This chapter has two objectives. The first is to argue for the fact of _meta-ethical pluralism_. In other words, the chapter argues that the recent empirical scholarship suggesting that people are both realists and anti-realists cannot be simply dismissed on the basis of being philosophically inadequate because even when we increase the level of clarity and rigor, the pluralism remains. The second is to argue for _the function of meta-ethical pluralism_. In other words, the chapter argues against the view (...) that this pluralism in people’s meta-ethical commitments is incoherent or a sign of confusion and puts forth the view that, instead, it serves a pragmatic function—namely, that it promotes civility and aids in the individual and collective navigation of normative space within a morally imperfect world. (shrink)

his book develops an account of legal reasoning based on underlying narrative patterns, and compares other such approaches in legal philosophy, psychology and history. Download full ToC and Preface from http://www.legaltheory.demon.co.uk/books_lfnc.html.

Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason is one of the most perplexing aspects of his moral philosophy. The aim of this paper is to defend Kant’s doctrine from the common charge of dogmatism. My defense turns on a previously unexplored analogy to the notion of ‘matters of fact’ popularized by members of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century. In their work, ‘facts’ were beyond doubt, often referring to experimental effects one could witness first hand. While Kant (...) uses the German equivalent in different contexts, I argue that the scientific analogy opens up a new framework for interpreting his strategy of justification in the Critique of Practical Reason. In the final section, I address a few possible objections to my reading, one of which I anticipate coming from Dieter Henrich and Ian Proops, who have argued that Kant’s Fact of Reason is best understood under a legal analogy. (shrink)

Metaphysics relies on the presupposition of the non-being of the world: since the world has once not existed it is necessary to postulate a cause for its existence, i.e. an extrinsic principle to explain the absolute beginning of the causal series of all things that constitute the world. After the critique of theologizing metaphysics by authors like Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, the notion of an absolute beginning still persists though in a field in which it often goes as such unnoticed, (...) while it factually enjoys wide acceptance, namely in epistemology. It sounds as a truism that knowledge begins: personal inexistence (birth-death cycle) and the phenomenon of unconsciousness (sleep-wake cycle) seem to endorse the obviousness of that statement. Now, to link the beginning of the phenomenal series of subjective acts of knowledge with the existence of an external world that causes the specific content of our temporary cognitive acts relies, however, on two presuppositions, namely on the thesis of a complete non-being or nothingness of knowledge and, intrinsically related to this first presupposition, on the thesis of an absolute beginning of cognitive activity. If knowledge begins from its own nothingness, there must be a cause that is external to the totality of acts of knowledge, a cause that it doesn´t belong to the series of cognitive acts and, therefore, that it is not caused by any of them: this uncaused cause of contentful knowledge is supposed to be the real world external to the knowing subject. In my paper I make explicit the relation between realist-empiricist approachs to epistemology and the double presupposition of the nothingness and absolute beginning of knowledge, I explain the difficulties implied by these two presuppositions and, finally, I propose as a plausible solution to those difficulties some key theoretical claims of absolute idealism. (shrink)

Joseph E. Uscinski and Ryden W. Butler argue that fact-checking should be condemned to the dustbin of history because the methods fact-checkers use to select statements, consider evidence, and render judgment fail to stand up to the rigors of scientific inquiry and threaten to stifle political debate. However, the premises upon which they build their arguments are flawed. By sampling from multiple “fact-checking agencies” that do not practice fact-checking on a regular basis in a consistent manner, (...) they perpetuate the selection effects they criticize and thus undermine their own position. Furthermore, not only do their arguments suffer from overgeneralization, they fail to offer empirical quantification to support some of their anecdotal criticisms. This rejoinder offers a study demonstrating a high level of consistency in fact-checking and argues that as long as unambiguous practices of deception continue, fact-checking has an important role to play in the United States and around the world. (shrink)

In this bold work of broad scope and rich erudition, Richard W. Miller sets out to reorient the philosophy of science.

