Why do people create extra representations to help them make sense of situations, diagrams, illustrations, instructions and problems? The obvious explanation— external representations save internal memory and com- putation—is only part of the story. I discuss seven ways external representations enhance cognitive power: they change the cost structure of the inferential landscape; they provide a structure that can serve as a shareable object of thought; they create persistent referents; they facilitate re- representation; they are often a more natural (...) representation of structure than mental representations; they facilitate the computation of more explicit encoding of information; they enable the construction of arbitrarily complex structure; and they lower the cost of controlling thought—they help coordinate thought. Jointly, these functions allow people to think more powerfully with external representations than without. They allow us to think the previously unthinkable. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to explore the motivational structures of external whistleblowers involved in the decision to blow the whistle by applying MEC theory and the laddering technique. Using both soft and hard laddering methods, data were collected from 37 Korean external whistleblowers. Results revealed that the means-end chain of external whistleblowers was the hierarchical linkage among two concrete attributes, two functional consequences, and one terminal value. The extant whistleblowing literature has either made assumptions about (...) whistleblowers’ motivations when developing models or has drawn indirect inferences from measures of other variables. Our study is the first with an explicit and empirical focus on whistleblowers’ motivations. The findings provide evidence of the motivational structures of external whistleblowers that consist of a set of complex paths linked by multi-layered motivators. This research will be helpful in designing and reviewing whistleblowing programs for organizations, regulatory agencies, and journalists. (shrink)

We seem to directly perceive external things. But can we? According to the time‐lag argument, we cannot. What we directly perceive happens now. There is a time‐lag between our perceptions and the external things we seem to directly perceive; these external things happen in the past; thus, what we directly perceive must be something else, for example, sense‐data, and we can only at best indirectly perceive other things. This paper examines the time‐lag argument given contemporary metaphysics. I (...) argue that this argument is not as compelling as it may initially seem. First, it denies that what we directly perceive can ever be what it seems to be; second, it conflicts with the current physical conception of time, relativity theory. This latter point leads to a more general one: the argument's force depends on a particular metaphysical conception on time, presentism, which is controversial in contemporary metaphysics of time. Given the alternative conception, eternalism, the argument is much less compelling. The overall argument of this paper, then, is that, if one wishes to hold that we directly perceive external things, we should subscribe to the latter view of time, i.e., eternalism. (shrink)

The paper explores the main competing interpretations of Aristotle's view of the relation between happiness and external goods in the Nicomachean Ethics. On the basis of a careful analysis of what Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics (and other works such as the Eudemian Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric, etc.) it is argued that it is likely that Aristotle takes at least some external goods to be actual constituents of happiness provided that (1) they are accompanied by virtuous activity and (...) (2) the agent enjoying and using those external goods does so in ways compatible with the continuous aim of acting virtuously. (shrink)

Aristotle tells us that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity: we can contemplate alone, and with minimal resources, while moral virtues like courage require other individuals to be courageous towards, or courageous with. This is hard to square with the rest of his discussion of self-sufficiency in the Ethics: Aristotle doesn't generally seek to minimize the number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and seems happy to grant that such a life will be self-sufficient despite (...) requiring a lot of external goods. In this paper I develop an interpretation of self-sufficiency as a form of independence from external contributors to our activity, and argue that this interpretation accounts both for Aristotle's views on contemplation and for the role self-sufficiency plays in his broader account of human happiness. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap famously distinguished between the external meanings that existence questions have when asked by philosophers and the internal meanings they have when asked by non-philosophers. Carnap’s overall position involved various controversial commitments, but relatively uncontroversial interpretative principles also lead to a Carnap-style distinction between internal and external questions. In section 1 of this paper I offer arguments for such a distinction in several particular cases; in section 2 I defend my arguments from numerous objections and motivate them (...) by using points drawn from the general theory of interpretation; and in section 3 I discuss the meanings of external questions, ultimately arguing that they are best understood as involving primitive metaphysical notions, and that when so understood, it is natural to adopt a general error theory about philosophical ontology. (shrink)

