virtual trend; innate ideas that, in the eyes of Biran, would result from the use of dynamics and more specifically from the concept of ‘force considered as virtual’. These three references to virtuality have (...) a problematic aspect that the present article attempts to pinpoint, relying on the role that Maine de Biran himself attributed to virtuality in his own philosophical itinerary. In particular, the Mémoire sur la décomposition de la pensée gives a central role to ‘virtual force’ as a force pre-existing to me, that allows him to avoid substantialism.Virtual force seems to be a malleable concept that helps to reconcile two initially contradictory concepts for Biran, that of substance and that of activity. Yet, this is precisely what Leibniz's dynamics does in his eyes. Therefore, the temptation to attribute this key concept to Leibniz himself is strong, all the more so as Jean Bernoulli, Emilie du Chatelet and D'Alembert had already introduced virtuality in the vocabulary of Leibniz's dynamics to qualify the dead force. Biran is thus led to reconstruct the intellectual itinerary of Leibniz and to consider that Leibniz drew his concept of force from the experience of apperception, in the sense Biran meant it. (shrink)

In the Structure of Behaviour Merleau-Ponty introduces the concept of “virtual space” and those of “virtual movement” and “virtual body” in the Phenomenology of perception. The purpose of this article is to establish the links between these three notions that Merleau-Ponty borrows from the psychological literature of his time and to show why they constitute key elements of his philosophy of perception.

Arguments for a just transition are integral to debates about climate change and the drive to create a carbon-neutral economy. There are currently two broad approaches rooted in ethics and justice for framing just energy transitions. The first can be described as internal to the transition and emphasizes the anticipation, assessment, and redressing of harms created by the transition itself and the inclusion in transition governance of groups or communities potentially harmed by its disruptions. In this article, we propose a (...) second approach to ethics and justice in an energy transition, which we describe as systemic or societal in scope. This approach complements attention to the proximate dynamics and impacts of the transition process with a focus on the distant societal and economic outcomes the transition brings into being and how they compare to conditions prior to the transition. It poses the question: do the transformative social, economic, and technological changes wrought by energy systems create more just societies and economies, or do they instead reinforce or recreate long-standing injustices and inequalities? We illustrate this approach with an assessment of one of the most significant existing forms of energy injustice: the energy-poverty nexus. We argue that the energy-poverty nexus reflects configurations of socio-energy systems that create complex, extractive feedbacks between energy insecurity and economic insecurity and, over time, reinforce or exacerbate poverty. We further argue that just energy transitions should work to disentangle these configurations and re-design them so as to create generative rather than extractive feedbacks, thus ending the energy-poverty nexus and creating long-term outcomes that are more just, equitable, and fair. (shrink)

La question de l’appartenance de Hobbes à l’histoire du libéralisme peut paraître paradoxale compte tenu des caractéristiques les plus fréquemment associées à sa philosophie politique et au symbole du Léviathan, puissance irrésistible et illimitée, dans lequel certains ont entrevu le spectre de l’État totalitaire. Cette question a pourtant donné lieu à d’âpres débats au point de paraître incontournable tant pour la compréhension de la philosophie politique de Hobbes que pour celle du libéralisme.

Il faut se féliciter de l'édition et de la traduction française de trois grands textes économiques de John Locke, Quelques considérations sur les conséquences qu'auraient une baisse de l'intérêt et un rehaussement de la valeur de la monnaie, Brèves observations sur un mémoire intitulé « Des moyens d'encourager la frappe des monnaies en Angleterre, et ensuite de l'y garder », Nouvelles considérations sur le rehaussement de la valeur de la monnaie. Ces textes, traduits ici pour la première fois...

The 483 pieces that comprise the work come complete with five indexes. One is a valuable index of correspondents including, for each one, biographical information; there are indexes of names of towns cited in the correspondence, of proper names, of works cited, and of things. The notes systematically establish the ties between different works and point out all the references to works alluded to.

Cette oeuvre majeure de Nicolas de Cues, aussi essentielle que la Docte Ignorance bien que moins connue, est, selon les termes de Jocelyne Sfez, un « Discours de la méthode ». Elle expose en effet une méthode novatrice pour atteindre le vrai, à partir de l'explicitation de sa racine métaphysique. L'ouvrage suit inlassablement les deux mouvements inséparables de progression de l'unité dans l'altérité et de retour de l'altérité vers l'unité. L'unité infinie, divine, absolue, est en elle-même in...

Genesis 22 has always been an important text in Jewish-Christian polemics. Yet this text contains elements which are problematic to both traditions alike. One such problem is the exact reading and the exegesis of verse 12, 'Now I know that you fear God', which poses the problem of God's foreknowledge. Two possible vocalizations of the Hebrew produce either the reading 'I know' or 'I have made known'. The first one is the Masoretic reading of Genesis 22, the second one appears (...) in different places in the Jewish tradition. In the Greek patristic tradition, 'You have made known' is also proposed, which could seem to hint at a different reading of the radicals in Hebrew. In Syriac however, two possible ways of vocalizing the radicals produce either 'I have made known' or 'You have made known', which suggests that the second reading in Greek specifically has a Syriac background. The first possibility, 'I have made known', though probably the original one, is never chosen by Syriac exegetes - because it was a well known Jewish solution to the problem and the Syrians were looking for a solution of their own? Another way of tackling the problem lay in the decision whether it was God himself or only an unknowing angel who spoke. But since the angel acted on God's behalf, not many exegetes found this an effective way to defend God's omniscience. The question of the audience of the proclamation when given either by God's angel or by Abraham himself also interested many exegetes in both traditions. (shrink)