Crito is a dialogue by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. It depicts a conversation between Socrates and his wealthy friend Crito regarding justice, injustice, and the appropriate response to injustice. Socrates thinks that injustice may not be answered with injustice, and refuses Crito's offer to finance his escape from prison. The dialogue contains an ancient statement of the social contract theory of government.

Crito was written in response to popular slanders concerning Socrates’ failure to escape from prison, and accompanying misgivings within the Socratic circle. Plato responds by asking his audience to disregard the slander of the mob and obey the moral expert instead. But he also responds by creating an image of Socrates and his friends widely at odds with the popular slander; by implying that Socrates’ critics were themselves guilty of some of the behaviour they charged against Socrates; by pointing (...) out that Socrates had no viable alternative to death; and, in partial contradiction to all this, by rejecting the popular morality which saw Socrates’ abandonment and death as signs of failure. In the rhetorical climax of the composition, Plato shows that Socrates chose to die rather than victimize or offend the laws of the city, which he represents as sentient beings. The weaknesses that have been perceived in the arguments of the Athenian Laws are not fatal to the composition, because it aims not at a convincing demonstration, but at providing a portrait of Socrates’ own overwhelming conviction of the rightness of his decision. (shrink)

In comparison to the speech of the Laws, the dialectic between Crito and Socrates at the beginning of theCritohas received little attention. In this paper I argue that it contains an important philosophical message. It illustrates that the many's failure to follow Socrates' principles, like his principle of non-retaliation, is due to the intrinsic fragility of true beliefs. Though the many can understand Socrates' values and may accept his principles if he argues with them long enough, they may fail (...) to hold on to his principles when confronted with the difficulties of life. Crito's failure to deliberate Socratically at the beginning of theCritoexemplifies the many's predicament. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper is an analysis of Plato's use of the embassy to Achilles in Homer's Iliad book 9 as a literary template for Crito's mission to persuade Socrates to escape from prison in Athens. Plato's purpose is to elevate the nature of a hero by contrasting the impulsive, impetuous, mercurial temper of Achilles with the steady, thoughtful, deliberative, calmly rational argument of Socrates. Plato shows, in a volley fired at the poet, how the philosopher is more meaningfully heroic than (...) the warrior, for where the warrior aims selfishly at securing his own honor, the philosopher aims at political virtue. (shrink)

Most interpretations of the Crito, such as the absolute obligation view and the civil disobedience view, are thought to be grounded largely in an obligation of gratitude. I present arguments for why these interpretations are not viable, and then propose an alternative solution; this alternative is the obligation of fair play. While the obligation of fair play has been discussed before in relation to the Crito, this is the first full account of the position. The fair play interpretation (...) both precludes absolute obligation and does not require civil disobedience to resolve supposed inconsistencies with the Apology. (shrink)

If Platonic dialogues are dramas, then Socrates' interlocutors can be understood in their full humanity rather than foils for Socrates. This essay examines Crito, not as he appears in the dialogue named after him, but in the Euthydemus, where he reveals himself to a much greater degree. Here Crito is revealed as a successful businessman, a lover of money, who also has protective feelings about his son Critobolus. The physical frailty is a cause of concern. By understanding (...) class='Hi'>Crito in these terms, it is possible to discern how the passion of envy governs much the way Crito responds to events. One also discovers that Crito does not always say what he means, but has a tendency to only reveal his own vulnerabilities after he has learned of the vulnerabilities of those with whom he is conversing, in this case, Socrates. But Crito is not entirely selfish. As a father, and as a friend of Socrates, he is also driven by a desire to be philanthropic. The nature of Crito's philanthropy is made manifest in the way he chastises Socrates for admitting, in public, that he does not necessarily believe in the gods of the city. Crito understands the consequences for Socrates of such an admission. Finally, Crito, the lover of money, also has an understanding of what philosophy is: something that can be owned. It is more like what an ideology is than the Socratic quest for wisdom. This analysis prepares one for a return to Plato's Crito, and to a consideration of the relationship of the Socratic life to politics and money-making. (shrink)

