ArgumentSmallpox inoculation was introduced in Europe in the early eighteenth century and has been considered the first mass treatment of disease based on practical use of probability calculations and mathematical tools of computation. The article argues that these new approaches were deeply entangled with other rationalities, most emphatically that of exemplarity. Changes in inoculation methods around mid-century gradually changed the conceptualization of disease, seeing all cases as fundamentally equal, and thus making it more relevant to count them. Arithmetic (...) changed the ways of thinking about smallpox epidemics, but new ways of conceptualizing disease were vital to making it a matter of arithmetic at all. The article investigates what happened when numbers and figures were introduced into medical matters: Who did the figures really concern, and what types of argument were they fitted into? How were numbers transformed into metaphors, and how did quantitative argument work together with arguments from exemplarity? (shrink)

This study examines the effectiveness of the inoculation strategy in countering vaccine-related misinformation among Hong Kong college students. A three-phase between-subject experiment was conducted to compare the persuasive effects of inoculation messages, supportive messages, and no message control. The results show that inoculation messages were superior to supportive messages at generating resistance to misinformation, as evidenced by more positive vaccine attitudes and stronger vaccine intention. Notably, while we expected the inoculation condition would produce more resistance than (...) the control condition, there was little evidence in favor of this prediction. Attitudinal threat and counterarguing moderated the experimental effects; issue involvement and political trust were found to directly predict vaccine attitudes and intention. The findings suggest that future interventions focus on developing preventive mechanisms to counter misinformation and spreading inoculation over the issue is an effective strategy to generate resistance to misinformation. Interventions should be cautious about using health advocacy initiated by governments among populations with low political trust. (shrink)

This paper advocates for a shift from insular paternalism to developmental paternalism in education, contending that students' engagement with erroneous ideas is crucial for building the ability to resist harmful notions and support democracy. The proposed inoculative approach exposes students to problematic ideas, guiding them through the process of overcoming these beliefs using the pedagogy of relation. The author employs behavioral economics to explore the shortcomings of insular paternalism and the early Christian notion of metanoia to explain the importance of (...) changing one's mind. This developmentally-informed approach fosters rational thinking and curbs extremist ideologies. The paper asserts that prioritizing an inoculative approach over an insulatory one equips students to navigate the complexities of the modern world and uphold democratic values. (shrink)

Toxic speech inflicts individual and group harm, damaging the social fabric upon which we all depend. To understand and combat the harms of toxic speech, philosophers can learn from epidemiology, while epidemiologists can benefit from lessons of philosophy of language. In medicine and public health, research into remedies for toxins pushes in two directions: individual protections (personal actions, avoidances, preventive or reparative tonics) and collective action (specific policies or widespread “inoculations” through which we seek herd immunity). This paper is the (...) beginning of a project of identifying potential inoculations and antidotes to toxic speech. The essay brings a social practice theory of language, with special reliance on language‐games and inferential roles, into conversation with concepts from the study of biologic toxins. Some speech harms are acute while others are chronic and insidious; they have different methods of delivery, come in variable doses, and not everyone is equally susceptible to the power to harm. I argue that of the many kinds of challenges we might issue against toxic speech, challenging its expressive commitments has the greatest potential to stop the damage. The essay explores the different sorts of protections that inoculations and antidotes might offer against discursive toxins and sketches how to imagine these in the practices that govern our speech. The paper does not make policy recommendations, but an epidemiology of discursive toxicity reveals several kinds of “more speech” that might fight against “bad speech.”. (shrink)