ABSTRACTMichelle Amazeen's rebuttal of Uscinski and Butler 2013 is unsuccessful. Amazeen's attempt to infer the accuracy of fact checks from their agreement with each other fails on its own terms and, in any event, could as easily be explained by fact checkers’ political biases as their common access to the objective truth. She also ignores the distinction between verifiable facts and unverifiable claims about the future, as well as contestable claims about the causes of political, social, and economic (...) phenomena. The social benefits that she claims for the fact-checking enterprise must, at the very least, be weighed against the strong possibility that what passes for fact checking is actually just a veiled continuation of politics by means of journalism rather than being an independent, objective counterweight to political untruths. (shrink)

G.A. Cohen famously employs the fact-sensitivity thesis to critique constructivist theories of justice – namely, that constructivist theories are mistakenly sensitive to facts about the world. According to Cohen’s thesis, principles can respond to facts only because they reflect deeper principles that do not respond to any facts. A theory of justice should be fact-insensitive because fact-insensitive principles are the logical foundations of fact-sensitive principles. While I do not attempt to challenge the validity of Cohen’s thesis, (...) I argue for its triviality for the constructivist project because it cannot lead to the normative implications Cohen himself and others might have attributed to it. In particular, I argue that knowing that a principle has deeper logical groundings does not necessarily mean those groundings are knowable or stable. Even if constructivist principles of justice have fact-insensitive foundations, this does not imply that these foundations must be explicitly articulated, nor does it require constructivists to adopt a different approach to theorizing justice. (shrink)

Can an act of yours, unpremeditated and not begun until after my wrongful action, make you morally complicit in my deed? The ancient common law says it can. Modern commentators demur, holding an accessory after the fact to be an accessory in name only. I argue that the common law has right on its side. Often what one has done, and what wrong one is responsible for having committed, are determined, in part, by factors not within one’s control. But (...) those factors are not necessarily within no one’s control. When, intentionally but without prior co-ordination, you act in such a way as to make the wrong I have performed more wrongful, more harmful, or a wrong which stands unannulled for longer, you make yourself my accomplice, by changing – worsening – what I have done. I argue that moral philosophy should recognize the accomplice liability of accessories after the fact. (shrink)

This paper makes the case for what we call ‘logic-checking’. The paper begins by providing an overview of the development of fact-checking and of how fact-checking functions. As part of this discussion, we identify some limitations of fact-checking, including its reliance on testimony to function as intended. Such considerations, we argue, motivate logic-checking, which, when well articulated, can demonstrate that a piece of reasoning is flawed to an audience. What logic-checking involves is set out and examples of (...) logic-checking are provided. The objection that experts in informal logic conducting logic-checking will be biased, thus undermining the whole enterprise, is considered and rejected. (shrink)

The focus of my argument is whether, and in what sense, freedom is “revealed” by the fact of reason in Kant’s second Critique. I examine the passages in which Kant refers to the fact of reason and conclude that he uses the term to refer to our taking morality as authoritative, and to our apprehending the content of the moral law. I then point out how various commentators have claimed each to be the fact of reason. Next (...) I address how each is claimed by Kant to reveal “freedom” to us and argue that our taking morality as authoritative is best understood as referring to our conception of ourselves as autonomous beings, and that our apprehending the moral law’s content reveals only the idea of freedom as a coherent one. So neither would demonstrate not that we are actually autonomous, nor would their conjunction, despite what some commentators have claimed. In closing I defend the highly deflationary position that the fact of reason entitles us to postulate our freedom, but only from the practical point of view, and that it demonstrates that freedom is a coherent idea. (shrink)

From a philosophico-methodological perspective, this chapter analyzes fact, fiction, and fake news in the context of the relationship between science and cinema. This analysis is mainly focused on semantic, epistemological, methodological, and ontological aspects, but logical, axiological, and ethical elements are also considered. The underlying problem is fake news in cinema (and, as far as it coincides, in television series), seen from science and through comparative analysis with the notions of “fact” and “fiction.” The analysis begins with the (...) role of science in the case of films and the problem of fake news. After this framework, the focus is on the distinction between fiction and fake news, looking at the characteristics of “fiction” and how one moves from fiction to fake news. Later, it delves into the notion of “fact” and the differences with fake news and fiction in cinema. This involves highlighting that the facts are based on natural occurrences, social events, or artificial phenomena. In addition, there is emphasis on the existence of many types of facts, as can be seen from semantic, epistemological, methodological, and ontological aspects. Lastly, there is an assessment of films, facts, and fake news. On the one hand, this is related to the problems about truth and consensus; and, on the other hand, there are the issues about misinformation and disinformation. (shrink)