The Crito dramatizes the impossibility, and the indispensability, of persuasion sby locating it between two extremes, Socrates and the Laws, the truths of philosophy and the force of politics. The question is whether those two limits are themselves inside or outside rhetoric. Can philosophy persuade, ormust it always be an alternative sto persuasion? Socrates insists on ignoring the opinion, and the power, of the many, and so the Laws have to show themselves as different from the opinion of the (...) many in order for him to obey. If Socrates and the Laws cannot talk to each other, it is because philosophy and politics are incommensurable. If there is common ground, it is because persuasion can make the two, philosophy and politics, commensurable to each other. Socrates exhibits the philosopher’s task as transforming himself from a universal thinker into a particular agent, while the Laws face the opposite challenge, aspiring to a generality that makes them rational and normative, and so open to discourse and persuasion. The many whom Socrates constantly denigrates have the particularity of being fickle and changeable, while the Laws look rigid. Socrates, as he says in the Apology, is always the same. Both sides look to the flexibility and adaptability to circumstances central to rhetoric. (shrink)

These dramatized, unabridged versions of Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo present the trial, imprisonment, and execution of Socrates, who Phaedo said was the "wisest, best, and most righteous person I have ever known."In the Euthyphro Socrates approaches the court where he will be tried on charges of atheism and corrupting the young. On the way he meets Euthyphro, an expert in religious matters. Socrates challenges Euthyphro's claim that ethics should be based on religion.In the Apology Socrates presents his (...) own defense. He explains why he has devoted his life to challenging the most powerful and important people, a process that has generated great resentment and has led to his indictment. He insists that instead of being punished he should be rewarded for his services to his fellow citizens. Socrates fails in his attempt to avoid the death sentence, but his friend Crito has bribed the guards offers him a way to escape. In the third dialogue Crito tries to persuade Socrates that it is right to flee from the unjust sentence imposed on him. In the course of their conversations they probe the foundations of civil and moral law, and treat issues that are as relevant to our time as to theirs.The Phaedo presents Socrates' final conversation. What will become of him once he drinks the poison prescribed for his execution? Socrates and his friends examine several arguments to prove that the death of the body does not kill the soul. (shrink)

Socrates does not use the Laws' Speech in the Crito principally to persuade Crito to accept his coming execution. It is used instead to persuade Crito to examine and work on his inadequate view of justice. Crito's view of justice fails to coordinate one's duties to friends and those to the law. The Laws' Speech accomplishes this persuasive goal by accompanying Crito’s earlier speech. Both start from the same view of justice, one that Crito (...) accepts, but reach opposing conclusions. Crito cannot judge between the two appealing speeches. His understanding of justice is too confused for him to decide well how to help Socrates. His need to explain what happened the morning he visited Socrates will prompt him and others to examine this indeterminate view of justice. Socrates foregoes direct refutation because Crito will not abide that usual way of interrogation. Engaging in short question-and-answer conversation is not the only way to bring a person to aporia and the intention to examine oneself. Socrates does not here undermine his assertions in the Apology about his ignorance, lack of interest in teaching, constant philosophizing, and his belief that what he does is question, examine, and test those he talks to. (shrink)

Plato’s overarching and seemingly unabashedly explicit purpose of his entire Socrates-featured — not to say -dominated — dialogue-form corpus is to put forth Socrates’ side of any argument in a singularly positive light. While, granted, this asymmetry is at times disrupted by the rather strong appearances of such then-leading erudite and social lights as Parmenides, Thrasymachus, and Glaucon, Plato inclines toward portraying Socrates’ interlocutors as virtually reflexively assenting to what the latter maintains, or proposing toothless, undeveloped, in a word, pro (...) forma differing opinions. Conversely, Socrates is (literally) unfailingly rendered as more composed and amiable than, and as intellectually superior to, everyone else; it is he who normally determines the direction of, leads, and wins nearly every debate; and he either adroitly converts his counterparts to his side or even reduces them to silence. Not surprisingly, therefore, after perusing any of Plato’s dialogues wherein the participants arrive at no clear understanding of the subject under discussion, the reader is left with the distinct sense that this is, fundamentally, Socrates’ personal, but nevertheless sublime, failure. As Plato quotes Socrates intimating about as much in the concluding paragraphs of the Charmides: “I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to discover what that is to which the lawgiver gave this name of temperance or wisdom” (175b) (italics mine). (shrink)

"This edition, which replaces the original Loeb edition..., offers text, translation, and annotation that are fully current with modern scholarship"--Front flap of dust jacket, volume 1.

