José Luis Bermúdez introduces the philosophy of psychology as an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature and mechanisms of cognition. _Philosophy of Psychology_ charts out four influential 'pictures of the mind' and uses them to explore central topics in the philosophical foundations of psychology, including the relation between different levels of studying the mind/brain; the nature and scope of psychological explanation; the architecture of cognition; and the relation between thought and language. Chapters cover all the core concepts, including: models of (...) psychological explanation the nature of commonsense psychology arguments for the autonomy of psychology functionalist approaches to cognition computational models of the mind neural network modeling rationality and mental causation perception, action and cognition the language of thought and the architecture of cognition. _Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction_ is a very clear and well-structured textbook from one of the leaders in the field. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.

Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders.

Beyond different starting points, stakeholder theory and Catholic Social Thought share many compatible perspectives when analyzing the role of the firm in economic activity, especially regarding the attention of the firm to different social and economic actors. Additionally, ST bears limitations regarding its ethical and anthropological foundation, and also about the legitimation of the different stakeholders’ interests. Therefore, ST lacks clear criteria to solve possible conflicts of interest between stakeholders. This paper analyzes the potentiality of ST, widely accepted in corporate (...) management, to integrate CST principles in order to solve those conflicts. At the same time, the paper studies the possibility of finding in the principles of CST an anthropological and ethical foundation for ST. This foundation could be the source of criteria to discuss the levels of legitimation and prioritization between stakeholders´ interests, especially when those interests collide. (shrink)

Forms of thinking that involve thinking about thought are only available to creatures participating in a public language. Thoughts can only be the objects of further thoughts if they have suitable vehicle and the only suitable vehicle is public language sentences. These language-dependent cognitive abilities range from second-order reflection on one's own beliefs and desires and the capacity to attribute thoughts to others to the ability to entertain tensed thoughts and to deploy logical concepts. Many of these language-dependent cognitive abilities, (...) however, have primitive analogues that do not involve intentional ascent and hence are available at the nonlinguistic level. This chapter considers the practical implications this has for the scope and limits of nonlinguistic thought. The chapter explores the question: what types of thinking are in principle unavailable to nonlinguistic creatures? There are two types of intentional ascent, which might be termed explicit and implicit intentional ascent respectively. (shrink)

This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.

Drawing on political, legal, national, post-national, as well as American and European perspectives, this collection of essays offers a diverse and balanced discussion of the current arguments concerning deliberative democracy. The essays consider the thr.

This paper focuses on two enduring features of Gareth Evans’s work. The first is his rethinking of standard ways of understanding the Fregean notion of sense and the second his sustained attempt to undercut the standard opposition between Russellian and Fregean approaches to understanding thought and language.I explore the peculiar difficulties that ‘I’ poses for a Fregean theory and show how Evans’s account of the sense of the first person pronoun can be modified to meet those difficulties.

Thinking without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Many scientific disciplines treat non-linguistic creatures as thinkers, explaining their behavior in terms of their thoughts about themselves and about the environment. But this theorizing has proceeded without any clear account of the types of thinking available to non-linguistic creatures. One consequence of this is that ascriptions of thoughts to non-linguistic creatures have frequently been held to be metaphorical and not to be taken at face value. (...) Bermúdez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. Whereas existing discussions of thought at the non-linguistic level have concentrated on how such thoughts might be physically realized, Bermúdez approaches the problem by considering what is required in explaining behavior in psychological terms. In developing a positive account of non-linguistic thought he shows how the experimental tools used by developmental psychologists and students of animal behavior can be used to give a precise account of the way in which a human infant or non-human animal is representing the world. Much of the book is devoted to exploring the differences between thinking without words and language-based thinking. Bermúdez argues that there are clear limits to the expressive power of non-linguistic thought. Nonetheless, he identifies primitive analogues at the non-linguistic level that can be used to explain sophisticated non-linguistic behaviors. Thinking Without Words is the first full-length philosophical study of this important topic. It is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior. (shrink)

This paper considers how best an eliminativist might argue for the radical falsity of commonsense psychology. I will be arguing that Paul Churchland’s “official” arguments for eliminative materialism (in, e.g., Churchland 1981) are unsatisfactory, although much of the paper will be developing themes that are clearly present in Churchland’s writings. The eliminativist needs to argue that the representations that feed into action are fundamentally different from those invoked by propositional attitude psychology. The “springs of action” are representations of features that (...) are much more finely grained than those encoded within the vocabulary that we employ to specify the content of propositional attitudes. The eliminativist’s most promising strategy is to argue that, whatever we might think about why we behave the way we do, careful experimental work will show that we are in fact acting in virtue of representations of properties and microfeatures that fall completely outside the ambit of propositional attitude psychology. The paper considers a number of examples of how this eliminativist strategy might be developed, ranging from the implications of the two visual systems hypothesis to research in social psychology into the role that situational factors play in controlling action. (shrink)

