Very few scholars discuss the moral basis of the right of persons accused of crimes to be supplied with attorneys if they cannot afford them. More discussion of the topic is needed, in particular because political theorists who prefer a minimal state deny that indigent persons have such a moral right. This article addresses their contentions by developing three arguments for supplying poor persons accused of crimes with defense attorneys. First, doing so will prevent state officials from becoming emboldened (...) in their dealings with the poor, such that they might come to pose a threat to the non-poor. Second, poor persons who believe that the state does not treat them fairly will have reduced incentives to abide by the law, which will, in turn, increase the cost of the minimal state. Third, the better off should show solidarity with the poor in demanding that the minimal state honor all citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and property. Crucial to these arguments is the claim that a right of indigent defense is unlike other welfare rights in that securing it protects other basic moral rights that minimal statists acknowledge. (shrink)

This paper will attempt to provide an overview of Bentham's fundamental thinking with regard to the relief of indigence. The manuscripts on which it draws form the texts of unpublished works, namely a set of ‘Three Essays on the Poor Laws’, which were completed by Bentham, and ‘Pauper Systems Compared’, which remains in a comparatively unfinished state. In the ‘Essays’, Bentham considers first the question of whether the relief of indigence should be a public responsibility, and, having concluded that it (...) should, moves on to consider what conditions should be attached to that relief. In ‘Systems Compared’, Bentham analyzes different systems of provision in terms of their compatibility with these conditions. (shrink)

The foundations of Horkheimer’s rational society are based on the premise that social philosophy could be a choice for the Critical Theory. Therefore [1] a dialectic interpretation of the social issue is developed between philosophy and social sciences theories, using the category of interdisciplinary materialism. [2] Characterizing an age in a state of indigence begins with the definition of Enlightenment as a process of disenchantment with the world that reduces human reality under the sign of domination. The liberator course of (...) the Enlightenment was marred from the beginning and ended up being a process of alienation and reification. [3] Hence, the moral sentiments of compassion and politic solidarity get to the stage in order to addressing a new ethical perspective in which it is posible to define an existential imperative that can view the human misery and the searching of happiness, in the purpose of overcoming the conditions and realities of the present age in state of indigence. (shrink)

This essay explores the major conflict between doing the best for indigents requiring health care and not unfairly imposing burdens on those who pay for that care through cost-shifting. The author argues that there is in fact no dilemma or conflict of duties presented here, but only because the doctor's concern with justice in bearing the burden of health care requires a system within which different levels of health care are available and in which indigent care is provided in (...) a manner that minimizes the cost of providing that care. (shrink)

Las opiniones sobre el pauperismo de Camús están influenciadas por su conocimiento de la antigüedad clásica, pero sus propuestas siguen la línea del pensamiento social católico que comienza a conformarse en Francia a partir de 1840. Camús es uno de los primeros en exponer en España las ideas de los principales ideólogos de esta corriente.

Cultural philosophy is one of the leading disciplines of contemporary philosophy. The greatest challenge to it today is Naturalism, which – putting it simply – is the basing of Culture on natural phenomena. Even when this endeavor has been achieved, Culture remains in our everyday lives as it always was: its own phenomenon, which we urgently need in order to survive, and to live well. There are many interpretations of Culture, but the most important of all is Culture as a (...) medium of coping with life and the world. A significant sign of Culture is the mastering of reality. Reality, then, is when it rains; Culture is when you use an umbrella! (shrink)

L'autorité panoptique s'exerce donc bien au-delà des pouvoirs du surveillant central. Le Panoptique impose sa domination aux pauvres et aux indigents dans un but : les former ou les réformer... au bonheur!

A 4-day-old female was admitted into a Nigerian Hospital, with neonatal tetanus, jaundice, and sepsis. Four days into the treatment, her clinical condition continued to deteriorate. The family requ...

This article examines the verse: “And they give food, despite their love for it, to the needy, the orphan, and the captive” (Surah Al-Insan 76:8) within the contextual integrity of Surah Al-Insan. Being a Medinan surah, it deals with the formation process of the faithful believer’s personality. The aforementioned verse represents the social manifestation of spiritual discipline within the surah’s main theme and reflects the ethical stance of believers woven with sincerity, benevolence, and altruism. Within this framework, the meaning of (...) the verse is analyzed through the lens of the Quranic contextual structure (siyāq) and the interrelated context (sibāq). It is emphasized that the act of feeding is not merely a social aid, but the product of a high-level faith training. This action is performed solely for the sake of Allah and is closely related to the fear of Allah and hope for His reward. Exegetes, especially Al-Qurtubi and Al-Razi, interpret the phrase “for the sake of Allah” (li-wajhillāh) as representing the pinnacle of sincerity, and the plural verb form “We feed you” (nut'imukum) as underscoring the concept of collective action in building the Islamic moral society. The verse’s linguistic and rhetorical aspects are examined in detail. The use of “ʿalā ḥubbihi” (“despite their love for it”) with the preposition ʿalā instead of maʿa (“with”) or fī (“in”) is a rhetorical choice indicating resistance and overcoming, signifying that the giving is done despite a strong love for the food, not merely along with or in it. This demonstrates the supreme degree of altruism where one prioritizes others above his own desires. Throughout the study, fundamental sources of Quranic exegesis such as those by Al-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi, Al-Razi, and Ibn Ashur have been consulted. Furthermore, insights from the sciences of language and rhetoric have been utilized. The analysis is also framed by the higher objectives of Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharī‘a), including human dignity, fostering a sense of responsibility, establishing the ethics of sincerity and altruism. The verse, therefore, concretizes the Quranic typology of the exemplary believer and points to the fundamental principles shaping the ethical backbone of the Islamic community. Surah Al-Insan begins by reminding humans of their origin from nothingness and the purpose of their creation—trial and testing. It categorizes humanity into those who are grateful and those who are ungrateful, then presents the righteous as a model whose faith is manifested in practical behavior, with feeding others leading this behavior. The verse appears as a pivotal point in the surah’s thematic progression, starting with the scene of creation and testing, moving to the behavior of benevolence and altruism, and concluding with the promise of eternal divine reward as expressed in: “So Allah protected them from the evil of that Day and gave them radiance and happiness.” This structure emphasizes the intrinsic link between sincere deeds and the noble reward in the hereafter. Thus, the verse does not describe a mere incidental act but rather sketches the characteristics of the “perfect human” who transcends self-interest and devotes what he loves for the sake of Allah, thereby deserving eternal delight and bliss. The methodology employed in this study combines analytical and inductive approaches, involving contextual and rhetorical reading of the Quranic text, supported by reputable exegeses, linguistic and rhetorical sciences, and the objectives of Islamic law, to reveal the deep significance of feeding others and its psychological and social effects. (shrink)

