Buying and selling are the most natural activities common to human beings. In a society where profit overrides personal dignity and human rights, many people see market as a virtue-free zone. They do not believe that one can buy and sell without dishonest gains. Consequently, they are ready to do anything in the name of business: manufacturing and selling fake and substandard goods and services for originals. Today, markets are flooded with fake medical drugs, fake foods, fake drinks/water, fake motor (...) parts and fake building materials. Thus market exhibits exploitative and negative impacts on customer satisfaction. Its impact on human life and property leads to increased deaths because of poisoning, building collapses and even increased road accidents. Such market transaction lacks mutual benefit which is its telos. This paper seeks to establish that market is not a virtue-free zone. It has moral standards of excellence internal to it. (shrink)

While many sociocultural, contextual, biological, behavioral, and psychological variables may contribute to the widespread under-representation of girls and women in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics field, this study focused on STEM-gender stereotypes, school experiences, and adolescence as critical factors in driving students' interest and motivation in STEM. Based on this, the study investigated differences by gender and national context in adolescents' STEM-gender stereotypes, school empowerment, and school engagement in a preliminary step, and simultaneously examined how adolescents' STEM-gender stereotypes were (...) related to school empowerment and school engagement as well as to socioeconomic status. These latter relations were considered within the context of the potential moderating role of gender and national context. Participants included 213 Italian adolescents and 214 Nigerian adolescents, who completed measures of school empowerment and engagement, STEM-gender stereotypes, and SES. A multivariate analysis of covariance showed that Nigerian girls and boys reported significantly higher levels of school empowerment, school engagement, and STEM-gender stereotypes than their Italian peers. Moreover, regardless of the national context, boys scored significantly higher on school empowerment and STEM-gender stereotypes than girls. Furthermore, a multiple-group path analysis revealed how higher school empowerment was related to lower STEM-gender stereotypes in both Italian and Nigerian girls' groups, while higher school engagement was associated with lower STEM-gender stereotypes only in the Nigerian groups. Regardless of gender and nationality, higher SES was linked to lower STEM-gender stereotypes. These findings particularly suggest that school empowerment and school engagement can be relevant dimensions to be studied and to develop strategies to counteract STEM-gender stereotypes in adolescence. Nonetheless, gender and national context are key factors to be considered. Limitations, strengths, future research, and educational implications are discussed. (shrink)

David Lewis defends Genuine Modal Realism (GMR) by way of an inference to the best explanation (IBE); reasons of theoretical utility are taken as markers of truth. Warrant for thinking that IBE is reliable depends on the availability of access to the relevant matters that is independent of the various uses of IBE. Domains permitting no such independent access are domains over which we can have no confidence that instances of IBE are reliable. Genuine Modal Realism's plurality of worlds is (...) one such domain. The wider implication is that IBE is not reliable for adjudicating metaphysical disputes. (shrink)

Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and Bayesianism are our two most prominent theories of scientific inference. Are they compatible? Van Fraassen famously argued that they are not, concluding that IBE must be wrong since Bayesianism is right. Writers since then, from both the Bayesian and explanationist camps, have usually considered van Fraassen’s argument to be misguided, and have plumped for the view that Bayesianism and IBE are actually compatible. I argue that van Fraassen’s argument is actually not so misguided, (...) and that it causes more trouble for compatibilists than is typically thought. Bayesianism in its dominant, subjectivist form, can only be made compatible with IBE if IBE is made subservient to conditionalization in a way that robs IBE of much of its substance and interest. If Bayesianism and IBE are to be fit together, I argue, a strongly objective Bayesianism is the preferred option. I go on to sketch this objectivist, IBE-based Bayesianism, and offer some preliminary suggestions for its development. (shrink)

In this article, I consider an important challenge to the popular theory of scientific inference commonly known as ‘inference to the best explanation’, one that has received scant attention.1 1 The problem is that there exists a wide array of rival models of explanation, thus leaving IBE objectionably indeterminate. First, I briefly introduce IBE. Then, I motivate the problem and offer three potential solutions, the most plausible of which is to adopt a kind of pluralism about the rival models of (...) explanation. However, I argue that how ranking explanations on this pluralistic account of IBE remains obscure and pluralism leads to contradictory results. In light of these objections, I attempt to dissolve the problem by showing why IBE does not require a ‘model’ of explanation and by giving an account of what explanation consists in within the context of IBE. (shrink)

