Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality. It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of rationality. This (...) occurs when the motivation for conciliationism does not come from taking disagreement as evidence of one's own rational failings. However, divorcing the motive for conciliating from worries about rationality does not remove a feature of conciliationism that some find troubling: that conciliationism can lead to cases of “rational toxicity,” in which the most rational response to one's evidence involves violating some rational ideal. (shrink)

The concept of Conciliation Ethics in the Qurʾan is a crucial aspect of Islamic Law: Conciliation features notably in the Qurʾanic text which gives rise to Islamic rules and regulations, Conciliation is an important dispute resolution method in an Islamic legal system, and Conciliation-related Qurʾanic textual analysis reveals a broad range of legal language and concepts. Traditional studies of Conciliation in the Qurʾan have often focussed on the process of ṣulḥ through intermediaries, particularly in marriage (...) and between groups of Muslims, whilst there is a dearth of Western scholarship in this area. Using Classical Arabic tafsīr and Western literature on Conciliation as a general concept, this paper examines holistically and analytically the concept of Conciliation Ethics in the Qurʾan, investigating its scope, constituent elements, emphasis and purpose. This paper argues, based on a manual survey of the entire Qurʾan, that Conciliation is not limited to isolated contexts or verses where ṣulḥ is mentioned explicitly. The paper finds that Conciliation is a pervasive concept throughout the hierarchy of social relationships. It is achieved through behaviours such as good conduct, attitudes such as ‘Differentiation’ and ‘Externalisation’ and preventative strategies of dispute avoidance, and sometimes includes a contract or Reconciliation process. It is emphasised in the Qurʾan through a range of stylistic features and is of fundamental importance in maintaining the fabric of society. (shrink)

Conciliation in the Qurʾan is an essential read in understanding how the Qurʾan persuades its audience to resolve societal conflicts. The author brings to light the central ethical notion of iḥsān (gracious conduct), and explores the challengin.

What should your reaction be when you find out that someone that you consider an "epistemic peer" disagrees with you? Two broad approaches to this question have gained support from different philosophers. Precise characterizations of these approaches will be given later, but consider for now the following approximations. First, there is the "conciliatory" approach, according to which the right reaction to a disagreement is to move one's opinion towards that of one's peer, in proportion to the degree of trust that (...) one accords to that peer—for instance, if you thought that, in case of disagreement, you are equally likely to be right, then the conciliatory approach would have it that you should meet your epistemic peer halfway. The other, "nonconciliatory" approach, holds that one's reaction to a disagreement need not be perfectly in line with one's prior degree of trust in the other party. Notice an important asymmetry between these two approaches: the conciliatory approach has it that conciliation is the right reaction to any disagreement, whereas the nonconciliatory approach has it that there are some possible disagreements the correct reaction to which is not to conciliate (or not to the extent mandated by conciliatory views). This article examines the dispute between conciliatory and nonconciliatory views by distinguishing and examining possible answers to four different questions. (shrink)

This essay is a response to three review articles on two recently published books dealing with aspects of Hinduism and science: Jonathan Edelmann's Hindu Theology and Biology: The Bhāgavata Purāṇa and Contemporary Theory, and my own, Hindu Perspectives on Evolution: Darwin, Dharma and Design. The task set by the editor of Zygon for the three reviewers was broad: they could make specific critiques of the two books, or they could use them as starting points to engage in a broad discussion (...) of Hinduism and science, or religion and science in general. In my response, I first provide a fairly detailed reply to David Gosling's many critiques of my book, and in the process call into question his Advaitic conciliation of Hinduism and science. Thomas Ellis's thesis of basic incompatibility between Hinduism and science is much closer to my own viewpoint. One of the main objectives of my book was to explain and illustrate this incompatibility with specific regard to Hindu and Darwinian perspectives on evolution. In this essay I provide a few examples in support of Ellis's incompatibility thesis, encompassing both epistemological and metaphysical dissonances. Finally, I reflect upon Varadaraja V. Raman's wide-ranging exposition on the all-encompassing nature of the Hindu tradition that readily accommodates both religious and scientific quests for knowledge. Raman uses the two books only as starting points for his own thoughts, without reference to my book. I confine myself, accordingly, to a brief critique of his complementarity approach to Hinduism and science, and of his radical inclusivism that enfolds basically all philosophical positions into the warm embrace of the Hindu tradition, including even the extreme antireligious materialism of the Cārvāka. (shrink)

