This study focuses on CEO hubris and its effect on corporate unethical behaviour—pollution in particular, and in addition examines critical institutional contingencies [state ownership, political connection and industrial competition] which may moderate this effect. With data from over-polluting listed firms based on the real-time pollution monitoring system in transitional China from 2015 to 2017, we find that CEO hubris is significantly positively related to firm pollution, and that the moderating role of SO is not significant, that PC positively (...) moderates the hubris–pollution relationship and that industrial competition negatively moderates this relationship. These findings contribute to research on the upper echelon theory, institutional theory and the growing literature on emerging economies. (shrink)

This essay advances a philosophical and Stoic reinterpretation of hubris that challenges the reductionist treatment it has received in contemporary management research. Whereas most studies, shaped by a positivist epistemology, have sought to quantify the effects of leader hubris on performance, this essay reclaims the concept's original ethical and spiritual meaning: the corruption of the leader's soul through excessive exposure to power. Drawing on Stoic philosophy, we argue that hubris should be understood not only as a measurable (...) psychological trait but as a moral distortion of the self, produced by the intoxicating effects of power on the soul. By revisiting the Stoic tradition of spiritual exercises and building on the examples of Marcus Aurelius and Alcibiades, this essay enables a rethinking of leadership development: it is not a matter of competencies or behavioural development, but an education of the soul grounded in self-knowledge, temperance, and ethical vigilance. By doing so, this essay opens a heterodox space for reuniting philosophy and leadership ethics in the critique of power and abuse of power. (shrink)

The research theorizes how hubris impacts ethical decision making and develops empirical evidence that earnings manipulation is more likely at firms led by CEOs influenced by hubris. The theory posits that hubris impairs moral awareness by causing decision makers to ignore external factors that otherwise drive such awareness. Additionally, these individuals apply a flawed subjective assessment of the decision they face which further impairs moral awareness. The predicted result is that hubris leads managers to invoke an (...) amoral decision process which causes a higher incidence of unethical behavior among these individuals. An empirical study investigates the relationship between CEO hubris and the unethical practice of earnings manipulation. This study finds a significant correlation between CEO hubris and earnings manipulation at the firms they lead, an outcome broadly consistent with the theory developed. (shrink)

Hubris is a notion that has recently acquired special urgency, as it seems to express in the post-communist era the demands of justice during the tragic clash between governance and violence. This ethico-political notion deserves to be studied not only in ancient writings but in modern drama and thought as well. Nikos Kazantzakis' unduly neglected Capodistria (1944) dramatizes the dilemmas of civic action during the democratic constitution of a polity. A reading of this tragedy from the perspective of political (...) theory suggests ways in which the meaning of hubris in modernity may be better understood. (shrink)

This study focuses on CEO hubris and its detrimental effect on corporate financial performance along with an examination of critical corporate governance contingencies (CEO power and board vigilance) that may moderate the negative effect. From 654 observations of 164 Korean firms over the years 2001–2008, we found that CEO power exacerbated the negative effect of CEO hubris on corporate financial performance, whereas board vigilance mitigated it. This study provides empirical evidence that entrenchment problems arising from CEO hubris (...) would be exacerbated as CEOs become more powerful, but weakened as board of directors become more vigilant. Theoretical contributions and practical implications will be discussed. (shrink)

This article comments on the recent study “CEO hubris and firm pollution: state and market contingencies in a transitional economy” of Zhang et al. :459–478, 2020) in this journal. We very much appreciate the valuable initiative of Zhang et al. to study the potential effect of CEO characteristics on corporate pollution. At the same time, we are concerned with the authors’ interpretation of the regression results and their operationalization of CEO hubris. We hope to contribute to the literature (...) on managerial hubris in two ways. First, we repair the authors’ inferences and conclusions about the actual effect of CEO hubris on firm pollution with respect to their conflicting regression results. Second, we unpack and clarify the authors’ vulnerable operationalization of CEO hubris. We hope to stimulate more research on the relationship between CEO hubris and firm pollution, and managerial hubris more generally through a more rigorous operationalization and measurement of hubris. (shrink)

