The first and largest series of materials from the first donation consists of professional correspondence between David Hull and other philosophers of science as well as academics in related fields. These correspondents were in disciplines such as evolutionary biology whose work was of interest to Hull. The remaining series deal with manuscripts written by Hull. The second donation consists of scrapbooks documenting Hull's personal and professional life. These scrap books contain material from previous generations of (...) class='Hi'>Hull's family as well as photos of his friends and philosophical colleagues. This material documents the philosophical activity of David L. Hull between the years 1965-2003. This time span encompasses the whole of his professional career and extends into his retirement. The material consists of letters, manuscripts, surveys, background materials for the research surveys, overheads for talks, data sheets, and other texts generated by his professional career. His works address philosophical problems in and historical explication of many areas of biology including classification, taxonomy, theoretical systematics, evolutionary theory, historical biology, and ecology. (shrink)

"Legend is overdue for replacement, and an adequate replacement must attend to the process of science as carefully as Hull has done. I share his vision of a serious account of the social and intellectual dynamics of science that will avoid both the rosy blur of Legend and the facile charms of relativism.... Because of [Hull's] deep concern with the ways in which research is actually done, Science as a Process begins an important project in the study of (...) science. It is one of a distinguished series of books, which Hull himself edits."—Philip Kitcher, Nature "In Science as a Process, [David Hull] argues that the tension between cooperation and competition is exactly what makes science so successful.... Hull takes an unusual approach to his subject. He applies the rules of evolution in nature to the evolution of science, arguing that the same kinds of forces responsible for shaping the rise and demise of species also act on the development of scientific ideas."—Natalie Angier, New York Times Book Review "By far the most professional and thorough case in favour of an evolutionary philosophy of science ever to have been made. It contains excellent short histories of evolutionary biology and of systematics (the science of classifying living things); an important and original account of modern systematic controversy; a counter-attack against the philosophical critics of evolutionary philosophy; social-psychological evidence, collected by Hull himself, to show that science does have the character demanded by his philosophy; and a philosophical analysis of evolution which is general enough to apply to both biological and historical change."—Mark Ridley, Times Literary Supplement "Hull is primarily interested in how social interactions within the scientific community can help or hinder the process by which new theories and techniques get accepted.... The claim that science is a process for selecting out the best new ideas is not a new one, but Hull tells us exactly how scientists go about it, and he is prepared to accept that at least to some extent, the social activities of the scientists promoting a new idea can affect its chances of being accepted."—Peter J. Bowler, Archives of Natural History "I have been doing philosophy of science now for twenty-five years, and whilst I would never have claimed that I knew everything, I felt that I had a really good handle on the nature of science, Again and again, Hull was able to show me just how incomplete my understanding was.... Moreover, [Science as a Process] is one of the most compulsively readable books that I have ever encountered."—Michael Ruse, Biology and Philosophy. (shrink)

Ludwik Borkowski has constructed a quantifier-less calculus of names (BRN1), which is regarded as a base system here. The system can be extended with the use of the deductive power of rules of introduction and omission of functors π and σ (BRN2), which serve here as the substitutes of quantifiers. If we adopt the extensionality rule for the functor of singular inclusion (REε), we obtain yet another extending of the system (BRN3) accompanied by simultaneous considerable reduction of the primary rules. (...) The interpretation of the last system in elementary ontology is included. (shrink)

A distinguished Polish writer, one of the activists of the European Culture Association, presents his very personal reflections on the interrelationship of faith, art and hope. He also includes his comments on Józef Szajna’s audience with John Paul II.

The purpose of this paper is to state and describe realisations of the theoretical literary intertextuality at school. In the perception of literary works both at school and in the study of literature, operation of various categories of intertextuality can be distinguished, e.g. intratextual and intertextual, genological and intersemiotic, and even metatextual types. The materials studied confirm that the intertextual and intersemiotic types of analysis are most frequent.

Henryk Kurczab is a literature specialist, educator, lecturer and professor of Rzeszów Univertsity as well as Rzeszów College of Pedagogics. His book is a plenteous source of knowledge concerning dialogue, translatability and interaction of arts in the sense of semiotic ‘meaning’ and ‘sign’. The subject matter chosen by the author, i.e. arts correspondence, its own exemplification as well as interpretations, distinguish his work by individaulizing cognitive values.

