Proponents of epistemic partiality in friendship argue that friendship makes demands of our epistemic lives that are at least inconsistent with the demands of epistemic propriety, and perhaps downright irrational. In this paper, I focus on the possibility that our commitments to our friends distort how we respond to testimony about them, their character, and their conduct. Sometimes friendship might require us to ignore (or substantially underweight) what others tell us about our friends. However, while this practice might help promote (...) your friendship and protect your friends, refusing someone’s testimony can constitute a special kind of insult towards them, according to Allen Hazlett (2017) and Finlay Malcolm (2018). It seems to follow that friendship can require us to insult people by refusing their testimony. This should count against treating your friends with epistemic partiality, one might think. It’s plausible that we have moral reasons not to insult other people, whether they’re our friends or not. The risk of insulting non-friends, it turns out, is just the beginning of the problems for the epistemic partiality in friendship. Recent discussions in social epistemology, led by Miranda Fricker (2007), Kristie Dotson (2011) and José Medina (2012), among others, have brought renewed attention the distinctly epistemic nature of some kinds of injustice. Drawing on this work, I’ll suggest a principled way to determine when epistemic partiality in friendship is morally impermissible because of the genuine risk of harmful epistemic injustice. -/- The paper proceeds as follows. First, I’ll argue that treating our friends with epistemic partiality can involve insulting other people by refusing their testimony. Then I’ll consider whether we ever ought to commit more morally serious testimonial injustices in the name of friendship. After considering some putative cases, I’ll introduce the concept of testimonial injustice, referring primarily to the work of Dotson (2011). I’ll explain how and why the epistemic bias which I’ve prescribed in friendship could be thought to cause such injustice. Drawing on the work of Sheila Lintott (2015), I’ll consider some ways in which the extent of the testimonial injustice caused by bias in friendship might be worse yet, namely, because of the role that homophily plays in determining who we become (and remain) friends with. In particular, I’ll consider whether epistemic partiality perpetuates racist or sexist forms of testimonial injustice. Finally, I’ll attempt to alleviate some of these concerns and determine when we’re morally required to treat friends with epistemic partiality. I’ll argue that whilst protecting a friend’s well-being might require you to cause testimonial injustice, such injustice would be morally unjustified. Accordingly, if you commit such injustice in the name of friendship, you’re morally blameworthy for doing so. This, I suggest, imposes an additional limit on epistemic partiality in friendship. (shrink)

When you don’t believe a speaker’s testimony for reasons that call into question the speaker’s credibility, it seems that this is an insult against the speaker. There also appears to be moral reasons that count in favour of refraining from insulting someone. When taken together, these two plausible claims entail that we have a moral reason to refrain from insulting speakers with our lack of belief, and hence, sometimes, a moral reason to believe the testimony of speakers. Reasons for (...) belief arising from non-epistemic sources are controversial, and it’s often argued that it’s impossible to base a belief on non-epistemic reasons. However, I will show that even if it is possible to base a belief on non-epistemic reasons, in the case of testimonial insult, for many or most cases, the moral reasons for belief don’t need to be the basis of our doxastic response. This is because there are, in many or most cases, either sufficient epistemic reasons for belief, or sufficient moral reasons for action that guide our response to testimony. Reasons from testimonial insult, in many cases, simply lead to overdetermination. Even if there are such moral reasons for belief, they are therefore practically unnecessary in many cases. There are, though, some cases in which they play an important role in guiding belief. This perhaps surprising conclusion is one unexplored way to defend epistemic over pragmatic reasons for belief. (shrink)

Melina Constantine Bell (2021) argues that J. S. Mill's harm principle permits society to coercively interfere with the use of bigoted insults, since these insults are harmful on “a more expansive, modern, conception of harm.” According to Bell, these insults are harmful in virtue of their contributing to detrimental objective states like health problems. I argue that people with illiberal dispositions might have intense and sustained negative subjective reactions to behavior that the harm principle ought to protect, reactions intense enough (...) to affect their health or other objective interests. Bell's way of thinking about harm therefore has illiberal implications. Yet I agree with her that bigoted insults should be regarded as harmful. I therefore propose an alternative way of understanding harm according to which subjective pain is a harm when it is intentionally caused. (shrink)