This essay is an analysis of the central arguments in Plato’s Crito. The dialogue shows, in a variety of ways, that the opinion of another person can have practical relevance in one’s deliberations about what to do – e.g. as an argument, as a piece of expert advice, as a threat. Especially important among these forms of practical relevance is the relevance of authoritative commands. In the dialogue, the Laws of Athens argue that Socrates must accept his sentence of (...) death, because he must regard the court’s verdict as a command from a practical authority – the city. The Laws’ arguments rely on special features of authority-reasons that many commentators have overlooked. This article explains why the Law’s arguments are unsuccessful. Finally, it is argued that Socrates’ description of ‘the many’ suggests that the city lacks the deliberative capacity necessary for possessing practical authority. (shrink)

Citizenship, with its presumptive rights, privileges and obligations, has been a fundamental challenge confronting the state since the classical Greek era and the transformation and reorganization of the centralized medieval Holy Roman Empire after the Thirty Years War. With the changing patterns of state formation from the large and unwieldy empires organized into absolutist states to the more nationalistic/linguistic formations a recurring issue has been the constitutional or legal guarantees of the rights of the citizen as well as his/her obligations (...) to the state. This paper engaged in a nuanced study of Plato’s Crito as it relates the contradictions of citizenship as social membership and as participation in the modern state. The primary objective was to adapt Socrates’ experience to discuss the citizenship challenge in the modern state and driven by the research question on the implications of the emergence of new challenges to the contradictions of citizenship. Social contract theory by Thomas Hobbes served as the theoretical framework. Data collection was mainly from secondary sources such as academic journals, books, newspapers and internet sources, and data analysis based on the content and textual analysis of extant and relevant literature on the subject matter. Conclusively, the study realized that citizenship in the modern state is determined largely by the protection, in various ramifications, given to the citizen by the state, but that given a change in the circumstances many would decline to die for the state. Accordingly, it recommended a mutualism in the relationship and responsibilities between that state and the citizen of the modern state, particularly the underdeveloped states of the Third World. (shrink)

On the question of civil disobedience the Crito seems out of step with what Socrates says on thematter in other dialogues. This paper argues that Socrates does not abandon his earlier preference for philosophy over the law by choosing to stay and die, but rather, it is because of his preference for philosophy and the philosophic way of life that he ends up not escaping. This paper reaches its conclusion by showing that the argument of the Laws is unpersuasive (...) to Socrates because the Laws are unjust. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on the complex relation between ethics andpolitics in Plato’s Crito. While the issue is presented from a contemporaryperspective, the problems of civil disobedience and politicalobligation are the present study’s primarily concern. The issue of civildisobedience concerns moral reasons for breaking the law, whereasthe concept of political obligation refers to a moral duty to obey the law.When disagreeing with the view that Socrates in the dialogue arguesfor an unconditional obedience to the state, the article builds on (...) theApology. Subsequently, the similarities between the position of Socratesand that of H.D. Thoreau are investigated. Finally, the paper discussesthe concept of political obligation so as to show that the argumentin the Crito anticipates several modern theories. The modern controversiesthat this article covers are shown to play an important role in Plato’sdialogue, as they are the basis of Socrates’ political obligation. (shrink)

In the most comprehensive treatment of Plato 's Crito to date, Richard Kraut says: 'If possible, the Crito ought to be interpreted in a way that makes it consistent with the Apology and the other early Platonic dialogues.' My aim in the following paper is sympathetic to this view. However, the consistency I find is wider in scope than the reconciliation of Socrates' commitment to disobedience in one dialogue and his apparent rejection of disobedience in the other. I (...) seek a reconciliation between the Socratic charge to live an examined life and the demands of a life under law. (shrink)

These new translations of the Defence of Socrates, the Euthyphro, and the Crito present Plato's remarkable dramatizations of the momentous events surrounding the trial of Socrates in 399 BC, on charges of irreligion and corrupting the young. They form a dramatic and thematic sequence, raising fundamental questions about the basis of moral, religious, legal, and political obligation. The introduction provides a stimulating philosophical and historical analysis of these texts, complemented by useful explanatory notes and an index of names.