This article explores a novel conciliation between Mulla Sadra’s philosophy of Essential Movement (al-haraka al-jawhariyya) and Existential Gradation (tashkik al-wujud) and the Presentist-Fragmentalist (PF) understanding of time within Causal Set Theory (CST). We argue that the apparent tension between Sadra’s view of time as a qualitative aspect of existential intensity and CST’s discrete accumulation of events can be resolved. We propose that the “accumulation of events” in a growing causal set is the very mechanism by which qualitative changes in (...) existential intensity are instantiated. A simple mathematical mapping, based on the causal fecundity of the “now”, is introduced as an interpretive tool to illustrate how the discrete growth of reality in CST can reflect the hierarchical actualization of existence in Sadra’s metaphysics. This interdisciplinary approach offers new perspectives on the nature of time, being, and cosmic evolution. (shrink)

Cet article examine quelques idées concernant ce que j’appelle une éthique de la mémoire publique. Plus exactement, il considère comment les citoyens devraient apprendre à se souvenir du mal politique commis et subi dans des sociétés marquées par les circonstances de la réconciliation, dans lesquelles la stabilité politique et les pratiques démocratiques sont mises en péril par des souvenirs collectifs qui alimentent l’antipathie mutuelle et le ressentiment entre les citoyens d’un même État. Comment des communautés démocratiques fonctionnelles peuvent-elles être réparées (...) ou créées à nouveau lorsqu’elles ont été fracturées par des hostilités historiques? Cet article examine un certain nombre de réponses possibles à cette question en utilisant une conception délibérative de ce qu’une communauté démocratique fonctionnelle devrait être. Cette conception s’incarne en gros dans deux normes démocratiques : l’impartialité et l’inclusion. C’est en référence à ces deux normes que l’article discute différentes tentatives actuelles de remplacer les anciennes histoires nationales, qui s’appuyaient sur les mythes civiques, par des histoires multiculturelles qui les refusent.This article examines some ideas about what I call the ethics of public memory. More exactly, it considers how citizens should learn to remember political evil done and endured in societies marked by the circumstances of reconciliation in which political stability and democratic practices are thwarted by collective memories that fuel mutual antipathy and resentment among citizens of a common state. How democratically functional national communities can be repaired or created anew when they have been fractured by historical enmities? The article examines a number of possible answers using a deliberative conception of what a functional democratic community should be. This conception is roughly embodied in two democratic norms : impartiality and inclusion. It is in reference to those two norms that the article discusses current attempts at replacing the old national histories, which relied on civic myths, by multicultural histories, which eschew them. (shrink)

Hegel attribue à l'art et à Ia philosophie une même tâche dans l'histoire de l'Esprit, celle de « réconcilier » les opposés. Nous expliquerons de quels éléments à médiatiser il s'agit, et une étude détaillée de textes de l'Introduction à l'Esthétique nous amènera à critiquer le moment de la transition vers la philosophie, celui de la poésie romantique. Nous suggérerons en particulier que l'emploi de deux critères différents pour établir la hiérarchie des arts et des formes empêche Hegel de justifier (...) réellement le dépassement de l'art par la philosophie ainsi que la supériorité de la réconciliation philosophique.Hegel assigns to art and philosophy one and the same task in the history of the Spirit, that of "reconciling" the opposites. I explain which elements are mediated, and rely on a detailed study of extracts from the Introduction to Aesthetics to criticize the moment of the transition to philosophy, viz. romantic poetry. In particular, I suggest that the use of two different criteria to establish a hierarchy of arts and forms prevents Hegel from giving a proper justification of how philosophy transcends art, and of why its reconciliation is superior. (shrink)