In this paper, we will explore how Albert Camus has much to offer philosophers of education. Although a number of educationalists have attempted to explicate the educational implications of Camus’ literary works, these analyses have not attempted to extrapolate pedagogical guidelines towards developing an educational framework for children’s philosophical practice in the way Matthew Lipman did from John Dewey’s philosophy of education, which informed his philosophy for children curriculum and pedagogy. We focus on the phenomenology of inquiry; that is, inquiry (...) that begins with genuinely felt doubt, pointing to a problematic to which the inquirer seeks a solution or resolution. We argue that the central purpose of education is to develop lucid individuals. To this end, we concentrate on Dewey and the pragmatist tradition, starting from Peirce, leading to Lipman’s development of Dewey’s educational guidelines into classroom practice. We show where Camus and the pragmatists are congruent in their thinking, insofar as they can inform the educative process of the community of inquiry. What we conclude is that the role of the teacher is to develop lucid individuals facilitated in a classroom that is transformed into a community of inquiry embedded in contemporary historical moments. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of the relation between political populism and mass media, and how this relation becomes problematic for democratic societies. It focuses on the fact that mass media, due to their purpose and infrastructure, can unintentionally reinforce populist messages. Research findings from communication science and political psychology are used to illustrate how, for example, a combination of mass media agenda setting and motivated reasoning can influence citizens’ political decisions and impair their political autonomy. This poses a particular (...) normative challenge for modern democracies: how to counter these populism-supporting effects within the constraints of democratic legitimacy? After showing how severely limited legal measures to curb populist media effects would be, the paper argues in favour of media competence education as a way of providing future citizens with an epistemic toolkit to navigate the media environment and strengthen their political autonomy. (shrink)

The episodes of cowpox inoculation (1798) and rabies preventive treatment (1885) are celebrated as the landmark of modern medicine. Paradoxically, these two advances have been accomplished without any theoretical breakthrough in the understanding of immunity. Going further, they were made possible by a long past of empirical procedures among which smallpox inoculation played an outstanding role. The paper explores the paradox of 'Immunization without Immunology' and Pasteur's reconstruction of the past, through his successful use of a metaphor. 'Vaccine', (...) originally linked to the jennerian method, was meant by Pasteur to designate a general program of virus attenuation. The paper investigates the scientific factors accounting for why viruses played such a leading role in immunization. The longlasting immunity, the easy transmission from man to man characteristic of smallpox allowing in vivo experimentation, may explain how crude procedures of early immunizers shaped scientific ideologies and strategies of public health and family initiated modern 'vaccinology'. (shrink)

ArgumentThe border in turn-of-the-century Argentina was a place of heightened anxiety. State officials ignored the nation's vast land borders and focused on the port, located in the capital city of Buenos Aires, which attracted nearly six million European immigrants in the decades after 1870. Federal authorities were seeking to attract new immigrants and yet they were terrified that opening their gates would allow entry among the potential citizenry a new category of “toxins” dangerous to the national body. The authorities hired (...) physicians as gatekeepers to identify desirable and undesirable traits that went beyond the definition of communicable disease. Science and medicine appeared to provide a means of legitimating a variety of attempts by the state to control the makeup of the population; in reality, the state's power to inspect immigrants for disease, racial toxins, social upheaval, and political instability was minimized by realistic decisions to open borders and by a weak and limited ability to control the influx of people. Alongside calls for immigrant selection there coexisted a strong trend in political discourse that sought to build a unified, homogenous national culture by accepting and assimilating the foreign masses. Both approaches, however, had similar goals – the material progress of the nation, the advancement of Argentina's “civilization,” and the erasure of traces of “foreignness” among the new population. (shrink)

In On Immunity: An Inoculation, essayist and author Eula Biss has given academics and clinicians interested in the public’s skepticism of vaccines, and of science skepticism more generally, a fresh look at what drives these phenomena. Despite public health’s continued success in maintaining high rates of coverage for vaccines across the United States, recent measles, mumps, and rubella outbreaks in the U.S. have harmed lives and indicate cracks in the vaccine uptake façade. From a public health perspective, it’s all (...) hands on deck to make sure vaccine coverage stays high. Biss’s outsiders’ view of these issues offers bioethicists, public health practitioners, and physicians much... (shrink)

AI-enabled services, such as chatbots and generative systems, are often unable to generate correct information per user request, thus creating user resistance and preventing the smooth diffusion of AI services. Previous research has mostly addressed how to improve AI responses but fails to consider user resistance against misinformation from AI. Based on inoculation theory and a heuristic systematic model, this chapter discusses the cognitive mechanisms of inoculation effects on using AI chatbots by addressing questions on how users construe (...) inoculation messages and how the messages influence users’ resistance against misinformation. How inoculation confers resistance to users provides important implications for theory and practice. The chapter found that inoculation messages alleviate the negative effects of misinformation from AI chatbots on user interaction. It renders a critical perspective of how the theory can be conceptually extended to misinformation and how the theoretical frame can be used practically. (shrink)