Inference to the best explanation is theoretically interesting in that it promises to throw new light on what an explanation is. IBE challenges the standard view of the relation between inference and explanation. But sometimes it seems that previous explanation is more independent of inference than IBE suggests. Sometimes we have explanation before inference which is not IBE. This chapter examines the possibility that the latter is the rule rather than the exception.

In this paper we investigate how inference to the best explanation (IBE) works in engineering science, focussing on the context of malfunction explanation. While IBE has gotten a lot of attention in the philosophy of science literature, few, if any, philosophical work has focussed on IBE in engineering science practice. We first show that IBE in engineering science has a similar structure as IBE in other scientific domains in the sense that in both settings IBE hinges on the weighing of (...) explanatory virtues. We then proceed to show that, due to the intimate connection between explanation and redesign in engineering science, there is a further engineering domain-specific virtue in terms of which engineering malfunction explanations are evaluated, viz. the virtue of redesign utility. This virtue entails that the explanatory information offered by a malfunction explanation should be instrumental in predicting counterfactual dependencies in redesigned systems. We illustrate and elaborate these points in terms of a number of engineering examples, focussing in particular on the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447. Our extension of analyses of IBE and explanation to engineering science practice offers new insights by identifying a new explanatory virtue in malfunction explanation: redesign utility. (shrink)

Inference to the best explanation is theoretically interesting in that it promises to throw new light on what an explanation is. IBE challenges the standard view of the relation between inference and explanation. But sometimes it seems that previous explanation is more independent of inference than IBE suggests. Sometimes we have explanation before inference which is not IBE. This chapter examines the possibility that the latter is the rule rather than the exception.

Different views have been proposed about how Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and Bayesianism might be compatible with one another. One is a hybrid view, according to which explanatory considerations play a role in driving the Bayesian machinery. Another is an ‘emergent compatibilist’ view, in which an independently motivated Bayesian model of IBE is provided, so that explanatory considerations emerge from the Bayesian machinery rather than driving it. Specific scientific arguments can serve as test cases for these general views. (...) The chapter argues that the case of Williams’ argument against group selection, discussed by Elliott Sober, is better understood with the emergent compatibilist picture, than with the hybrid view. This analysis of the case challenges Elliott Sober’s claim that the epistemic significance of appeals to the explanatory virtue of parsimony is highly case-specific. Instead, a more unified picture of IBE and its connection to Bayesianism is suggested. (shrink)

Van Fraassen does not merely perform Bayesian conditionalization on his pragmatic theory of scientific explanation; he uses inference to the best explanation (IBE) to justify it, contrary to what Prasetya thinks. Without first using IBE, we cannot carry out Bayesian conditionalization, contrary to what van Fraassen thinks. The argument from a bad lot, which van Fraassen constructs to criticize IBE, backfires on both the pragmatic theory and Bayesian conditionalization, pace van Fraassen and Prasetya.

Several friends of inference to best explanation have claimed in recent work that explanatory virtues, such as consilience, simplicity and increased precision, play an important heuristic role in assigning probabilities to available hypotheses and that it is this role that justifies continued efforts to investigate the scope, nature and epistemic value of the inference rule. In this paper I argue that understanding explanatory virtues as a guide to probability assignments creates a critical dilemma for advocates of IBE that has not (...) previously been made sufficiently explicit and which has significant implications for the prospects of the rule. I conclude that the viability of IBE requires that explanatory virtues be related to a non - probabilistic conception of success. (shrink)