There are communities in which disadvantaged groups experience severe inequality. For instance, poor and indigent families face many difficulties accessing their social rights. Their condition is largely the consequence of the wrong choices of those in power, either historical or more recent choices. The lack of opportunities of these deprived citizens is due to state omissions. In such communities, it is not unusual for homeless members of these particular groups to occupy abandoned lands and build their shelters there. However, (...) almost everywhere, these actions constitute a crime. The typical response to this situation is prosecution and punishment. In this paper, I will defend the occupation of public places as a consequence of the failure of governments to solve the problem of housing, and I will argue that we must distinguish a social claim from a crime and avoid the use of criminal law in these “occupation cases”. I will also argue that our right—as a community—to blame and punish these “squatters” is eroded by the fact that we perpetrated their situation of injustice. (shrink)

We agree with Chapman et al. (2025) that the Common Rule needs revision, particularly regarding the application of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) in health research with Indig...

The access-to-justice movement broadly concerns the extent to which people have the ability to resolve legally actionable problems. To the extent that individuals seek resolution through civil litigation, they can be disadvantaged by their unmet need for legal services, particularly in high-stakes cases and complicated areas of law. I propose an innovative legal intervention to this problem called “compensatory preliminary damages,” which builds from the work of Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein. I argue that preliminary damages should function as compensatory (...) awards for harm to a plaintiff’s ability to access justice, rather than a contingency loan that might make indigent plaintiffs worse off than before if they lose. By awarding such damages, courts make plaintiffs whole for harm to their access to justice that is not conditional on a decision after the merits or their final recovery for the injuries alleged. As such, the award would not need to be repaid. (shrink)

English summary: This commentary of Plato's Euthydemus demonstrates its place as the clearest text for understanding the relationship between Platonism and Sophism. French description: De tous les dialogues de Platon, l'Euthydeme est peut-etre le plus exclusivement consacre a l'elucidation de la relation du platonisme avec la sophistique. Ce qu'on a pris pour indigence de son contenu, c'est l'acuite avec laquelle la forme y est consideree. Formalisme moral de Socrate, formalisme eristique des sophistes: dans la lecon d'eristique donnee a Socrate apparait, (...) plus clairement peut-etre que dans aucun texte antique, la logique propre au discours sophistique, celle-la meme a laquelle a affaire dans sa totalite le texte platonicien. La sophistique, et Platon avec elle, relevent d'un regime de discours pre-aristotelicien, et c'est dans la pratique de ce discours que demande a etre reinscrite la tant galvaudee ironie socratique. (shrink)

The economically deprived come into contact with the criminal court system in disproportionate number. This collection of original, interactive essays, written from a variety of ideological perspectives, explores some of the more troubling questions and ethical dilemmas inherent in this situation. The contributors, including well-known legal and political philosophers Philip Pettit, George Fletcher, and Jeremy Waldron, examine issues such as heightened vulnerability, indigent representation, and rotten social background defenses.

I will, in this paper, set out the philosophical foundations and the basic structure of a new theory of justice. I will argue that both these foundations and the theory which is based upon them are intuitively attractive and theoretically sound. Finally, I will argue that both are supported by the fact that they lead to attractive implications such as the following: One can justify at least some governmental redistributive programs which presuppose that those receiving the wealth have a right (...) to it, without being committed to any form of egalitarianism. The justification for these redistributive programs respects property entitlements; it argues, in effect, that property entitlements and rights to some redistribution of wealth presuppose each other, rather than being in conflict with each other. The amount of redistribution to which each indigent person is entitled is directly proportional to the wealth of the society in question and inversely proportional to the number of indigents in the society in question. There are at this stage in the history of Western thought few entirely new ideas in philosophy. Too much has been written about the important issues to allow for entirely new approaches. My theory is no exception to these generalizations, for it draws upon the tradition of John Locke, of the agrarian reforms such as Paine, Spence, and Ogilvie, and of libertarian writers such as Robert Nozick. Nevertheless, I will argue, the resulting theory is a significant advance over the ideas of these earlier writers. (shrink)