This paper introduces three new concepts: epistemic health, epistemic immunity, and epistemic inoculation. Epistemic health is a measure of how well an entity (e.g. person, community, nation) is functioning with regard to various epistemic goods or ideals. It is constituted by many different factors (e.g. possessing true beliefs, being disposed to make reliable inferences), is improved or degraded by many different things (e.g. research funding, social trust), and many different kinds of inquiry are relevant to its study. Epistemic immunity (...) is the robustness with which an entity is resistant to performing certain kinds of epistemic activity, such as questioning certain ideas, believing certain sources, or making certain inferences. Epistemic inoculation occurs when social, political or cultural processes cause an entity to become immune to engaging in certain epistemic activities. After outlining each of these concepts, we close by considering some of the risks associated with attempts to improve others’ epistemic health. (shrink)

Ken Daley has argued that cognitive enhancements aiming to improve evaluative judgment and self-control should be permissible on the same grounds as vaccinations: both reduce susceptibility to harm without causing comparable detriment. In this commentary, I argue that this analogy collapses upon closer inspection. I contend that Daley’s proposal faces a dilemma: it must be interpreted either as a form of moral enhancement or as an enhancement of prudential judgment. If the former, it entangles the vaccine analogy in the debate (...) regarding compulsory bioenhancement, raising intractable problems regarding autonomy and the imposition of contested values that do not apply to somatic medicine. If the latter, I argue that such enhancements would structurally bias decision-making toward safety. This ‘hyper-prudence’ would not merely reduce harmful recklessness but could inadvertently eliminate the ‘poor judgment’ required for transformative human achievements and political solidarity—risks that are often only vindicated retrospectively. Finally, I argue that the transformative nature of such enhancements undermines the possibility of the very informed consent that the vaccination model presumes. (shrink)

To maximally flourish, the social sciences must be inoculated against parasitic ideas (e.g., postmodernism) and suicidal empathy (e.g., an epistemology of care), both of which arise when the pursuit of truth is confounded with social justice activism. Furthermore, the social sciences currently exist in disorganized if not incoherent silos of knowledge void of an organizing meta-theory. The evolutionary lens provides such a unifying framework whilst engendering the requisite consilience.

ABSTRACT: This paper draws on Michel Foucault’s work to offer a critique of how two problems – COVID 19 and the racism that gave rise to the 2020 racial uprisings – were conjoined under one language of disease and, consequently, one model of disease management. Drawing on Foucault’s account of apparatuses [ dispositifs ] of security, it argues that the conjunction of COVID and racism tacitly invokes what I call a model of inoculation, wherein the goal is to nullify (...) and normalize a threat. Invoking this inoculation model by analogizing COVID and racism tacitly oriented understandings of both what the problem around the racial uprisings was and how it ought to be solved. I argue that this analogy mobilized anti-racist practices toward stabilizing reforms over potentially more thoroughgoing societal changes. (shrink)

During a smallpox epidemic in April 1721, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu asked Dr. Charles Maitland to "engraft" her daughter, thus instigating the first documented inoculation for smallpox (_Variola_ virus) in England. Engrafting, or variolation, was a means of conferring immunity to smallpox by placing pus taken from a smallpox pustule under the skin of an uninfected person to create a local infection. The introduction of infectious viral matter, however, could trigger fullblown smallpox, and the practice was controversial for both (...) this reason and the pervasive conviction that it was immoral to intentionally infect a human body. Eventually, engrafting was phased out altogether in favor of vaccination, a much safer procedure established by Edward Jenner in the late eighteenth century. Montagu's decision was influenced by her experiences in Constantinople, where she had spent a year, and where engrafting was commonplace. As a smallpox survivor herself, Montagu had taken an interest in Turkish inoculation practices, and had had her son Edward engrafted while in Turkey. She was not the first person to import the idea of smallpox inoculation to England, nor the first English person to have their child inoculated (other English children had been inoculated while visiting Turkey), yet she quickly became known for importing and popularizing smallpox inoculation. At the request of her acquaintances, she took her inoculated daughter with her on a round of visits into elite households to demonstrate the safety of the procedure. The reputation she gained was both positive and negative: monuments were erected in her honor, encomiastic poems were published, and Voltaire declared her "a woman of as fine a genius, and endued with as great a strength of mind as any of her sex in the British Kingdoms"; however, anti-inoculationists ridiculed her, some society figures regarded her warily, and Alexander Pope satirized her in his poetry. Montagu’s pioneering role in the smallpox debate is undoubtedly significant: she instigated the first smallpox inoculation on English soil, and she was largely responsible for making the practice acceptable in elite circles. My interest in this essay is in the nature and significance of Montagu’s reputation as an inoculation pioneer. I will argue that her reputation was based on the particular combination of her social position as a Whig and an aristocratic woman; her interest in progressive and enlightened forms of social, political, and scientific thought; her standing in influential literary circles; and, not least, the force of her own personality. In broad terms, I offer Montagu’s involvement in the smallpox debate as a case study in a new kind of public role becoming available to elite women in the early eighteenth century — a role that caused considerable discomfort among her peers and in the medical community, and one that stimulated a widespread controversy in print publications of the day. (shrink)