It is common nowadays for laypeople to take public stances on complex issues, such as the effectiveness of a vaccine or the seriousness of anthropogenic climate change, without any kind of disciplinary expertise. Yet those who do so act as if they were experts in the field, disseminating their thoughts and sometimes also spreading their advice. Scholars have ascribed this phenomenon to various kinds of individuals, such as conspiracy or contrarian thinkers, science denialists, know-it-all experts and celebrities. This paper aims (...) to argue that behind such different manifestations lies a common, independently identifiable epistemic disposition that will be called epistemic hubris that will be fully explained in relation to other epistemic vices already discussed in the literature. Epistemic hubris includes, but is not limited to, overconfidence; it may or not entail arrogance; it is similar to yet distinct from hyper-autonomy and conspiracy thinking. Its peculiarity is that individuals who develop it seem to believe that they can easily become experts, even without special training. This disposition negatively affects individuals’ epistemic conduct, hindering knowledge and true belief formation, and can generate morally relevant consequences when people who falsely consider themselves experts begin to share their mistaken beliefs. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the claim that the ‘dis-incumbenced’ posture required by existential humanism in its raw, uncompensated form is a hubristic one. The first section tries to evaluate the claim on the basis of truth and objectivity. The second section introduces some rival approaches on ‘dis-incumbence’. The final section argues that the issue of hubris of humanism requires restatement, or a new angle of vision.

Psychophysics measures the attributes of perceptual experience. The question of whether some of these attributes should be interpreted as more fundamental, or “real,” than others has been answered differently throughout its history. The operationism of Stevens and Boring answers “no,” reacting to the perceived vacuity of earlier debates about fundamentality. The subsequent rise of multidimensional scaling (MDS) implicitly answers “yes” in its insistence that psychophysical data be represented in spaces of low dimensionality. I argue the return of fundamentality follows from (...) a trend toward increasing epistemic humility. Operationism exhibited a kind of hubris in the constitutive role it assigned to the experimenter’s presuppositions that is abandoned by the algorithmic methods of MDS. This broad epistemic trend is illustrated by following the trajectory of research on a particular candidate attribute: tonal volume. (shrink)

Some theories of virtue epistemology appear to sanction an equivalence between intellectual disagreement and moral opprobrium. This seems to require an equivalence between intellectual and moral virtues, or at least some calibration between them. This paper challenges the idea that the taxonomy of virtues is sufficiently precise to warrant moral opprobrium as the outcome of an epistemic dispute. On the contrary, when one shifts from the epistemic plane to the moral, it is often due to the moral vice of (...) class='Hi'>hubris. In such cases, opprobrium is a moral failing of the accuser and does nothing to advance the epistemic cause. I attribute at least some of today’s intense political and cultural polarization to hubris. (shrink)

This paper demonstrated the influences of initiation, development, turn-down, and reinitiation of the dynamic capability of an entrepreneurial firm in the solar energy industry. The focus is on the impact of entrepreneurial hubris, which may affect the decision of ambidexterity that can vitalize dynamic capability. The findings indicate that, when the major decision maker has the trait of hubris, the decision-making process may be overly arbitrary, and a decision of being exploratory or exploitative alone is likely to be (...) made. On the contrary, when the founder entrepreneur is aware of the hubris and shares decisive power, the decision of being ambidextrous as a dynamic capability is more freely achieved. This paper contributes by discovery of the cognitive-based microfoundation of entrepreneurial ventures and linkage of such microfoundation to organizational ambidexterity. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the moral status of agricultural biotechnology and, more specifically, genetically modified crops by employing the hubris argument. The old notion of hubris, given to us by the ancient Greeks, provides a narrative from which we can understand ourselves and technology. Ronald Sandler offers us an understanding of hubris he claims gives us a prima facie reason and a presumption against the use of GM crops. I argue that Sandler’s hubris argument fails (...) for several reasons: Sander and many others fail to have a proper understanding of agriculture as an inherently technological practice which is radically different from ‘nature’; the notions of control and manipulation which are central to the concept of hubris are difficult to understand and use in the context of agriculture; trying to establish a prima facie reason against GM crops runs into serious difficulty since many GM crops are profoundly different from each other; and even if we accept Sandler’s argument of hubris, it actually plays no role in the reasoning and evaluation of the moral status of different GM crops. (shrink)

