In this paper, we focus attention on the role of computer system complexity in ascribing responsibility. We begin by introducing the notion of technological moral action (TMA). TMA is carried out by the combination of a computer system user, a system designer (developers, programmers, and testers), and a computer system (hardware and software). We discuss three sometimes overlapping types of responsibility: causal responsibility, moral responsibility, and role responsibility. Our analysis is informed by the (...) well-known accounts provided by Hart and Hart and Honoré. While these accounts are helpful, they have misled philosophers and others by presupposing that responsibility can be ascribed in all cases of action simply by paying attention to the free and intended actions of human beings. Such accounts neglect the part played by technology in ascriptions of responsibility in cases of moral action with technology. For both moral and role responsibility, we argue that ascriptions of both causal and role responsibility depend on seeing action as complex in the sense described by TMA. We conclude by showing how our analysis enriches moral discourse about responsibility for TMA. (shrink)

Modern computational systems are commonly designed around deterministic or discrete state-based models, where uncertainty is typically resolved early during state evaluation. [1], [14], [22] The framework further distinguishes deterministic Absolute States represented as {Abs}_A = (-1, 0, +1) and equivalently expressed as |A| = (-1, 0, +1) from derived ambiguity-preserving Q-States, enabling state-aware evaluation without forcing immediate collapse into rigid binary interpretation. [A:Absolute State]. However, many real-world systems operate under conditions where ambiguity persists, evolves, and directly influences system behavior (...) [A1:Ambiguity]. -/- This paper introduces an ambiguity-aware computation method operating within a Multi-State Computational Model, where Q-States are treated as a first-class computational state construct [A2:Q-State]. Instead of forcing immediate resolution, the proposed computational method preserves, interprets, and propagates ambiguity through a structured Transformation Pipeline. The pipeline integrates State Derivation, Q-State Identification, and State-Aware Graph Evaluation. [A3:State-Aware]. -/- A key conceptual distinction is established between Computing State and Computational State, enabling ambiguity-aware evaluation under structured operational constraints. [A4:Computing vs Computational State]. The proposed computational methods incorporate Lattice-Based Representation and Node State Classification to model system behavior under ambiguity [A5:Node-State]. -/- Sparsity Dynamics and Path Validity are introduced as core evaluation mechanisms, supported by Boundary Conditions and Hysteresis Dynamics to maintain stability, continuity, and evaluation consistency [A6:Sparsity, Path-Validity]. Simulation results demonstrate controlled Q-State propagation and convergence toward high Confidence Interval (CI) outcomes under structured ambiguity constraints [A7:Boundary-Conditioned Hysteresis]. -/- This approach provides a foundation for modeling complex systems where uncertainty is not prematurely eliminated, but systematically represented, evaluated, and incorporated into state-aware computational evaluation. [A8:Graph-Based Systems]. (shrink)

Scientists depend on complex computational systems that are often ineliminably opaque, to the detriment of our ability to give scientific explanations and detect artifacts. Some philosophers have s...

I argue that there are different orders of mechanisms with different constitutive relevance and individuation conditions. In common first-order mechanistic explanations, constitutive relevance norms are captured by the matched-interlevel-experiments condition (Craver et al. (2021) Synthese 199:8807–8828). Regarding individuation, we say that any two mechanisms are of the same type when they have the same concrete components performing the same activities in the same arrangement. By contrast, in higher-order mechanistic explanations, we formulate the decompositions in terms of generalized basic components (GBCs). (...) These GBCs (e.g., logic gates) possess causal properties that are common to a set of physical systems. Mechanistic explanations formulated in terms of GBCs embody the epistemic value of horizontal integration, which aims to explain as many phenomena as possible with a minimal amount of abstract components (Wajnerman Paz (2017a) Philos Psychol 30:213–234). Two higher-order mechanisms are of the same type when they share all the same GBCs, and they are organized as performing the same activities with the same interactions. I use this notion of mechanistic order to enhance the mechanistic account of computation (MAC) and provide an account of the epistemic norms of computational explanation and the nature of medium-independent functional properties and mechanisms. Finally, I use these new conceptual tools to address four criticisms of the MAC. (shrink)