Modern public-health initiatives in industrialized countries revolve around immunization against contagious diseases. The practice of engendering immunity against disease through disease first emerged in Western European social and medical landscapes in the eighteenth century as inoculation, based on the imported Middle Eastern practice of ‘engrafting’. By the nineteenth century, this practice had evolved into the procedure of vaccination, in the first instance directed against smallpox. Popular and academic narratives thus often categorize inoculation as a procedure from the Middle (...) East which was transformed into the truly scientific procedure of vaccination by English and French knowledge. This characterization has obscured the complex traditions of intellectual exchange between English and French networks and Middle Eastern societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This article examines these networks in order to show how knowledge was transformed as it circulated between communities during this period. Both Western Europeans and Egyptians across different social hierarchies translated foreign or new medical practices according to the needs of their knowledge and goals, creating cycles of adoption and adaptation. This exploration of inoculation and vaccination furthers our understanding of the bilateral translation processes ingrained in the global circulation of knowledge. (shrink)

In its recent review of the US Public Health Service Sexually Transmitted Disease Inoculation Study, conducted in Guatemala from 1946 to 1948, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues identified a number of egregious ethical violations, but failed to adequately address issues associated with the intentional exposure research design in particular. As a result, a common public misconception that the study was wrong because researchers purposefully infected their subjects has been left standing. In fact, human subjects have (...) been exposed to disease pathogens for experimental purposes for centuries, and this study design remains an important scientific tool today. It shares key features with other types of widely accepted research on human subjects and can be conducted ethically, provided certain safeguards are implemented. That these safeguards were not implemented in Guatemala is what made that study wrong, rather than the fact of intentional exposure itself. To preserve public trust in the clinical research enterprise, this conclusion ought to be stated explicitly and emphasised. (shrink)

"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics," said Twain—or was it Disraeli? Even if statistics are honest, they submerge individual differences in generality. On a hostile interpretation, statistics are a deceiver's toolkit, a numerical expression of the tyranny of the average, a power capable of denaturing anything it touches. Many a clinical trial boasts results with statistical, albeit not clinical, significance.1For the hater of statistics Swift's "A Modest Proposal" is a locus classicus. Purporting to correct the (...) "computations" of other pamphleteers, the narrator of this masterpiece of irony gives a numerical cast to his argument for the butchering of human yearlings as the solution to... Read More. (shrink)

In this paper, we critically consider the analogy between “infodemic” and “pandemic”, i.e. the spread of fake news about COVID-19 as a medial virus and the infection with the biological virus itself from the perspective of cultural evolutionary theory (CET). After confronting three major shortcomings of the ‘infodemic’ concept, we use CET as a background framework to analyze this phenomenon. To do so, we summarize which bi-ases are crucial for transmission in terms of cultural selection and how transmission is restricted (...) by filter bubbles or echo chambers acting as TRIMS (transmission isolating mechanisms) post “infection”, which isolate false from trustworthy scientific information in the context of the Corona pandemic. This is followed by a demonstration of the threat to biological fitness posed by the effects of an infection with fake news, which leads to a reduced willingness to vaccinate and follow health measures. We identify fake news on Covid as pseudoscience, trying to immunize itself from external influences. We then address the question of how to combat the infodemic. Since debunking strategies, such as warnings by fact-checking, have proven relatively ineffective in combating fake news, the inoculation theory from psychology might offer an alternative solution. Through its underlying ‘prebunking strategy’, which educates individuals about the risks and tactics of fake news prior to a potential infection, they could be ‘immunized’ in advance, similar to a virological vaccination. Although we recognize that the pandemic/infodemic analogy is in fact far from perfect, we believe that CET could provide a theoretical underpinning in order to give much more semantic depth to the concept ‘infodemic’. (shrink)