These dramatized, unabridged versions of Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo present the trial, imprisonment, and execution of Socrates, who Phaedo said was the "wisest, best, and most righteous person I have ever known."In the Euthyphro Socrates approaches the court where he will be tried on charges of atheism and corrupting the young. On the way he meets Euthyphro, an expert in religious matters. Socrates challenges Euthyphro's claim that ethics should be based on religion.In the Apology Socrates presents his (...) own defense. He explains why he has devoted his life to challenging the most powerful and important people, a process that has generated great resentment and has led to his indictment. He insists that instead of being punished he should be rewarded for his services to his fellow citizens. Socrates fails in his attempt to avoid the death sentence, but his friend Crito has bribed the guards offers him a way to escape. In the third dialogue Crito tries to persuade Socrates that it is right to flee from the unjust sentence imposed on him. In the course of their conversations they probe the foundations of civil and moral law, and treat issues that are as relevant to our time as to theirs.The Phaedo presents Socrates' final conversation. What will become of him once he drinks the poison prescribed for his execution? Socrates and his friends examine several arguments to prove that the death of the body does not kill the soul. (shrink)

De início, apresentaremos a tese de Demócrito e Leucipo, segundo a qual o ser não é mais que o não-ser, tendo como contraponto o pensamento eleata acerca da inexistência necessária do não-ser. Esta discussão nos remete à oposição entre o pleno e o vazio que será posteriormente traduzida na oposição entre o ser e o nada. Desse modo, a oposição entre o pleno e o vazio é uma oposição que se desloca para o ser e o não-ser. Em seguida, faremos (...) a apreciação do escrito pré-crítico kantiano Ensaio para introduzir em filosofia o conceito de grandeza negativa, no qual distinguimos certo tipo de oposição tomada entre grandezas em geral que, acreditamos, poderia ser interpretado como estando de acordo com o posicionamento de Demócrito e Leucipo sobre o estatuto ontológico do não-ser como princípio equivalente ao ser, e não como sua contradição em sentido puramente lógico. Initially, we present the theory of Democritus and Leucippus whereby being is not more than the not-being, in contrast to Eleatic ideas about the necessary inexistence of the not-being. This discussion leads us to the opposition between the whole and the empty, which will then be transposed into the opposition between being and nothingness. Thus, the opposition between wholeand the empty is an opposition that moves to beingand not-being. Finally, we will make an assessment of the Kantian pre-critical essay Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitude into philosophy, in which we recognize a kind of opposition that, as we believe, would be interpreted as being in agreement with the position of Democritus and Leucippus regarding the ontological status of the not-being as an equivalent principle to the being, understood here not as a mutual contradiction in a purely logical sense. (shrink)

In this article, I propose novel answers to three longstanding questions in the scholarship on Plato’s Crito: (1) Why does Socrates choose to respond to Crito in the second part of the conversation by using a speech?; (2) Why does this speech employ personification?; and (3) Why are the Laws, specifically, personified? The answers to these questions will reveal Socrates’ method of treating Crito and his worldview. The latter considers himself to be a good man for a (...) twofold reason, namely, he is concerned not only about helping a friend but also about the possible negative consequences of doing so. Crito takes care not to harm anyone while saving his friend and wishes to use only legitimate means. But Socrates will ultimately show Crito how, in fact, he uses violence to achieve his goals; how he harms others in the process, and how he is not nearly as good a friend as he believes himself to be. The result is a new way of looking at the dialogue, and of Plato’s message in composing it. (shrink)

Much recent scholarship on Plato’ Crito has revolved around the controversy about the relationship and possible compatibility between the arguments Socrates gives in his own person (SocratesS) and those he gives in the person of the Laws (SocratesL). By contrast, the relation between the arguments given by SocratesL and those given by Crito continues to be seen as uncontroversial: by the end of the dialogue, commentators agree, Crito has no choice but to concede to the force of (...) SocratesL’s arguments. Against this traditional reading, this paper will argue not only that SocratesL’s arguments fail to secure Crito’s agreement, but also that two characters’ attempts to communicate end at an impasse that seems to leave little room for meaningful shared discourse –and may even undermine Crito’s belief in the possibility of meaningful speech. My interpretation is informed by Socrates’ account (at 49c9-e3) of the need for and nature of a “common ground” as a prerequisite for genuine dialogue. This passage, I argue, challenges the traditional analysis of Crito as the representative of a particular value system or a particular “type”, demanding, instead, a consideration of the effect of Socrates’ arguments upon Crito in light of a more robust view of the latter’s perspective. Such a reconsideration has consequences not only for our appreciation of the dramatic structure of the dialogue, but also for how we understand one of the dialogue’s central, if underexplored, themes: the belief in a shared logos and the psychagogic necessity and perils of testing that belief. (shrink)