After discussing the distinction between artifacts and natural entities, and the distinction between artifacts and technology, the conditions of the traditional account of moral agency are identified. While computer system behavior meets four of the five conditions, it does not and cannot meet a key condition. Computer systems do not have mental states, and even if they could be construed as having mental states, they do not have intendings to act, which arise from an agent’s freedom. On (...) the other hand, computer systems have intentionality, and because of this, they should not be dismissed from the realm of morality in the same way that natural objects are dismissed. Natural objects behave from necessity; computer systems and other artifacts behave from necessity after they are created and deployed, but, unlike natural objects, they are intentionally created and deployed. Failure to recognize the intentionality of computer systems and their connection to human intentionality and action hides the moral character of computer systems. Computer systems are components in human moral action. When humans act with artifacts, their actions are constituted by the intentionality and efficacy of the artifact which, in turn, has been constituted by the intentionality and efficacy of the artifact designer. All three components – artifact designer, artifact, and artifact user – are at work when there is an action and all three should be the focus of moral evaluation. (shrink)

Modern computer systems are ubiquitous in contemporary life yet many of them remain opaque. This poses significant challenges in domains where desiderata such as fairness or accountability are crucial. We suggest that the best strategy for achieving system transparency varies depending on the specific source of opacity prevalent in a given context. Synthesizing and extending existing discussions, we propose a taxonomy consisting of eight sources of opacity that fall into three main categories: architectural, analytical, and socio-technical. For each (...) source, we provide initial suggestions as to how to address the resulting opacity in practice. The taxonomy provides a starting point for requirements engineers and other practitioners to understand contextually prevalent sources of opacity, and to select or develop appropriate strategies for overcoming them. (shrink)

In this paper we will demonstrate that a computational system can meet the criteria for autonomy laid down by classical enactivism. The two criteria that we will focus on are operational closure and structural determinism, and we will show that both can be applied to a basic example of a physically instantiated Turing machine. We will also address the question of precariousness, and briefly suggest that a precarious Turing machine could be designed. Our aim in this paper is to (...) challenge the assumption that computational systems are necessarily heteronomous systems, to try and motivate in enactivism a more nuanced and less rigid conception of computational systems, and to demonstrate to computational theorists that they might find some interesting material within the enactivist tradition, despite its historical hostility towards computationalism. (shrink)

Organisations are computing systems. The university’s sports centre is a computing system for managing sports teams and facilities. The tenure committee is a computing system for assigning tenure status. Despite an increasing number of publications in group ontology, the computational nature of organisations has not been recognised. The present paper is the first in this debate to propose a theory of organisations as groups structured for computing. I begin by describing the current situation in group ontology and by (...) spelling out the thesis in more detail. I then present the example of a sports centre to illustrate why one might intuitively think of organisations as computing systems. To substantiate the thesis, I introduce Piccinini’s restrictive analysis of physical computation. As I show, organisations meet all criteria for being computing systems. Organisations are structured groups with the function of manipulating medium-independent vehicles according to rules. Furthermore, I argue for the modal claim that this is a necessary feature of organisations. Having sketched the computational account of organisations, I compare it to other proposals in the literature. (shrink)

In this paper, the role of the environment and physical embodiment of computational systems for explanatory purposes will be analyzed. In particular, the focus will be on cognitive computational systems, understood in terms of mechanisms that manipulate semantic information. It will be argued that the role of the environment has long been appreciated, in particular in the work of Herbert A. Simon, which has inspired the mechanistic view on explanation. From Simon’s perspective, the embodied view on cognition seems natural but (...) it is nowhere near as critical as its proponents suggest. The only point of difference between Simon and embodied cognition is the significance of body-based off-line cognition; however, it will be argued that it is notoriously over-appreciated in the current debate. The new mechanistic view on explanation suggests that even if it is critical to situate a mechanism in its environment and study its physical composition, or realization, it is also stressed that not all detail counts, and that some bodily features of cognitive systems should be left out from explanations. (shrink)