Selective abduction is in contrast with creative abduction as well as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). There are two types of selective abduction: Either hypotheses are selected among new and conjectural hypotheses without any prior knowledge ( Pierce s' selective abduction), or the selection of the best hypotheses and explanations is among a large number of possible hypotheses and explanations already known (L. Magnani's selective abduction and G. Schurz's factual abduction). According to both views, as well as an alternative (...) view, which belongs to Dov M. Gabby and John Woods, selective abduction is different from inference to the best explanation. Schurz's factual abduction depends on all three sub-processes of inference, i.e.: colligation, observation, and judgment (c, o, and j); But Pierce's selective abduction, on the other hand, has only a third sub-process, i.e. judgment process (j), and therefore it cannot be regarded as a process of abductive epistemic inference. (shrink)

We provide a novel Bayesian justification of inference to the best explanation. More specifically, we present conditions under which explanatory considerations can provide a significant confirmatory boost for hypotheses that provide the best explanation of the relevant evidence. Furthermore, we show that the proposed Bayesian model of IBE is able to deal naturally with the best known criticisms of IBE such as van Fraassen?s?bad lot? argument.

Van Fraassen’s (1989) infamous best of a bad lot objection is widely taken to be the most serious problem that afflicts theories of inference to the best explanation (IBE), for it alleges to show that we should not accept the conclusion of any case of such reasoning as it actually proceeds. Moreover, this is supposed to be the case irrespective of the details of the particular criteria used to select best explanations. The best of a bad lot objection is predicated (...) on, and really only requires, the idea that in any real case of IBE where one hypothesis is favored as best over those with which it competes, it is always the case that it is more likely that the true explanation is to be found in the set of unformulated and unconsidered logical alternatives to the set of actually considered hypotheses. On this basis, Van Fraassen believes that accepting the conclusion of IBEs so understood is irrational and this is simply because such inferences are supposedly not probative. In this paper the best of a bad lot objection will be addressed and it will be shown that Van Fraassen’s notorious criticism of IBE depends on a problematic conflation of two notions of rationality and thus that his criticism of IBE involves a damning equivocation. In essence, he conflates ideal standards of rationality with epistemic standards of rationality and, in so doing, makes it appear to be the case that we should not accept the conclusions of IBEs. But, when we disambiguate the concepts of rationality at work in the argument Van Fraassen’s conclusion simply does not follow. (shrink)

This paper represents a counterreply to “A rejoinder to Alessio Gava’s ‘Van Fraassen, a inferência da melhor explicação e a Matrix realista’”, by Minikoski and Rodrigues da Silva, released in Problemata (v. 12, n. 2, 2021). The authors originally published an essay in the same journal, “Van Fraassen and inference to the best explanation” (2016), the object of critic - ‘friendly and gentle’ - in a work of mine that also appeared in Problemata, in 2019. In this paper I will (...) show that, even when the subject matter is the inference to the best explanation, realists and antirealists end up debating about the same old topics, that represent the essence of the controversy between the two philosophical stances. (shrink)

Park (Sociologija 28(1):56–64, 2017; Axiomathes 28(4):435–446, 2018;Soc Epistemol 33(1):88–99, 2019) argues that Bas van Fraassen (1980) uses inference to the best explanation (IBE) to defend his contextual theory of explanation. If Park is right, then van Fraassen is in trouble because he rejects IBE as a rational rule of inference. In this reply, I argue that van Fraassen does not use IBE in defending the contextual theory of explanation. I distinguish between several conceptions of IBE: heuristic IBE, objective Bayesian IBE, (...) and ampliative IBE. I argue that van Fraassen holds the ampliative conception of IBE and that his rejection of IBE concerns only ampliative IBE. I also argue that van Fraassen’s defense of the contextual theory of explanation, at best, can be interpreted as an instance of heuristic IBE, but not ampliative IBE. Therefore, I argue, Park’s criticism of van Fraassen misfires. (shrink)

In German judicial methodological theories, Analogie is a form of further development of the law (Rechtsfortbildung) in cases of statutory loopholes (Gesetzeslücke). This paper argues that there are at least four levels of indeterminacy in Analogie which reveal the argumentative characteristics in making an Analogie argument. Current methodological theories commonly construct Analogie based on deductive models; however, this approach fails to address the argumentative process of Analogie. This paper suggests that theories of Inference to the Best Explanation can better capture (...) these characteristics when it is used to represent Analogie in law. It examines theories of IBE and evaluates their potential to facilitate legal reasoning. The last part of this paper suggests an Analogie model which is based on IBE. This alternative model enhances the rationale-giving and dialectical function in the construction of an Analogie argument. (shrink)