The study of human behaviour, and the minds that produce that behaviour, has been an occupation of scholars, artists, and philosophers for millennia. But it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that psychology came into its own as a distinct field of study—and, more importantly, as a scientifically legitimate field of study. When we view psychology as a science, certain questions naturally emerge: what sorts of phenomena does psychology seek to explain? What is distinctive about the kinds (...) of explanations adduced in this science? How do these explanations integrate with theories and explanations in other fields of study? Does psychology aim to explain all mental phenomena, or are there some areas, such as consciousness, that will be forever beyond its explanatory powers? Due to its very nature, psychology is a field that both philosophers and scientists have critically examined over the years. This critical examination has, in turn, generated a literature that is voluminous, heavily contested, and increasingly technical. To help users to make sense of this large and complex scholarly corpus, this new four-volume collection from Routledge is both comprehensive and sensitive to the ongoing nature of debates in the field. Two expert editors have carefully assembled classic contributions, as well as more recent work, to create an indispensable ‘mini library’ of the best and most influential scholarship in the philosophy of psychology. With a comprehensive index and newly written introductions by the editors, The Philosophy of Psychology will be welcomed by a broad range of scholars, researchers, and advanced students, especially those working in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between two ways of thinking about the sources of self-consciousness. We can think about the sources of self-consciousness either in genetic terms (as the origins or precursors of self-conscious thoughts) or in epistemic terms (as the grounds of self-conscious judgements). Using Christopher Peacocke's account of self-conscious judgements in Being Known as a foil, this paper brings out some important ways in which we need to draw upon the sources of self-consciousness in the genetic sense for (...) a proper understanding of the sources of self-consciousness in the epistemic sense. (shrink)

Dialectics is a philosophical method, it has methodology rigor for academic research. It is divided into two main variants: Greek and German. In turn, there are particularities between each variant, the Greek is subdivided into Platonic and Aristotelian, and the German into Hegelian and Marxist. The present article focuses on the first variant. It explores the ontological and epistemological presuppositions, through a specific review of the Platonic Dialogues Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman (also called Politicus); it also deals with Aristotle’s (...) Topics. The reading of these works, with the dialectical method as the object of study, is done from the approach of a Metaphysics of Relation, a notion that is assumed from the connotative and explicative view as a strategy to identify a common thread of the Greek variant of dialectics. (shrink)

Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose (...) class='Hi'>Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (7) [Currently Displayed]Robbins, Philip (2000) Paradox Twice Lost (8)Fuller, Gary and Slater, Carol W. (2000) "I"-Thoughts: Criteria, Constitution, and Concept Possession (9)Evans, Cedric Oliver (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (3)Bermudez, Jose Luis and Polytechnique, CREA Ecole (1999) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (representation and Mind) (1). (shrink)

This chapter outlines the different types of question posed by the forms of psychological explanations of the behavior of nonlinguistic creatures given in various parts of the cognitive and behavioral sciences. Due to the cognitive turn in the behavioral and cognitive sciences in the modern age, high-level cognitive abilities are being investigated in an ever-increasing number of species and at earliest stages of human development. This chapter explores the development in the scientific study of human characteristics and animal behavior. The (...) new discipline of cognitive ethology is essential in the study of the mental states of animals and of how those mental states manifest themselves in behavior. The three areas of cognitive ethology, developmental, psychological, and cognitive archaeology are becoming ever more closely integrated. Research into animal cognition is now employing the dishabituation paradigm. (shrink)

Ethics normally proceeds by establishing some kind of ground from which norms can be derived for human action. However, no such terra firma is found in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, which instead lays down a sedimentary soil consisting of a blend of nothingness and contingency. This paper aims to show how Sartre is able to build an ethical theory from this seemingly groundless mixture, and it proceeds in three sections. Section one aims to disentangle the relation between the for-itself (...) (pour-soi) and the in-itself (en-soi) from antithetical characterizations by placing them in a state of supervenience. Section two works to explain how both the in-itself and the for-itself are not divided ontologically, but are both in the same ontological state, namely, contingency. And in section three, it is argued that Sartre’s ethics reveals that because human beings share the same thrownness with Others in a world, they have to take title for such a world. Within a Sartrean ethics of nothingness, one’s nothingness leads one to the shared nothingness of Others, of which one must take responsibility. (shrink)