Discussions of reproducibility are casting doubts on the credibility of experimental outcomes in the life sciences. Although experimental evolution is not typically included in these discussions, this field is also subject to low reproducibility, partly because of the inherent contingencies affecting the evolutionary process. A received view in experimental studies more generally is that standardization (i.e., rigorous homogenization of experimental conditions) is a solution to some issues of significance and internal validity. However, this solution hides several difficulties, including a reduction (...) of external validity and reproducibility. After explaining the meaning of these two notions in the context of experimental evolution, we import from the fields of animal research and ecology and suggests that systematic heterogenization of experimental factors could prove a promising alternative. We also incorporate into our analysis some philosophical reflections on the nature and diversity of research objectives in experimental evolution. (shrink)

Stich and Ravenscroft (1994) distinguish between internal and external accounts of folk psychology and argue that this distinction makes a significant difference to the debate over eliminative materialism. I argue that their views about the implications of the internal/external distinction for the debate over eliminativism are mistaken. First, I demonstrate that the first of their two external versions of folk psychology is either not a possible target of eliminativist critique, or not a target distinct from their second (...) version of externalism. Second, I show that whether or not the second of their two external version of folk psychology is open to eliminativist critique depends on ‘internal’ factors. Finally, I argue that they are wrong to claim that eliminativists might, by attacking external versions of folk psychology, escape being put out of business if the simulation theory is correct. (shrink)

The internal-external issue of ren 仁 and yi 義 concerning whether ren and yi are internal or external is traceable to the Warring States period. One of the most famous recorded debates happened between Gaozi and Mengzi in Mengzi 6A:4. In the existing literature it is generally believed that Gaozi holds that ren is "nei" 內 and yi is "wai" 外, whereas Mengzi contends that both ren and yi are "nei."1 However, this assertion has two problems that I (...) aim to address in the present essay.First, it is not well founded to predicate that Mengzi considers ren and yi, as well as li 禮 and zhi 智, completely... (shrink)

One of the most important and perennially debated philosophical questions is whether we can have knowledge of the external world. Butchvarov here considers whether and how skepticism with regard to such knowledge can be refuted or at least answered. He argues that only a direct realist view of perception has any hope of providing a compelling response to the skeptic and introduces the radical innovation that the direct object of perceptual, and even dreaming and hallucinatory, experience is always a (...) material object, but not necessarily one that actually exists. This leads him to a metaphysics in which reality is ultimately constructed by human decisions out of objects that are ontologically more basic but which cannot be said in themselves to be either real or unreal. (shrink)

This paper provides an inferentialist account of model-based understanding by combining a counterfactual account of explanation and an inferentialist account of representation with a view of modeling as extended cognition. This account makes it understandable how the manipulation of surrogate systems like models can provide genuinely new empirical understanding about the world. Similarly, the account provides an answer to the question how models, that always incorporate assumptions that are literally untrue of the model target, can still provide factive explanations. Finally, (...) the paper shows how the contrastive counterfactual theory of explanation can provide tools for assessing the explanatory power of models. (shrink)

This paper gives a broad account of the various sequent-based proof formalisms in the proof-theoretic literature. We consider formalisms for various modal and tense logics, intuitionistic logic, conditional logics, and bunched logics. After providing an overview of the logics and proof formalisms under consideration, we show how these sequent-based formalisms can be placed in a hierarchy in terms of the underlying data structure of the sequents. We then discuss how this hierarchy can be traversed using translations. Translating proofs up this (...) hierarchy is found to be relatively straightforward while translating proofs down the hierarchy is substantially more difficult. Finally, we inspect the prevalent distinction in structural proof theory between ‘internal calculi’ and ‘external calculi.’ We discuss the ambiguities involved in the informal definitions of these categories, and we critically assess the properties that (calculi from) these classes are purported to possess. (shrink)