The necessity of a calculation aiming to evaluate a risk can be revoked in doubt when the question is to make a decision in a situation of uncertainty, all the more when the question is about life or death. In the controversy opened on the opportunity to inoculate the smallpox, D'Alembert’s position constitutes an exemplary case of scepticism concerning the application of the mathematics, and in this particular case the probability theory, to decisions relative to the human life. D’Alembert, indeed, (...) disputes in the social mathematics the power to describe human phenomena by looking for regularities and for formalizations without separating the mathematical and probability dimensions of the philosophic and ethical ones. By following the debate which, in the middle of the 18th century, takes place between the French mathematician and his Swiss counterpart Daniel Bernoulli, we attend one of the episodes of the slow gestation of the notions of risk-taking, decision and rationality. (shrink)

Au xviie siècle, la question de la durée de la vie fait l’objet d’un nouveau traitement en termes d’arithmétique politique. Cette mathématisation, avec la construction de la notion de « vie moyenne », permet une intégration de l’art de prolonger la vie aux techniques de gouvernement. Élaborée dans le cadre des pratiques financières de rentes viagères, la notion émigre vers l’économie politique, où la vie n’est plus conçue comme support d’intérêts mais comme force productive. Le problème se pose alors en (...) termes de philosophie politique : le pouvoir peut-il se fonder sur des impératifs de maximisation de la vie moyenne pour contraindre ses sujets? La question fut posée au sujet de l’inoculation de la petite vérole. Dans le débat qui déchira les Lumières françaises, c’est en réalité la question du fondement de ce que Michel Foucault appelait le biopouvoir qui est en jeu. (shrink)

This chapter debunks the common idea that the Church opposed or banned dissection, autopsies, anesthetic, and inoculation. In reality, it championed all of these. The key roles of John William Draper and Andrew Dickson White in popularizing and disseminating the false narrative are highlighted by analyzing their respective texts (_History of the Conflict_ and _A History of the Warfare_), and some modern examples of the myths are also analyzed. This chapter includes a helicopter view of the history of medicine, (...) and of attitudes within Christendom toward the subject. It concludes that the overall contribution of Christianity to medicine has been a positive one, not a negative one. (shrink)

Infodemics fuel the proliferation of misinformation and disinformation, often outpacing the effectiveness of existing countermeasures. Current interventions—such as debunking and psychological inoculation—typically address either specific instances of false or misleading content or the known manipulative tactics through which such content spreads. While these approaches are effective and scalable, most remain inherently corrective and struggle to anticipate shifts in the disinformation landscape. In this paper, we argue for a theoretical shift in paradigm towards a proactive framework to address disinformation: we (...) propose a content-agnostic model grounded in the identification of recurring linguistic, narrative, logical, and critical thinking patterns that characterize manipulative disinformation prone to virality. By identifying these structural “fingerprints” of disinformation, our framework aims to open new avenues for a research agenda that could inform new inoculation strategies to promote individual and collective resilience. If inoculation provides the methodological foundation for building resistance to manipulation, then identifying structural “fingerprints” provides the core “antigens” that such intervention can target. This, in turn, could enable people to recognize and resist manipulation regardless of the topic, medium, or context through which manipulatory content is delivered. We argue that this approach may offer a sustainable path to building long-term resilience in the face of an evolving and increasingly complex and challenging information ecosystem. (shrink)

So far the book has worked on the assumption that the confrontation with contrary evidence always requires rational believers to reduce their credence in the relevant propositions. This chapter introduces the notion of “evidential preemption,” which occurs when a testifier, in addition to offering testimony that _p_, also warns the hearer that others will try to persuade them of contrary views. This chapter argues that whenever it is rational for someone to accept the “ground-level” testimony on offer, it is also (...) rational for them to accept the warning about what others will tell them. When they are subsequently confronted with this testimony, its evidential force has effectively been neutralized, since it is, essentially, information the subject has already conditionalized on. In this way, evidential preemption can serve as a tool for “epistemic inoculation,” all but ensuring that subjects cannot make beneficial use of the contrary evidence to correct their beliefs. (shrink)