In this article I analyze the speech of the Laws in Plato’s Crito from a jurisprudential perspective. More specifically I explore the Laws’ views about the authority of law. I offer new interpretations of their famous ‘persuade or obey’ alternative and of their arguments about their superior moral status and the agreements of the citizens with them. I also explore the rather neglected topic of the mental attitude towards their authority that they demand from the citizens and conclude with (...) a discussion of their understanding of the relation between law and morality. I approach the speech of the Laws as a historian of legal thought and try to locate their arguments firmly within both the context of the ancient Athenian legal system and the context of Platonic philosophy. (shrink)

The crito takes no stand on the question of whether violating the law is ever morally justified, despite modern attempts to derive a civil disobedience doctrine from it. The argument is largely ad hoc and ad hominem and resistant to generalization as political theory. The central claim is that socrates' escape would be unjust because escape would be an act whose maxim is incompatible with the principle of effective legality. A new construal of the crito's argument is offered (...) and several problems with the argument are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a close analysis of the first scene in Plato’s Crito. Understanding a Platonic dialogue as a philosophical drama turns apparent scene-setting into an integral and essential part of the philosophical discussion. The two apparently innocent questions Socrates asks at the beginning of the Crito anticipate Crito’s two problems, namely how he regards his friendship with Socrates as opposed to his complicated relations with the polis and its sovereignty. These two questions are an (...) integral part of the philosophical discussion presented throughout the dialogue. (shrink)

This paper examines Crito’s motives for wanting to help Socrates escape, and Socrates’ rhetorical strategy for handling Crito’s concerns, particularly Crito’s fear of the many. It concludes that Socrates’ admitted concern for his reputation provides the only adequate explanation for his obedience to the court, an explanation which does not rely on his explicit arguments for obligation, but which helps explain why he is concerned to come to the law’s defence. Joining others in suggesting that Socrates’ case (...) for obligation be taken as rhetoric, the examination of the text reveals that not only are Socrates’ arguments too problematic to be an adequate defence of obligation, but these same arguments point to a criticism of punitive law that makes it unlikely that Socrates is philosophically invested in the defence he offers to Crito. (shrink)

A textual parallel between the Crito 51d5–e4 and Plotinus II, 9 [33], 8 reveals a likely allusion to Plato's argument that staying in a city while knowing its laws and being free to go entails accepting them. With this passage in mind, it is easier to follow the otherwise convoluted and elliptic argument of Plotinus' chapter against the Gnostic claim of the badness of the world.

My paper has two aims. The first is to challenge the widespread assumption that the personified Laws of Athens, whom Socrates gives voice to during the second half of the _Crito express Socrates' own views. I shall argue that the principles which the Laws espouse not only differ from those which Socrates sets out in his own person within the dialogue, but are in fact in conflict with Socrates' states principles. (edited).

So far, interpreters have not made the import of this last clause clear. F. J. Church translates the last phrase ‘they act at random’. Burnet says of Adam that he seems to have been the first to point out that the meaning cannot be ‘they act at random’. Instead, ‘the phrase expresses indifference’. Adam′s idea, which Burnet here commends, is that the many are thoughtless in their treatment of the individual; and Adam compares 48C below: the many would lightly put (...) someone to death and just as lightly bring him back to life again. The Burnet-Adam point is evidently that the many have a policy of acting indifferently, or just as it occurs to them—by contrast with the ‘at random’ in Church′s translation, which suggests that they act without policy at all. (shrink)

A close reading of the Crito, with a focus on irony in Socrates' speech by the Laws and on the way this allows Socrates to chart a mean course between Crito's self-destructive resistance to the rule of Athenian law and Socrates' own philosophical reservations about its ethical limitations.