Après avoir montré que la conception arendtienne de l’éducation vise à concilier autorité et liberté, cet article aborde certains facteurs socio-techniques qui, selon Hannah Arendt, affectent dans ses fondements le milieu éducatif au point que la crise de l’autorité et de la transmission enregistrée dans cette « sphère particulière » n’est susceptible que de solutions inédites. Car si la crise de l’éducation est d’abord le résultat d’une rupture avec la tradition, elle se traduit également par l’incapacité à gérer la démesure (...) qu’entraîne le progrès en ce domaine. L’ouverture aux générations futures permet toutefois de redonner à l’éducation sa place dans la fondation et le maintien d’un monde public commun. After demonstrating how the arendtian conception of education aims to reconcile authority and freedom, this article tackles some of the social and technical stakes, which, according to H. Arendt, have a basic effect on the world of education to the point that the crisis of authority and transmission noted in that “special sphere” will only respond to unusual solutions. For, if the crisis in education is first of all the result of the break with tradition, it is also revealed through an inability to control the excesses which seem to follow progress made in this field. Its opening to future generations enables education, however, to regain its place in the foundation and the preservation of a common public world. (shrink)

Conciliationism is a view—well, a family of views—in the epistemology of disagreement. The idea, simply put, is that, in a wide range of cases where you find yourself in disagreement with another reasoner about the truth of some proposition, you are rationally obliged to adjust your credence in the direction of hers. Conciliationism enjoys a fair bit of prima facie plausibility. Most versions of it, however, suffer from a common (and rather obvious) problem: self-incrimination. Although there is some recognition in (...) the recent literature on disagreement that there is a problem in this vicinity, it, more often than not, is completely ignored. When it is not completely ignored, both the conciliationists and their critics tend to frame the problem incorrectly. As a result, they end up focusing most of their attention on pseudo-problems rather than the genuine worry. Furthermore, even when they have hit on the genuine worry, conciliationists have tended to give surprising and implausible responses to it. Even by their own lights, conciliationists aren’t justified in believing their conciliationist theses. In this paper, I argue that it’s time to come clean. Time to look for a view on the epistemic significance of disagreement that we can actually be justified in believing. (shrink)

In the epistemology of peer disagreement, Conciliationism holds that discovering a disagreement with an epistemic peer rationally requires substantial revision in one’s credence. A novel explanation for this rational requirement, Accountability Thesis (Peter, Synthese 190(7):1253-1266, 2013), argues that it is grounded in irreducibly second-personal reasons arising from a relationship of mutual accountability between deliberating agents. This essay challenges this second-personal approach, arguing in favour of an explanation that invokes no irreducibly second-personal reasons. The alternative explanation, which appeals only to third-personal (...) evidence and first-personal norms of rationality, is argued to be explanatorily superior. It is more parsimonious and possesses greater explanatory scope, accounting for cases Accountability Thesis cannot, such as disagreement with absent epistemic peers. Furthermore, it provides a more complete account by integrating the dual evidential role of peer disagreement as both first-order testimonial evidence and higher-order evidence of one’s own fallibility. The essay does not argue that there could be no procedural epistemic obligations in deliberation with epistemic peers; such a claim would rule out other plausible understandings of epistemic peerhood. Nonetheless, it concludes that insofar as argument for Accountability Thesis operates within a standard Conciliationist framework, its second-personal explanation for Conciliationism does not succeed. (shrink)