Heidegger contrasts meditative thinking, which allows detachment from beings, with calculative thinking, which maintains an instrumental and interested relationship with them. In his view, the principle of reason is the main tool for dominating available things. He also embeds the Medieval essence-existence duality within this framework of causality geared towards manipulating beings, judging that the religious notion of creation failed to distance this duality from Greek essentialism. Now, by appropriating the Islamic notion of creation ex nihilo, Avicenna places an ontological (...) indigence at the heart of the created world. He believes that a being necessary by something other than itself remains contingent in itself, even after being caused. Thus, knowledge of the cause doesn’t grant dominance over the thing but fosters detachment from contingent being, recognizing its dependence on an upstream otherness. Moreover, Meister Eckhart, who according to Heidegger perfectly illustrates meditative thought, is indebted precisely to this ontological poverty established by Avicenna. In addition to describing this possible objection from Avicenna to Heidegger, the more general aim of this study is to explore the possibility of an ethical and disinterested use of the principle of reason. (shrink)

BackgroundDoctor and healthcare worker (HCW) strikes are a global phenomenon with the potential to negatively impact on the quality of healthcare services and the doctor-patient relationship. Strikes are a legitimate deadlock breaking mechanism employed when labour negotiations have reached an impasse during collective bargaining. Striking doctors usually have a moral dilemma between adherence to the Hippocratic tenets of the medical profession and fiduciary obligation to patients. In such circumstances the ethical principles of respect for autonomy, justice and beneficence all come (...) into conflict, whereby doctors struggle with their role as ordinary employees who are rightfully entitled to a just wage for just work versus their moral obligations to patients and society.DiscussionIt has been argued that to deny any group of workers, including "essential workers" the right to strike is akin to enslavement which is ethically and morally indefensible. While HCW strikes occur globally, the impact appears more severe in developing countries challenged by poorer socio-economic circumstances, embedded infrastructural deficiencies, and lack of viable alternative means of obtaining healthcare. These communities appear to satisfy the criteria for vulnerability and may be deserving of special ethical consideration when doctor and HCW strikes are contemplated.SummaryThe right to strike is considered a fundamental right whose derogation would be inimical to the proper functioning of employer/employee collective bargaining in democratic societies. Motivations for HCW strikes include the natural pressure to fulfil human needs and the paradigm shift in modern medical practice, from self-employment and benevolent paternalism, to managed healthcare and consumer rights. Minimizing the incidence and impact of HCW strikes will require an ethical approach from all stakeholders, and recognition that all parties have an equal moral obligation to serve the best interests of society. Employers should implement legitimate collective bargaining agreements in a timely manner and high-handed actions such as mass-firing of striking HCWs, or unjustifiable disciplinary action by regulators should be avoided. Minimum service level agreements should be implemented to mitigate the impact of HCW strikes on indigent populations. Striking employees including HCWs should also desist from making unrealistic wage demands which could bankrupt governments/employers or hamper provision of other equally important social services to the general population. (shrink)

Everyone knows the old adage, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” but we seem not to live by it. In the Western world’s health care systems, we often bemoan the “fact” that prevention is underfunded compared to treatment. This book explores this “fact” through empirical and moral debates about the prevention/treatment balance. Contributors examine actual expenditures, the history of policies, and structural features that have affected treatment’s apparent priority, the values that may explain and justify it, (...) and the religious and cultural traditions that have shaped it. Economists, scholars of public health and preventive medicine, philosophers, lawyers, and religious ethicists provide analyses and claims that are often surprising: the imbalance between prevention and treatment expenditures is smaller than often stated, once non-clinical sources of prevention are included. Most prevention is cost-effective, but no more so than treatment, and little prevention is cost-saving. Benefit/risk thresholds for prevention perhaps ought to be higher than treatment. Priority for treatment reflects the power of compassion, driven by vividness of immediate need. Our tort system rewards for harm incurred more than for lack of prevention. The Judeo-Christian religious tradition emphasizes aid to the sick and helping the medically indigent. Countering these claims supporting treatment priority are philosophical analyses and one religious tradition that show why arguments for treatment priority are tenuous. For example, some economic analytic techniques like cost-effectiveness analyses using “discounting of future lives” may rest on weak moral grounds. Seventh-day Adventism is an “apocalyptic” Christian tradition whose members have put a strong priority on long-term prevention. This book provides a wide range of perspectives, some not often heard from in health policy debates. (shrink)

Background Student-run clinics (SRCs) are a unique medical education and healthcare delivery model. On one hand, SRCs have the potential to bridge important care gaps and train future practitioners to address complex health disparities. On the other, allowing students to administratively “run” a clinic for the indigent, with varying levels of oversight, raises ethical questions. This review attempts to identify and synthesize the major ethical concerns scholars have raised about SRCs.Methods We searched PubMed, Embase, Ovid Medline, Web of Science, (...) and SCOPUS, reviewed all publications in the non-indexed Journal of Student Run Clinic and The Free Clinic Research Collective, and iteratively snowball sampled the bibliographies and Google Scholar “cited by” results of included publications until saturation. We performed thematic analysis of included publications.Results Of 7,584 initial results, we identified 503 publications on SRCs and 22 relevant to this review. In total, 4.3% (22/503) of the SRC literature focuses on ethical concerns, which we inductively categorize as: 1) Structural and systemic problems, 2) Lack of consistent administrative and clinical oversight, 3) Substandard quality-of-care, 4) Undue influence on patients, 5) Negative impact on trainees, and 6) Inadequate involvement of the community.Discussion SRCs are a growing part of the U.S. healthcare safety net system. They are also an important nexus of ethical questions that impact patient care and trainee education. Many identified concerns relate to administrative, structural, and sociological issues which may be outside the direct training (and potentially awareness) of most medical students. Some work cautions that SRCs have potential to produce results discordant with their core aims, such as racial equity, health equity, and training service-oriented healthcare professionals. Increased awareness of these potential pitfalls offers new avenues for bioethical investigation and practical opportunities to support students and faculty in positioning these unique clinics for success. (shrink)