In this chapter I contend that Husserl’s investigations of reduction and givenness culminate in a hubris and a humility that are not precisely where Marion might look for them. In the first section of this essay I set out the main points in Marion’s reading of Husserl. I begin by outlining the broadening and breakthrough achieved in the early work, and then consider the shift that Marion sees presaged in the principle of all principles and announced in the reduction. (...) On the latter’s interpretation, appearing things are reduced to objects within the intentional immanence of consciousness. This process culminates in poor and flat phenomena that are modelled on the mathematising horizons of the subject. I go on to give a short outline of Marion’s alternative notions of the interloqué and the saturated phenomenon. I commence the second section by looking briefly at what I call Husserl’s philosophical hubris, brought out in some of his remarks concerning the subjective a priori. Hubris lies in the interpretation of everything as a meaning for me, from God through to the world. It does not lie in the taking of beings as objects within fixed horizons, for Husserl shows a notable humility towards the things themselves in their respective appearances. Such humility is not a rarity, but is threaded through the explications that follow on the procedures of epoché and reduction. In the rest of this section, my concern is to show that, as Husserl’s thought develops, he pays ever more attention to the original modes of givenness of transcendent things. In the third and final section, I suggest that he also does justice to the character of the world as non-objective ground and horizon. Philosophical hubris will in no way preclude empirical humility. (shrink)

This chapter assesses the charge of humanism against absolutism. For the typical absolutist, they have the capacity to provide an account of the world that is both true and clean. This claim, in the humanist's view, is lacking in humility because it is one that someone could only have reason to accept if he or she were possessed of enhanced cognitive powers they in fact lack. Implicitly and illegitimately, therefore, absolutism pretends to an exalted cognitive capacity. The first section chronicles (...) the points of both the ascending and descending absolutism. The second section explains the problems in the ‘super-spectator's position’. The third and fourth sections investigate the role of science and scientific realism. The last section explains the side of atypical absolutist. The chapter concludes that typical absolutism stands convicted of hubris, of positing cognitive capabilities that there is good reason to suppose human beings could never possess. (shrink)

This essay deals in both critique and diagnosis: critique, in that it outlines the failings of certain approaches to needs in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, and diagnosis, in that it links those failings to both certain forms of political leadership and judgement, especially as disfigured by ‘hubris’, and to universalising conceptions of need that fuel these failings. Universalist approaches to needs seem to provide the kind of priority and urgency that cuts through the messy business of politics. (...) But this is mistaken. In fact, they feed hubristic decision-making in politics because they assume needs can be determined without reference to expressed wants, needs and interests. They also ignore the possibility that the very process of collectively determining our needs and interests may be a need in itself. And they undermine the democratic determination of needs, which is necessary for learning about the nature and circumstances of our needs. I bring this argument out with particular reference to the pandemic politics of the USA, Brazil and South Africa. My focus is democratic politics and leadership. Leaders who were willing to listen to and empathise with their citizens and scientists – to hear needs on the ground – made better judgements than those who, normally through hubris, did not. South Africa fell somewhere in the middle. In short, the seemingly benign idea of a universal account of needs can thus have malign outcomes, including undermining the intrinsic, instrumental and constructive value of democracy and thus adequate judgement as regards needs on the ground. (shrink)