Our aim in this chapter is to draw attention to what we see as a disturbing feature of conciliationist views of disagreement. Roughly put, the trouble is that conciliatory responses to in-group disagreement can lead to the frustration of a group's epistemic priorities: that is, the group's favoured trade-off between the "Jamesian goals" of truth-seeking and error-avoidance. We show how this problem can arise within a simple belief aggregation framework, and draw some general lessons about when the problem is most (...) pronounced. We close with a tentative proposal for how to solve the problem raised without rejecting conciliationism. (shrink)

Although work–family conflict is highly relevant for both families and businesses, scarce attention has received from business ethics perspective. This article focuses on the latter, presenting a set of relevant insights from Catholic Social Teaching (CST). After reviewing the foundations and principles presented by CST regarding work–family relationships, a set of normative propositions are presented to develop work–family policies and for a correct personal work–family balance. It is argued that business responsibility with employees’ family should be considered as a part (...) of Corporate Social Responsibility. In addition, the applications of these principles and propositions can lead to a mutual enrichment of both business and family. (shrink)

Formal epistemologists criticise the Conciliatory View of peer disagreement for being non-commutative with conditionalisation, path dependent and does not preserve the independence between propositions. Failing to commute with conditionalisation, one may switch the order between conciliating and conditionalising and obtain different outcomes. Failing to be path independent, the outcome of conciliation varies with the order of the acquisition of new testimonies. Failing to preserve the independence between propositions, one may suffer from a sure-loss and hence be deemed irrational. The (...) three formal deficiencies urge people to abandon the Conciliatory View. This paper aims to show that one may save the Conciliatory View by conciliating with nonlinear functions. Research in the study of opinion pooling shows that the three deficiencies are not problems of the Conciliatory View, but problems of linear averaging. Hence, one can get rid of these formal deficiencies by making conciliation with nonlinear averaging functions. After showing how the three deficiencies can be avoided, I will explore the features of nonlinear averaging functions and argue that they have properties that correctly capture people’s intuition concerning disagreement. The conclusion, therefore, is to suggest epistemologists develop a more fine-grained taxonomy for cases of disagreement. With a deliberate categorisation of different kinds of disagreement, epistemologists can pick the proper averaging rule to apply in each specific case, and get rid of possible formal deficiencies. (shrink)

Court conciliation conducted by judges in Chinese people’s courts has been playing a vital role in resolving civil disputes. When it heaps praises and compliments, it also faces severe criticisms such as pressing parties to settle due to judges’ over-engagement. To date, except for mere criticisms from the legal literature, few efforts have been made to reveal how judges get engaged linguistically in conciliation and whether their engagement exceeds the limit in each phase of court conciliation. This (...) paper, taking the engagement system of the appraisal framework and the exchange structure model as the theoretical basis, aims to analyze the features of judges’ engagement and the underlying forces that influence their engagement. Data-analysis shows that for court conciliation conducted in court, judges often employ dialogically contractive resources in uni-directional information exchange structures to warrant their engagement. Under the co-influence of the driving and curbing forces, judges are often “dancing with shackles” in court conciliation. (shrink)

A common worry about moral conciliationism is that it entails at best uncertainty about many of our moral beliefs and at worst epistemological moral scepticism. Against this worry, I argue that moral conciliationism saves us from epistemological moral scepticism and enables us to be confident in many of our moral beliefs. First, I show that only taking disagreements seriously as a threat to our beliefs allows us to utilise agreements in support of our beliefs (call this symmetry). Next, I argue (...) that utilising moral agreements as an epistemic resource allows moral conciliationism to resist the potentially worrisome reduction in confidence of our moral beliefs. Taking the relevance of moral agreement into account, I argue that it is anti-conciliationism that must meet the challenge of epistemological moral scepticism. For this, I suggest that moral inquiry is best understood as a collective endeavour. If so, then agreement on our moral judgments is required to justify the confidence we have in many of our moral beliefs. However, by symmetry, this appeal is possible only if one accepts the conciliatory attitude towards disagreements. Hence, accepting, rather than rejecting moral conciliationism, is the way out of moral scepticism. (shrink)