This chapter consider the Experiential IBE Argument. According to that argument, it should be inferred that time robustly passes because doing so is the best explanation for its seeming, in experience, as though time robustly passes. It is first argued that we should reject the second premise of that argument, namely the claim that the best explanation of having experiences (as) of robust passage is that there is robust passage. The chapter argues that there are no possible veridical experiences of (...) robust passage. So, positing robust passage cannot be a good, let alone the best, explanation for anyone having such experiences. Second, it argues that we should reject premise (1) of the argument, namely the claim that we have experiences (as) of robust passage. The chapter argues that since there are no illusory experiences as of robust passage, there are no experiences as of robust passage. (shrink)

Many philosophers claimed that there might be fertile ground for collaboration between IBE and the objective end of the Bayesian methodology. Recent literature is investigated in this chapter, to highlight the latest developments about the possibility of such a collaboration. The merits of the convergence of the two methods are presented. It is argued that arriving on this end is not an easy goal as there are four ways by which subjective considerations may overshadow the objective picture. The existence of (...) subjective virtues, the vagueness of the mapping, the absence of an accurate weighting, and the existence of partial virtues allow the generation of infinitely many different initializations of priors and likelihoods, thus keeping the explanationist away from the objective extreme. Hence, either the explanationist successfully faces up with each one of the four problems so as to converge to the objective end or she ends up in a semi-objective position, whereby the explanatory restrictions allow a bunch of equally good probability distributions. (shrink)

As a result of using inference to the best explanation (IBE), we gain confidence in the belief that a true hypothesis is more likely to be conceived than unconceived, and in the belief that the world is explainable. Therefore, the use of IBE is required for these two beliefs to be justified rather than the other way around. However, van Fraassen’s argument from a bad lot and de Ray’s argument from a brute fact presuppose erroneously that the two beliefs are (...) required for IBE to be justified. This false presupposition results in excessive requirements on the use of IBE, in skepticism about our best scientific theories, and in backfires on van Fraassen’s use of IBE and de Ray’s use of IBE. (shrink)

It is often observed that explanatory reasoning, especially the so-called inference to best explanation, plays a crucial role in theory choice in scientific practice. This paper defends an alternative account of the justificatory role of explanatory reasoning in general, and IBE in particular, inspired by C.S. Peirce's account of abduction. Most contemporary proponents of IBE take it to provide justification for accepting hypotheses as true. In contrast to this, the Peircean view defended here takes explanatory reasoning to first and foremost (...) provide justification for pursuing hypotheses, i.e. to subject them to empirical testing. The standard view of IBE faces a problem of accounting for the connection between explanatoriness and truth-likeliness : Why should the fact that a hypothesis would be a good explanation if it were true give us any reason to regard it as actually true? The Peircean view avoids this problem since justification for pursuing a hypothesis H does not require showing H any more probable. Furthermore, the Peircean view faces no analogous challenge: I develop an account of pursuit where the connection between explanatoriness and justification for pursuit is simple and intuitive. Briefly: assuming that one important goal of science is to find good explanations, showing that H would provide a better explanation than previously thought also shows that it would be more valuable to learn whether H is actually true, thus increasing the justification for pursuing H. Finally, the Peircean view provides an alternative account of the role played by explanatory reasoning in many of the historical case studies cited by proponents of IBE. This undermines historical-empirical arguments for the reliability of explanatory reasoning as a guide to true hypotheses. (shrink)

This paper defends an account of explanatory reasoning generally, and inference to the best explanation in particular, according to which it first and foremost justifies pursuing hypotheses rather than accepting them as true. This side-steps the problem of why better explanations should be more likely to be true. I argue that this account faces no analogous problems. I propose an account of justification for pursuit and show how this provides a simple and straightforward connection between explanatoriness and justification for pursuit.