This essay aims to contribute comparative points of contact between two influential figures of nineteenth century aesthetic reflection; namely, Victor Hugo’s artful considerations on architecture in his novel Notre-Dame de Paris and G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophical appraisal of the artform in his Lectures on Fine Art. Although their individual views on architecture are widely recognized, there is scant comparative commentary on these two thinkers, which seems odd because of the relative convergence of their historically situated observations. Owing to this shortage, I (...) note that, while certainly not identical, Hugo and Hegel share an aesthetic family resemblance in how they hold similar ideas on architecture’s symbolic function, cognitive content, and, ultimately, how the artform’s ability to remain a standing paragon of meaning was razed by successive modes of cultural communication. Consequently, the essay works to show some congruent aesthetic affinities between these two great figures, but which appears to be overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

_Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings _is a comprehensive anthology that includes classic and contemporary readings from leading philosophers. Addressing in depth the major topics within philosophy of psychology, the editor has carefully selected articles under the following headings: pictures of the mind commonsense psychology representation and cognitive architecture. Articles by the following philosophers are included: Blackburn, Churchland, Clark, Cummins, Dennett, Davidson, Fodor, Kitcher, Lewis, Lycan, McDowell, McLeod, Rey, Segal, Stich. Each section includes a helpful introduction by the editor which aims (...) to guide the student gently into the topic. The book is highly accessible and provides a broad-ranging exploration of the subject, including discussion of the leading philosophers in the field. Ideal for any student of philosophy of psychology or philosophy of mind. (shrink)

G.W.F. Hegel argues that a philosophy of history should engender comprehension of evil in the world. And yet some commentators have charged his philosophy with transcending mere explication by justifying the existence of these evils. In defense of his words, Hegel famously characterizes evil as a modal mismatch; namely, as the incompatibility between what is given and what ought to be the case. Unfortunately, some readers of Hegel’s grand narrative either continue to struggle with or overlook this fine distinction. Against (...) such readings, I organize my paper into three sections that speak directly to these concerns. In §1, against the concern that Hegel’s view of the “actual world” justifies suffering, it is shown that his philosophy does not endorse the merely extant world, which is a whole world apart from the actual world. In §2, I articulate the premises of Hegel’s Doppelsatz to argue that the famous slogan is not, as some commentators take it, an endorsement of “things as they are.” And in §3, I expose a category error that mistakes an epistemological claim made by Hegel about contingency as a metaphysical assertion in support of evil. Ultimately, I argue that Hegel views evil as neither actual nor necessary nor justified. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Thorstad’s striking claim in Chapter 4 of Inquiry Under Bounds that there are no epistemic norms of inquiry. While we do not find the claim convincing, engaging with Thorstad’s arguments has forced us to take a closer look at assumptions and principles that we, no doubt like many others, have been too quick to take for granted. The paper clarifies different types of norms governing activities such as inquiry and argues that that, even when cognitive frailty, (...) boundedness, and the practical nature of inquiry are taken into account, there still remains a space for what might be termed the project of pure inquiry, governed by purely epistemic norms. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo problematizar o pano de fundo ontológico da natureza em seu significado geológico-climático e seu vínculo antropoceno (estágio geológico de impacto humano); Ela se desenvolve a partir da categoria metafísica de relação – não em seu sentido aristotélico (amplamente compartilhado por Tomás de Aquino, Amor Ruibal e Xavier Zubiri), nem em seu sentido estruturalista ou pós-estruturalista, mas em sua conotação materialista especulativa, para falar com Quentin Meillassoux. O autor destas reflexões já justificou este conceito metafísico (...) de relacionamento como relação em outros manuscritos acadêmicos. A problematização se coloca como um esforço para debater a hipótese de uma rede de interfaces (entendidas como o espaço entre duas fases bioquímicas ou físico-químicas), as conexões lógicas, as complexas (inter-relações complementares ou antagônicas onde nenhum participante detém uma hierarquia) que explicam uma realidade material estranha a qualquer agente cognitivo. Para tanto, o artigo utiliza uma estratégia metodológica estritamente filosófica. Afirma-se, assim, que o bloco conceitual das explicações filosóficas – isto é, a metafísica – possibilita a identificação de um nó (ponto de origem) que dá origem a ramificações epistêmicas de implicações éticas suscetíveis de aterrissagem educacional, estética e política. (shrink)