The article considers three episcopal assemblies held in Gaul, which the manuscript tradition has not preserved, all involved in doctrinal debates on grace and free will. The first two, the council of Arles and the synod of Lyon, took place in the second half of the fifth century and concerned the affair of the presbyter Lucidus. The third is the Council of Valence that met just before the Second Council of Orange (529), that is, the council that marks the “resolution” (...) of the conflict and also the only documented. With the idea that the history of the councils occupies important points in the reconstruction of the debate on grace and free will, even in the case of councils whose acts have not been transmitted, the article seeks to enhance these three events by reconsidering indirect sources. The episcopal meetings of Arles, Lyon, and Valence are, indeed, an integral part of the doctrinal work on grace and free will, which for about a century interested monastic and ecclesiastical circles in Gaul. Moreover, the recovery of their history restores well the complexity of the cultural, religious and political climate in which they took place. (shrink)

Canadian government agencies now promote participatory research among researchers to find solutions to problems in education with the involvement of professionals working on the field. This text is based on two examples in education and describes the intermediary work done by researchers with professionals at the start-up of the research. It demonstrated how groundwork and communication with the research partners might bring the scientific and professional communities closer.

Résumé La théorie du choix rationnel (TCR), dans son interprétation standard, ne se présente pas comme une théorie causale, mais bien normative. L’économie expérimentale, en remplaçant les hypothèses sous-jacentes à l’interprétation standard de la TCR par des hypothèses plus réalistes – une fonction d’utilité qui inclut des préférences sociales, par exemple – a permis d’améliorer la prédictivité de la TCR. En revanche, elle n’est pas parvenu à surmonter une autre difficulté théorique à laquelle fait face la TCR, à savoir l’absence (...) d’ancrage causal des entités formelles postulées. Dans cet article, nous montrons comment la neuroéconomie, parce que son étude ne se limite pas à des manifestations comportementales, laisse entrevoir le développement d’une véritable science naturelle de la décision. (shrink)

Pietraszewski misrepresents both the nature of behaviour in conflict and the ability of psychology to theorise the relational properties of group designation. At the behavioural level, he focusses exclusively on “attack,” when consolation/care in conflict is equally present and important. At the theoretical level, he ignores existing psychological work on how group perception is shaped by the meta-contrast principle.

Formal epistemologists criticise the Conciliatory View of peer disagreement for being non-commutative with conditionalisation, path dependent and does not preserve the independence between propositions. Failing to commute with conditionalisation, one may switch the order between conciliating and conditionalising and obtain different outcomes. Failing to be path independent, the outcome of conciliation varies with the order of the acquisition of new testimonies. Failing to preserve the independence between propositions, one may suffer from a sure-loss and hence be deemed irra- tional. (...) The three formal deficiencies urge people to abandon the Conciliatory View. This paper aims to show that one may save the Conciliatory View by conciliating with nonlinear functions. Research in the study of opinion pooling shows that the three deficiencies are not problems of the Conciliatory View, but problems of linear averaging. Hence, one can get rid of these formal deficiencies by making conciliation with nonlinear averaging functions. After showing how the three deficiencies can be avoided, I will explore the features of nonlinear averaging functions and argue that they have properties that correctly capture people’s intuition concerning disagreement. The conclusion, therefore, is to suggest epistemologists develop a more fine-grained taxonomy for cases of disagreement. With a deliberate categorisation of different kinds of disagreement, epistemologists can pick the proper averaging rule to apply in each specific case, and get rid of possible formal deficiencies. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article lit ensemble le Deuxième Sexe et La Dialectique de la Raison, pour montrer comment ils démystifient l’identification femme-nature. Après avoir posé que leurs entreprises émancipatrices de dénaturalisation reposent sur la déréification, j’examine le problème du soi-disant « asservissement à l’espèce », qui sous-tend l’identité fictive entre les concepts de « femme » et de « nature » dans la vision patriarcale. Je soutiens qu’examiner ce problème de manière critique nous permet d’identifier les réconciliations extorquées que présupposent les (...) projets bourgeois et coloniaux de subjectivité désincarnée et de domination de la nature. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article porte sur l’analyse des interrelations entre les pratiques non officielles du sulh, de la réconciliation, et le travail des cours de justice à partir d’enquêtes menées en Algérie et, subsidiairement, au Soudan. J’illustrerai en particulier l’idée que le sulh – action faisant bien souvent référence au ‘ûrf (conventions usuelles ou droit coutumier) ou encore à la loi coranique et aux jurisprudences musulmanes (malékite en particulier) – s’inscrit en continuité et en complément avec le travail judiciaire. Je propose (...) ici de réfléchir à la pluralité des acteurs, mais également aux dimensions spatiales et temporelles qui orientent l’ensemble du processus articulant pratiques non officielles de réconciliation et celles (officielles) des cours de justice. Nous avons en effet une pluralité de lieux – lieu du crime, lieux de la réconciliation, cours de justice – qui imprègnent et l’interprétation que l’on se fait de l’offense et le procès socio-légal (réconciliation/cours de justice) dans son ensemble. Je discuterai ainsi des conséquences pratiques et théoriques de cette articulation entre réconciliation (sulh) et processus judiciaire. (shrink)