In pedagogical contexts and in everyday life, we often come to believe something because it would best explain the data. What is it about the explanatory endeavor that makes it essential to everyday learning and to scientific progress? There are at least two plausible answers. On one view, there is something special about having true explanations. This view is highly intuitive: it’s clear why true explanations might improve one’s epistemic position. However, there is another possibility—it could be that the process (...) of seeking, generating, or evaluating explanations itself puts one in a better epistemic position, even when the outcome of the process is not a true explanation. In other words, it could be that accurate explanations are beneficial, or it could be that high-quality explaining is beneficial, where there is something about the activity of looking for an explanation that improves our epistemic standing. The main goal of this paper is to tease apart these two possibilities, both theoretically and empirically, which we align with “Inference to the Best Explanation” and “Explaining for the Best Inference”, respectively. We also provide some initial support for EBI and identify promising directions for future research. (shrink)

Öz Mâtürîdî, dinin anlaşılmasında akla verilen değer açısından Eş‘arîler ile Mu‘tezile arasında konumlandırılmaktadır. Mâtürîdî’nin akıl yürütme anlayışında, gerçekliği beş duyu ile algılanabilen ve şehâdet âlemi olarak adlandırılan dış dünyanın ayrı bir yeri vardır. Mâtürîdî’ye göre bu dünya, beş duyunun algı alanına girmeyen ve gayb âlemi olarak bilenen duyular ötesi âlemin varlığına delil teşkil etmektedir. Kitâbu’t-Tevhid’de bu delillendirme “Delâletü’ş-Şâhid ale’l-Gâib” terkibiyle ifade edilmiştir. “Görünür âlem” veya “duyular âlemi” de denilen bu âlem, bizzat varlığıyla onu var edenin varlığına şahitlik etmektedir. Ancak görünür (...) âlemin, görünmezin varlığına şahitliğinin her zaman mümkün olup olmadığı tartışmalıdır. Şayet bu mümkünse hangi şartlarda gerçekleşeceği, üzerinde durulması gereken konulardandır. Söz gelimi görünür âlemin kendisinin özelliklerini taşıyan bir âleme şahitlik ettiği kabul edildiğinde bu durum Allah hakkında nasıl uygulanacaktır? Yani Allah’ın da bu âlem gibi fizik kurallarına bağlı bir varlık olduğu mu kabul edilecektir? Zira görünür âlemin kendisi gibi bir âleme şahitlik ettiğini kabul etmek böyle bir sonuca götürebilir. Öte yandan Allah ve sıfatları ile ahiret âlemi gibi konularda bu metodun kullanılmaması durumunda bilgi elde edilebilecek başka bir yol var mıdır? Mesela duyu organları bu sahada ne kadar etkindir? Veya “doğru haber”den elde edilen bilgi kendi başına yeterli midir? Çalışmamız, Mâtürîdî’nin görünür âlemi temel alarak görünmez âlemle ilgili yorumlamalarında nasıl bir yol takip ettiğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, literatür taraması, kavram tahlili, metin yorumlama yollarıyla yapılmış ve Mâtürîdî’nin Kitâbu’t-Tevhid ve Te’vîlat adlı eserleriyle sınırlandırılmıştır. (shrink)

Contrary to the view maintained by many philosophers that science employs the deductive testing of hypotheses, observational natural sciences such as paleoanthropology and the earth sciences apply a scientific methodology consisting in the proposal of hypotheses which are best fitted to the available empirical data, i.e. which best explain the data. Observational natural sciences are predominantly empirical. They are grounded in observation, and they do not implement any Popperian deductive testing of hypotheses. Theoretical natural sciences such as mathematical physics also (...) apply inference to the best explanation for the introduction of significant concepts and hypotheses. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that in contemporary science, the use of abductive reasoning continues to be as effective as ever. (shrink)