The article presents the editor’s activity of “Library of Comments of Stanisław Wyspianski’s Works”, established in 1938 by “ Polish Library” Publishing Institute. The subject of the study are comments to four dramas of Stanisław Wyspiański: Varsovian, Boleslaus the Brave, The Judges and The Wedding. The authors of the comments: Juliusz Saloni, Janina Kulczycka-Saloni, Jan Durr and Leon Płoszewski have prepared separate slight editions consisting of interpretations and foot-notes without texts of the analysed dramas intended especially for secondary-school pupils.

This book is an attempt to demonstrate that the basic principles of phonological organization boil down to the interaction between the strength of nuclei as licensers of phonological structure and various non-rerankable scales of complexity occurring at different levels of phonological representation. The licensing relation between nuclei and the preceding onsets on the one hand, and governing relations between consonants, which are to a great extent determined by their internal melodic structure, allow us to view the phonological representation as a (...) self-organizing system, which is able to pr. (shrink)

A sense of social responsibility was the reason why Einstein tried to overcome the need of loneliness, which was an important trait in liis character, in order to develop his socio-political activities. These activities were intensified as he gained recognition and then fame, which was caused by his scientific achievements. This was because he realized that along with his fame, the social importance of his declarations and his activities increases.Believing that knowledge should be developed for its own sake, Einstein insisted (...) at the same time, that practical applications of the results of the experiments should be used to the humanity’s good. For a long time he was an active pacifist, but when Hitlerism came to power, he came to conclusion, that it constitutes such a great danger, that it is necessary to develop the arms to prevent the world from being conquered. This was the reason why in 1939 he signed a letter to President Roosevelt, in which he pointed to the necessity to carry on the experiments on the possibility to develop the atom bomb. Being aware of the fact that he shares in the responsibility for its realization, Einstein the stronger commited himself to the fight against the dangers of the nuclear war in the last decade of his life. (shrink)

(Announcement of the dissertation, ready for the press, on „Lines of Patristic Controversies on the Person”, read at a session of the Philosophical Section of the Society of the Catholic University of Lublin).In the patristic period there arose two great philosophic schools: the „saecu- iariorum schola” and the „ecclesiasticorum schola”.The „saeculariorum schola”, which considered not only the principles of aristo- telian philosophy but also the aristotelian conception of the structure of the substantive individual an absolute truth, gave in the doctrine (...) of St. John of Damascus (its last representative) the following picture of the metaphysical structure of the substantive individual:ύπόταις-μεριχόν { ύπόταις-ὕπαρξις ἐνυπόστατον { συμβεβηϗότα---έτεροϋπόστατα φύσις { μορφή ὄλη πρώτη { αὐτρϋπόσταταIn Latin we can express it as follows:individuum substantivum { existentia quidditas { accidentia substantia { forma substantialis materia primaThe person is the ύπόταις-μεριχόν „individuum substantivum”, endowed with an intelligent nature; the element constituting the person is the ύπόταις-ὕπαρξις („existentia”).The „ecclesiasticorum schola” which considered only the principles of aristotelian philosophy an absolute truth, gave in the doctrine of Rusticus Diaconus (its last representative) the following picture of the metaphysical structure of a substantive individual:subsistentia-individuum substantivum { natura { accidentia subiecta natura subsistentia-fundamentumLeontius of Byzantium, a predecessor of Rusticus, expressed the idea of the „ecclesiasticorum schola” in the following Greek terms:ύπόστασις-μεριχόν { ένυπόστατον { συμβεβηϗότα---έτεροϋπόστατα φύσις ύπόστασις-ύποχείμενον } αὐτρϋπόσταταThe person is the „subsistentia-individuum substantivum”(ύπόστασις-μεριχόν) endowed with an intelligent nature; The element constituting the person is the intelligent „sub- sistentia-fundamentum” (ύπόστασις-ύποχείμενον). The conception of the metaphysical structure of the substantive individual in general, and the discovery of the element constituting the person in particular, as presented by the „ecclesiasticorum schola” have fallen into oblivion. (shrink)