Que la théorie de la « double vérité » n'a jamais été soutenue par les aristotéliciens radicaux du moyen âge est une certitude déjà acquise par les historiens. Le terme même d' « averroïstes » par lequel on les identifiait a été sérieusement mis en cause. Pourtant, il est évident que les maîtres és arts de Paris, dans la deuxième moitié du XIIIe siécle, ont éprouvé des difficultés considérables à mettre en harmonie les vérités de foi et les conclusions du (...) raisonnement philosophique. Comment se posait ce conflit et quelle voie de réconciliation ont-ils cherchée? Deux ouvrages récents nous donnent l'occasion de reprendre ce problème qui a fait déjà couler beaucoup d'encre dans l'historiographie du XXe siècle. Il s'agit de la monographie monumentale de M. Van Steenberghen sur Siger de Brabant et l'étude fondamentale de M.R. Hissette sur la condamnation de 1277. (shrink)

"Est-il possible pour une nation de se réconcilier? C’est à cette question simple mais nécessaire que cet essai est dédié. La mort de Nelson Mandela en décembre 2013 a conduit à un recueillement mondial au début du XXIe siècle. Les ennemis d’hier se sont réunis autour du mythe du prisonnier réconciliateur. Cette réunion n’indique sans doute pas l’adhésion aux actions du militant sud-africain : célébrer Mandela, c’est chercher à bénéficier de son aura. Une ère de réconciliations a commencé à la (...) fin du XXe siècle. Les processus sont canalisés et enclos dans la tradition libérale : le libéralisme se présente comme le chantre de la paix et du bonheur. Pourtant le monde n’aurait jamais été si violent... Cette contradiction devrait suffire à disqualifier le libéralisme comme projet politique viable, et pourtant, le monde continue à lui confier les rênes. L’auteure piste donc à la fois les réussites et les échecs des réconciliations contemporaines. Elle s’interroge sur ces réconciliations politiques mais aussi philosophiques et scientifiques qui n’auraient jamais pu avoir lieu du temps des deux blocs. Elle propose un chemin à rebrousse-poil, en montrant que la paix et la conciliation ne sont possibles qu’au prix du conflit et de la confrontation. Passant par l’Afrique du Sud, mais aussi le Kurdistan, l’Algérie ou le Canada, l’auteure propose non pas de ne pas réconcilier, mais de réconcilier en déconciliant. Elle ne le propose pas comme une simple idée, mais esquisse les traits d’une pratique" (4ème de couv.). (shrink)

