While most people believe the best possible life they could lead would be an immortal one, so‐called “immortality curmudgeons” disagree. Following Bernard Williams, they argue that, at best, we have no prudential reason to live an immortal life, and at worst, an immortal life would necessarily be bad for creatures like us. In this article, we examine Bernard Williams' seminal argument against the desirability of immortality and the subsequent literature it spawned. We first reconstruct and motivate Williams' somewhat cryptic argument (...) in three parts. After that, we elucidate and motivate the three best (and most influential) counterarguments to Williams' seminal argument. Finally, we review, and critically examine, two further distinct arguments in favor of the anti‐immortality position. (shrink)

According to the Permissive View, it is rationally permissible for a person’s preferences to be both future-biased about pleasant experiences and temporally neutral about achievements. Some philosophers argue that, intuitive though it may be, the Permissive View can’t be right because it runs afoul of a plausible requirement for rationality: namely, that it is rationally impermissible to form one’s preferences by moving back and forth between different evaluative perspectives. Samuel Scheffler has recently attempted to show that this requirement is in (...) fact compatible with the Permissive View. This paper casts doubt on Scheffler’s attempt. I argue that Scheffler either fails to reconcile the Permissive View with the requirement for evaluative consistency or commits himself to unacceptably counterintuitive claims. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Ben Bramble defends a version of hedonism which holds that purely repetitious pleasures add no value to one’s life (i.e. Non-Repeatable Hedonism). In this paper, we pose a dilemma for Non-Repeatable Hedonism. We argue that it is either committed both to a deeply implausible asymmetry between how pleasures and pains affect a person’s well-being and to deeply implausible claims about how to maximize well-being, or is committed to the claim that a life of eternal (...) pleasure for a person can be just as good for them as a life of eternal suffering. The only way out of this dilemma is for Bramble to reject the Non-Repetition Requirement. Yet, rejecting this requirement both forces Bramble to reject the wholly unique, core component, of his view and undermines his view’s ability to handle one of the most powerful objections to hedonism, viz., that a life with a larger quantity of so-called “base” (or lower) pleasures is better for a person than a life with a slightly smaller quantity of so-called higher pleasures. We conclude that Non-Repeatable Hedonism must be rejected in favor of standard forms of hedonism or some non-hedonic view of well-being. (shrink)

En julio de 2023, Felipe Eleutério Pereira, estudiante de maestría en el programa de posgrado en Filosofía de la UNESP/Marília, realizó una pasantía de investigación en España como Investigador Colaborador en la Universitat de les Illes Balears (UIB), en Palma de Mallorca, con el apoyo financiero de la FAPESP con supervisión en Brasil de Mariana C. Broens (UNESP). Durante esta estancia, llevó a cabo una entrevista con el profesor Antoni Gomila, una de las principales referencias en los estudios sobre la (...) Perspectiva de Segunda Persona (PSP). Como destaca el filósofo Lewis (2019), desde principios del siglo XXI se han producido numerosas contribuciones académicas en torno a la idea de la segunda persona en diversas disciplinas, como la Filosofía de la Mente, la Filosofía del Lenguaje, la Ética, la Epistemología, la Psicología del Desarrollo, la Psiquiatría e incluso la Neurociencia. Según lo planteado por Gomila (2001, 2002) y posteriormente revisado críticamente por Diana Pérez (2013), la PSP rechaza la noción de que la expresión lingüística actúe como portadora exclusiva de significado. En cambio, esta perspectiva enfatiza la presencia de una “intención-en-acción”, que surge del encuentro en tiempo real entre agentes sociales, y una dinámica relacional que emerge en el contexto de dicha interacción. En este marco, el comportamiento de un agente incita a otro a responder de forma coherente con el sentido de la situación compartida (Gomila, 2001). De esta manera, los estados intencionales de un agente repercuten directamente en los de otro, sin que ninguno de los participantes se limite a actuar como observador pasivo o externo (Escajadillo, 2018). Como explican Pérez y Gomila (2018, 2022), este enfoque relacional propio de la segunda persona no se reduce a las perspectivas de primera persona (más subjetiva) o tercera persona (más objetiva), sino que constituye la condición de posibilidad para su postulación y desarrollo. (shrink)

Analisamos a crítica de Georges Politzer (1998) à hipótese freudiana do inconsciente (Freud, 1996, 2018), com base na abordagem que adotamos, a Perspectiva de Segunda Pessoa, desenvolvida mais recentemente por Diana Pérez e Antoni Gomila (2018, 2021). Em específico, buscamos entender melhor o reconhecimento de estados psicológicos através do relato pessoal, buscando superar a dicotomia epistemológica entre primeira e terceira pessoa, na qual se concentra Politzer. Nossa contribuição para os estudos em Filosofia da Psicologia consiste em delimitar e extrair consequências (...) específicas do âmbito próprio de casos de segunda pessoa, como na prática clínica aqui focalizada, a fim de robustecer abordagens cuja tentativa de compreensão dos fenômenos psicológicos parecia até então limitada. (shrink)