An axiomatic characterisation of the functor of sequential assertion is propsed here. By means of it the functor of sequential conjunction is defined. In the temporal interpretation these functors are respectively read as: next/then and and-next/and-then. It is proved that the proposed system (SAS) and its strenghtening (SAS*) comprise respectively von Wright’s And Next and And Then systems. The consistency and independence of axioms of the richer of the two proposed structures (SAS*) is settled by interpretation in the quadrivalent propositional (...) calculus. (shrink)

Sentences with the form: x is δ y, where δ is one of the modal operators (of the n/n category) is usually interpreted as rendering modalities of the de re type, as contrary to sentences included in the scheme: ΔP(x), where the modal operator Δ (of the s/s category) is semantically ambiguous (de re or de dicto). In literature treating modality as de dicto modality dominates. This results mainly from the fact that modal calculi are practiced mainly as sentential calculi, (...) built over the classical sentential calculus, where – in the nature of things – the structure of sentences is not analyzed. We also have some extensions of elementary ontology (Lebedev’s) with the modal operator of the is-δ (s/nn) type as the primary operator.In the article a construction is suggested, in which an operator of the δ (n/n) type is the primitive term. It is an elementary modal ontology that is an inferential extension of one of the mentioned systems, despite a formal simplification of its axioms. (shrink)

The author refers to the construction that includes two types of negation – external (~) and internal (¬). When we consider an object belonging to a given universe and a given set of predicates, some of them belong to it, and others do not. There may also be such predicates about which it cannot be sensibly stated that they belong to the object – and this is the third case (vagueness) that can be explained by such a construction. It is (...) a non-classical theory of predication. In the classical theory of predication (whose standard realization is the classical predicate calculus) we only have one negation operator (external negation).The idea may be transferred to the calculus of names. In the article a certain broadening of elementary ontology is suggested, where analogous distinctions among predication operators and name negation allow (from the meta-linguistic perspective) perceiving the phenomenon of indefiniteness (vagueness) of names in a new light. (shrink)

From the logical point of view, the most interesting among the pronouns are demonstrative pronouns (especially: this/that), indefinite pronouns (a/an), definite pronoun (the) and quantifying pronouns (every, all, some). Unlike personal pronouns (e.g. I/you/he) they are in fact functors (of the n/n category).The differentiation between personal pronouns (n) and functor pronouns (n/n) is vital here. This differentiation does not exist in traditional grammar.The study is limited to determining functor pronouns with the use of logical properties of quantifying expressions, which are (...) functor pronouns themselves – all (π) and some (σ) – formally expressed in the quantifier-less calculus of names (BRN). The calculus is properly enriched with demonstrative pronouns (demonstrativa), in connection to certain studies by Toshiharu Waragai (LID). An attempt to employ this system (BRND) in the analysis of some fragments of Ockham’s Summa Logicae is shown here. The work is concluded with the analysis of a functor pronoun the only (ι), being a special case of a definite pronoun, which is characterised here by means of rules. The work reveals the connection between this pronoun and the operator of definite descriptions (marked in the same way) in relation to a certain Ludwik Borkowski’s conception. (shrink)

The notion of relation is one of the most important concepts present in our language.This study propose some extension of elementary ontology (OE) for relational variables and defining in his framework the concepts of the classical calculus of relations. Such enriched elementary ontology (OER) is a better tool for the analysis of natural language.It is shown that syllogistic with the negative terms enriched by so called oblique syllogisms (SNU with the axioms C1–C5) is a fragment of OER system (Theorem 1).The (...) OER system is enriched next with individual variables (a,b,c) and by assuming the individual term referentiality (axiom A2) we obtain OER* system. The Proof that the classical calculus of relations (KRR) is a part of the system OER* (Theorem 2) is given. (shrink)

