This paper examines Boltzmann’s responses to the Loschmidt reversibility objection to the H-theorem, as presented in his Lectures on Gas Theory. I describe and evaluate two distinct conceptions of the assumption of molecular disorder found in this work, and contrast these notions with the Stosszahlansatz, as well as with the predominant contemporary conception of molecular disorder. Both these conceptions are assessed with respect to the reversibility objection. Finally, I interpret Boltzmann as claiming that a state of molecular disorder serves (...) as a necessary condition for the application of probabilistic arguments. This in turn offers a way to bridge the conceptual gap between the H-theorem and his combinatorial argument. (shrink)

A comparison is made of the traditional Loschmidt and Zermelo objections to Boltzmann's H-theorem, and its simplified variant in the Ehrenfests' 1912 wind-tree model. The little-cited 1896 objection of Zermelo is also analysed. Significant differences between the objections are highlighted, and several old and modern misconceptions concerning both them and the H-theorem are clarified. We give particular emphasis to the radical nature of Poincare's and Zermelo's attack, and the importance of the shift in Boltzmann's thinking in response to (...) the objections as a whole. (shrink)

In (Weaver 2021), I showed that Boltzmann’s H-theorem does not face a significant threat from the reversibility paradox. I argue that my defense of the H-theorem against that paradox can be used yet again for the purposes of resolving the recurrence paradox without having to endorse heavy-duty statistical assumptions outside of the hypothesis of molecular chaos. As in (Weaver 2021), lessons from the history and foundations of physics reveal precisely how such resolution is achieved.

An intricate, long, and occasionally heated debate surrounds Boltzmann’s H-theorem (1872) and his combinatorial interpretation of the second law (1877). After almost a century of devoted and knowledgeable scholarship, there is still no agreement as to whether Boltzmann changed his view of the second law after Loschmidt’s 1876 reversibility argument or whether he had already been holding a probabilistic conception for some years at that point. In this paper, I argue that there was no abrupt statistical turn. In the (...) first part, I discuss the development of Boltzmann’s research from 1868 to the formulation of the H-theorem. This reconstruction shows that Boltzmann adopted a pluralistic strategy based on the interplay between a kinetic and a combinatorial approach. Moreover, it shows that the extensive use of asymptotic conditions allowed Boltzmann to bracket the problem of exceptions. In the second part I suggest that both Loschmidt’s challenge and Boltzmann’s response to it did not concern the H-theorem. The close relation between the theorem and the reversibility argument is a consequence of later investigations on the subject. (shrink)

Boltzmann’s H-theoremH-theorem(1872) was explicitlyLille UniversityconceivedIEMN in order to proofProof Clausius’ Second LawLaw (1850s) and for cyclicCyclicprocessesProcess only (1854). Secondary literature used to join the function EE function, in Boltzmann’s 1872–paper, to the development of EntropyEntropy. However, Clausius’ Second Law for cyclical processes did not deal with Entropy; moreover, in a cyclic processProcess, entropy variation, being a state function, is necessarily equal to zero. Later, Clausius introduced the Entropy quantity in order to settle the framework of non-cyclic processes mathematically (1865; (...) 1872). In this paper we will shed light on this issue through the textual analysisAnalysis of Clausius and Boltzmann’s seminal works; a critical discussion of the main historiographyHistoriography of the H-theoremH-theorem and its interplay with EntropyEntropy will be presented as well. (shrink)

The two theories that revolutionized physics in the twentieth century, relativity and quantum mechanics, are full of predictions that defy common sense. Recently, we used three such paradoxical ideas to prove “The Free Will Theorem” (strengthened here), which is the culmination of a series of theorems about quantum mechanics that began in the 1960s. It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, (...) if the experimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particle’s response (to be pedantic—the universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous history of the universe. Our argument combines the well-known consequence of relativity theory, that the time order of space-like separated events is not absolute, with the EPR paradox discovered by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in 1935, and the Kochen-Specker Paradox of 1967 (See [2].) We follow Bohm in using a spin version of EPR and Peres in using his set of 33 directions, rather than the original configuration used by Kochen and Specker. More contentiously, the argument also involves the notion of free will, but we postpone further discussion of this to the last section of the article. Note that our proof does not mention “probabilities” or the “states” that determine them, which is.. (shrink)

In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning to losing. In this note, we prove a new impossibility theorem concerning this axiom: there is no ordinal voting method satisfying positive involvement that also satisfies the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, resolvability, and a common invariance property for Condorcet methods, namely (...) that the choice of winners depends only on the ordering of majority margins by size. (shrink)