In 1982 the American philosopher and Levinas scholar Edith Wyschogrod conducted an interview with Emmanuel Levinas, the transcript of which she published seven years later. Early in the interview, Wyschogrod proposed to Levinas that his philosophy constituted a radical break with western theological tradition because it started not with a Parmenidean ontological plenitude, but rather with the God of the Hebrew Bible. The God Levinas began with, according to Wyschogrod, wasan indigent God, a hidden God who commands that there (...) be a world apart from God, because God needs the multiplicity of the world in order for there to be justice. Levinas responds to this proposal: That’s quite right. Justice, I call it responsibility for the other, right? There is even in Totality and Infinity, the evocation of the tzimtzum [the idea in kabbalistic writings of the self-contraction of God in order to create the void in which creation can take place], but I won’t venture into that. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the possible relations between Fritz London’s account of the status of the observer in quantum physics and transcendental phenomenology. Firstly, I discuss Steven French’s interpretation of London’s thesis as a phenomenological account of the status of the observer, along with the objections Otávio Bueno has brought forward. Secondly, refusing in part both French’s and Bueno’s theses for several reasons, I propose another way of reading London’s thesis in the framework of transcendental phenomenology. Namely, I put (...) London’s account of the observer against the backdrop of Husserl’s analyses of the objectifying acts and objectual constitution. Finally, I end this article with some criticisms of what seems to me the ontological indigency of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, to whose “spirit” London also belongs. (shrink)

The United States, unlike all other industrialized nations, does not have a comprehensive public system for financing health care. Nevertheless, the magnitude of America's public health care financing effort is remarkable. Of the one trillion dollars the United States spent on health care in 1996, almost half, $483.1 billion, was spent by public programs. In 1995, Medicare—our social insurance program for persons over sixty-five and the long-term disabled—overed 37.5 million Americans; Medicaid—our program for indigent elderly and disabled persons and (...) indigent children and their families—covered 36.3 million. In 1996, Medicare and Medicaid spent $203.1 and $147.7 billion, respectively. The payment policies of these massive public health care programs have a profound effect on the provision of health care.Many of the recipients of Medicare and Medicaid suffer pain. In 1994, 376,200 Americans over age sixty-five died of cancer. Virtually all of these would have been Medicare recipients, and as many as 70 percent of them died in unrelieved pain. Nearly four million Americans over sixty-five endured the pain of inpatient surgery in 1995, again nearly all of whom were Medicare recipients. (shrink)

Healthcare user fees present an important barrier for accessing services for the poorest (indigents) in Burkina Faso and selective removal of fees has been incorporated in national healthcare planning. However, establishing fair, effective and sustainable mechanisms for the removal of user fees presents important challenges. A participatory action-research project was conducted in Ouargaye, Burkina Faso, to test mechanisms for identifying those who are indigents, and funding and implementing user fee removal. In this paper, we explore stakeholder perceptions of ethical considerations (...) relating to participation and partnership arising in the action-research. (shrink)

The wide consensus in research with regard to the modernity of keeping companion animals lies behind the prevailing conclusions about attitudes toward the canine species in pre-modern societies. These were reviewed mainly from a utilitarian perspective. Characterized, in part, by the protective shelter of the extended household and, as such, free of the tensions affecting the nuclear family in industrial cities, pre-modern societies supposedly lacked in the emotional stress and indigence that condition or encourage dog keeping. A careful examination of (...) the sources, both narrative and pictorial, however, suggests more ambivalent attitudes thus challenging widespread research premises and justifying further analysis. This study, covering rural and urban societies in the ancient and medieval periods, examines references to dogs as companion animals in traditional societies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:From Dilthey to Mead and Heidegger: Systematic and Historical Relations MATTHIASJUNG FOR TODAY'S READER, G. H. Mead's lectures on Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century offer a surprise: Mead, despite having attended his lectures from 1889 to 1891, does not mention the name of Wilhelm Dilthey, who nowadays is regarded as one of the classical authors of nineteenth-century philosophy. Mead's lectures lack any sign of awareness concerning the (...) hermeneutic tradition, represented by such names as Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Droysen and, of course, Dilthey. Nevertheless it is, as I would like to show in the following pages, quite obvious that Mead's own philosophical conception shows some striking parallels with Dilthey's thought, which can be explained partly through direct influence, partly through the similarity of the questions both tried to answer. For Mead's missing reference to the mentioned tradition, I see two complementary explanations. Firstly, the philosophical importance of the hermeneutic tradition in nineteenth-century philosophy was mainly a retrospective matter. Only after 1927, when Martin Heidegger published Being and Time, did philosophical interest in hermeneutics begin; and then it took thirty-three years more till Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method brought about a historical interest in the development of hermeneutic thought. Secondly, Mead's own passion for the development of science may have forced him to neglect these philosophical movements, which seemed to resist the autocracy of (natural) science. Wilhelm Dilthey's thought, especially around the year 189o, can systematically be interpreted as a common starting-point for two of the most important directions of contemporary philosophy: pragmatism and hermeneutics. It is but a small exaggeration to say that G. H. Mead drew out the pragmatic, Martin Heidegger the hermeneutic consequences of Dilthey's concept of [661 ] 662 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER ~995 Seelenleben, understood as a "best~indige Wechselwirkung zwischen unserem Eigenleben und dem Milieu. ''1 Mead's phase-model of acting, his whole idea of understanding meaning as the result of a social process, are paralleled and partly anticipated by Dilthey, as is Heidegger's conception of Dasein as "beingin -the-world" and his attempt to understand the inner historicity of life.2 In pointing this out, I do not want to claim that Mead was conscious of the systematic relation of his theories to Dilthey's work; nevertheless I will argue that Dilthey's ideas may have served as a source of inspiration and, furthermore, that this inspiration was made possible through some important similarities in the systematic architecture of both hermeneutics and pragmatism.3 I begin by working out the historical dimension, which Hans Joas characterized as "Meads biographische Abkunft von Dilthey"4 (section l). After that, I will sketch Dilthey's philosophical position around 189o in order to show how he works to transform the German tradition of "philosophy of consciousness" into a new concept of interaction between the life-processes of detranscendentalized subjects and their environment (section 2). Having done this, I will be ready to discuss the parallels between Mead's pragmatic approach to the life-process and Dilthey's work (section 3). Finally, the early Heidegger's and Mead's transformations of "philosophy of consciousness" will briefly be interpreted as different ways of overcoming the inherent problems of Dilthey 's attempt (section 4). Between April 23, 1889 and October ~4, 1891 G. H. Mead was registered at the Humboldt-University of Berlin.5 During this period Wilhelm Dilthey, who had come from Breslau to Berlin in 1882, gave the following lectures: "Geschichte der neueren Philosophie"; "Geschichte und System der P/idagogik "; "Logik und Erkenntnistheorie"; "Psychologie als Erfahrungswissen- ' Wilhelm Dilthey, DichterischeEinbildungskraft und Wahnsinn, in GesammelteSchriften, Bd. VI (Stuttgart/G6ttingen: Teubner/Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht, 1962),95. 9In Sein und Zeit (cited from the 15th edition, Tfibingen: Niemeyer, 1979),Heidegger refers frequently to Dilthey: 46, 47, 2o5, 2~ 249, 376f-, 385, 397-4o4 9The two most important sources concerning his early reception of Dilthey'swork are the lecture from the summer semester of 192o,Phi~nomenologieder Anschauung und des Ausdrucks, ed. C. Strube (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1993) and the "Kasseler Vortr~ge," given in 1925 under the title "Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der... (shrink)