A distinction should be made between:1. Fundamental philosophy, covering epistemological, logical, and methodological questions as well as basic ontological ones; and 2. metaphysics bent on solving, in the light of fundamental philosophy, the problem of the metaphysical structure of substantive being.The history of philosophy shows that metaphysics has failed so far to present a unique (universally and definitely accepted) solution of its problem; it is subject to internal struggle among contending systems: Plato’s, Aristotle’s, Rusticus the Deacon’s, John of Damascus’, Thomas (...) Aquinas’ (early years), Duns Scotus’, Cajetano’s and Suarez’s. The metaphysics presented here considers itself as a synthesis, or rather as the final stage of the development of metaphysics from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinaś’ mature age, through Rusticus the Deacon.Such substantive beings as man, animal or plant are „enlarged” substantive beings, consisting of a soul, substantive being stricto sensu, complemented into an „enlarged” substantive being by a body, collection of material, substantive beings, formed by the soul into an organism appropriate to it, and united by virtue of the soul’s substantiveness into the sphere of that same substantiveness. The souls are „entia alteri incommunicabilia”, they cannot be incorporated into the frame of any alien substantiveness. The material substantive beings are „entia alteri communicabilia”; as such they can be incorporated into the frame of the substantiveness of non-material substantive beings.The metaphysical structure of substantive beings stricto sensu and that of both material substantive beings and uncorporeal substantive beings, parallel to the former, is as follows:The substantive being stricto sensu, qua being limited in perfection, compound, n,on-unique, contingent, subject to change — in the light of the theory of act and potency consists of:1. act — esse, forma, suprastantia, natura;2. potency — suppositum, first stuff, substantia, subsistentia. Both esse and actual insubstantive being, but „in alio”, i. e. „supra alium”. Suppositum is an. insubstantive potential being, but „in se” and „sub alio”. The esse of a substantive being sensu stricto consists of a fundamental, permanent esse, and of a superficial, functional esse. In the souls, the fundamental esse is an assembly composed of active and passive faculties; from the potentialities of the passive faculties arises the functional esse, the assembly of the acts of the faculties. In material substantive beings the fundamental esse is extension, magnitude, quality, etc; the functional esse is the „forces” of the material being. The suppositum (first stuff, substantia, subsistentia) is the ontological keystone of substantive being, uniting diversely composed esse (forma, suprastantia, natura) in one substantive individuum (unum et aliquid substantivum); it is, at the same time, the element individuating the substantive being in the given one substantive individuum.In the light of the theory of act and potency (potentia cognoscitur per actum sibi correspondentem) should be distinguished, parallel to multiform esse’s (forma, suprastantia, natura), multiform suppositum (first stuff, substantia, subsistentia) — namely spiritual, sensitive, vegetative, material ones. Material suppositum (material first stuff, material substantia, material subsistentia) is prime matter.The system of substantive beings is a scale with analogous rungs: „ens alteri communicabile materiale”, „ens alteri incommunicabile vegetativum” — vegetable individual, „ens alteri incommunicabile sensitivum” — animal individual, and „ens alteri incommunicabile, sui compos et sui iuris”, rational, free, immortal rational individuum — person. Rational suppositum (first stuff, substantia, subsistentia) is the element constituting a person. (shrink)

In its suppositional phrasing the quantifier-less calculus of names has rules of introduction and Omission of the all (π) and some (σ) functors of the n/n category. The functors are the equivalents of quantifiers. A certain extension of its language by individual variables and a list Operator ([…]) is proposed here. In so extended language the quantifier-less calculus of names with lists is constructed, where axiom AI (a Substitute of the axiom of the theory of identity) and the rules characterising (...) the list Operator are adopted. (shrink)

The paper contains references to a logical construction with two types of negation: an external (~) and internal (¬) one, where the substitution of the dichotomous law of excluded middle (with the αV~α schema) by the trichotomy (αV¬αV±α) is proposed. With reference to an object belonging to a given universe and a given set of predicates some of them apply to it, whereas others do not. There can also exist such predicates which cannot be sensibly said to apply to it (...) – they are indeterminate to it. What is proposed here is transferring these distinctions to a sentence calculus and devising a construction with a functor of weak assertion (+) as its primitive functor. This functor together with the functor of external negation allow an additional interpretation of the sentences falling into the third category described above (indirectness) whenever there is a need to express sentences referring to indirect states between the positive state and its negative counterpart. (shrink)