This study examines the importance of external monitoring and public reporting on the performance of firms in the global apparel industry. By focusing on the relevance of company reputation in the global community, the authors examine financial performance and stock market reaction to the release of information describing the manufacturing practices of firms made available by a third-party monitor. Using agency theory as a predictive framework, industry-wide changes in market measures of company risk as a result of third-party monitoring (...) are found, suggesting that society values such external reports. The authors’ findings are important to business and society because they bridge the gap in knowledge about how voluntary compliance programs are supplemented by external monitoring and reporting for firms operating in the global environment. This work suggests that external monitoring is valuable to business and society by reducing information asymmetry between the two groups and encouraging accurate assessment of the risks associated with global operations. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by (...) denying skeptical hypotheses or knowledge closure. (shrink)

In this paper, I compare and contrast two kinds of scepticism, Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Quinean scepticism about meaning. I expose Quine's metaphysical claim that there are no facts of the matter about meaning as a sceptical response to a sceptical problem regarding the possibility of our knowledge of meanings. I argue that this sceptical response is overkill; for the sceptical problem about our knowledge of meanings may receive a treatment similar to the naturalistic treatment Quine (...) himself offered for the problem of our knowledge of the external world. Further, I suggest that a naturalistic treatment of Quinean meaning scepticism may fare better than Quine's own naturalistic treatment of external world scepticism. (shrink)

Most of the literature on Organisational Change Management for Sustainability (OCMS) has focussed on internal proactive changes and a steady state. There has been limited research focussing on extreme external stimuli or events, such as the COVID-19, that affect organisations and their sustainability efforts which were negatively affected by the pandemic. Organisations’ sustainability priorities, prior to the COVID-19 outbreak were on the economic dimension, and then environmental and social dimensions. During the pandemic the priorities changed to social issues (i.e. (...) taking care of employees) and then the economic (i.e. to survive). Prior to the outbreak, the drivers in all organisations were skewed towards internal factors. During COVID-19, there was a shift towards external stimuli in all types of organisations. The barriers show a similar pattern to the drivers, where prior to the pandemic there were skewed towards internal factors, and during the pandemic, these shifted towards external stimuli. Most of the system elements were affected negatively by COVID-19, with the exception of organisational systems. External events need to be considered when addressing OCMS, particularly when such events are as shattering as the COVID-19 outbreak. (shrink)

This paper proposes an analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (1888–1966) On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b) from the perspective of Husserl’s theory, of whole and parts in Logical Investigations. The author identifies the “whole (Ganz)” with “sensory givenness” and “parts (Teile)” with “feeling givenness (Empfindungsgegebenheit)” and “appearance givenness (Erscheinungsgegebenheit)”. The dependent-independent relations and laws that prescribe unity of objects at the center of Husserl’s theory of whole and parts are also foundational in (...) HCM’s early ontology. This is torn between two forces. On the one hand, she searches for an essential and unified whole, viewed as independent of the senses, of consciousness, and of the human subject in general. This search is expected to provide a grip on the problem of “reality as such”. On the other hand, while searching for access to this whole, HCM encounters the involvement of the senses and consciousness in its appearances, that is, in the appearing of the external world. (shrink)

A problem which enthusiasts ofIST, Nelson's internal set theory, usually face is how to treat external sets in the internal universe which does not contain them directly. To solve this problem, we considerBST,bounded set theory, a modification ofIST which is, briefly, a theory for the family of thoseIST sets which are members of standard sets.We show thatBST is strong enough to incorporate external sets in the internal universe in a way sufficient to develop the most advanced applications of (...) nonstandard methods. In particular, we define inBST an enlargement of theBST universe which satisfies the axioms ofHST, an external theory close to a theory introduced by Hrbaček.HST includes Replacement and Saturation for all formulas but contradicts the Power Set and Choice axioms (either of them is incompatible with Replacement plus Saturation), therefore to get an external universe which satisfies all ofZFC minus Regularity one has to pay by a restriction of Saturation. We prove thatHST admits a system of subuniverses which modelZFC (minus Regularity but with Power Set and Choice) and Saturation in a form restricted by a fixed but arbitrary standard cardinal.Thus the proposed system of set theoretic foundations for nonstandard mathematics, based on the simple and natural axioms of the internal theoryBST, provides the treatment of external sets sufficient to carry out elaborate external constructions. (shrink)