Christian teaching about creation out of nothing appears to evacuate creatures of intrinsic worth. A theological‐spiritual response to this anxiety outlines the elements of the doctrine: understanding creation requires the direction of intelligence by divine instruction; God alone is cause of being to other beings, by his power, will and goodness; the act of creation is ineffable, instantaneous, without movement, supereminent, and without material cause; created things have being by divine gift; the relation of creator and creatures is mixed, the (...) creator not being constituted by creatures. Does this entail a metaphysics of creaturely privation in which creatures are permanently indigent? The creator is benevolent and, with no self‐interest, gives life, and so moves creatures to activity that the non‐reciprocal character of the creator‐creature relation is not malign but the principle of creaturely perfection. (shrink)

There is nothing more appalling than mining companies benefiting from the resources of a country while the communities in which they operate gain nothing from such operations. Consequently, this leaves such communities indigent and destitute. In this way, Social Labour Plans (SLPs) play an essential role in the development of communities and employees in the mining sector. An SLP is a document that sets out a mining company’s commitments to its employees and the communities in which it operates. In (...) such a document, the mining company has to also outline how such commitments will be achieved. However, the study identifies criticisms that follow due to the failure of mining companies to achieve the commitment made to the respective communities. The lack of concern by the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) is an element of concern for the country. Thus, it defies the purpose and aim of the DMRE to develop a mineral resources and energy sector that ‘promotes economic growth and development, social equity and environmental sustainability’. This chapter recommends that the DMRE should take cognisance of the struggles that various communities in South Africa are experiencing. As presumed, nations with sizeable mineral resource endowments should be fortunate enough to advance in terms of development. In South Africa, this is yet to be seen. (shrink)

Scientific evidence is often more reliable than other types of evidence commonly used in criminal trials – i.e., eyewitness identifications, confessions, and informant testimony. Nevertheless, despite its obvious value, forensic science has not always merited the term “science.” Three developments in the 1990s focused attention on its shortcomings: the advent of DNA profiling, the Supreme Court's “junk science” decision, and a number of wellpublicized crime laboratory scandals. In light of these developments, and in order to take full advantage of the (...) power of forensic science to aid in the search for truth, a number of reforms are needed: Crime laboratories should be accredited, lab procedures should be standardized, and basic research needs to be conducted on many commonly used techniques. Court procedures also require improvement: Defense experts should be more readily available to indigent defendants, and more comprehensive pretrial disclosure of the substance of expert testimony should be provided. (shrink)

In 1997 the women-run nonprofit organization Dress for Success opened its first location with the aim of empowering low-income women by providing gently used suits for job interviews. Drawing on eight months of fieldwork in an affiliate office, we analyze cross-race and cross-class interactions between privileged volunteers and low-income clients to demonstrate the emergence of what we term “neoliberal maternalism.” Historical forms of maternalism—the mother-centric voluntarism aimed at assisting indigent families a century ago—emphasized women’s domesticity and promoted the earliest (...) welfare provisions. We suggest that neoliberal maternalism, instead, works alongside welfare retrenchment by insisting that single mothers become self-sufficient workers. Similar to earlier maternalisms, the benevolence of affluent volunteers serves to reinforce class and race superiority while producing moments of genuine care and connection. We argue that while all forms of maternalism come with a related body politics aimed at disciplining the bodies of othered women, neoliberal maternalism carries a distinct body politics that, rather than regulating the home and reproduction, intrusively enforces ideals of aesthetic labor required for the postindustrial service economy. Finally, we suggest that retaining maternalism as an analytic framework is particularly important for investigating the influence of neoliberalism and the eroding social safety net on interactions between women. (shrink)