This chapter provides an argument that intentional ascent requires semantic ascent, on the grounds that intentional ascent requires the ability “to hold a thought in mind” in a way that can only be done if the thought is linguistically vehicled. It tries to explain that there is an important class of thoughts that is in principle unavailable to nonlinguistic creatures. It also explores how language can function as a cognitive tool. Many of these functions do not actually require a full-fledged (...) language. If language is to have a distinctive, unique, and essential cognitive function, so that the difference between linguistic and nonlinguistic cognition is qualitative rather than merely quantitative, then it should be investigated further. The chapter takes into account many aspects of language where language functions as a cognitive tool: memory augmentation; environmental simplification; coordination; transcending path-dependent learning; control loops; and data manipulation and representation. (shrink)

This chapter explains how a theorist might fix an ontology in a way that will allow the theorist to determine what objects a particular non-language-using creature is capable of thinking about—or, in other words, that will elucidate how the creature “carves up” its world into bounded individuals. Among other issues, it explores a version of successful semantics based on the idea that the content of a belief is its utility condition and the content of a desire its satisfaction-condition. Existing versions (...) of success semantics generate a significant problem of indeterminacy. Success semantics originated with some fleeting comments by Frank Ramsey about the beliefs of a chicken in his 1927 article ‘Facts and Propositions’. He commented that the chicken's belief that a certain type of caterpillar is poisonous should be equated with the chicken's abstaining from eating such caterpillars on account of unpleasant experiences connected with them. (shrink)

This chapter examines two theories related to the human character. It explores the differing responses to the questions of psychological explanations of the behavior of nonlinguistic creatures given by the two approaches to the nature of thought outlined earlier, and shows how neither can provide a fully satisfying account of thinking without words. They are Ferge's conception of thoughts as the senses of sentences and Fodor's language of thought hypothesis to the effect that thinking should be understood in terms of (...) the operation of sentence-like formulae in an internal language of thought. Both approaches start off from a single basic assumption, which is that the nature of thought can best be analyzed through the nature of language, but each approach takes a very different view of the essence of language. The chapter reveals Ferge's greater interest in mathematical thoughts than in those expressible by means of a natural language. (shrink)

Forms of thinking that involve thinking about thought are only available to creatures participating in a public language. Thoughts can only be the objects of further thoughts if they have suitable vehicle and the only suitable vehicle is public language sentences. These language-dependent cognitive abilities range from second-order reflection on one's own beliefs and desires and the capacity to attribute thoughts to others to the ability to entertain tensed thoughts and to deploy logical concepts. Many of these language-dependent cognitive abilities, (...) however, have primitive analogues that do not involve intentional ascent and hence are available at the nonlinguistic level. This chapter considers the practical implications this has for the scope and limits of nonlinguistic thought. The chapter explores the question: what types of thinking are in principle unavailable to nonlinguistic creatures? There are two types of intentional ascent, which might be termed explicit and implicit intentional ascent respectively. (shrink)

A theory of nonlinguistic thought is incomplete without an account of nonlinguistic reasoning and the norms of rationality by which such reasoning is governed. This chapter tries to show how an account of nonlinguistic rationality emerges when we pose the question: What could count as evidence that a nonlinguistic creature is behaving rationally? There are several different forms of evidence that can come into play here. At the most sophisticated level, a creature is behaving rationally when it is sensitive to (...) the consequences of different courses of action, but there are types of rationality that do not involve such consequence-sensitivity. Different forms of rationality are appropriate to different types of explanation, and this chapter draws a distinction between level 1 rationality and level 2 rationality that maps onto the distinction between explanations of the type proposed by the minimalist and explanations that make use of belief-desire psychology. (shrink)

This chapter explores how a semantics can be provided for nonlinguistic thoughts in a way that both does justice to philosophical constraints on acceptable theories of content and provides the ethologist or developmental psychologist with a workable method of assigning content to the beliefs and desires of nonlinguistic creatures. The utility condition of a belief is a state of affairs construable in purely extensional terms. Determining an ontology can be no more than the first stage in resolving the problem of (...) indeterminacy. A single state of affairs can be apprehended by a creature in many different ways, and in order to explain how its representations of the environment cause it to behave in the way it does, one can specify not simply the state of affairs it is representing but also how it apprehends that state of affairs. (shrink)

This chapter considers a deflationary or minimalist construal of the nature of nonlinguistic thought that might be deployed to finesse the apparent need to attribute thoughts to creatures that are not language-users. The aim of the minimalist proposal is to show that thinking behavior in nonlinguistic creatures can be understood in nonpropositional and perceptual terms, rather than through the attribution of propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires. In opposition to this the book suggest that there are important types of (...) nonlinguistic thought that cannot be accommodated in the manner proposed by the minimalists. The requirements of psychological explanation often demand that we attribute to nonlinguistic creatures thoughts that are structured, represent the world in a highly determinate way, and reflect the particular mode of presentation under which the creature apprehends its environment. (shrink)