Some bemoan the incivility of our times, while others complain that people have grown too quick to take offense. There is widespread disagreement about what counts as an insult and when it is appropriate to feel insulted. Here I propose a definition and a preliminary taxonomy of insults. Namely, I define insults as expressions of a lack of due regard. And I categorize insults by whether they are intended or unintended, acts or omissions, and whether they cause offense or (...) not. Unintended insults are of particular concern since greater understanding may help us to avoid them. And insults by omission warrant special consideration because they suggest an interesting extension of Grice’s theory of conversational implicature. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the nature of insults—a subject that has been rather neglected in the philosophical literature. I claim that an insult has to do with causing us to lose face. We save face with regards to everybody else, and thus anybody is supposedly liable to insult us. In this sense, our interlocutor serves both as an individual encountering us face-to-face, and as an audience in front of whom our weaknesses are exposed. When the insult involves something (...) we know to be wrong, we can try and refute it. True insults are harder to tackle, and therefore might hurt more. But we cannot adopt a strategy of not caring about what others think because it is through interactions with them that we explore both our views and identity. (shrink)

This article examines what is wrong with some expressive acts, ‘insults’. Their putative wrongfulness is distinguished from the causing of indirect harms, aggregated harms, contextual harms, and damaging misrepresentations. The article clarifies what insults are, making use of work by Neu and Austin, and argues that their wrongfulness cannot lie in the hurt that is caused to those at whom such acts are directed. Rather it must lie in what they seek to do, namely to denigrate the other. The causing (...) of offence is at most evidence that an insult has been communicated; it is not independent grounds of proscription or constraint. The victim of an insult may know that she has been insulted but not accept or agree with the insult, and thereby submit to the insulter. Hence insults need not, as Waldron argues they do, occasion dignitary harms. They do not of themselves subvert their victims' equal moral status. The claim that hateful speech endorses inequality should not be conflated with a claim that such speech directly subverts equality. Thus, ‘wounding words’ should not unduly trouble the liberal defender of free speech either on the grounds of preventing offence or on those of avoiding dignitary harms. (shrink)

Philosophers often treat racist and sexist slurs as a special sort of puzzle. What is the difference between a slur and its correlates? In attempting to answer this question, a second distinction has been overlooked: that between slurs and insults. What makes a term count as a slur? This is not an unnecessary taxonomical question as long as ableist terms such as ‘moron’ are dismissed as mere insults. Attempts to resolve the insult/slur distinction by considering the communicative content of (...) slurs are not promising. A better solution is offered by speech act theory, and this paper develops a novel way to describe ordinary slurring utterances as oppressive speech acts. This can both explain the difference between slurs and insults, and challenge the dismissal of ableist terms. (shrink)

Should the government censor dangerous anti-vaccination propoganda? Should it restrict the praise of terrorist groups, or speech intended to promote discriminatory attitudes? In other words, should the government curb the advocacy of dangerous ideas and actions (i.e. 'harmful advocacy'), or should the government take a more permissive approach? Strong free speech supporters argue that citizens should be free to engage in and to hear harmful advocacy, arguing that restrictions are deeply objectionable at best, and, at worst, wholly impermissible. To support (...) their position, strong free speech supporters have offered a wide range of arguments and ideas. One of the most interesting arguments revolves around the idea that restrictions on harmful advocacy are deeply insulting to citizens. The worry, broadly understood, is that this kind of censorship is demeaning, treats citizens as though they are stupid, or as though they are children. As such, even when censorship is effective in preventing harms to citizens, it nonetheless comes at the significant political cost of failing to properly respect the citizenry at large. By contrast, so the thought goes, an alternative political scheme that prohibits censorship, or permits it only in exceptional cases, does a better job of respecting citizens as independent, rational, morally responsible agents. This alternative political system may, sometimes, be less effective at preventing speech harms. But it is a political system where citizens can stand tall and hold their heads high. In this paper, I consider and reject three versions of the worry that censorship is insulting. §1 explores the idea that censorship is insulting qua involving a negative appraisal of the citizens being interfered with. The key idea here is that censorship involves a lack of what Stephen Darwall terms ‘appraisal respect’, insofar as the government is suggesting that citizens cannot be trusted to manage their own beliefs and intentions. Drawing on the work of Thomas Nagel, §2 explores the idea that censorship diminishes the political status of citizens. Finally, §3 explores the suggestion that censorship is incompatible with a full appreciation of the thinking nature of citizens, and thus involves a lack of what Darwall would term ‘recognition respect’. The paper argues that censorship is not necessarily premised upon an insulting view of the citizenry. On the contrary, it argues that the best kind of censorship stems from a rich appreciation of the diverse range of capabilities, needs, vulnerabilities, and responsibilities of citizens, as well as the need for co-operation between citizens if societal flourishing is going to be achieved on a large scale. Granted, such a vision places an emphasis on the imperfections and liabilities of citizens – at least when compared to the rather solitary, highly intellectual creature one sometimes finds in the philosophical literature. Still, such a vision of citizens as imperfect falls well short of being genuinely insulting. To err is human. And there’s nothing insulting about being treated like a human. (shrink)