IBE ('Inference to the best explanation' or abduction) is a popular and highly plausible theory of how we should judge the evidence for claims of past events based on present evidence. It has been notably developed and supported recently by Meyer following Lipton. I believe this theory is essentially correct. This paper supports IBE from a probability perspective, and argues that the retrodictive probabilities involved in such inferences should be analysed in terms of predictive probabilities and a priori probability ratios (...) of initial events. The key point is to separate these two features. Disagreements over evidence can be traced to disagreements over either the a priori probability ratios or predictive conditional ratios. In many cases, in real science, judgements of the former are necessarily subjective. The principles of iterated evidence are also discussed. The Sceptic's position is criticised as ignoring iteration of evidence, and characteristically failing to adjust a priori probability ratios in response to empirical evidence. (shrink)

Proponents of IBE claim that the ability of a hypothesis to explain a range of phenomena in a unifying way contributes to the hypothesis’s credibility in light of these phenomena. I propose a Bayesian justification of this claim that reveals a hitherto unnoticed role for explanatory unification in evaluating the plausibility of a hypothesis: considerations of explanatory unification enter into the determination of a hypothesis’s prior by affecting its ‘explanatory coherence’, that is, the extent to which the hypothesis offers mutually (...) cohesive explanations of various phenomena. (shrink)

How do we reconcile the claim of Bayesianism to be a correct normative theory of scientific reasoning with the explanationists’ claim that Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) provides a correct description of our inferential practices? This chapter articulates and defends a version of the heuristic defence of IBE. Three challenges remain that focus on the idea that IBE can lead to knowledge. Answering those challenges requires renouncing standard Bayesianism’s commitment to personalism, while also going beyond objective Bayesianism regarding the (...) constraints on good priors. The result is a non-standard, super-objective Bayesianism that identifies probabilities with evaluations of plausibility in the light of the evidence. (shrink)

Philosophers often refer to a magical-sounding form of inference, called Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But in truth, nearly all explanations are IBE. It is the chosen form of explanation in science and in everyday life. What is IBE? In barest outline, it is an explanation arrived at because it makes the best sense of the available evidence. If we are going to explain the unique success of Western science, the great leap forward, we will have to start not (...) with the drab inductive accounting of Francis Bacon, but with the fanciful guesses of hybrid moderns like Boyle and Newton. They made grand guesses about the particles that roiled invisibly in those glass containers, and about why compressing the gases increased the temperature and why increasing the temperature increased the pressure. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the relationship between Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism, both of which are well-known accounts of the nature of scientific inference. In Sect. 2, I give a brief overview of Bayesianism and IBE. In Sect. 3, I argue that IBE in its most prominently defended forms is difficult to reconcile with Bayesianism because not all of the items that feature on popular lists of “explanatory virtues”—by means of which IBE ranks competing explanations—have confirmational import. (...) Rather, some of the items that feature on these lists are “informational virtues”—properties that do not make a hypothesis \ more probable than some competitor \ given evidence E, but that, roughly-speaking, give that hypothesis greater informative content. In Sect. 4, I consider as a response to my argument a recent version of compatibilism which argues that IBE can provide further normative constraints on the objectively correct probability function. I argue that this response does not succeed, owing to the difficulty of defending with any generality such further normative constraints. Lastly, in Sect. 5, I propose that IBE should be regarded, not as a theory of scientific inference, but rather as a theory of when we ought to “accept” H, where the acceptability of H is fixed by the goals of science and concerns whether H is worthy of commitment as research program. In this way, IBE and Bayesianism, as I will show, can be made compatible, and thus the Bayesian and the proponent of IBE can be friends. (shrink)

Seungbae Park argues that Bas van Fraassen’s rejection of inference to the best explanation (IBE) is problematic for his contextual theory of explanation because van Fraassen uses IBE to support the contextual theory. This paper provides a defense of van Fraassen’s views from Park’s objections. I point out three weaknesses of Park’s objection against van Fraassen. First, van Fraassen may be perfectly content to accept the implications that Park claims to follow from his views. Second, even if van Fraassen rejects (...) IBE he may still endorse particular arguments that instantiate IBE. Third, van Fraassen does not, in fact, use IBE to support his contextual theory. (shrink)