In _The Sources of Normativity_, Christine M. Korsgaard argues that unconditional obligation can be accounted for in terms of practical identity. My argument in this paper is that practical identity cannot play this foundational role. More specifically, I interpret Korsgaard's argument as beginning with something analogous to Kant's fact of reason, viz. with the fact that our minds are reflective. I then try to show that her determination of this fact is inadequate and that this causes the (...) argument concerning practical identity to fail. Finally, I argue that a conception of the fact of reason more in line with what I take to be Kant's own is necessary to account for unconditional obligation. (shrink)

It is common to distinguish between conscious mental episodes and standing mental states — those mental features like beliefs, desires or intentions, which a subject can have even if she is not conscious, or when her consciousness is occupied with something else. This paper presents a view of standing mental states according to which these states are less real than episodes of consciousness. It starts from the usual view that states like beliefs and desires are not directly present to the (...) mind, but are posited to explain thought and behaviour. Ascriptions of these states are attempts to model a subject’s “Worldview”: the totality of their cognitive, conative and affective dispositions. When ascribing standing states, we often significantly simplify the complexity of the Worldview. This simplification is a feature of models in general. The Worldview is also distinguished from the “Habitus” — the totality of dispositions that are associated with character traits. As with the Worldview, modelling the Habitus should be treated as a useful simplification of a very complex reality. It is argued that although these models have some similarities with fictions, these similarities are outweighed by the dissimilarities. (shrink)

Fact checking has become a prominent facet of political news coverage, but it employs a variety of objectionable methodological practices, such as treating a statement containing multiple facts as if it were a single fact and categorizing as accurate or inaccurate predictions of events yet to occur. These practices share the tacit presupposition that there cannot be genuine political debate about facts, because facts are unambiguous and not subject to interpretation. Therefore, when the black-and-white facts—as they appear to (...) the fact checkers—conflict with the claims produced by politicians, the fact checkers are able to see only (to one degree or another) “lies.” The examples of dubious fact-checking practices that we discuss show the untenability of the naïve political epistemology at work in the fact-checking branch of journalism. They may also call into question the same epistemology in journalism at large, and in politics. (shrink)

Our goal is to analyze the distinction between factual statements and opinions from a philosophical—specifically an epistemological—perspective. Section 1 reviews the most common criteria for drawing the distinction, which while inadequate, as explained in Section 2, still plays an important cultural and political role. In Section 3, we argue that the difference between factual statements and opinions does not involve a single criterion. Instead, the conceptual structure of the terms ‘fact’ and ‘opinion’ is analogous to that of natural kinds—terms (...) with multiple dimensions. We expect that improved theory will lead to improvements in pedagogy, decision-making, and public discourse. But these consequences are not our chief focus. (shrink)

In the closing chapter, the reader will be presented with a rather peculiar fact concerning our formal knowledge processes—specifically, scientific knowledge—and the relation of this odd fact with art and aesthetics. This peculiarity and the paradox that it gives rise to will be brought out in stages in the argument that follows. In brief, the chapter is going to show that within the methodological approach and measurements of science, it is impossible to give any meaningful explanation of lived (...) life and phenomenological experience. This is an admission of science itself, as will be shown. And yet there would be no science if it were not for lived life—the basic impulse to measure things comes from the experience of similarities and differences and their consequences for the life around us and in us. This is the central paradox of knowledge. The artistic impulse transcends this paradox and opens the doors of perception. (shrink)

Political fact-checkers evaluate the truthfulness of politicians’ claims. This paper contributes to an emerging scholarly debate on whether fact-checkers treat political parties differently in a systematic manner depending on their ideology (bias). We first examine the available approaches to analyze bias and then present a new approach in two steps. First, we propose a logistic regression model to analyze the outcomes of fact-checks and calculate how likely each political party will obtain a truth score. We test our (...) model with a sample of fact-checks from Newtral, a major Spanish fact-checker. Our model would signal bias under two assumptions: a) all political parties are on average equally accurate in their statements; b) the verification method gives precise instructions and is implemented systematically. We investigate this second assumption with a series of interviews with Newtral fact-checkers. We show that standard verification protocols are so loosely implemented that fact-checks reflect a set of journalistic decisions, rather than a bias in the statistical sense. We call for a more rigorous definition of verification methods as a pre-requisite for an unbiased assessment of politician’s claims. (shrink)