Tarana Burke’s #MeToo movement is about “healing and action. Everything else is a distraction” (Burke 2019). That is, Burke helps people develop local resources for survivors of sexual violence, and local strategies for the prevention of sexual violence: healing and action. This essay is focused on Burke’s “community healing circles.” These are small groups of people who meet to talk about the sexual violence they have suffered. Using her own theory of insults, Daly describes the damaging insult that results (...) from sexual violence, and proposes an explanation of how Burke’s community healing circles help survivors to overcome that harm. She then briefly considers how similar practices could be used in other contexts. Her central contention is that sexual violence expresses a profound lack of respect, and that this tends to diminish survivors’ sense of self-worth. Sharing these experiences with similarly-situated people can help survivors recover their dignity. She proposes two mechanisms involved in this recovery: First, being treated with respect counters the tendency to believe that one does not deserve respect. Second, understanding your experiences can be easier when you see them reflected in another. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the claim, made by G. E. M. Anscombe and J. L. Austin, that you can insult someone by refusing her testimony. I argue that refusing someone’s testimony can manifest doubt about her credibility, which in the relevant cases is offensive to her, given that she presupposed her credibility by telling what she did. I conclude by sketching three applications of my conclusion: to the issue of valuable false belief, to the issue of testimonial injustice, (...) and to the issue of skepticism about testimonial knowledge. (shrink)

In virtue of what does a linguistic act count as an insult? I discuss five main approaches to this question, according to which an insult is determined by (i) the semantic properties of the expression used; (ii) the insulter, her intention, or attitudes; (iii) the addressee and her personal standard; (iv) the features of the speech act performed; and (v) the standard of the relevant social group. I endorse the last, objectivist account, according to which an act x (...) counts as an insult if and only if x is assessed as demeaning when addressed at A by the standard of the relevant social group at t. (shrink)

(2010). Insult to Injury: Ethical Confusion in American Heart Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular Care. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 68-70.

Political Insults proposes a theory of international insult that focuses on interrelations between social identity and power. The book analyses conflicts between the U.S. and North Korea, sovereignty contestations around islands in the Japanese sea, Pussy Riot in Russia, veterans in Ukraine, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

This study aims to investigate the experiences and problems of foreign nationals in Turkey, concerning microaggressions. Thus, it was aimed to find out which types of microaggressions -and at what frequency- are experienced by people who come to Turkey for different reasons like education, pursuit of a better life or escaping from war. The study was conducted in five different cities of Turkey. Students from primary school to university, teachers, parents and doctors took part in the study. The participants were (...) asked the single question “Do you ever experience deliberate or undeliberate insults, whether verbal or behavioral, targeting your ethnic identity and diversity in Turkey?” The results of the study show that microaggression is a very serious problem in Turkey. It can be gathered from the findings that Turkish people are not as tolerant to foreign people as they used to be. Behaviors that make people of foreign origin feel like second-class citizens and alienated take place quite often. Foreigners are usually connected with negative occurrences and they are reminded that they are not welcome in this country. These people are also accused of causing many misfortunes in the country. The study also exhibits that foreign nationals suffer greatly from prejudices about their cultures and they become the target of explicit and direct insults particularly regarding their race. (shrink)

Metaphors are powerful communicative tools because they produce ”framing effects’. These effects are especially palpable when the metaphor is an insult that denigrates the hearer or someone he cares about. In such cases, just comprehending the metaphor produces a kind of ”complicity’ that cannot easily be undone by denying the speaker’s claim. Several theorists have taken this to show that metaphors are engaged in a different line of work from ordinary communication. Against this, I argue that metaphorical insults are (...) rhetorically powerful because they combine perspectives, presupposition, and pragmatics in the service of speech acts with assertoric force. (shrink)