Le présent article propose d’élucider la définition warburgienne de l’homme par la schizophrénie à partir d’une lecture des Fragments sur l’expression et de l’introduction à l’ Atlas Mnémosyne. L’usage de termes appartenant au registre de la négativité semble en effet indiquer une constitution de l’être humain depuis l’épreuve de la scission de l’esprit. On peut alors supposer que la fonction de l’activité symbolique est non seulement de délimiter un périmètre en mesure d’assurer à l’homme une présence au monde, mais aussi (...) de réconcilier les pôles opposés de son esprit et de parvenir à l’individualisation. Sous ce prisme, l’histoire de la culture peut dès lors être lue comme le déploiement de la dualité Apollon-Dionysos, que le psycho-historien doit reconduire à son unité organique. (shrink)

Le statut des fidèles divorcés remariés est cause de malaise. Cet article se propose d’exposer la doctrine de l’Église catholique en ce domaine, de l’analyser et de faire apparaître les insatisfactions qu’elle suscite. Dans une seconde partie, il tente d’ouvrir une nouvelle voie. Celle-ci suppose la prise en considération de l’échec, dans la vie chrétienne. Elle déplace le moment où l’Église intervient, pour le situer non plus lors d’un second mariage, mais au moment de la faillite du premier. Elle propose (...) aux personnes en cause un accompagnement ecclésial, et le sacrement de réconciliation qui les rétablit dans la communion plénière avec l’Église. (shrink)

La reconnaissance des droits des hommes, des femmes et des enfants s'inscrit dans l'exigence morale de permettre aux sujets de se réconcilier avec la contingence de leurs corps. Telle est la pointe du discernement éthique et juridique que Xavier Dijon met en oeuvre dans ces pages. Lorsque l'amour de l'homme et de la femme semble infécond, quel traitement leur permettra d'accueillir, dans les limites de leurs corps, la promesse de leur amour? De quelle norme physique ou mentale le handicap est-il (...) l'anomalie et jusqu'où le supporter? Faut-il reprendre l'argumentaire qui s'oppose à la dépénalisation de l'avortement, largement acceptée dans les pays occidentaux? Coment les droits du patient à une mort digne trouveront-ils figure juridique? En chacun de ces points, la réflexion de l'auteur se veut catholique : elle a toute personne humaine en vis-à-vis. Editeur. (shrink)

A sizeable body of literature suggests that informal methods of dispute resolution — and, in particular, conciliation — flourish only in societies marked by extensive social hierarchy. Given this literature, it is quite surprising to discover that in the mid-nineteenth century, the United States embarked on an extensive debate regarding whether to adopt "conciliation courts," whose primary function was to reconcile the disputants by persuading them to embrace an equitable compromise. First created by the French Revolutionaries in 1790, (...) conciliation courts were widely established throughout continental Europe. Observing this development, leading American lawyers and politicians pondered seriously whether the United states ought to follow suit. Debate over whether to embrace such institutions occurred at the very highest of levels, and a series of states enacted constitutional provisions authorizing their legislatures to create conciliation courts. Ultimately, however, despite the widespread interest in such institutions, these were never established — except in the notable case of the Freedmen’s Bureau courts of the Reconstruction South. This Article explores this largely forgotten episode in American legal history. It examines why a nation that was radically egalitarian by standards of the time would seriously consider embracing an institution that we tend more commonly to associate with inegalitarian, strongly hierarchical societies — and why, after coming so close to adopting conciliation courts, it ultimately failed to do so. In the process, by situating the debate over conciliation courts in a broader social and legal context, the Article also excavates the origins of the modern, quintessentially American commitment to the virtues of formal, adversarial process. (shrink)