Biotechnologies – synthetic biology in particular – are sometimes blamed for playing God or manifesting hubris, that is, for evincing the vicious attitude of transcending the limits of human agency. In trying to create living organisms, we would adopt an attitude that is immoral for human beings. In this article, I want to show that this blame is unwarranted. I distinguish two aspects of the argument, which claims that it is impossible for human beings to create life and immoral (...) to attempt it. I argue that if we adopt a conception of what life consists of in agreement with the scientific world view, there is no place for hubris. Finally, I maintain that even if we accept a non-scientific conception of life (a vitalist or a supernatural one), we are not in a position to formulate the blame against synthetic biologists because what they do cannot contravene this vitalist or supernaturalist view. (shrink)

Virgil has Evander trace the origins of the name of the river Tiber back to the death of a giant, called ‘Thybris’ (Aen. 8.330–2). This article argues that the reference to the violent (asper) giant can be understood as etymological wordplay on the Greek word hubris and as a potential allusion to the grammatical debate on the nature of aspiration. Varro's De gente populi Romani is identified as an important source for the characterization of the Tiber as a giant (...) in primeval times. The political implications of the word hubris are also briefly explored with reference to various identities to which Evander alludes. The final part of the article argues that Theocritus’ Idyll 1 and the scholiast to Theocritus may have also inspired Virgil's description of the Tiber in this passage. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that professional healthcare organizations such as the AMA and ANA ought not to take controversial stances on professional ethics. I address the best putative arguments in favor of taking such stances, and argue that none are convincing. I then argue that the sort of stance-taking at issue has pernicious consequences: it stands to curb critical thought in social, political, and legal debates, increase moral distress among clinicians, and alienate clinicians from their professional societies. Thus, because (...) there are no good arguments in favor of stance-taking and at least some risks in doing so, professional organizations should refrain from adopting the sort of ethically controversial positions at issue. (shrink)

Hubris among CEOs is generally considered to be undesirable: researchers in finance and in management have documented its unwelcome effects and the media ascribe many corporate failings to CEO hubris. However, the literature fails to provide a precise definition of CEO hubris and is mostly silent on how to prevent it. We use work on hubris in the fields of mythology, psychology, and ethics to develop a framework defining CEO hubris. Our framework describes a set (...) of beliefs and behaviors, both psycho-pathological and unethical in nature, which characterize the problematic relationship of the hubris-infected CEO towards his or her own self, others and the world at large. We then demonstrate how the development of authentic leadership may contribute to preventing or attenuating hubris by addressing its psycho-pathological nature through the true self and meaningful relationships with others. In addition to its psycho-pathological dimension, CEO hubris also contains an ethical dimension. We therefore propose that the development of the virtue of reverence might contribute to the prevention or attenuation of CEO hubris, because reverence makes the individual aware of his or her place in the world order and membership of the community of humans. (shrink)

Most historians explain changes in conceptions of the epistemic virtues and vices in terms of social and historical developments. I argue that such approaches, valuable as they are, neglect the fact that certain changes also reflect changes in metaphysical sensibilities. Certain epistemic virtues and vices are defined relative to an estimate of our epistemic situation that is, in turn, defined by a broader vision or picture of the nature of reality. I defend this claim by charting changing conceptions of the (...) virtue of epistemic humility in nineteenth century intellectual culture, focusing on claims about the humility or hubris of the Victorian scientific naturalists. (shrink)

In the pages of this journal, a fruitful debate has evolved on the ethical legitimacy of fractional-reserve banking. In this article, we respond to the new arguments raised by Evans as we clarify our position on the unethical and illegitimate nature of fractional-reserve banking. Fractional-reserve banking is not a recent financial innovation but represents a long-standing legal aberration. The co-mingling of two mutually exclusive financial contracts, deposit and loan, confounds the contracting parties’ purposes, intents, rights, and obligations. As a result, (...) it creates unsolvable legal difficulties and ethical dilemmas. While these problems are most evident in the case of a bank run, they also arise when trying to answer the simple question of “who owns a deposit?”. (shrink)