Que se passerait-il si l’on déplaçait les problèmes posés aujourd’hui sous la notion de « blasphème » en les envisageant à travers la catégorie de « l’insulte »? Cet article esquisse cet exercice, en s’appuyant, entre autres, sur les actes de parole d’Austin et sur les performatifs de Judith Butler. Ces discussions de philosophie du droit et du langage ont des implications très concrètes sur la façon dont nous pouvons ressentir et réagir aux multiples points de contact entre ce que (...) nous disons et ce que nous faisons avec des mots. Les sphères du droit, de la politique, de la socialité s’en trouvent sans doute plus profondément affectées que celle de la religion. (shrink)

While compliments are usually intended to give credit and insults offense, the latter cannot simply be treated as opposites of the former. For example, a speaker can give credit to others as well as himself/herself. But while a speaker can offend others, it is less clear that a speaker can offend himself/herself. Understanding why this should be so provides us with a key insight into the nature of insults, namely, that it is predicated on the presumption that some dissimilarity exists (...) between the speaker and the target of the insult. Various interesting implications follow from this insight, allowing us to understand why competitive ritualized exchanges of insults are more commonly attested than are analogous competitions involving compliments; better appreciate the ideological bases of politically correct speech; and adjudicate on the relative merits of various theories of politeness, in particular, on claims concerning the relationship between politeness and face. (shrink)

This article argues that in the contests between Demosthenes and Aeschines, their insulting depictions of each other highlight the mouth as a prominent vehicle for communicating ideas about intemperance. Much of the imagery in the speeches lampoons oratorical delivery, especially vocal tone and deportment, which perceptibly project the speakers' characters. While Demosthenes is a piping chatterbox and Aeschines a voluble shouter, both extremes are characterized by an overuse or misuse of the mouth and its vocal organs. These insulting portrayals of (...) the mouth's capacities contribute to a larger abusive discourse that develops around professional speakers during this period. (shrink)

“A gentleman will not insult me, and no man not a gentleman can insult me.” This enthymeme, widely attributed to Frederick Douglass, suggests a strengthening of the Stoic claim that no insult can disturb the tranquility of the sage. Instead of shielding the Stoic, virtue disarms the assailant attempting the insult. Un-insultability comports better with the Stoic’s concern for the moral welfare of others—even those who mean you harm. The feminist analysis of illocutionary silencing suggests a (...) plausible mechanism for this stronger interpretation. Accordingly, Stoic counsel on insults is reinterpreted in light of J. L. Austin’s theory of speech acts. (shrink)

Adoption is often framed as an alternative to abortion. However, many women feel that pregnancy and birth made them a mother and that this new identity is not erased by the fact they are not raising that child. This article argues that involuntary adoption occurs when legislative coercion deprives a pregnant person of a realistic abortion option, forcing them into this position of being a parent who is not parenting. The article also argues that the moral seriousness of motherhood begins (...) at conception, not because embryos are the moral equivalent of babies, but because that's when the pregnant person becomes a “potential mother” who must make a new set of decisions in response to her status. The reversal of Roe v. Wade has made narrative insight into the dynamics of pre-Roe adoption critical. Therefore, this article offers the stories of a 1969 birth mother's journey from being a teenager who relinquished her birth daughter to becoming a physician working in abortion care and of a 1965 adoptee's effort to reach out to her birthparents at age fifty-four as texts for ethical analysis. (shrink)

Standard conceptions of discrimination cannot account for all that is morally wrong about discrimination, as they cannot explain how individual acts of discrimination wrong not only their direct target but also all members of the targeted social group. In response to this lacuna, I develop a comprehensive account according to which discrimination consists of two interdependent wrongs: to discriminate against B, A must, first, treat B worse than C in a way that is grave enough to make this differential treatment (...) morally wrong; and second, A must do so in a way that is disrespectful to B and to the social group B is perceived to belong to. (shrink)

This paper is about paradigmatic slurs, i.e. expressions that are prima facie associated with the expression of a contemptuous attitude concerning a group of people identified in terms of its origin or descent, race, sexual orientation, ethnia or religion, gender, etc. Our purpose is twofold: explaining their expressive meaning dimension in terms of a version of stereotype semantics and analysing their original and most typical uses as insults, which will be called with a neologism ‘insultive’, in terms of a speech (...) act theory. (shrink)