With increasing inoculations and emerging coronavirus variants, governments worldwide are challenged to adopt proper liberty-restricting measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19 and minimise grave consequences for liberty and well-being caused by over a year-long pandemic. Cameron et al ’s proposal of a selective strategy addresses this pressing issue.1 Following Savulescu and Cameron, they argue for limiting the liberty of the elderly. But, instead of claiming not doing so is an instance of wrongful levelling down equality, they argue this discriminative (...) strategy is morally acceptable.2 I argue against the selective liberty-restrictive measures after proposing a revision of the five-limb proportionality test that plays a pivotal role in supporting their argument. The following is a reconstruction of Cameron et al ’s central argument: It is ethically acceptable to promote the best outcome. One way to promote the best outcome is to maximise utility at the population level without imposing unreasonable costs on the most vulnerable individuals. All else being equal, adopting selective liberty-restricting measures in the COVID-19 pandemic is the best way to maximise utility at the population level without imposing unreasonable costs on the most vulnerable individuals. If it is ethically acceptable to …. (shrink)

The bite of the lone star tick spreads alpha‐gal syndrome (AGS), a condition whose only effect is the creation of a severe but nonfatal red meat allergy. Public health departments warn against lone star ticks and AGS, and scientists are working to develop an inoculation to AGS. Herein, we argue that if eating meat is morally impermissible, then efforts to prevent the spread of tickborne AGS are also morally impermissible. After explaining the symptoms of AGS and how they are (...) transmitted via ticks, we argue that tickborne AGS is a moral bioenhancer if and when it motivates people to stop eating meat. We then defend what we call the Convergence Argument: If x‐ing prevents the world from becoming a significantly worse place, doesn't violate anyone's rights, and promotes virtuous action or character, then x‐ing is strongly pro tanto obligatory; promoting tickborne AGS satisfies each of these conditions. Therefore, promoting tickborne AGS is strongly pro tanto obligatory. It is presently feasible to genetically edit the disease‐carrying capacity of ticks. If this practice can be applied to ticks carrying AGS, then promoting the proliferation of tickborne AGS is morally obligatory. (shrink)

Slurs are incendiary terms so much that many ordinary speakers and theorists deny that sentences containing them can ever be true, and utterances where they occur embedded within normally "quarantining" contexts, like conditionals and indirect reports, are still typically offensive. At the same time, however, many speakers and theorists also find it obvious that sentences containing slurs can be true; and there are clear cases where embedding does inoculate a speaker from the slur's offensiveness. I argue that four standard accounts (...) of the "other" element that differentiates slurs from their more neutral counterparts semantic content, perlocutionary effect, presupposition, and conventional implicature all fail to account for this puzzling mixture of intuitions about truth, and for this mixture of projection and quarantining. Instead, I propose that slurs make two distinct, coordinated contributions to a sentence's conventional communicative role: predication of group membership and endorsement of a derogating perspective on the group. Predication of group membership is "at issue" by default, but different semantic and conversational contexts can alter the relative prominence and scope of the two contributions. (shrink)

In this paper1 I shall present not just the conscience of Huckleberry Finn but two others as well. One of them is the conscience of Heinrich Himmler. He became a Nazi in 1923; he served drably and quietly, but well, and was rewarded with increasing responsibility and power. At the peak of his career he held many offices and commands, of which the most powerful was that of leader of the S.S. - the principal police force of the Nazi regime. (...) In this capacity, Himmler commanded the whole concentration-camp system, and was responsible for the execution of the so-called ‘final solution of the Jewish problem’. It is important for my purposes that this piece of social engineering should be thought of not abstractly but in concrete terms of Jewish families being marched to what they think are bath-houses, to the accompaniment of loud-speaker renditions of extracts from The Merry Widow and Tales of Hoffman, there to be choked to death by poisonous gases. Altogether, Himmler succeeded in murdering about four and a half million of them, as well as several million gentiles, mainly Poles and Russians. The other conscience to be discussed is that of the Calvinist theologian and philosopher Jonathan Edwards. He lived in the first half of the eighteenth century, and has a good claim to be considered America’s first serious and considerable philosophical thinker. He was for many years a widely-renowned preacher and Congregationalist minister in New England; in 1748 a dispute with his congregation led him to resign (he couldn’t accept their view that unbelievers should be admitted to the Lord’s Supper in the hope that it would convert them); for some years after that he worked as a missionary, preaching to Indians through an interpreter;, then in 1758 he accepted the presidency of what is now Princeton University, and within two months died from a smallpox inoculation. Along the way he wrote some first-rate philosophy: his book attacking the notion of free will is still sometimes read.. (shrink)