At first glance, in Valla’s thinking, his ‘poor’ conception of metaphysics seems to contrast with his appreciation of the ‘richness’ of rhetoric, as opposed to the indigence of dialectic. However, poverty can be understood in two senses: on the one hand, it designates a lack, even an insufficiency; on the other, it expresses the search for something simple, even essential. So, poverty, like nakedness (Séris 2021)1, is a concept with an opposite polarity. What is elementary can therefore be fundamental. Consequently, (...) how can we understand, in Valla’s thought, the link between the ontological reduction of all transcendentals to the res and the opulence of rhetoric? To try to answer this question, this paper seeks to analyze the ambivalent nature of the opposition between poverty and wealth in order to reinterpret it in the opposition between simplicity and complexity. It is not certain that gain will be found on the side that we would expect to find it. (shrink)

This article begins by accepting that strategic ignorance, or agnotology, underpins academic practice and perpetuates the systemic disadvantage experienced on a global level by non-White and Indige...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Human Act by Can Laurens LöweThomas M. Osborne Jr.Can Laurens Löwe. Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Human Act. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. 225. Hardback, $99.99.This book is about the way in which Thomas Aquinas understands the human act to be composed of form and matter. It provides a fresh reading of many central texts from Thomas and (...) addresses philosophical concerns that are relevant to the contemporary literature. Although Löwe is not clear about this point, Thomas does not use in this context the terms 'formal' and 'material' in the strictest sense, as when he describes the soul as the form of the body, but in different extended senses, as when he says that charity is the form of the other virtues because it gives them a new character (Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 23, art. 8).Löwe focuses on choice, which he considers to be antecedent to the human act, and the commanded or exterior act, which he considers to be the entire human act. This focus simplifies his account, since in one and only one text—the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae—does Thomas appear to give as many as twelve acts that are stages or phases of a complete human act. Thomas devotes special attention to three acts of the will concerning the end, namely simple willing, intention, and enjoyment; and three acts of the will concerning the means, namely consent, choice, and use; and two intellectual acts, namely deliberation and command. Four other possible phases or stages are mentioned in passing, such as the judgment of choice. According to the standard interpretation, a human [End Page 152] act such as almsgiving might consist of intending to help an indigent person, deliberating about whether to give food or money, making a judgment of choice about the best means of helping (such as giving money), choosing to give the money, and then commanding the will's use of certain other powers, such as the movement of the hands and feet. In his other writings, Thomas mentions only some of these stages, and he often mentions only simple willing, deliberation, and choice. Scholars disagree over the number and importance of the acts or parts of acts discussed in the Prima Secundae and how to integrate them with what Thomas says in other texts. Löwe argues that the human act is what Thomas describes as the act's execution; he claims that this act has the intellect's command for its extrinsic form, the will's use for its intrinsic form, and the commanded act for its matter.This book has three parts. Part 1 provides a general account of the author's view that choice explains the act's freedom even if it is not part of the resulting act. In part 2, Löwe gives a novel account of Thomas's claim that the judgment of the intellect gives form to the act of choice. He draws on the distinction that Thomists make (although Thomas is less clear) between the composition of terms, or the enunciative proposition, and the judgement, or judicative proposition. For instance, the statement 'carrots are orange' as an enunciative proposition might be entertained as doubtful or likely, or placed in a conditional statement. However, someone might assent to this same composition by judging that it is true. Löwe's account is confusing on this point, as he describes as "judgment" what his Thomists describe as the enunciative proposition, which is the composition of terms (38–41). Terminological difficulties aside, Löwe draws on what he sees as the related distinction between the content of a judgment and the attitude toward the judgment, using this distinction to describe the freedom of the judgment that precedes choice. The intellect composes different precepts and then assents to one of them. According to Löwe, Thomas thinks that the agent's ability to choose between different goods is reduced to the intellect's ability to assent to the content of one precept and not the content of another according to a kind of second-order... (shrink)

It is obvious that the practice of begging is growing exponentially and changing into various forms mostly among the Christians in the Nsukka area. Although begging has long been in existence in the Nsukka area, it has never been encouraged. Financial assistance from family and relatives usually prevents an indigent person from begging in the street. Giving alms to the poor is regarded as a religious duty by many people. But, some beggars take advantage of people's sympathy and thus (...) the practice of begging is encouraged. Many scholars have written about the increase in the number of beggars in Igboland and attributed it to a number of factors such as poverty and ill health. Some see it as an indictment on government. However, this present study attributes the increase in the number of beggars in Nsukka's cultural area to religion, laziness as against hard work, individualism as against communalism, social disorganisation because of urbanisation. These beggars who do nothing other than to beg are less productive, and consequently contribute nothing to the nation's economy. They are a nuisance in the society, as some engage in all kinds of immoral activities that degrade human society. This study therefore attempts to explore the growing trend of begging among Igbo Christians in Nsukka Urban. It aims to identify the different dimensions of begging and the reasons behind this practice. A qualitative phenomenological method was employed in this study. CONTRIBUTION: The findings of this study revealed that poverty is not the cause of begging among Christians in Nsukka but rather laziness, individualism, and religious mendicancy, among others. It recommends that the Igbo people should go back to the values that bind them together. (shrink)

This article analyzes a report by the Immigrants’ Protective League in Chicago (1931) on maintenance orders in separated families. Written in the context of a draft international convention on assistance to indigent aliens, the report presents the various tactics used by the organization’s social workers to reunite families in order to avoid legal action. Analysis of the life stories of couples and families as they appear in the document shows the process of legitimization of International case work and reveals (...) the practices of social workers who relied on emotions to restore a family social model weakened by migration. The document also allows us to trace migratory projects and journeys that faced numerous administrative and legislative constraints. (shrink)