The problem of automated theorem finding is one of the 33 basic research problems in automated reasoning which was originally proposed by Wos in 1988, and it is still an open problem. To solve the problem, an approach of forward deduction based on the strong relevant logics was proposed. Following the approach, this paper presents a systematic methodology for automated theorem finding. To show the effectiveness of our methodology, the paper presents two case studies, one is automated (...) class='Hi'>theorem finding in NBG set theory and the other is automated theorem finding in Peano’s arithmetic. Some known theorems have been found in our case studies. (shrink)

Mathematical theorems are cultural artifacts and may be interpreted much as works of art, literature, and tool-and-craft are interpreted. The Fundamental Theorem of the Calculus, the Central Limit Theorem of Statistics, and the Statistical Continuum Limit of field theories, all show how the world may be put together through the arithmetic addition of suitably prescribed parts (velocities, variances, and renormalizations and scaled blocks, respectively). In the limit — of smoothness, statistical independence, and large N — higher-order parts, such (...) as accelerations, are, for the most, part irrelevant, affirming that, in the end, most of the world's particulars may be averaged over (a very un-Scriptural point of view). (We work out all of this in technical detail, including a nice geometric picture of stochastic integration, and a method of calculating the variance of the sum of dependent random variables using renormalization group ideas.) These fundamental theorems affirm a culture that is additive, ahistorical, Cartesian, and continuist, sharing in what might be called a species of modern culture. We understand mathematical results as useful because, like many other such artifacts, they have been adapted to fit the world, and the world has been adapted to fit their capacities. Such cultural interpretation is in effect motivation for the mathematics, and might well be offered to students as a way of helping them understand what is going on at the blackboard. Philosophy of mathematics might want to pay more attention to the history and detailed technical features of sophisticated mathematics, as a balance to the usual concerns that arise in formalist or even Platonist positions. (shrink)

We prove a local normal form theorem of the Gaifman type for the infinitary logic L∞ω(Qu)ω whose formulas involve arbitrary unary quantifiers but finite quantifier rank. We use a local Ehrenfeucht‐Fraïssé type game similar to the one in [9]. A consequence is that every sentence of L∞ω(Qu)ω of quantifier rank n is equivalent to an infinite Boolean combination of sentences of the form (∃≥iy)ψ(y), where ψ(y) has counting quantifiers restricted to the (2n–1 – 1)‐neighborhood of y. (© 2005 WILEY‐VCH (...) Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

Motivated by a paper by Barut and Meystre, Bohm's EPR gedanken experiment performed with classical and spin-s particles is considered, and the applicability of Bell's theorem to these cases is discussed. The classical model presented by Barut and Meystre is modified to become a stochastic local hidden-variable model reproducing the results of an EPR experiment of the type performed by Aspect et al.

This paper consists primarily of a survey of results of Harvey Friedman about some proof-theoretic aspects of various forms of Kruskal's tree theorem, and in particular the connection with the ordinal Γ0. We also include a fairly extensive treatment of normal functions on the countable ordinals, and we give a glimpse of Verlen hierarchies, some subsystems of second-order logic, slow-growing and fast-growing hierarchies including Girard's result, and Goodstein sequences. The central theme of this paper is a powerful theorem (...) due to Kruskal, the ‘tree theorem’, as well as a ‘finite miniaturization’ of Kruskal's theorem due to Harvey Friedman. These versions of Kruskal's theorem are remarkable from a proof-theoretic point of view because they are not provable in relatively strong logical systems. They are examples of so-called ‘natural independence phenomena’, which are considered by most logicians as more natural than the metamathematical incompleteness results first discovered by Gödel. Kruskal's tree theorem also plays a fundamental role in computer science, because it is one of the main tools for showing that certain orderings on trees are well founded. These orderings play a crucial role in proving the termination of systems of rewrite rules and the correctness of Knuth-Bendix completion procedures. There is also a close connection between a certain infinite countable ordinal called Γo and Kruskal's theorem. Previous definitions of the function involved in this connection are known to be incorrect, in that, the function is not monotonic. We offer a repaired definition of this function, and explore briefly the consequences of its existence. (shrink)

In [2], Jockusch and Shore have introduced a new hierarchy of sets and operators called the REA hierarchy. In this note we prove analogues of the Friedberg Jump Theorem and the Sacks Jump Theorem for many REA operators. MSC: 03D25, 03D55.

A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell’s Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes that.