The ambivalent reputation of theology as an academic discipline is attributed to the often circular character of its procedures based on presumed authoritative sources. Recently, science too has come under the shadow of “postmodernist” critiques but, it is argued, has been able to withstand them successfully and make epistemologically warrantedclaims to be depicting reality—thereby vindicating human rationality. Evolutionary epistemological considerations also reinforce confidence in the more general deliverances of the human exploration of reasonableness through inference to the best explanation (IBE). (...) The consequences of applying IBE, with its associated criteria, in theological investigation are considered in relation to theology as it is and as it might be. A number of issues critical for thedevelopment of a credible theology are identified. In spite of the challenging and somewhat negative view of contemporary theology to which this leads, hope is expressed that a genuinely credible “evangelical,”“catholic,” and liberal theology may yet emerge for the new millennium. (shrink)

Under the rubric of understanding the problem of explainability of AI in terms of abductive cognition, I propose to review the lessons from AlphaGo and her more powerful successors. As AI players in Baduk (Go, Weiqi) have arrived at superhuman level, there seems to be no hope for understanding the secret of their breathtakingly brilliant moves. Without making AI players explainable in some ways, both human and AI players would be less-than omniscient, if not ignorant, epistemic agents. Are we bound (...) to have less explainable AI Baduk players as they make further progress? I shall show that the resolution of this apparent paradox depends on how we understand the crucial distinction between abduction and inference to the best explanation (IBE). Some further philosophical issues arising from explainable AI will also be discussed in connection with this distinction. (shrink)

This chapter considers two IBE Arguments to the conclusion that the world is dynamical. The first, the Attitude IBE Argument, says that the best explanation of judging certain attitudes, namely tensed attitudes, to be fitting, or not, is that they are (or are not) fitting, and that if the world were a block world, those attitudes could not be fitting and so the best explanation of people’s judgements is that the world is dynamical. The second IBE Argument, the Preference IBE (...) Argument, says that the best explanation of having certain preferences, namely future-biased preferences, and judging them to be appropriate is that they are appropriate. But, such preferences could only be appropriate if the world is dynamical, and so the best explanation for having those preferences and judging them to be appropriate is that the world is dynamical; and so the chapter should conclude that the world is dynamical. The chapter introduces tensed attitudes and future-biased preferences, and reflects on new empirical evidence regarding the latter. It argues that the claim that they could only be fitting/appropriate if the world is dynamical should be rejected. It then argues that what would render them so are perspectival facts, which obtain in both dynamical and block worlds. Finally, the chapter argues that there are good evolutionary cum psychological explanation for having the attitudes and preferences people do, which in no way rely on the notion of robust passage. So, both IBE Arguments should be resisted. (shrink)

This chapter argues that, taken in totality, the considerations adduced in this book support the conclusion that our world is a block world, because positing robust passage is redundant. As part of this argument, it considers and rejects the idea that positing robust passage allows one to explain process asymmetries. The chapter concludes that there is no reason to posit robust passage arising out of the way the world seems to people, either experientially, or belief-wise, or concept-wise, or attitude-wide, and (...) so there is no reason to posit robust passage. So, they ought not. Given this, the chapter argues that one ought to conclude that the world is a block world. It then presents a new IBE argument to the conclusion that the world is a block world, according to which people know, for a range of events, which lies in the past and which in the future, and the best explanation of this knowledge is that the world is a block world, thereby inferring that the world is a block world. (shrink)

This chapter takes up the idea that people pre-reflectively believe our world to be dynamical, and that since the best explanation for this is that the world is dynamical, one should infer that it is (the Belief IBE Argument). It considers new empirical data regarding our temporal beliefs. The chapter then argues that, in general, one ought to not infer from people’s believing that P to P itself. It then considers several arguments to the conclusion that there is something special (...) about a widespread belief that time robustly passes, which means that the best explanation for this belief is that time robustly passes. It argues that these fail. The chapter then argues that positing robust passage is a very poor explanation for anyone coming to believe that time robustly passes. Finally, it takes up the question of why, if time does not robustly pass, so many people believe it does, and present new empirical evidence in this regard. (shrink)