Ethical relativists and subjectivists hold that fact must be distinguished from value, ‘is’ from ‘ought’ and reason from emotion. Their distinctions have been called into question, notably by Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness 2001), also by Alasdair Macintyre (Dependent Rational Animals 1999). Reason in the form of the life sciences—ethology, biology—indicates that what is good or bad for an individual animal and its species are matters of objective fact. There is nothing relativistic about the idea that fresh meat is good for (...) wolves and it is a fact, a paradigm fact, that polluted water is bad for dolphins. Moreover what is good for an animal is often something that is good about it. Sharp ears and great speed are good for deer and are also what makes a deer a good specimen of its kind. These general remarks apply to the human animal as well as to ‘ordinary’ animals. The good and bad discussed by moral philosophers cannot be radically different from the good and bad known through reason. But if it were it would normally be a remarkably indigent field of study. (shrink)

W e are watching television, and an advertisement for UNICEF, OXFAM, or the Christian Children’s Fund interrupts our favorite show. We grab our remotes and quickly flip to another channel. Perhaps we mosey to the kitchen for a snack. Maybe we just sit, trying not to watch. These machinations may banish these haunting images of destitute, starving children from our TVs and our thoughts, but they do not alter the brutal facts: millions of people in the world are undernourished; thousands (...) die each day; most of those who suffer and die are children, and, with collective effort we could end the suffering of millions without too much strain. At the same time, many of us talk as if we were nearly indigent. Relative to the rich in our society we may be financially strapped. But relative to most citizens of the world, we are awash with money. Given that, what, if anything, should we do, individually or collectively, to alleviate their suffering and save their lives? Most of us interpret this as asking: should we be charitable, and, if so, how charitable? That seems to be the guiding premise of organizations who implore us to send money: they tell us to open our hearts, to be generous, to give of ourselves, to help those in need. The character of their appeal reveals just how pervasive the “charity view” is. W e think that although it would be nice of us to assist the starving, none of us is morally required to assist them—that we have done nothing (very) wrong if we ignore those strangers in need. Indeed, most people assume that if we help, then we are moral heros. (shrink)

When writing about Buddhism, much attention is paid to Buddha’s Four Noble Truths: Life is suffering; Suffering is caused by craving and attachment; Suffering can be overcome by achieving non-attachment; the means to achieving non-attachment is to follow the Eight-Fold Path. Herein, the focus is on the Fourth Noble Truth, the following of Buddha’s Eight-Fold Path, which is the means to achieve the penultimate goal of Buddhism, non-attachment. Non-attachment is primarily aimed at developing non-attachment to personal cravings, to egoistic desires. (...) The purpose of the non-attachment is to free the self to experience the feeling of compassion for all sentient beings and to take action on that universal compassion to relieve the suffering of all sentient beings. In contemporary parlance, the phrase, all sentient beings can be taken to stand for our global environment, its inhabitants and future generations. Non-attachment thus is not equivalent to detachment.Hidden in the practice of the Eight-Fold Path is the key to Buddhist economics, the Eighth path, the path of Right livelihood. In order to fully implement compassion, the economic path must be rightly chosen. One cannot achieve the goal of universal compassion, that is, the relief of suffering throughout the world, without the proper economic path, designated by the term, Right livelihood. Right livelihood will be the subject of this chapter’s inquiry. In Mahayana Buddhism, one cannot achieve spiritual enlightenment until everyone in the world achieves spiritual enlightenment. When one takes Right livelihood into account, herein also referred to as Buddhist economics, one cannot achieve Right livelihood until everyone in the world achieves Right livelihood and the effects of Right livelihood, the elimination of suffering are universally distributed. The concept of Right livelihood is to be understood as the practice of economic activity that is directed to the elimination of suffering in its most urgent cases, that is, in the most indigent people and places in the world. (shrink)