This article explores the link between CEOs’ language and hubristic leadership. It is based on the precepts that leaders’ linguistic utterances provide insights into their personality and behaviours; hubris is associated with unethical and potentially destructive leadership behaviours; if it is possible to identify linguistic markers of CEO hubris then these could serve as early warnings sign and help to mitigate the associated risks. Using computational linguistics, we analysed spoken utterances from a sample of hubristic CEOs and compared (...) them with non-hubristic CEOs. We found that hubristic CEOs’ linguistic utterances show systematic and consistent differences from the linguistic utterances of non-hubristic CEOs. Demonstrating how hubristic leadership manifests in CEO language contributes to wider research regarding the diagnosis and prevention of the unethical and potentially destructive effects of hubristic leadership. This research contributes to the wider study of hubris and unethical leadership by applying a novel method for identifying linguistic markers and offers a way of militating against the risk of unethical and destructive CEO behaviours induced or aggravated by hubristic leadership. (shrink)

Jan Patočka’s early phenomenology, as presented in The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, does not merely adopt Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld. The paper demonstrates the originality of Patočka’s appropriation of this concept, but also its internal tensions and difficulties. Seeking to elaborate a concept of a phenomenology allowing for a theory of the lifeworld stricto sensu, i.e. of the life of the world, Patočka’s book effectively shows that there is no ahistorical, absolute or “natural” starting point for phenomenology. (...) Truth, as approachable through phenomenology, is not given, but must rather be developed. Elaborating on the concept of transcendental idealism, Patočka’s early phenomenology thus suggests a vivid idea of “intermeshing” monads ontologically grounding the world. (shrink)

Patočka’s phenomenology, as presented in The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, creatively transforms Husserl’s concept of Lebenswelt. The chapter demonstrates the originality of Patočka’s approach. I summarize Patočka’s analysis of the natural world to focus on the concept of transcendental subjectivity. How can this subjectivity be achieved by a finite consciousness and, even more importantly, what is this subjectivity? Elaborating on Husserl’s transcendental idealism, Patočka identifies the concrete concept of constituting subjectivity with that of “monads” intermeshing with one another. (...) I suggest interpreting this concept as pointing to trans-individual process of life embodied by the monads ontologically grounding the world. (shrink)

This chapter argues that human beings are incapable of the ‘dis-incumbenced’ posture by establishing its unlivability. The first two sections support the claim that the dis-incumbenced posture is unendurable by using the ‘Asian’ Experience, the Aphasic Exerience, and the Unheimlich Experience as testimonies. The next two sections defend the thoughts that human beings need to be answerable, and that answerability must be something beyond human life itself. The chapter concludes that reflective beings cannot dispense with the conviction that their lives (...) are answerable to and find measure in something beyond the human. Thus, humans are incapable of the ‘dis-incumbenced posture’. (shrink)

I describe several historical cases of engineers or inventors obsessed with perfecting their products, illustrating how in some of those cases the perfectionist impulse led to tremendously valuable innovation, while in others to disaster, or at least to failure of the project to make the mark in history it otherwise could have. The psychological tendency towards perfecting an instrument for achieving some telos beyond what is pragmatically necessary or even desirable was diagnosed by Adam Smith, and may always be a (...) source of mixed blessings. (shrink)

ABSTRACT During the Cold War the United States developed an espionage style that reflected its love affair with technology (technophilia) whereas the Soviet Union and the East Bloc continued a tradition of using humans to collect intelligence. This essay places the origins and development of these espionage styles during the Cold War in historical and social context, and assesses their strengths and weaknesses by drawing on examples from particular cases. While the United States won the Cold War, the East Bloc (...) won the spy wars because of a more effective espionage style. I conclude with some reflections on the uses of history for future policy, and suggest areas for further study. (shrink)