Model checking, a prominent formal method used to predict and explain the behaviour of software and hardware systems, is examined on the basis of reflective work in the philosophy of science concerning the ontology of scientific theories and model-based reasoning. The empirical theories of computational systems that model checking techniques enable one to build are identified, in the light of the semantic conception of scientific theories, with families of models that are interconnected by simulation relations. And the mappings between these (...) scientific theories and computational systems in their scope are analyzed in terms of suitable specializations of the notions of model of experiment and model of data. Furthermore, the extensively mechanized character of model-based reasoning in model checking is highlighted by a comparison with proof procedures adopted by other formal methods in computer science. Finally, potential epistemic benefits flowing from the application of model checking in other areas of scientific inquiry are emphasized in the context of computer simulation studies of biological information processing. (shrink)

The paper presents a paradoxical feature of computational systems that suggests that computationalism cannot explain symbol grounding. If the mind is a digital computer, as computationalism claims, then it can be computing either over meaningful symbols or over meaningless symbols. If it is computing over meaningful symbols its functioning presupposes the existence of meaningful symbols in the system, i.e. it implies semantic nativism. If the mind is computing over meaningless symbols, no intentional cognitive processes are available prior to (...) symbol grounding. In this case, no symbol grounding could take place since any grounding presupposes intentional cognitive processes. So, whether computing in the mind is over meaningless or over meaningful symbols, computationalism implies semantic nativism. (shrink)

Computers are increasingly interactive. They are no more transformational systems producing a final output after a finite execution. Instead, they continuously react in time to external events that modify the course of computing execution. While philosophers have been interested in conceptualizing computers for a long time, they seem to have paid little attention to the specificities of interactive computing. We propose to tackle this issue by surveying the literature in theoretical computer science, where one can find explicit proposals for (...) a model of interactive computing. In that field, the formal modelling of interactive computing systems has been brought down to whether the new interaction models are reducible to Turing Machines. There are three areas where interaction models are framed. The comparison between TMs and interactive system models is at stake in all of them. These areas are namely some works on concurrency by Milner, on Reactive Turing Machines, and on interaction as a new computing paradigm. For each of the three identified models, we present its motivation, sum up its account for interaction and its legacy, and point out issues regarding the understanding of computers. The survey shows difficulties for epistemologists. The reason is that these analyses focus on the formal equivalence between interactive models of computation and classic ones. Such a project is different from addressing how a computing machine can be interactive: in other words, which mechanisms allow it. (shrink)

In chapter eleven of "On The Foundation of Computing," Primiero takes on the implementation debate in computer science. He contrasts his theory with two other views—the Semantic and the specification—artifact. In this paper, I argue that there is a way to fine-tune the implementation concept further. Firstly, contrary to Primiero, I claim it is problematic to separate the implementation relationship from the conditions which make it correct. Secondly, by taking a pluralistic approach to implementation, I claim it is a (...) mistake to try and provide a general theory of implementation for the entire production cycle of computational systems. (shrink)

This essay aims to contribute robust grounds to question the Susskinds’ influential, consequentialist logic when it comes to the legitimacy of automation within the legal profession. It does so by questioning their minimalist understanding of the professions. If it is our commitment to moral equality that is at stake every time lawyers hail the specific vulnerability inherent in their professional relationship, the case for wholesale automation is turned on its head. One can no longer assume that, as a rule, wholesale (...) automation is both legitimate and desirable, provided it improves the quality and accessibility of legal services. The assumption, instead, is firmly in favour of designing systems that better enable legal professionals to live up to their specific responsibility. The rest of the essay outlines key challenges in the design of such profession-specific, ‘ethics aware’ decision-support systems. (shrink)

The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Test± passing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably (...) be persons. (shrink)

What we have learnt in the last six or seven decades about virtual machinery, as a result of a great deal of science and technology, enables us to offer Darwin a new defence against critics who argued that only physical form, not mental capabilities and consciousness could be products of evolution by natural selection. The defence compares the mental phenomena mentioned by Darwin’s opponents with contents of virtual machinery in computing systems. Objects, states, events, and processes in virtual machinery which (...) we have only recently learnt how to design and build, and could not even have been thought about in Darwin’s time, can interact with the physical machinery in which they are implemented, without being identical with their physical implementation, nor mere aggregates of physical structures and processes. The existence of various kinds of virtual machinery (including both “platform” virtual machines that can host other virtual machines, e.g. operating systems, and “application” virtual machines, e.g. spelling checkers, and computer games) depends on complex webs of causal connections involving hardware and software structures, events and processes, where the specification of such causal webs requires concepts that cannot be defined in terms of concepts of the physical sciences. That indefinability, plus the possibility of various kinds of self-monitoring within virtual machinery, seems to explain some of the allegedly mysterious and irreducible features of consciousness that motivated Darwin’s critics and also more recent philosophers criticising AI. There are consequences for philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and robotics. (shrink)