Formal epistemologists criticise the Conciliatory View of peer disagreement for being non-commutative with conditionalisation, path dependent and does not preserve the independence between propositions. Failing to commute with conditionalisation, one may switch the order between conciliating and conditionalising and obtain different outcomes. Failing to be path independent, the outcome of conciliation varies with the order of the acquisition of new testimonies. Failing to preserve the independence between propositions, one may suffer from a sure-loss and hence be deemed irra- tional. (...) The three formal deficiencies urge people to abandon the Conciliatory View. This paper aims to show that one may save the Conciliatory View by conciliating with nonlinear functions. Research in the study of opinion pooling shows that the three deficiencies are not problems of the Conciliatory View, but problems of linear averaging. Hence, one can get rid of these formal deficiencies by making conciliation with nonlinear averaging functions. After showing how the three deficiencies can be avoided, I will explore the features of nonlinear averaging functions and argue that they have properties that correctly capture people’s intuition concerning disagreement. The conclusion, therefore, is to suggest epistemologists develop a more fine-grained taxonomy for cases of disagreement. With a deliberate categorisation of different kinds of disagreement, epistemologists can pick the proper averaging rule to apply in each specific case, and get rid of possible formal deficiencies. (shrink)

À la différence du maternel, périodique et temporel, le féminin érotique est régi par la poussée constante de la libido. Au cours des cinq étapes de la vie d’une femme, l’auteur suit le parcours des antagonismes susceptibles d’intervenir entre ces deux pôles du destin féminin et leur souhaitable réconciliation. L’essentiel, pour une femme, n’est-il pas de pouvoir vivre physiquement et psychiquement ces trois expériences : être femme-sujet, mère et amante?

Lors de son séjour à Berne, celui qui deviendra le plus grand philosophe de la réconciliation pense l’échec, voire l’impossibilité de toute réconciliation. Le jeune Hegel commence par affirmer la nécessité d’un retour aux sources de la réconciliation chrétienne; puis il s’interroge sur l’échec de la réconciliation proposée par le Christ, sur la persistance de l’irréconciliation, et sur la fausse réconciliation. La conclusion fait ressortir le thème du renversement d’une doctrine initialement pure et celui du remède contre la fausse réconciliation.

Ce texte s’intéresse aux conditions de réussite des mécanismes de type commission de vérité et de réconciliation. Il présente deux grilles à partir desquelles il analyse et compare trois cas : la Truth and Reconciliation Commission d’Afrique du Sud, les tribunaux gacaca au Rwanda et la Commission de vérité et réconciliation du Canada sur les pensionnats indiens. La première grille évalue la capacité d’une CVR à promouvoir la justice et la responsabilité. La seconde, leur capacité à favoriser la réconciliation nationale. (...) La thèse défendue est que les CVR relèvent davantage de l’éthique que du droit et du politique. La première grille applique des critères qui relèvent de ces deux derniers registres. Ce faisant, elle ne prend pas en compte la finalité de réconciliation des CVR et faillit à les évaluer correctement. La seconde grille, qui emprunte aux modalités de la justice réparatrice et à l’éthique, corrige ces lacunes. (shrink)

An increasing amount of research has examined the management of competing logics, and possible tensions arising between them, within “hybrid organizations.” However, the ways in which the relationships of hybrids with other organizations shape the conciliation of these logics and tensions have received limited attention so far. In this theoretical paper, we examine how hybrid organizations deal with interorganizational collaboration, in particular whether and how their hybridity can be maintained when they partner with “dominant-logic organizations.” Drawing on empirical literature (...) on social enterprise–corporate collaborations, we develop a framework and several propositions on how competing logics and their balancing within hybrid organizations may be affected by interactions with organizations underpinned by one dominant logic. We suggest that influences will mostly depend on the type of collaboration pursued. A collaboration based on a lower level of engagement and interaction between the two partners is likely to give precedence to one logic over the other, reducing inter-logic tensions but possibly compromising organizational hybridity. By contrast, a collaboration featuring numerous interactions and mission compatibility may facilitate sustained hybridity if tensions are acknowledged and managed. Our propositions contribute to the literatures on hybrid organizations, interorganizational collaboration, and social enterprise. (shrink)