In the present paper we give a precise definition of a hidden-variable theory for quantum mechanics, whereby we adopt the weakest possible definition of a hidden-variable theory, which is compatible with the assumption that the bounded observables of a quantum mechanical system are represented by the elements of the real part Ar of a W*-algebra A (of the most general type) and the states are represented by the “normal states” (in the mathematical sense) of A. We then go on to (...) show that an example put forward by Bell in 1966 satisfies our definition (Sec. 2). Finally we make use of Bell's famous theorem to show that for a sufficiently non-commutative W*-algebra A no hidden-variable theory in our sense exists (Theorem 3.3 and its corollaries). (shrink)

The important recent book by Schurz ( 2019 ) appreciates that the no-free-lunch theorems (NFL) have major implications for the problem of (meta) induction. Here I review the NFL theorems, emphasizing that they do not only concern the case where there is a uniform prior—they prove that there are “as many priors” (loosely speaking) for which any induction algorithm _A_ out-generalizes some induction algorithm _B_ as vice-versa. Importantly though, in addition to the NFL theorems, there are many _free lunch_ theorems. (...) In particular, the NFL theorems can only be used to compare the expected performance of an induction algorithm _A_, considered in isolation, with the expected performance of an induction algorithm _B_, considered in isolation. There is a rich set of free lunches which instead concern the statistical _correlations_ among the generalization errors of induction algorithms. As I describe, the meta-induction algorithms that Schurz advocates as a “solution to Hume’s problem” are simply examples of such a free lunch based on correlations among the generalization errors of induction algorithms. I end by pointing out that the prior that Schurz advocates, which is uniform over bit frequencies rather than bit patterns, is contradicted by thousands of experiments in statistical physics and by the great success of the maximum entropy procedure in inductive inference. (shrink)

Ronald Dworkin has long criticized legal positivists for their efforts to distinguish between legal and non-legal standards of conduct that are incumbent on people. Recently, Dworkin has broached this criticism in his hostile account of the debates between Incorporationist Legal Positivists and Exclusive Legal Positivists. Specifically, he has maintained that Incorporationists cannot avoid the unpalatable conclusion that the axioms and theorems of arithmetic are legal norms. This article shows why such a conclusion is indeed avoidable and why Dworkin's criticism is (...) therefore wide of the mark. (shrink)

SummaryMany historians of science recognize that the outcome of the celebrated debate on Boltzmann's H-Theorem, which took place in the weekly scientific journal Nature, beginning at the end of 1894 and continuing throughout most of 1895, was the recognition of the statistical hypothesis in the proof of the theorem. This hypothesis is the Stosszahlansatz or “hypothesis about the number of collisions.” During the debate, the Stosszahlansatz was identified with another statistical hypothesis, which appeared in Proposition II of Maxwell's (...) 1860 paper; Burbury called it Condition A. Later in the debate, Bryan gave a clear formulation of the Stosszahlansatz. However, the two hypotheses are prima facie different. Burbury interchanged them without justification or even warning his readers. This point deserves clarification, since it touches upon subtle questions related to the foundation of the theory of heat. A careful reading of the arguments presented by Burbury and Bryan in their various invocations of both hypotheses can clarify this technical point. The Stosszahlansatz can be understood in terms of geometrical invariances of the problem of a collision between two spheres. A byproduct of my analysis is a clarification of the debate itself, which is apparently obscure. (shrink)

First, the demonstration of Bell's theorem, i.e., of the nonlocal character of quantum theory, is spelled out using the EPR criterion of reality as premises and a gedankenexperiment involving two particles. Then, the EPR criterion is extended to include quantities predicted almostwith certainty, and Bell's theorem is demonstrated on these new premises. The same experiment is used but in conditions that become possible in real life, without the requirements of ideal efficiencies and zero background. Very high efficiencies and (...) low background are needed, but these requirements may be met in the future. (shrink)

We prove a local normal form theorem of the Gaifman type for the infinitary logic L∞ω(Qu)ω whose formulas involve arbitrary unary quantifiers but finite quantifier rank. We use a local Ehrenfeucht‐Fraïssé type game similar to the one in [9]. A consequence is that every sentence of L∞ω(Qu)ω of quantifier rank n is equivalent to an infinite Boolean combination of sentences of the form (∃≥iy)ψ(y), where ψ(y) has counting quantifiers restricted to the (2n–1 – 1)‐neighborhood of y. (© 2005 WILEY‐VCH (...) Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

We obtain in this paper a representation of the formulae of extensions ofL by generalized quantifiers through functors between categories of first-order structures and partial isomorphisms. The main tool in the proofs is the back-and-forth technique. As a corollary we obtain the Caicedo's version of Fraïssés theorem characterizing elementary equivalence for such languages. We also discuss informally some geometrical interpretations of our results.