This chapter proposes an analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s (1888–1966) On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (Conrad-Martius in Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung III. Max Niemeyer, Halle, pp. 345–542) from the perspective of Husserl’s theory, of whole and parts in Logical Investigations. The author identifies the “whole (Ganz)” with “sensory givenness” and “parts (Teile)” with “feeling givenness (Empfindungsgegebenheit)” and “appearance givenness (Erscheinungsgegebenheit)”. The dependent-independent relations and laws that prescribe unity of objects at the (...) center of Husserl’s theory of whole and parts are also foundational in HCM’s early ontology. This is torn between two forces. On the one hand, she searches for an essential and unified whole, viewed as independent of the senses, of consciousness, and of the human subject in general. This search is expected to provide a grip on the problem of “reality as such”. On the other hand, while searching for access to this whole, HCM encounters the involvement of the senses and consciousness in its appearances, that is, in the appearing of the external world. (shrink)

CDA disputation (disp.) 5 initiates a long segment of five disputations dedicated to cognitive theory. Like his affective theory (CDA disp. 10–12), cognitive theory follows the pattern from a general consideration to a particular consideration, in which various cognitive modalities are discussed according to their specificities. Although in CDA disp. 5 Suárez also occasionally distinguishes the peculiarities of the particular powers, all of its questions are analyzed from a general point of view, that is, indiscriminately of whether a cognition is (...) of the external senses, of the interior senses or of the intellect. This general approach in itself suggests much about Suárez’s philosophy of perception. It is then in the later disp. 6–9 where he ‘descends’ to these cognitive particularities. (shrink)

Having treated the cognition of the sentient part of the soul and of the external senses considered ‘in communi’ (CDA disp. 5–6), in CDA disp. 7 Suárez embarks on the large subject matter of the particular sensory modalities. Unlike the two preceding disputations, CDA disp. 7 also extends its thematic focus to natural sciences, such as optics and anatomy. Despite the scientific catch of this disputation Suárez’s bent remains philosophical. A large part of disp. 7 engages in philosophical topics (...) concerning the issues of nature, subject, cause and kinds of the particular proper sensibles and the media in which these sensibles are spread. This is not surprising considering that Suárez individuates and differentiates the senses especially through reference to their objects. Considerable space in CDA, disp. 7 is also devoted to the topic of the sensible species of the particular sensory modalities and their multiplication in medio. One of the crucial questions raised in this disputation involves the relation of the sensibles’ intentional and natural actions and affections of the media and organs. A significant part of the disputation is dedicated also to Suárez’s denial of Aristotle’s general claim about the necessary existence of a medium interposed between the organ and the objects. This denial brings Suárez close to a theory of tactile introception, namely to a view according to which touch can sense not only the first qualities of external objects but also the internal states of one’s own body called dolorogenic qualities. In general, this disputation zooms in on the particulars and fleshes out what had been presented earlier in the more general disputations. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has presented several arguments that seek to cast doubt on the idea that cognition can be factorized into internal and external components. In the first section of this paper, I attempt to evaluate these arguments. My conclusion will be that these arguments establish several highly important points, but in the end these arguments fail to cast any doubt either on the idea that cognitive science should be largely concerned with internal mental processes, or on the idea that (...) cognition can be analysed in terms of the existence of a suitable connection between internal and external components. I shall present an argument for the conclusion that cognition involves certain causal processes that are entirely internal. (shrink)