What are the relations among wisdom, virtue, and expertise? Wisdom can be defined broadly as knowledge about how to live well. At the least, the task of living well requires some conception of what it means for a life to be good as well as the knowledge and skill needed to actualize the good in one’s spheres of life. While this idea is easy to assert, it is difficult to examine empirically. This is because the scientific study of wisdom immediately (...) runs up against the challenge of the fact/value dichotomy. While psychological science seeks to study “what is”, the “wisdom” of any given decision, act or person is something that can only be assessed against some conception of the good. Thus, the study of wisdom calls on us to seek ways to bridge the fact/value dichotomy. In this paper, we pursue this goal. We suggest that the study of wisdom requires the integration of at least two forms of inquiry: psychological-empirical analyses of the development of knowledge and skills, and philosophical-conceptual inquiries into what it means to live a good life. In elaborating this approach, we first differentiate the concepts of wisdom, wise decision-making, and wisdom-supporting skills. Then we describe conceptual and empirical tools for assessing the development of wisdom-supporting skills as well as an evaluative framework for assessing the “wisdom” of any given act of decision-making. To illustrate these ideas, we report the results of a study demonstrating how the capacity for wise decision-making can be cultivated through participation in a program devoted to fostering the development of wisdom-supported skills. (shrink)

Ralph W. Rader, along with Sheldon Sacks and Wayne Booth, was one of the three leading figures of the second generation of neo-Aristotelian critics. During his long career in the English Department at the University of California, Berkeley, Rader published scores of essays. _Fact, Fiction, and Form: Selected Essays_, edited by James Phelan and David H. Richter, collects the most important of these essays, all of them written between the late 1960s and the late 1990s. These critical inquiries, which engage (...) with a remarkable range of literary texts—_Moll Flanders_, _Pamela_, _Tristram Shandy_, “Tintern Abbey,” “My Last Duchess,” _Barchester Towers_, _Lord Jim_, _Ulysses_, and more—are a rich resource for anyone interested in criticism’s ongoing conversations about the following major issues: the concept of form, the genres of the lyric and the novel, the literary dimensions of literary history, the distinction between fiction and nonfiction, the evaluation of literary quality, and the testing of theories and of interpretations. Moreover, the essays collectively develop a distinctive, coherent, and compelling vision of literary form, purpose, and value. Rader’s vision is distinctive and coherent because it is based not on an underlying theory of language, power, history, or culture but rather on the idea that form is the means by which humans respond to fundamental aspects and conditions of their existence in the world. His vision is compelling because it includes a rigorous set of standards for adequate interpretation against which he invites his audience to measure his own readings. (shrink)

This article makes six points. First, under any plausible normative perspective, the distinction between mistake (and ignorance) of criminal law and mistake of fact must at least sometimes be drawn. Second, the fundamental distinction is between a mistake about the state’s authoritative statement of what is prohibited (“M Law”), and a mistake about whether that prohibitory norm is instantiated in a particular case (“M Fact”). Third, when an actor makes a mistake about an evaluative criterion whose content the (...) fact-finder has discretion to elaborate, it is impossible both to allow this discretion and to faithfully realize a jurisdiction’s policy of treating M Fact and M Law differently. Fourth, the claim that every unreasonable M Fact is really a M Law elides important differences between the two kinds of mistake. Fifth, various borderline objections, such as the famous Mr. Fact/mr. Law example, do not undermine the fundamental distinction, although in rare instances, they do constitute genuine counterexamples that do not effectuate the principles and policies that the distinction ordinarily serves; and even here, they are exceptions that prove (the rationale for) the rule. Sixth, specification or evolution of a criminal law norm, such as the criterion for nonconsent in rape law, can convert a legally relevant M Fact into a legally irrelevant M Law. This phenomenon does not undermine the fundamental distinction between these types of mistake; to the contrary, it reveals the significance of that distinction. (shrink)