The idea that human thought requires the execution of mental algorithms provides a foundation for research programs in cognitive science, which are largely based upon the computational conception of language and mentality. Consideration is given to recent work by Penrose, Searle, and Cleland, who supply various grounds for disputing computationalism. These grounds in turn qualify as reasons for preferring a non-computational, semiotic approach, which can account for them as predictable manifestations of a more adquate conception. Thinking does not ordinarily require (...) the execution of mental algorithms, which appears to be at best no more than one rather special kind of thinking. (shrink)

Safe Safety arguments are key components in a safety case. Too often, safety arguments are constructed without proper reasoning. To address this, we argue that informal logic argument schemes have important roles to play in safety argument construction and reviewing process. Ten commonly used reasoning schemes in computer system safety domain are proposed. The role of informal logic dialogue games in computer system safety arguments reviewing is also discussed and the intended work in this area is (...) proposed. It is anticipated that this work will contribute toward the development of computer system safety arguments, and help to move forward the interplay between research in informal logic and research in computer system safety engineering. (shrink)

Sources of error and accountability in computer systems: Comments on “accountability in a computerized society”.

The Halting Problem, famously proven undecidable by Alan Turing, establishes that no general algorithm can determine whether an arbitrary program will halt or run indefinitely when executed on an idealized Turing machine. This foundational result assumes a closed, isolated computational system with potentially infinite resources. This paper proposes a novel perspective by leveraging Recursive Entropic Time (RET), a theoretical framework wherein time is not a fundamental, pre-existing entity but an emergent, processual property generated intrinsically by systems engaging in recursive (...) informational dynamics. We hypothesize that by modeling a computational program P as a RET system that inherently interacts with an environment E, its halting behavior can be conditionally ana lyzed and potentially predicted, particularly for classes of programs considered undecidable in the classical isolated sense. This work develops a theoretical framework where a pro gram’s internal rate of epistemic time accumulation (dTint dtext )—a measure of its readiness for subsequent computational steps—is modulated by its internal informational loads (such as Shannon entropy SP of its state, and computational complexity CP) and, crucially, by an environmental coupling function fcoupling that quantifies the informational exchange and influence between P and E. Halting is thus reconceptualized not as a binary, *a priori* decidable property of an isolated program, but as an emergent state transition or a critical point in the temporal dy namics of the coupled P-E system. This approach aims to bridge the gap between the theo retical undecidability of the Halting Problem and the observable, often resource-constrained or environmentally-influenced, termination behavior of programs in real-world, non-isolated computational contexts. The paper outlines potential RET-based halting conditions, includ ing stagnation due to overwhelming informational load and environmentally-induced state resolutions, and provides a simplified computational illustration of these principles. (shrink)

This project continues our interdisciplinary research into computational and cognitive aspects of narrative comprehension. Our ultimate goal is the development of a computational theory of how humans understand narrative texts. The theory will be informed by joint research from the viewpoints of linguistics, cognitive psychology, the study of language acquisition, literary theory, geography, philosophy, and artificial intelligence. The linguists, literary theorists, and geographers in our group are developing theories of narrative language and spatial understanding that are being tested by the (...) cognitive psychologists and language researchers in our group, and a computational model of a reader of narrative text is being developed by the AI researchers, based in part on these theories and results and in part on research on knowledge representation and reasoning. This proposal describes the knowledge-representation and natural-language-processing issues involved in the computational implementation of the theory; discusses a contrast between communicative and narrative uses of language and of the relation of the narrative text to the story world it describes; investigates linguistic, literary, and hermeneutic dimensions of our research; presents a computational investigation of subjective sentences and reference in narrative; studies children’s acquisition of the ability to take third-person perspective in their own storytelling; describes the psychological validation of various linguistic devices; and examines how readers develop an understanding of the geographical space of a story. This report is a longer version of a project description submitted to NSF. This document, produced in May 2007, is a L ATEX version of Technical Report 89-07 (Buffalo: SUNY Buffalo Department of Computer Science, August 1989), with slightly.. (shrink)