Hume’s understanding of the external world, particularly, his conception of objects, or what he occasionally refers to as “bodies,” is the subject of much dispute. Are objects mind-independent? Or, are they just what we see, feel, smell, taste, or touch? In other words, are objects just sense data? Or, are they ideas about sense data? Or, are objects, somehow, mind-independent, but we have ideas of them, and we receive sense data from them? In this paper, I provide some answers (...) to these questions—by way of distinguishing between the vulgar position, the philosophical position, and Hume’s position. (shrink)

This paper determines the acoustic properties of external wall building materials composition. Noise pollution is one of the main pollutants nowadays but it is not considered of great importance in the construction field, despite some studies showing that greater acoustic pollution is produced by buildings under construction. The study consists of analysing two different types of buildings equipped with a different type of external masonry composition in terms of building materials. The buildings are located at “21 Dhjetori” street, (...) Tirana, Albania. Furthermore, the case study area is treated as an area that consistently harvests noise. The impact of noise pollution on the existing building materials is going to be analyzed. Those milestones will provide information regarding the noise levels, a comparison of the actual level of noise production (outdoor and indoor areas), sound transmission, and sound diminution, as well as the implementation of acoustic materials in order to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants. The selected area has the highest norms of acoustic pollution in the city according to the studies implemented by Determination of acoustic properties of building materials is an important task gaining higher importance due to the demand for suitable construction materials, located in places with high levels of noise and places with heavy traffic, such as in urban areas. The aim of this paper is to display a comparative study of the actual noise levels generated by this area. It indicates the acoustic properties of the current building materials followed by a more suitable soundproof insulation. (shrink)

Aristotle's requirement that virtuous actions be chosen for themselves is typically interpreted, in Kantian terms, as taking virtuous action to have intrinsic rather than consequentialist value. This raises problems about how to reconcile Aristotle's requirement with (a) the fact that virtuous actions typically aim at ends beyond themselves (usually benefits to others); and (b) Aristotle's apparent requirement that everything (including virtuous action) be chosen for the sake of eudaimonia. I offer an alternative interpretation, based on Aristotle's account of loving a (...) friend for herself, according to which choosing a virtuous action for itself involves choosing it on account of those features of it that make it the kind of action it is, where these features include its intended consequences (such as the benefits it seeks to provide to others). I then suggest that Aristotle may take these consequences (including benefits to others) as contributing (and contributing non-instrumentally) to the agent's own eudaimonia, and that there is no conflict here with Aristotle's view that eudaimonia is an activity of the soul. For just as my activity of teaching is actualized in my students (provided they learn from me), so too my virtuous activity can be actualized in its beneficiaries. If this is right, then Aristotle's view is far from the Stoic (and proto-Kantian) view often attributed to him. (shrink)

I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyse Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of identity—into the separate idea (...) that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of essence. Essence, however, is not identity. So the way seems to be open for the existence of necessary properties/relations which do not belong to the essence of entities; that is, the existence of necessary but external relations. I then offer some examples of such relations. (shrink)

Psychological externalism is the thesis that the contents of many of a person's propositional mental states are determined in part by relations he bears to his natural and social environment. This thesis has recently been thrust into prominence in the philosophy of mind by a series of thought experiments due to Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge. Externalism is a metaphysical thesis, but in this work I investigate its implications for the epistemology of the mental. I am primarily concerned with the (...) question whether externalism undermines the idea that a person typically knows the contents of her own thoughts, beliefs, and other propositional attitudes directly and authoritatively. I criticize arguments that have been advanced on behalf of a positive answer to this question, and argue that they rest on a faulty conception of the nature of first person authority, one which likens our access to our own minds to perception. An account of the basis of first person authority is sketched that locates our epistemic right to our self-ascriptions of propositional attitude not in our ability to discriminate among the various thought contents we might be thinking, but rather in our ability to express our thoughts, and to think with them in accordance with the norms of rationality. I consider also the question whether first person authority and externalism jointly make possible a refutation of certain forms of global skepticism, as has been famously argued by Putnam. I argue that Putnam's attempted refutation fails, because the crucial externalist claims that drive it are not knowable a priori. (shrink)