This paper consists in a comparative study of the notions of negative fact in the early works of Russell and Wittgenstein. How to account for our ability to think both that it is false that what is not the case is the case and incorrect to think that it is true that what is not the case is the case? Are the truth and the correctness of such thoughts and of their expressions meant to be insured by the existence (...) of negative facts? Or do we need to think of negative facts differently? In his early works, Russell argues not only that negative facts exist, but also that the philosophical problem they suffice to solve is real. While in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein dissolves the philosophical problem by letting the superfluity and misleadingness of the affirmation of the existence of negative facts be seen as such. (shrink)

This paper considers the medium of videogames from a goodmanian standpoint. After some preliminary clarifications and definitions, I examine the ontological status of videogames. Against several existing accounts, I hold that what grounds their identity qua work types is code. The rest of the paper is dedicated to the epistemology of videogaming. Drawing on Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin's works, I suggest that the best model to defend videogame cognitivism appeals to the notion of understanding.

Adorno's critique of phenomenology amounts to nothing less than a denial of its possibility as pure eidetic science. This article traces this critique in terms of the dialectic Adorno presents between fact and essence. Following Adorno, I examine how the contingency of fact mediates the possibility of eidetic analysis, rendering any “pure essence” undetermined by fact impossible. In turn, I uncover the generative potential of Adorno's critique for a new form of dialectical phenomenological research still allowing for (...) the universality and necessity of essence despite recognizing its necessary mediation by fact. I claim that Adorno's dialectical critique, far from undermining phenomenology as he proclaims, reveals how it can more adequately engage in eidetic analysis to obviate the antinomy he diagnoses between fact and essence. (shrink)

G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the (...) normativity of fact-dependent principles by referring to a fact-independent, moral conception of the person, which is not a principle of justice.1. (shrink)

This paper applies the argumentative perspective to the concept of scientific fact by combining the rhetorical and the sociological perspectives. The scientific fact is presented as an entity having both an epistemic and a social meaning, and the scientific paper is presented as a discourse that has both an epistemic value and role related to knowledge and to the description of the ‘world,’ and a social value, fulfilling social roles within its relevant discourse community. The discussion leads to (...) some insights into the connection between scientific language and facts. Scientific language reflects the degree of facticity of the utterance at every stage: various linguistic and discursive elements reflect the current factual status of the utterance. This conception of fact is dynamic and open to discussion, and it is presented from the author’s point of view. On the other hand, language, or the choice of language usage, creates facticity in the sense of social acceptance: by using language, the researcher reports on his belief that what he is describing is indeed a fact. The essence of the scientific paper as an argumentative text is that its point of departure is the faith of the speaker in the facticity of the new information, and its rhetorical aim is to convince the audience, based on its disciplinary rationality, to accept that same faith and thereby usher the new claim into the shared disciplinary body of knowledge. (shrink)

. Despite the classical prohibition of moving from fact to value, encounter with the biodiversity and plenitude of being in evolutionary natural history moves us to respect life, even to reverence it. Darwinian accounts are value-laden and necessary for understanding life at the same time that Darwinian theory fails to provide sufficient cause for the historically developing diversity and increasing complexity on Earth. Earth is a providing ground; matter and energy on Earth support life, but distinctive to life is (...) information coded in the genetic molecules that superintends this matter-energy. Life is generated and regenerated in struggle, persists in its perishing. Such life is also a gift; nature is grace. Biologists and theologians join in celebrating and conserving the genesis on Earth, awed in their encounter with this creativity that characterizes our home planet. (shrink)

The concept of truth is one of the central concepts not only of philosophy, but also of, for example, semiotics and law. The article analyses the concept (predicate) of truth in judicial fact-finding and the concept (predicate) of truth in legal interpretation from the perspective of the pluralist theory of truth. The concept of an unordered concept of truth is introduced in the paper, which is formed by pairs of opposing meaning postulates concerning a specific aspect of truth, such (...) as “correspondency” vs. “correspondency-independence” or “transcendence” vs. “immanence”. Individual concepts of truth are ordered sets of congruent meaning postulates. The analysis aims to reconstruct the meaning of the truth predicate in judicial fact-finding and legal interpretation from the point of view of meaning postulates. The conducted analysis shows that the predicate of substantive truth, the predicate of formal truth and the truth predicate in interpretation of law can be characterized by means of the same meaning postulates. In this light one may say that despite crucial differences between the indicated predicates, they belong to the same family of predicates of truth and represent the same way of “being true”. As a result, one may say the pluralist perspective reveals (in a certain sense - quite surprisingly) the essential unity of truth in judicial application of the law. (shrink)