It is well known that, in classical theory, Liouville's theorem shows that if an ensemble of systems is distributed over a small element of volume in phase space, the ensemble fills a region of equal volume at all later instants of time. In quantum mechanics, the uncertainty principle is associated with the products of the errors in conjugate coordinates and momenta, and such products can be interpreted in terms of volume elements in phase space. Comparison of these two facts (...) leads to the assertion in the interesting volume on “Statistical Mechanics” recently published by J. E. and M. G. Mayer that “The Liouville theorem is essential for the complete understanding of the uncertainty principle. (shrink)

Applying Weglorz' mode s of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow‐type social we fare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying “finite discrimination”, if and only if in Weglorz' mode there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals.

May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to May's axioms, we can uniquely determine how to vote on three alternatives. In particular, we add two axioms stating that the voting method should mitigate spoiler effects and avoid the so-called strong no show paradox. We prove a theorem stating that any preferential voting (...) method satisfying our enlarged set of axioms, which includes some weak homogeneity and preservation axioms, agrees with Minimax voting in all three-alternative elections, except perhaps in some improbable knife-edged elections in which ties may arise and be broken in different ways. (shrink)

In Arrovian social choice theory assuming the independence of irrelevant alternatives, Murakami (1968) proved two theorems about complete and transitive collective choice rules that satisfy strict non-imposition (citizens’ sovereignty), one being a dichotomy theorem about Paretian or anti-Paretian rules and the other a dictator-or-inverse-dictator impossibility theorem without the Pareto principle. It has been claimed in the later literature that a theorem of Malawski and Zhou (1994) is a generalization of Murakami’s dichotomy theorem and that Wilson’s (1972) (...) impossibility theorem is stronger than Murakami’s impossibility theorem, both by virtue of replacing Murakami’s assumption of strict non-imposition with the assumptions of non-imposition and non-nullness. In this note, we first point out that these claims are incorrect: non-imposition and non-nullness are together equivalent to strict non-imposition for all transitive collective choice rules. We then generalize Murakami’s dichotomy and impossibility theorems to the setting of incomplete social preference. We prove that if one drops completeness from Murakami’s assumptions, his remaining assumptions imply (i) that a collective choice rule is either Paretian, anti-Paretian, or dis-Paretian (unanimous individual preference implies noncomparability) and (ii) that adding proposed constraints on noncomparability, such as the regularity axiom of Eliaz and Ok (2006), restores Murakami’s dictator-or-inverse-dictator result. (shrink)

We prove uniformly computable versions of the Implicit Function Theorem in its differentiable and non-differentiable forms. We show that the resulting operators are not computable if information about some of the partial derivatives of the implicitly defining function is omitted. Finally, as a corollary, we obtain a uniformly computable Inverse Function Theorem, first proven by M. Ziegler.

It is difficult to describe this book without praising it. Collected here in one volume are some thirty-six high quality translations into English of the most important foreign-language works in mathematical logic, as well as articles and letters by Whitehead, Russell, Norbert Weiner and Post. The contents of the volume are arranged in chronological order, beginning with Frege's Begriffsschrift—translated in its entirety—and concluding with Gödel's famous "On Formally Undecidable Propositions" and Herbrand's "On the Consistency of Arithmetic". The translation of the (...) Gödel article is a small masterpiece, and is especially welcome in view of some of the rather poor efforts which have been made to render this important work into English. But this is more than a paste-pot job of anthologizing. Van Heijenoort and others have written prefaces to each of the included selections, in which are provided background historical and bibliographical information, comments on the intellectual currents which led to the production of the article, and, in many cases, a digest of the important theorems and concepts in the article itself. Each selection is a classic in its own right. In reading through the selections in this volume, one is struck by the extent to which purely mathematical problems and issues have controlled recent logical inquiry and have determined the development of various philosophies of mathematics. In the early stages, Frege and Peano were concerned with the logical reconstruction of arithmetic, and this led to the work of Russell and the logicist philosophy. Already in the development of the new logic there were certain problems which were resolved with Russell's theory of types—a device which many mathematicians felt to be rather artificial. The use of set theory, beginning with Cantor and reaching its maturity in Zermelo's 1904 proof of the well-ordering theorem, gave rise to a new set of difficulties concerning the axioms of choice, the continuum problem, and infinite sets. The two traditions are brought together in a common nexus of foundational problems by Weiner in 1914 and by Skolem's form of the Löwenheim theorem, given in 1920. Hereafter, the way is open for the rise of mathematical inquiry into the foundations of number systems, set theory and logic by Post, Skolem, von Neumann, Hilbert, Bernays, Gödel and many others. The work was far from completed by 1931, but a new and important tradition in mathematical inquiry had been established, and had come into its own. This book is, in effect, the record of an important chapter in the history of thought. No serious student of logic or foundations of mathematics will want to be without it.—H. P. K. (shrink)