In the last few years repeated scandals have rocked their worlds of many industries. Stories which have hit the headlines recently have included news of * Deliberate cheating by car makers to evade emissions tests * LIBOR and FX manipulation by bankers * Falsification of drug testing results plus allegations of bribery and corruption in major pharmaceutical corporations * Unlawful tapping of phones of the famous by newspapers * Cover-ups over high death rates in hospitals. While it is not always (...) obvious what has gone wrong, there is no disguising the widespread impact on many stakeholders, and the catastrophic loss of trust and sense of betrayal that results. Matt Nixon has had a privileged insider seat in several of the organizations which came to suffer major crises, crises which inspired deep emotional responses. (shrink)

Any meaningful investigation into the potential validity of religious beliefs—including God—should prominently include their innate presence in children. That presence offers an enormous challenge to the scientific perspective and appears to be more relevant than established arguments. As an initial backdrop to discussions here, I begin with some quotes conveying the import of the contemporary scientific vision of life, as well as quotes conferring that vision’s underlying DNA reliance. The article will then briefly argue that that confident vision—and in particular, (...) its DNA reliance—is clearly flawed. The main discussions then consider the mysterious phenomenon of terminal lucidity before moving on to a focus on the plausibility of a DNA-based evolutionary explanation for the fact that “[t]he universal themes of religion are not learned” since they arrive as our natural religion. As an example of our increasingly secular era, the paper pauses to note Western Buddhism’s divorce from religious and/or deeper perspectives. Subsequent closing discussions critically consider the questionable state of neuroscience and the limitations of the existing approaches to supporting religious perspectives. For those wondering about deeper aspects of life—with or without an affiliation to an official religion—then I suggest digging in for yourself. Hubris aside, the natural sciences do not have a monopoly on understanding life, and the contrary assumption has caused big problems. (shrink)

Innovation is often seen as essential for ventures to succeed. High business failure rates in entrepreneurship, however, suggest that innovations are frequently driven by entrepreneurs blinded by overconfidence. Thus, anticipating when and why entrepreneurs will be motivated to innovate is fundamental for entrepreneurial success. Using a large sample obtained from population surveys conducted in 77 countries, this study analyzes the variables that are significantly associated with innovative behaviors. The research tests a model proposing that the joint effects of hubris, (...) growth aspirations, and an entrepreneur’s level of entrepreneurial experience have a crucial impact on innovative endeavors. It finds that hubris is significantly related to entrepreneurs’ growth aspirations and that ambition, in turn, is positively related to innovative behaviors. In addition, the study finds that both relationships are moderated by the level of entrepreneurial experience. These findings highlight the need to wise up amateur entrepreneurs before they embark on innovative endeavors. (shrink)

The essays on obesity in this issue frequently refer to the recent American Medical Association (AMA) declaration of obesity as a disease. In response to these essays, I describe and explore the significance of ‘risk–factor medicalization’ and how negative unintended consequences with this approach to disease modeling are exemplified in many of the essays. I also relate the essays’ content to the issue of physician hubris in the face of their own helplessness in aiding the obese patient.

This second exploration of how the relationships between technology and animality are understood and represented by Levi focuses mostly on his science fiction and on how it challenges the human-animal divide as it was instead presented in “A Bottle of Sunshine.” The analysis of the overarching theme of hybridity in Levi’s work shows in fact that Levi represents himself as indeed a homo faber, who nonetheless needs a hybrid literary strategy capable of displaying the creative possibilities of limitrophy as well (...) as the hubris of traditional anthropocentric humanism. (shrink)