This chapter considers the Conceptual IBE Argument for robust passage, according to which it conceptually seems to us as though our world is dynamical. That is, people employ certain range of time-related concepts, including the concept of time itself, as well as the concepts of temporal passage, change, and persistence, in order to navigate the world, and that some or all of these concepts are ones that can only be satisfied if the world is dynamical. This chapter outlines several versions (...) of the Conceptual IBE Argument depending on the time-related concept in question. It is then argued that people should reject the claim that the world conceptually seems to us to be dynamical. New empirical evidence about the nature of these concepts is then presented, which undermines the idea that people employ a range of time-related concepts that will only be satisfied if the world is dynamical. (shrink)

This chapter argues for passage deflationism, the view that individuals do not have experiences (as) of robust passage. In this chapter, matters are approached from a quite different angle. Given what is known about what people report about how things seem to them in experience, it argues that deflationism should be endorsed because it offers the best explanation of these reports. The chapter first presents empirical evidence regarding what that people report regarding their experiences. Then it offers a new IBE (...) Argument to the conclusion that passage deflationism should be accepted because it is the best explanation of the variation found in people’s report about their experiences. The chapter then explains how the deflationist can explain this variation in reports. (shrink)

This chapter argues that if the universe is governed by laws of nature, then particular laws of nature cannot be discovered by empirical science unless the meta‐theoretic conception of laws is correct. This gives us a powerful reason to embrace the meta‐theoretic conception. The key argument appeals to underdetermination of theory by evidence, but it avoids the pitfalls of familiar underdetermination arguments against realism. Several objections to the argument are considered, including one based on Bayesianism, one based on inference to (...) the best explanation (IBE), one based on contextualist epistemology, and one that alleges that the only way to avoid inductive skepticism is to adopt an epistemology of science that allows for the discovery of laws of nature in spite of radical underdetermination of the laws by the available evidence. All these objections are found wanting. (shrink)

This chapter motivates why, and under which circumstances, the explanatory power of a scientific hypothesis with respect to a body of evidence can be explicated by means of statistical relevance. This account is traced back to its historic roots in Peirce and Hempel and defended against its critics (e.g., contrasting statistical relevance to purely causal accounts of explanation). Then we derive various Bayesian explications of explanatory power using the method of representation theorems and we compare their properties from a normative (...) point of view. Finally we evaluate how such measures of explanatory power can ground a theory of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). (shrink)

© 2016, UNESCO IBE.Using comparative data, this article examines the level and distribution of participation in adult education opportunities among countries that participated in PIAAC. It considers observed cross-country patterns in relation to some mechanisms that drive unequal chances to participate and to some policy issues that surround the provision, governance, and financing of different types of adult learning. It also explores recent policy developments relevant to AE in three selected countries.

In this article, I explore the compatibility of inference to the best explanation (IBE) with several influential models and accounts of scientific explanation. First, I explore the different conceptions of IBE and limit my discussion to two: the heuristic conception and the objective Bayesian conception. Next, I discuss five models of scientific explanation with regard to each model’s compatibility with IBE. I argue that Kitcher’s unificationist account supports IBE; Railton’s deductive–nomological–probabilistic model, Salmon’s statistical-relevance model, and van Fraassen’s erotetic account are (...) incompatible with IBE; and Salmon’s causal–mechanical model is merely consistent with IBE. In short, many influential models of scientific explanation do not support IBE. I end by outlining three possible conclusions to draw: (1) either philosophers of science or defenders of IBE have seriously misconstrued the concept of explanation, (2) philosophers of science and defenders of IBE do not use the term ‘explanation’ univocally, and (3) the ampliative conception of IBE, which is compatible with any model of scientific explanation, deserves a closer look. (shrink)

In this paper Beebee argues that the problem of induction, which she describes as a genuine sceptical problem, is the same for Humeans than for Necessitarians. Neither scientific essentialists nor Armstrong can solve the problem of induction by appealing to IBE, for both arguments take an illicit inductive step.