Do we insult, offend or slight a speaker when we refuse her testimony? Do we compliment, commend or extol a speaker when we accept her testimony? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is “yes”, but only in some instances, since these respective insults and compliments track the reasons a hearer has for rejecting or accepting testimony. When disbelieving a speaker, a hearer may insult her because she judges the speaker to be either incompetent as (...) a knower or insincere as a teller. However, there are many instances where we reject testimony without making this negative evaluation of the speaker, and as such, without paying her an insult. Testimonial compliments are fewer in number, and are not constitutive of “everyday” testimonial exchanges, since, speakers who are competent as knowers and sincere as tellers are merely behaving correctly in accordance with the norms of testifying. Nevertheless, deferring to an authority on belief can be complimentary to that speaker if by doing so we judge her to have some mastery in a particular domain. Testimonial insults and compliments have important moral implications, particularly with regard to epistemic injustice and therapeutic trust. (shrink)

Recent reports published by the United Nations and the World Health Organization suggest that the brain drain of healthcare professionals from the developing to the developed world is decimating the provision of healthcare in poor countries. The migration of these key workers is driven by a combination of economic inequalities and the recruitment policies of governments in the rich world. This article assesses the impact of the healthcare brain drain and argues that wealthy countries have a moral obligation to reduce (...) the flow of healthcare workers from the developing to the developed world. (shrink)

Next SectionThis article proposes that knowledge of cultural expectations concerning ethical responses to unintentional harm can help students and physicians better to understand patients’ distress when physicians fail to disclose, apologise for, and make amends for harmful medical errors. While not universal, the Judeo-Christian traditions of confession, repentance, and forgiveness inform the cultural expectations of many individuals within secular western societies. Physicians’ professional obligations concerning truth telling reflect these expectations and are inclusive of the disclosure of medical error, while physicians (...) may express a need for self-forgiveness after making errors and should be aware that patients may also rely upon forgiveness as a means of dealing with harm. The article recommends that learning how to disclose errors, apologise to injured patients, ensure that these patients’ needs are met, and confront the emotional dimensions of one’s own mistakes should be part of medical education and reinforced by the conduct of senior physicians. (shrink)

Both of the main points in Professor Murphy's paper seem to me clearly and effectively argued.1 It is incontrovertible that some people find hurtful the use of medical technologies to avoid the birth of children who, in the present order of things, would be disabled. No result from the philosophy of language, or anywhere else for that matter, can plausibly show otherwise. Indeed, even to speak of ‘legitimately interpreting’ events that cause one pain as ‘hurtful’, as Murphy does, seems a (...) shade too conciliatory to any who has the temerity to doubt this matter: typically, at least, I don't interpret a state of affairs as hurtful. I experience it so—or not.He's quite right to point out as well that the fact that someone's actions cause another to feel hurt does not, on its own, imply much of anything about the action's propriety. There are many serious people who are deeply distressed by others' reproductive choices that have nothing to do with disability: terminating a pregnancy for any reason causes some people considerable pain. Yet there seems no reason whatever to regard that pain, considered on its own, as a reason that—at least in general terms—should bear on a person's decision concerning whether or not to give birth to the fetus that she is gestating.Expressivist arguments, so understood, then, seem to have had their measure taken. If anyone had the temerity to think that no one is hurt by choices to avoid or end pregnancies because they might lead to the birth of a child who would be disabled, they can drop that thought right now. On the other hand, if someone thought that the hurt suffered by such people constitutes a serious reason for restricting what others can find out about their potential or actual pregnancies, or …. (shrink)

A common assumption is that paternalism generates a special, and especially grievous, insult. Identifying this distinctive insult is then presented as the key to unlocking the concept and determining its moral significance. I submit that there is no special insult. It is, rather, a particular form that a lack of recognition respect can take. Attempting to capture the special insult has led us into confusion. In particular, it has led theorists to abandon the idea that paternalists (...) must act for the sake of the individual whose agency they supplant, and even the notion that paternalistic action requires a distinctive motivation at all. I argue that paternalistic actions must come from a place of care and concern for the paternalised agent and show that this explains the moral significance of paternalism since it tempers the general insult that such actions deliver and provides a partial defence when paternalism is misguided. (shrink)