We study the uniform computational content of Ramsey’s theorem using both Weihrauch reducibility and a new variant of Weihrauch reducibility, where the functions in the reduction are required to be total. In the latter setting, we show that the strength of Ramsey’s theorem varies significantly depending on how one represents its solutions, for example, using characteristic functions or using enumerations. Some of our results extend beyond variants of Ramsey’s theorem. In particular, we show that RT 2 2 (...) $\mathsf {RT}^{2}_{2}$ sans serif upper R upper T 2 squared where solutions are represented using characteristic functions is not totally Weihrauch reducible to any computational problem whose solutions are represented using enumerations. Next, we study the computational problems RT ∞ n $\mathsf {RT}^{n}_{\infty }$ sans serif upper R upper T Subscript infinity Superscript n which take as input a colouring of n-tuples which has some infinite homogeneous set and asks for any such set. The problem RT ∞ 1 $\mathsf {RT}^{1}_{\infty }$ sans serif upper R upper T Subscript infinity Superscript 1 is fairly well-studied, as it is Weihrauch equivalent to the cluster point problem on N $\mathbb {N}$ double struck upper N. Our main result shows that RT ∞ 1 $\mathsf {RT}^{1}_{\infty }$ sans serif upper R upper T Subscript infinity Superscript 1 is not Weihrauch reducible to RT N 2 $\mathsf {RT}^{2}_{\mathbb {N}}$ sans serif upper R upper T Subscript double struck upper N Superscript 2, strengthening a result of Soldà and Valenti. We also show that the jump of RT ∞ 1 $\mathsf {RT}^{1}_{\infty }$ sans serif upper R upper T Subscript infinity Superscript 1 is Weihrauch equivalent to SRT ∞ 2 $\mathsf {SRT}^{2}_{\infty }$ sans serif upper S upper R upper T Subscript infinity Superscript 2. (shrink)

There is a long tradition of fruitful interaction between logic and social choice theory. In recent years, much of this interaction has focused on computer-aided methods such as SAT solving and interactive theorem proving. In this paper, we report on the development of a framework for formalizing voting theory in the Lean theorem prover, which we have applied to verify properties of a recently studied voting method. While previous applications of interactive theorem proving to social choice have (...) focused on the verification of impossibility theorems, we aim to cover a variety of results ranging from impossibility theorems to the verification of properties of specific voting methods. In order to formalize voting theoretic axioms concerning adding or removing candidates and voters, we work in a variable-election setting whose formalization makes use of dependent types in Lean. (shrink)

We characterize the model companions of universal Horn classes generated by a two-element algebra (or ordered two-element algebra). We begin by proving that given two mutually model consistent classes M and N of L (respectively L') structures, with $\mathscr{L} \subseteq \mathscr{L}'$, M ec = N ec ∣ L, provided that an L-definability condition for the function and relation symbols of L' holds. We use this, together with Post's characterization of ISP(A), where A is a two-element algebra, to show that the (...) model companions of these classes essentially lie in the classes of posets and semilattices, or characteristic two groups and relatively complemented distributive lattices. (shrink)

One of the basic theorems in universal algebra is Birkhoff's variety theorem: the smallest equationally axiomatizable class containing a class K of algebras coincides with the class obtained by taking homomorphic images of subalgebras of direct products of elements of K. G. Gratzer asked whether the variety theorem is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice. In 1980, two of the present authors proved that Birkhoff's theorem can already be derived in ZF. Surprisingly, the Axiom of Foundation plays (...) a crucial role here: we show that Birkhoff's theorem cannot be derived in ZF + AC {Foundation}. even if we add Foundation for Finite Sets. We also prove that the variety theorem is equivalent to a purely set-theoretical statement, the Collection Principle. This principle is independent of $ZF \{\operatorname{Foundation}$. The second part of the paper deals with further connections between axioms of ZF-set theory and theorems of universal algebra. (shrink)