It is commonly held that our thoughts, beliefs, desires and feelings - the mental phenomena that we instantiate - are constituted by states and processes that occur inside our head. The view known as externalism, however, denies that mental phenomena are internal in this sense. The mind is not purely in the head. Mental phenomena are hybrid entities that straddle both internal state and processes and things occurring in the outside world. The development of externalist conceptions of the mind is (...) one of the most controversial, and arguably one of the most important, developments in the philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century. Yet, despite its significance most recent work on externalism has been highly technical, clouding its basic ideas and principles. Moreover, very little work has been done to locate externalism within philosophical developments in both analytic and continental traditions. In this book, Mark Rowlands aims to remedy both these problems and present for the reader a clear and accessible introduction to the subject grounded in wider developments in the history of philosophy. Rowlands shows that externalism has significant and respectable historical roots that make it much more important than a specific eruption that occurred in late twentieth-century analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Various interpretations of Husserl have been presented in relation to the internalism-externalism debate. The debate concerns the question whether linguistic and mental content can be determined by features that are not only internal but also external to the subject. Besides different internalist and externalist interpretations of Husserl, there are interpretations that reject both internalism and externalism as frameworks for understanding Husserl. The main reason not to commit to either externalist or internalist interpretations seems to be that the internal-external (...) divide, which is pertinent to internalism and externalism, is purportedly inapplicable to the transcendental framework of Husserl’s phenomenology. Yet, it is not obvious how the concepts of internality and externality are understood when they are deemed inapplicable in this context, which reflects the ambiguity of the concepts in the internalism-externalism debate itself. The aim of this article is to clarify the internal-external divide and its rejection in these interpretations of Husserl. The reason why the internal-external divide has been deemed inapplicable to the transcendental framework of Husserl’s phenomenology is first located to a spatial sense in which the concepts of internality and externality are usually understood. It is then argued that the internal-external divide can be rendered applicable to the transcendental framework of Husserl’s phenomenology by reconfiguring internality and externality in relation to the subject’s point of view. In addition to Farkas’ proposal that conceives the internal-external divide in phenomenal terms, two phenomenological ways of understanding internality and externality are considered. The main problem in both Farkas’ proposal and the two phenomenological proposals is that they preclude some forms of externalism. This article solves the problem by using the two phenomenological proposals to modify Farkas’ proposal so that a broader range of externalism is enabled. (shrink)

Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy (...) of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support. (shrink)

Gigerenzer’s ‘external validity argument’ plays a pivotal role in his critique of the heuristics and biases research program (HB). The basic idea is that (a) the experimental contexts deployed by HB are not representative of the real environment and that (b) the differences between the setting and the real environment are causally relevant, because they result in different performances by the subjects. However, by considering Gigerenzer’s work on frequencies in probability judgments, this essay attempts to show that there are (...) fatal flaws in the argument. Specifically, each of the claims is controversial: whereas (b) is not adequately empirically justified, (a) is inconsistent with the ‘debiasing’ program of Gigerenzer’s ABC group. Therefore, whatever reason we might have for believing that the experimental findings of HB lack experimental validity, this should not be based on Gigerenzer’s version of the argument. (shrink)

Experimental “localism” stresses the importance of context‐specific knowledge, and the limitations of universal theories in science. I illustrate Latour's radical approach to localism and show that it has some unpalatable consequences, in particular the suggestion that problems of external validity (or how to generalize experimental results to nonlaboratory circumstances) cannot be solved. In the last part of the paper I try to sketch a solution to the problem of external validity by extending Mayo's error‐probabilistic approach.