Towards the end of the Tābi‘ūn generation (the generation of Muslims who followed the Sahaba [companions of the prophet Muhammad]), there was a search for a name through history, for people who were members of Ahl as-Sunnah (people of the tradition and the community of Muhammad [peace be upon him]), and were distinguished from other people with their understanding of zuhd (asceticism) and faqr (indigence), and their sensitivity to worship and to abide by righteous deeds. In this process, any name (...) other than Tasawwuf (Islamic mysticism, commonly known as Sufism) was not generally accepted because it was considered incomplete and inadequate in expressing the knowledge, state, behavior, and approaches of Sufi. The debate about the origin of the word Tasawwuf has continued from the first time to the present day. Some authors have argued that the original word was not in Arabic and hence it was not known during the time of Sahaba, while other authors have argued that it was in Arabic and that it was known in the time of Sahaba. Also, there were differences of opinion about the origin of the root word for Tasawwuf among the authors who argued that the origin of the word Tasawwuf was Arabic. When Sufi works are examined, it can be seen that each Sufi made many descriptions of Tasawwuf in accordance with the subjects they cared about and the state in which they lived. However, this study does not aim to examine the terminological descriptions of the notions of Tasawwuf expressed in the historical process, but to bring up some discussions about the origin of the word and to examine some issues related to the subject.Summary: There has been an ongoing search for a name for the group who was a part of Ahl as-sunnah and were distinguished from others with their outside appearances and zuhd (asceticism), and made intensive efforts for the elimination of the heart (sense of selfishness and ego). Some authors declared that this group was essentially famous and known, but that a name was needed to distinguish them from other people and to show their privileges. In the early days, some distinguishing names such as abid, nasik, vari‘, zahid (following are some of the descriptions/meanings of these names; one who prays a lot, servant of God, extremely religious, someone who gave up earthly possessions for God, etc.) were given to the pioneer Sufis. However, these names were not seen as a distinguishing feature because they were also given to other non-Sufi individuals, and the use of these names did not become widespread in later times. In addition, since these names indicated only one characteristic of the Sufi in terms of their meaning, they were considered incomplete and inadequate, and there was a need for a more comprehensive name. In addition to these names, there was also a search for new ones in some regions. Among these names, some names such as fuqaraa (the poor), ghuraba (eccentric and noncomformist), sayyaheen (pilgrims), shiqaftiyyah (cave people), dju’iyyah (who eats just enough to survive), malamatiyya (someone who believes in the value of self-blame), nouriyyah (someone who is trying to reach the God's light [nour in Arabic]) and moqarraboon (blessed). Khorasan, Basra, Damascus, and Baghdad are the locations where new names were searched for extensively. These names used in these regions have not gained prevalence in the historical process either. As a more comprehensive name in the historical process, the word Tasawwuf/Sufiyyah (sufism) was preferred. The word Sufism, which means "one who wears wool", signifies an external meaning. However, the main distinguishing feature of Sufi is not the external aspect, but the internal state and scholarship/wisdom. In this context, the relationship between name and person has always been the subject of discussion. Depending on the spiritual education of Sufi, there will be constant changes in their spiritual state and wisdom. There has been a lack of an encompassing name to express this change. Because of this insufficiency, the word Tasawwuf, which includes external meaning, has been accepted as an umbrella term, which also included the internal meaning. In addition, because wearing wool garments was the custom of elite servants of God such as prophets and saints, Sufis considered it appropriate to be known by this name. Tasawwuf has been accepted as a word that encompasses the meanings of words such as zuhd, faqr, vera’ (being afraid to sin), morality, adherence, nusq (praying for and worshipping God). In this sense, Tasawwuf does not mean only morality, zuhd, or worshipping. It refers to a feature that encompasses all of these and also includes other meanings.There are two different views on whether the word Sufism was known and used during the times of Muhammad (PBUH), Sahaba, and Tābi‘ūn. According to one view, the term Tasawwuf was not known during this period. For this reason, the advocates of this view accept Tasawwuf as a way of thinking and approach which is formed by some non-Islamic influences such as Indian, Iranian, Christian, Jewish, and Greek Philosophy. Contrary to this view, according to some advocates, Tasawwuf was known and used not only during the time of Muhammad (PBUH), Sahaba, and Tābi‘ūn, but also during Jahiliyyah period (ignorance period in Arabia before the advent of Islam. Wool (Suf) symbolized devotion during the Jahiliyyah period. When someone tied wool around his neck and head, this movement meant devotion. There are apparent connections between wool and sacrifice in some customs during the Jahiliyyah period.The fact that the word Sufism does not appear in Qur'an verses and hadith (the record of the words, actions, and approval of Muhammad [PBUH]) and that no one from the two prominent generations of Islam, Sahaba, and Tābi‘ūn, was called Sufi does not make it necessary to search for the origin of Tasawwuf in non-Islamic sources. Because although Tasawwuf is not mentioned in verses and hadith, there are some words such as Moqarraboon and Abrar (good samaritan) which correspond to Sufi. The names Sahaba, and Tābi‘ūn were the most honorable names for these two generations, this should explain why no one in the Sahaba, and Tābi‘ūn generations used the name Sufi or needed any other name. Although the name Sufi was not used as a word in the time of Sahaba, it is known that the life of Sahaba is the main premise of the Sufi lifestyle. For this reason, the Sufis took Sahaba as an example, especially the Ashab al-Suffa (young, unmarried, and poor Sahaba, who dwelled in the Suffas [shades] Muhammad [PBUH] built near the Al-Masjid al-Nabawi [a mosque the prophet built while in Medina]).With the preference of this word, discussions about the origin of the word have come up. Among these discussions, the most effective ones were whether the origin of the word was Arabic and if so, what was the root word. Authors such as Al-Qushayri and Ali Hujwiri did not accept the word Sufism as an Arabic word. According to them, there was no comparison showing that the word originally was Arabic. Whatever meaning is given, it is not correct to derive the name Sufi from a root word in Arabic according to the language rules. In this context, it is more appropriate that it is a moniker, not a word derivative. Contrary to Al-Qushayri and Ali Hujwiri, authors such as Abu Nasr as-Sarraj, Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi, Sohrevardi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Khaldun accept the origin of the word as Arabic, but they disagree about the word origin. Abu Nasr as-Sarraj, who is among the first sources of Tasawwuf, stated that the word origin was Safa (enjoyment), while authors such as Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi, Sohrevardi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Khaldun stated it was the word Suf (wool). According to them, if the origin of the word is accepted as Suf, in terms of vocabulary, the word becomes authentic and the wording correct. According to al-Kalabadhi, the words put forward about the origin were allied in terms of meaning, even if they appeared different on the outside, and the meanings of all these names were collected in the word Suf. (shrink)

ABSTRACT David Hume and Adam Smith are often regarded as preeminent contributors to the eighteenth-century Scottish ‘science of man.’ For our understanding of Hume’s and Smith’s contributions to this project, scholars today are especially indebted to Nicholas Phillipson, who influentially and persuasively demonstrated how the science of man that they developed sought to account for social progress as the result of man’s natural love of improvement in the face of conditions of indigence and want. Yet Phillipson’s work also helps us (...) see the ways in which the Scottish science of man sought to account for man’s moral development as well as our material development, and specifically the ways in which individual human beings come to develop virtue. This contribution thus extends Phillipson’s pioneering insights into the methodology of the Scottish science of man to show how Smith conceived of the love of improvement not only as the engine driving society towards civilization and opulence, but also as an important element in the ethical development of the individual. (shrink)