As a general rule, whenever a hearer is justified in forming the belief that p on the basis of a speaker’s testimony, she will also be justified in assuming that the speaker has formed her belief appropriately in light of a relevantly large and representative sample of the evidence that bears on p. In simpler terms, a justification for taking someone’s testimony entails a justification for trusting her assessment of the evidence. This introduces the possibility of what I will call (...) “evidential preemption.” Evidential preemption occurs when a speaker, in addition to offering testimony that p, also warns the hearer of the likelihood that she will subsequently be confronted with apparently contrary evidence: this is done, however, not so as to encourage the hearer to temper her confidence in p in anticipation of that evidence, but rather to suggest that the (apparently) contrary evidence is in fact misleading evidence or evidence that has already been taken into account. Either way, the speaker is signalling to the hearer that the subsequent disclosure of this evidence will not require her to significantly revise her belief that p. Such preemption can effectively inoculate an audience against future contrary evidence, and thereby creates an opening for a form of exploitative manipulation that I will call “epistemic grooming.” Nonetheless, I argue, not all uses of evidential preemption are nefarious; it can also serve as an important tool for guiding epistemically limited agents though complex evidential scenarios. (shrink)

Scientific realists don’t standardly discriminate between, say, biology and fundamental physics when deciding whether the evidence and explanatory power warrant the inclusion of new entities in our ontology. As such, scientific realists are committed to a lush rainforest of special science kinds (Ross, 2000). Viruses certainly inhabit this rainforest – their explanatory power is overwhelming – but viruses’ properties can be explained from the bottom up: reductive explanations involving amino acids are generally available. However, reduction has often been taken to (...) lead to a metaphysical downgrading, so how can viruses keep their place in the rainforest? In this paper, we show how the inhabitants of the rainforest can be inoculated against the eliminative threat of reduction: by demonstrating that they are emergent. According to our account, emergence involves a screening off condition as well as novelty. We go on to demonstrate that this account of emergence, which is compatible with theoretical reducibility, satisfies common intuitions concerning what should and shouldn’t count as real: viruses are emergent, as are trout and turkeys, but philosophically gerrymandered objects like trout-turkeys do not qualify. (shrink)

Empirical social sciences routinely model misinformation as exhibiting dynamics analogous to vaccinable diseases or contagious outbreaks, as in inoculation theory and other epidemiological models. However, idiosyncratic features of the social construction of misinformation violate the biological analogy in significant ways, rendering these models far weaker in effect size, predictive accuracy, and explanatory power than has been claimed. Four arguments are discussed regarding problems with the ontology of misinformation posited in these models, methods for measuring misinformation, individuation of mechanisms, and (...) application of interventions. A conclusion is drawn that model transfer from biology has often been unwarranted in misinformation studies and that alternative methods should be pursued instead. (shrink)

Halvorson argues that the semantic view of theories leads to absurdities. Glymour shows how to inoculate the semantic view against Halvorson's criticisms, namely by making it into a syntactic view of theories. I argue that this modified semantic-syntactic view cannot do the philosophical work that the original "language-free" semantic view was supposed to do.