This review considers three recent films that focus on the lives of captive exotic animals and the people who keep them: Water for Elephants , a fictional Hollywood feature, and the documentaries One Lucky Elephant and The Elephant in the Living Room . Despite their different motivations and target audiences, all three productions tell the stories of well-meaning people who take wild animals captive—most prominently elephants and lions—believing that only they can keep the animals safe and fulfilled. In each context, (...) these people have profound, if self-interested, emotional attachments to their nonhuman captives. These three films, then, offer captive wild animals as ambivalent figures and cinematic loci for stories of human hubris and redemption. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that we are now in the early stage of a revolution even more transformative than the Copernican. That great upheaval brought about a radical shift in the way men and women conceptualized their place in the universe. The revolution now under way entails a sea change in the way we think about ourselves in relation to the planet we inhabit—itself not a simple matter—and also the reeducation of our attitudes, values, feelings, emotions, patterns of (...) behavior, and modes of living. All of which is to say that it requires us to become very different people from the ones we now are. (shrink)

This paper explores whether DICTION text analysis software reveals distinctive language markers of a verbal tone of hubris in annual letters to shareholders signed by CEOs of major companies. We analyze 193 letters to shareholders, comprising about 368,000 words, focusing initially on 23 letters signed by CEOs who are alleged to be hubristic: Browne, Goodwin, and Murdoch. Their language use is statistically significantly high in terms of the DICTION master variable, REALISM. Based on further analysis, we contend that language (...) high in REALISM is not a distinctive marker of hubris but is likely to be a genre effect that is common in CEO letters to shareholders. We draw attention to the restricted capacity of DICTION to capture subtlety of language in CEO letters to shareholders. (shrink)

Castro-Gómez argues that in the colonial periphery of the Spanish Americas, Enlightenment constituted not only the position of epistemic distance separating science from all other knowledges, but also the position of ethnic distance separating the criollos from the ‘castes’. Epistemic violence—and not only physical violence—is thereby found at the very origin of Colombian nationality.

This paper explores and defends a form of transcendental argument that is neither bold in its attempt to answer the sceptic, as ambitious transcendental strategies, nor epistemically humble, as modest transcendental strategies. While ambitious transcendental strategies seek to meet the sceptical challenge, and modest transcendental strategies accept the validity of the challenge but retreat to a position of epistemic humility, this form of transcendental argument denies the assumption that undergirds the challenge, namely that truth and falsity may be legitimately predicated (...) of the conditions of knowledge. As a result, although this form of transcendental argument is not truth-directed, it is not vulnerable to a charge that is often levelled against modest transcendental arguments, namely that they amount to the adoption of a strategy of sophisticated capitulation. This form of transcendental argument, which is implicit in Collingwood’s conception of philosophy as the search for absolut... (shrink)

Ayn Rand and Immanuel Kant had profound disagreements, not just about the possible scope of knowledge, but (more importantly) about the possible scope of philosophy, especially metaphysics. This paper explores those disagreements, steel-manning both sides. My conclusion is that 1) both thinkers have worthwhile points to make, yet 2) Rand is guilty of poor scholarship while 3) Kant is guilty of appeal to ignorance. Despite the fallacious nature of (3), I stress that ignorance is not by itself something that philosophers (...) committed to objectivity should panic about. (shrink)

Most historians explains changes in conceptions of the epistemic virtues and vices in terms of social and historical developments. I argue that such approaches, valuable as they are, neglect the fact that certain changes also reflect changes in metaphysical sensibilities. Certain epistemic virtues and vices are defined relative to an estimate of our epistemic situation that is, in turn, defined by a broader vision or picture of the nature of reality. I defend this claim by charting changing conceptions of the (...) virtue of epistemic humility in 19th century intellectual culture - specifically the scientific naturalists. (shrink)

Neurotechnologies that promise to dampen (via pharmacologicals), disassociate (via electro-convulsive therapy), erase (via deep brain stimulation), and replace (via false memory creation) unsavory episodic memories are no longer the subject of science fiction. They have already arrived, and their funding suggests that they will not disappear anytime soon. In light of their emergence, this essay examines the neurostructure of normative morality to clarify that memory manipulation, which promises to take away that which is bad in human experience, also removes that (...) which enables human beings to be good. Concepts such as free will, moral responsibility, and the neurobiological basis of moral reasoning are explored to underscore the fundamental hubris inherent to the memory manipulation enterprise. (shrink)