Sigmund Freud famously described three existential insults to humanity stemming from heliocentrism, evolution, and psychoanalysis. In recent years we are, perhaps, beginning to see the emergence of a fourth: interdependency. Over the last several centuries, Anglo-American culture has modelled itself on a vision of the independent individual – strong, autonomous, and self-sufficient. Yet from feminist theory, communitarianism, disability theory, institutionalist economics, and elsewhere, the evidence mounts that independence is, in most contexts, a myth. We are, in fact, fundamentally social beings: (...) fragile, vulnerable, variously disabled, and intrinsically dependent. In their time, each of the existential insults had profound effects; they forced a re-examination of the self, which rippled throughout the culture and uprooted old practices. This article argues that taking interdependency seriously would similarly lead to profound changes in our culture, our central political concepts, and even our major institutions. (shrink)

David Miguel Gray’s “Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms,” published in this journal in 2025, proposes and defends a novel account of slurs. Here, I give an additional reason in favor of his account: it coheres well with recent philosophical theories of insults. This kind of fortuitous external consistency is a significant theoretical virtue. In this brief response paper, I will summarize Gray’s account of slurs and explain its natural fit with recent philosophical work on insults. After (...) that central task is done, I will make two further observations: in section 3, about the relationship between epistemic and linguistic sources of offense, and in section 4, about a possibility for future research raised by Gray’s taxonomy of negatively valenced terms. (shrink)

Helen's self-disparagement is an anomaly in epic diction, and this is especially true of those instances where she refers to herself as "dog" and "dog-face." This essay attempts to show that Helen's dog-language, in that it remains in conflict with other features of her characterization, has some generic significance for epic, helping to establish the superiority of epic performance over competing performance types which treated her differently. The metaphoric use of χύων and its derivatives has not been well understood: the (...) scholiast's gloss "shameless" is no more than a functional equivalent, and interpretations linking it primarily with reckless courage or with sexual misconduct are not well founded. An analysis of contexts suggests that "dog" as an insult has a fundamental association with physical greed and even cannibalism. The implied notion of avarice, however, may also be extended into other behavioral spheres, including those of fighting and sexuality. A character may also be called "dog" for reviling or slandering another unjustly. These strongly negative implications are out of keeping with the character given to Helen in epic. For where tragedy and lyric generally represent Helen as blameworthy, Homeric epic tends to absolve her of blame and to make her personally as well as physically attractive. The unexpected application of dog-terms to her may therefore be read as an allusion to other versions of the Troy legend which were more hostile to Helen. Negative portrayals of Helen are likely to have figured in the ancient kitharodic narrative which was a precursor of both tragedy and lyric; these are perhaps the unfriendly "songs" mentioned by Helen at Il. 6.357. By referring to such defamatory narratives through the dog-insult and through other instances of Helen's self-blame, the epic performer marks his own more favorable treatment as a generic preference. (shrink)

Beginning in the 1960s, the belief in landscape's degradation provides a kind of rallying cry for psychoanalysts and cultural critics attempting to diagnose the state of contemporary society.

On Tuesday, May 21, the State Duma passed a second reading of the law on the protection of the feelings of believers. While the matter has not reached the third, last reading, I consider it my duty to pay attention to both the respected deputies, and Patriarch Kirill and the heads of other confessions, to a number of points.

From high school cafeterias to the floor of Congress, insult is a truly universal and ubiquitous cultural practice with a long and earthy history. And yet, this most human of human behaviors has rarely been the subject of organized and comprehensive attention—until _Toward a Rhetoric of Insult_. Viewed through the lens of the study of rhetoric, insult, Thomas M. Conley argues, is revealed as at once antisocial and crucial for human relations, both divisive and unifying. Explaining how this (...) works and what exactly makes up a rhetoric of insult prompts Conley to range across the vast and splendidly colorful history of offense. Taking in Monty Python, Shakespeare, Eminem, Cicero, Henry Ford, and the Latin poet Martial, Conley breaks down various types of insults, examines the importance of audience, and explores the benign side of abuse. In doing so, Conley initiates readers into the world of insult appreciation, enabling us to regard insults not solely as means of expressing enmity or disdain, but as fascinating aspects of human interaction. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the encounter between Laius and his son at the crossroads (Soph. OT 802-813) in order to decide whether Oedipus is guilty of killing in excess of self-defense. The measure of danger to his life depends on the weapon, διπλᾶ κέντρα, used by Laius to strike him on the head. On the basis of both literary and iconographical evidence, it is argued that this was, in fact, a double whip rather than a goad, and therefore striking with it (...) was insulting, but not perilous. Furthermore, the way in which Laius travelled is clarified, and his τροχηλάτης is shown to be the same person as κῆρυξ and ἡγεμών, walking ahead and controlling the animals in harness. (shrink)