On the shared-­ends account of close friendship, proper care for a friend as an agent requires seeing yourself as having important reasons to accommodate and promote the friend’s valuable ends for her own sake. However, that friends share ends doesn't inoculate them against disagreements about how to pursue those ends. This paper defends the claim that, in certain circumstances of reasonable disagreement, proper care for a friend as a practical and moral agent sometimes requires allowing her judgment to decide what (...) you are to do, even when you disagree with her judgment (and even when her judgment is in fact mistaken). In these instances, your friendship can make it the case that you may not act on your own practical and even moral judgments because, at those times, you have a duty as her close friend to defer to her judgments. As a result, treating your friend properly as a responsible agent can require that you assist her in committing what may in fact be serious moral wrongs. (shrink)

I argue that there has been inadequate attention to and questioning of the dominance and normativity of whiteness in the cultural construction of bioethics in the United States. Therefore we risk reproducing white privilege and white supremacy in its theory, method, and practices. To make my argument, I define whiteness and trace its broader social and legal history in the United States. I then begin to mark whiteness in U.S. bioethics, recasting Renee Fox's sociological marking of its American-ness as an (...) important initial marking of its whiteness/WASP ethos. Furthermore, I consider the attempts of social scientists to highlight sociocultural diversity as a corrective in U.S. bioethics. I argue that because they fail to problematize white dominance and normativity and the white-other dualism when they describe the standpoints of African-American, Asian-American, and Native-American others, their work merely inoculates difference and creates or maintains minoritized spaces. Accordingly, the dominant white center of mainstream U.S. bioethics must be problematized and displaced for diversity research to make a difference. In conclusion, I give several examples of how we might advance the recommended endeavor of exploring our own ethnicity, class, and other social positioning and norms operating in U.S. bioethics, briefly highlighting "white talk" as one challenge. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars [1962: 1] described philosophy as an attempt to ‘understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term’. But it is distinctive of philosophy that many of us are interested not only in how the world is but in ways that it could be. That is, philosophy is concerned with facts about modality. Some of the most important arguments in philosophy hinge on modal premises, and philosophers have (...) typically assumed special expertise in evaluating these modal premises. Replicating Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird’s [2000] study of modal illusions, we show that training in mathematics and not philosophy predicts success in overcoming such illusions (n = 395). This study is the first to test the modal expertise of professional philosophers directly. Our findings undermine claims to modal expertise. Philosophical training does not inoculate expert philosophers against basic mistakes in modal judgment. (shrink)

In his book Prejudice, Endre Begby argues that people who hold paradigmatically prejudiced beliefs – for example, the belief that women are less adept at math than men – might be fully rational in holding those beliefs. In this article, I argue that Begby fails to provide compelling examples of beliefs that are both rational and prejudiced. On Begby’s account, whether a belief is prejudiced is determined by its content: it follows that any two token beliefs with the same content (...) will either both be prejudiced, or both unprejudiced, regardless of how they differ in other respects. I sketch an alternative account, on which whether a person’s belief counts as prejudiced might be sensitive to a greater range of factors. I then turn to Bebgy’s discussion of ‘evidential preemption,’ a phenomenon by which certain speech acts seem to inoculate themselves from having their contents disconfirmed or falsified by later counterevidence. I argue for skepticism about evidential preemption. To the extent that there is a genuine normative phenomenon in the neighborhood, it is the familiar one of testimonial defeat, in which testimony from one source is neutralized by conflicting testimony from another source that one has reason to think is more reliable. (shrink)

While philosophy and psychoanalysis privilege language and conceptual distinctions and mistrust the image, the philosopher and psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva recognizes the power of art and the imagination to unblock important sources of meaning. She also appreciates the process through which creative acts counteract and transform feelings of violence and depression. Reviewing Kristeva's corpus, Elaine P. Miller considers the intellectual's "aesthetic idea" and "thought specular" in their capacity to reshape depressive thought on both the individual and cultural level. She revisits Kristeva's (...) reading of Walter Benjamin with reference to melancholic art and the imagination's allegorical structure; her analysis of Byzantine iconoclasm in relation to Freud's psychoanalytic theory of negation and Hegel's dialectical negativity; her understanding of Proust as an exemplary practitioner of sublimation; her rereading of Kant and Arendt in terms of art as an intentional lingering with foreignness; and her argument that forgiveness is both a philosophical and psychoanalytic method of transcending a "stuck" existence. Focusing on specific artworks that illustrate Kristeva's ideas, from ancient Greek tragedy to early photography, contemporary installation art, and film, Miller positions creative acts as a form of "spiritual inoculation" against the violence of our society and its discouragement of thought and reflection. (shrink)