Reasoning and rationality are, of course, correlative notions, and this chapter pursues the question of the forms of inference available at the nonlinguistic level. This chapter provides the psychological explanation by exploring how the notion of practical reasoning might be applied at the nonlinguistic level. It also explores the idea that practical reasoning should be understood in decision-theorem terms. The decision-theoretic model is not required for the explanation of behaviors that are rational either in the level 1 or the level (...) 2 sense. Certain forms of practical reasoning, however, are available at the nonlinguistic level. The chapter also shows how it is possible to identity at the nonlinguistic level certain very basic forms of protological thinking. These basic forms of protological thinking include what is termed as protonegation and protoconditional reasoning. (shrink)

In Thinking about Consciousness David Papineau develops a position that combines the following four theses: A) Phenomenal properties exist. B) Any phenomenal property is identical to some material property. C) Phenomenal concepts refer to material properties that are identical to phenomenal properties. D) Phenomenal concepts are vague. The overall position is intended to do justice to materialism (in virtue of (B) and (C)), while at the same time accommodating the concerns both of those impressed by the Knowledge Argument and related (...) arguments (in virtue of (A)) and of those skeptical about the prospects for a science of consciousness (in virtue of D)). This paper shows that (A) through (D) cannot be held simultaneously. (shrink)

This chapter provides an argument that intentional ascent requires semantic ascent, on the grounds that intentional ascent requires the ability “to hold a thought in mind” in a way that can only be done if the thought is linguistically vehicled. It tries to explain that there is an important class of thoughts that is in principle unavailable to nonlinguistic creatures. It also explores how language can function as a cognitive tool. Many of these functions do not actually require a full-fledged (...) language. If language is to have a distinctive, unique, and essential cognitive function, so that the difference between linguistic and nonlinguistic cognition is qualitative rather than merely quantitative, then it should be investigated further. The chapter takes into account many aspects of language where language functions as a cognitive tool: memory augmentation; environmental simplification; coordination; transcending path-dependent learning; control loops; and data manipulation and representation. (shrink)

Brian Garrett has criticized my diagnosis of the paradox of self-consciousness. In reply, I focus on the classification of 'I'-thoughts, and show how the notion of immunity to error through misidentification can be used to characterize 'I'-thoughts, even though an important class of 'I'-thoughts (those whose expression involves what Wittgenstein called the use of 'I' as object) are not themselves immune to error through misidentification. 'I'-thoughts which are susceptible to error through misidentification are dependent upon those which are not. The (...) dependence here has to do with how a thinker understands what would defeat such thoughts. (shrink)

La voluntad de escapar de la llamada Metafísica de la Presenciase ha convertido en un tópico de la filosofía contemporánea. Sin embargo, tal tópico se relaciona a menudo con el primado de lo actual en el pensamiento antiguo, y con la correspondiente consideración de lo potencial como un modo imperfecto de la existencia. En el presente texto comenzamos por analizar la interpretación tradicional del fundamento de dicho primado en la filosofía de Aristóteles, que presenta una forma teológica. De acuerdo con (...) lo anterior, exploramos en la segunda parte del artículo el modo en que los intentos, por parte del pensamiento moderno, tendentes a erigir un discurso ontológico liberado del primado de la actualidad, han conducido, en algunos casos, a una suerte de Umkehrungque desemboca en una Metafísica de la Ausenciaque conserva la forma teológica y que defiende el primado de lo potencial, lo que resulta especialmente coherente con el Imperiumde lo Virtual característico de las concepciones actuales del tiempo, el lenguaje y el ser y el poder. Finalmente, tratamos de presentar otra interpretación del primado de lo actual en la ética y la metafísica de Aristóteles, que podría caracterizar una filosofía. (shrink)

This critical notice explores the distinction central to analytic philosophy between the logical study of the normative principles governing rational thought and the psychological study of the processes of thinking. Thomas Nagel maintains (1) that the fundamental principles of reasoning have normative force and make claims to universal validity; (2) that the fundamental principles of reasoning cannot be construed as the expression of contingent forms of life; and (3) that the identification of fundamental principles of reasoning should be completely independent (...) of psychological facts about how people reason. The notice draws upon intuitionist critiques of classical logic and the Allais paradox in expected utility theory to argue that (1) can be consistently combined with the denial of (2) and (3). (shrink)