The diversity of topics discussed in this book reflects the breadth of Judith Jarvis Thomson's philosophical work. Throughout her long career at MIT, Thomson's straightforward approach and emphasis on problem-solving have shaped philosophy in significant ways. Some of the book's contributions discuss specific moral and political issues such as abortion, self-defense, the rights and obligations of prospective fathers, and political campaign finance. Other contributions concern the foundations of moral theory, focusing on hedonism, virtue ethics, the nature of nonconsequentialism, and the (...) objectivity of moral claims. Finally, contributions in metaphysics and epistemology discuss the existence of sets, the structures reflected in conditional statements, and the commitments of testimony. Contributors: Jonathan Bennett, Richard L. Cartwright, Joshua Cohen, N. Ann Davis, Catherine Z. Elgin, Gilbert Harman, Barbara Herman, Frances Myrna Kamm, Claudia Mills, T.M. Scanlon, Ernest Sosa. (shrink)

The research analyzes the social ontology of the American philosopher B. Epstein. Social ontology studies the nature of the social world: what are its main elements and how they come together. There are different theories in modern social ontology: the theory of structuration, the theory of communicative action, social constructivism, critical realism. B. Epstein opposes psychological theories of social ontology and ontological individualism in explaining the social world. B. Epstein distinguishes between ontological questions about the social world and causal relationships (...) between events. The initial category of social ontology for American philosopher is a social fact. To establish a social fact, two actions are necessary: to give an ontological explanation of the existing social fact and to find facts that determine the conditions necessary for a social fact. Accordingly, B. Epstein distinguishes between two projects: the project of the foundation of a social fact and the project of fixing a social fact. The project of the foundation of a social fact provides an ontological explanation of a social fact, studies the conditions for the presence of social facts. The fixation project explores what gives rise to the conditions of the basis for social facts. The ground relation and the fixation relation are not causal relationships. A social fact must have diachronic constituent elements, which is, in particular, a test of social theory for truth. The article also discusses the theory of social facts by J. Serle. The theory of J. Serle B. Epstein refers to a psychological concept based on the collective acceptance of certain rules by the community. This position does not seem to be entirely correct, since J. Searle, in understanding the nature of a social fact, relies on social institutions, and the fact itself refers to institutional facts. (shrink)

This article considers historical facts and investigates the particular relationship between a factual and a valuative dimension within them. The operation is an autopsy of a particular historical fact, which works as an example. On this basis, the article will elucidate the similarities and the differences between historical facts and natural facts, with an emphasis on the observation that the former are more subject to the influence of interpretation than the latter. This feature of historical facts explains why social (...) and political struggles for recognition arise with respect to historical events. (shrink)

Histone variants are specialized histones which replace their canonical counterparts in specific nucleosomes. Together with histone post‐translational modifications and DNA methylation, they contribute to the epigenome. Histone variants are incorporated at specific locations by the concerted action of histone chaperones and ATP‐dependent chromatin remodelers. Recent studies have shown that the histone chaperone FACT plays key roles in preventing pervasive incorporation of two histone variants: H2A.Z and CenH3/CENP‐A. In addition, Spt6, another histone chaperone, was also shown to be important for (...) appropriate H2A.Z localization. FACT and Spt6 are both associated with elongating RNA polymerase II. Based on these two examples, we propose that the establishment and maintenance of histone variant genomic distributions depend on a transcription‐coupled epigenome editing (or surveillance) function of histone chaperones. (shrink)

The paper presents a new argument supporting the ontological standpoint according to which there are no mathematical facts in any set theoretic model of arithmetical theories. It may be interpreted as showing that it is impossible to construct fact-arithmetic. The importance of this conclusion arises in the context of cognitive science. In the paper, a new type of slingshot argument is presented, which is called hyper-slingshot. The difference between meta-theoretical hyper-slingshots and conventional slingshots consists in the fact that (...) the former are formulated in the semantic meta-language of mathematical theories without the use of the iota-operator or the lambda-operator as the abstractor, whereas the latter require for their expression at least one of these non-standard term-operators. Hyper-slingshots implement simpler language tools in comparison with those used in conventional slingshots. (shrink)