Recent literature in epistemology has focused on the following argument for skepticism (SA): I know that I have two hands only if I know that I am not a handless brain in a vat. But I don't know I am not a handless brain in a vat. Therefore, I don't know that I have two hands. Part I of this article reviews two responses to skepticism that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s: sensitivity theories and attributor contextualism. Part II considers (...) the more recent ‘neo-Moorean’ response to skepticism and its development in ‘safety’ theories of knowledge. Part III argues that the skeptical argument set out in SA is not of central importance. Specifically, SA is parasitic on skeptical reasoning that is more powerful and more fundamental than that displayed by SA itself. Finally, Part IV reviews a Pyrrhonian argument for skepticism that is not well captured by SA, and considers a promising strategy for responding to it. (shrink)

This article proposes a theoretical framework for external representation based problem solving. The Tic‐Tac‐Toe and its isomorphs are used to illustrate the procedures of the framework as a methodology and test the predictions of the framework as a functional model. Experimental results show that the behavior in the Tic‐Tac‐Toe is determined by the directly available information in external and internal representations in terms of perceptual and cognitive biases, regardless of whether the biases are consistent with, inconsistent with, or (...) irrelevant to the task. It is shown that external representations are not merely inputs and stimuli to the internal mind and that they have much more important functions than mere memory aids. A representational determinism is suggested—the form of a representation determines what information can be perceived, what processes can be activated, and what structures can be discovered from the specific representation. (shrink)

The phenomena of perception have been used by philosophers to kindle and fuel doubts about the reality of ‘the external world’, a phrase which points roughly in the direction of our natural environment. After grappling with problems, which trade under this title, one often discovers that the issues have less to do with the reality of anything which might be called ‘the external world’ and more to do with the reality of the problems themselves. In this paper I (...) propose to examine three approaches to what might deserve to be labelled, ‘problems about theexternal world’. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification.

Externalism is the thesis that the contents of intentional states and speech acts are not determined by the way the subjects of those states or acts are internally. It is a widely accepted but not entirely uncontroversial thesis. Among such theses in philosophy, externalism is notable for owing the assent it commands almost entirely to thought experiments, especially to variants of Hilary Putnam's famous Twin Earth scenario. This paper presents a thought experiment-free argument for externalism. It shows that externalism is (...) a deductive consequence of a pair of widely accepted principles whose relevance to the issue has hitherto gone unnoticed. (shrink)

Combining active externalism in the form of the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses with virtue reliabilism can provide the long sought after link between mainstream epistemology and philosophy of science. Specifically, by reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition, we can account for scientific knowledge produced on the basis of both hardware and software scientific artifacts. Additionally, by bringing the distributed cognition hypothesis within the picture, we can introduce the notion of epistemic group agents, (...) in order to further account for collective knowledge produced on the basis of scientific research teams. (shrink)

We examine whether analyst coverage influences corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle specifies three main factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts may reduce the fraud opportunity factor through external monitoring aimed at discouraging managerial misconduct, which can moderate agency problems. On the other hand, analysts may increase the fraud incentive factor by pressurizing managers to achieve short-term performance targets, which can exacerbate agency problem. In either case, the potential influence of analysts on the (...) fraud rationalization factor may be more pronounced among firms that are more dependent on the capital market for corporate finance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we show a negative association between corporate fraud propensity and analyst coverage, and that this effect is more pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises, which are more reliant on the stock market for external funding. These findings suggest that analyst coverage contributes to corporate fraud deterrence in emerging economies characterized by weak investor protection. The main policy implication is that further development of the analyst profession in emerging economies may benefit investors and strengthen business ethics. (shrink)

A critical account arguing that Williams did not succeed in undermining the possibility of external reasons. Hooker takes Williams’s conception of reason to be instrumentalistic in a problematic way.

In his paper "Role Obligations," Michael Hardimon defends an account of the nature and justification of institutional obligations that he takes to be clearly superior to the "standard" voluntarist view. Hardimon argues that this standard view presents a "misleading and distorted" picture of role obligations (and of morality generally); and in its best form he claims this view still "leaves out" of its understanding of even contractual role obligations an "absolutely vital factor". I argue against Hardimon that a related version (...) of this "standard view" of institutional obligations is "standard" for a very good reason - namely, that it is true. (shrink)