Historians have often described the rise of a “positivist natural science” as a defining feature of mid-nineteenth century German culture. This chapter argues, however, that “positivist” was not in fact a label that mid-nineteenth-century German scientists claimed for themselves. Indeed, the word was initially far more likely to be assigned to the natural sciences as an insult rather than as praise. In the German intellectual tradition, “positive knowledge” was a concept originally used in law and theology, not in natural (...) science. The concept came to be associated with the natural sciences during a set of contentious debates over educational reform in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s; in these debates, “positive” knowledge was devalued and seen as potentially dangerous to the education of elite young men. (shrink)

What is an appropriate response to insults? The question is not only relevant to contemporary discourse but also once piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. This paper brings Songzi (~382 BCE–~305 BCE), a much-neglected thinker who maintains one should remain indifferent to insults, into the dialogue and discusses how Songzi prompted the Confucian Xunzi to address a long-standing ambiguity within Confucian doctrine. Specifically, the Confucius and Mencius believe that an individual’s internal virtues can shield them from hostile (...) external stimuli, but they also believed that the external environment can and should affect one’s moral life in meaningful ways. In response to Songzi, Xunzi reaffirms the importance of cultivating one’s moral self, including the ability to experience shame in response to one’s own moral lapses, but he also acknowledges that purely external factors can induce negative emotions like shame even in the virtuous. (shrink)

Our attitude towards animals is highly inconsistent. Linguistic evidence of this is the many animal names that we use for characterizing other humans. Although terms like “beastly” draw a clear dividing line between mankind and the animal kingdom, we also see numerous similarities across species and coin expressions such as “eagle eyes” or “ostrich policy.” A treasure trove for such comparisons can be found in animal-based insults with which we mock the appearance or behavior of others. Based on English and (...) German examples, this contribution intends to give some ethological reasons for the fact that we choose specific animals for insulting humans. As this topic has not yet been widely explored, the result can only be a general overview, combining ethological and linguistic aspects. There are many expressions preferably used in “joshing,” but the never-ending creation of new expressions is proof of human creativity. (shrink)

Slurs have become a big topic of discussion both in philosophy and in linguistics. Slurs are usually characterised as pejorative terms, co-extensional with other, neutral, terms referring to ethnic or social groups. However, slurs are not the only ethnic/social words with pejorative senses. Our aim in this paper is to introduce a different kind of pejoratives, which we will call “ethnic/social terms used as insults”, as exemplified in Spanish, though present in many other languages and mostly absent in English. These (...) are ethnic terms like gitano, ‘Romani’, which can have an extensional and neutral use, but also a pejorative meaning building on a negative stereotypical representation of the Romani community. (shrink)

Insults elicit intense emotion. This study tests the hypothesis that one's social image, which is especially salient in honour cultures, influences the way in which one reacts to an insult. Seventy-seven honour-oriented and 72 non-honour oriented participants answered questions about a recent insult episode. Participants experienced both anger and shame in reaction to the insult. However, these emotions resulted in different behaviours. Anger led to verbal attack (i.e., criticising, insulting in return) among all participants. This relationship was (...) explained by participants’ motivation to punish the wrongdoer. Shame, on the other hand, was moderated by honour. Shame led to verbal disapproval of the wrongdoers behaviour, but only among the honour-oriented participants. This relationship was explained by these participants’ motivation to protect their social image. By contrast, shame led to withdrawal among non-honour-oriented participants. (shrink)

This chapter critically assesses three related objections to paternalism: that paternalism is prompted by insulting motives (the motive-based objection), that paternalism expresses an insulting message (the expressive objection), and that paternalism denies the moral equality of those subject to it (the status-based objection). Such objections have been pressed most prominently by Seana Shiffrin and Jonathan Quong. This chapter argues that none of these insult-based objections shows that there is anything even presumptively wrong about successful paternalistic intervention. Three of its (...) central arguments are that the paternalist agent’s motives are probably irrelevant to the permissibility of her behavior, that any message expressed by effective paternalistic intervention is likely to be true and thus unobjectionable, and that treating someone as though she is unlikely to make a good choice does not involve denying that she possesses capacities that are important to her status as an equal. (shrink)

Pre-publication certification through peer review stands in need of philosophical examination. In this paper, philosopher-psychologist Steven James Bartlett recalls the arguments marshalled four hundred years ago by English poet John Milton against restraint of publication by the "gatekeepers of publication," AKA today's peer reviewers.