As computational systems burgeon with advancing artificial intelligence (AI), the deterministic frameworks underlying them face novel challenges, especially when interfacing with self-modifying code. The Executioner Paradox, introduced herein, exemplifies such a challenge where a deterministic Executioner Machine (EM) grapples with self-aware and self-modifying code. This unveils a self-referential dilemma, highlighting a gap in current deterministic computational frameworks when faced with self-evolving code. In this article, the Executioner Paradox is proposed, highlighting the nuanced interactions between deterministic decision-making and self-aware code, and (...) the ensuing challenges. This article advocates for a re-evaluation of existing deterministic frameworks, emphasizing the need for adaptive decision-making mechanisms in computational systems. By dissecting the Executioner Paradox, the aim is to foster a robust discussion on evolving deterministic frameworks to accommodate the dynamic nature of self-modifying code, thereby contributing a forward-looking lens to the discourse on computational systems amidst advancing AI. (shrink)

In this article I will address the issue of the embodiment of computing systems from the point of view distinctive of the so-called Unconventional Computation, focusing on the paradigm known as Morphological Computation. As a first step, I will contextualize Morphological Computation within the disciplinary field of Embodied Artificial Intelligence: broadly conceived, Embodied Artificial Intelligence may be characterized as embracing both conventional and unconventional approaches to the artificial emulation of natural intelligence. Morphological Computation stands out from other paradigms of unconventional (...) Embodied Artificial Intelligence in that it discloses a new, closer kind of connection between embodiment and computation. I will further my investigation by briefly reviewing the state-of-the-art in Morphological Computation: attention will be given to a very recent trend, whose core concept is that of “organic reconfigurability”. In this direction, as a final step, two advanced cases of study of organic or living morphological computers will be presented and discussed. The prospect is to shed some light on our title question: what progress has been made in understanding the embodiment of computing systems? (shrink)

The final shape of the "Internet of Things" ubiquitous computing promises relies on a cybernetic system of inputs , computation or decision making , and outputs . My interest in this paper lies in the computational intelligences that suture these positions together, and how positioning these intelligences as autonomous agents extends the dialogue between human-users and ubiquitous computing technology. Drawing specifically on the scenarios surrounding the employment of ubiquitous computing within aged care, I argue that agency is something that (...) cannot be traded without serious consideration of the associated ethics. (shrink)

This essay presents and reflects upon the construction of a few experimental artworks, among them Caracolomobile , that looks for poetic, aesthetic and functional possibilities to bring computer systems to the sensitive universe of human emotions, feelings and expressions. Modern and Contemporary Art have explored such qualities in unfathomable ways and nowadays is turning towards computer systems and their co-related technologies. This universe characterizes and is the focus of these experimental artworks; artworks dealing with entwined subjective and objective (...) qualities, weaving perceptions, sensations and concepts. One of them, Caracolomobile, features an art installation creating a set up for an artificial robot that recognizes humans’ affective states and answers them with movements and sounds. The robot was installed over an artificial mirror lake in an open indigo-blue space surrounded by mirrors. It perceives and discriminates human emotional states and expressions using an interface developed with a non-intrusive neural headset (The neural headset used was developed by Emotiv Systems: http://www.emotiv.com . Accessed 11 August 2011). This artwork raises questions and looks for answers inquiring about the preliminary steps for the creation of artefacts that would conduct one to poetically experiment with affect, emotion, sensations and feelings in computational systems. Other works in progress ask about the poetic possibilities of mixing computational autonomous processes and behavioural robotic procedures (Arkin 1998 ) to create artificial environments mixed with humans. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relation of heuristic search and level of intelligence in cognitive computation systems. The paper begins with a review of the fundamental properties of a cognitive computation system, which is defined generally as a control system that generates goal-directed actions in response to environmental inputs and constraints. An important property of cognitive computations is the need to process local cues in symbol structures to access and integrate distal knowledge to generate a response. To deal (...) with uncertainties involved in this local-to-distal processing, the system needs to perform heuristic search to locate and integrate the right set of distal structures. The level of intelligence of the system depends critically on the efficiency of the heuristic search process. It is argued that, for a bounded rationality system, the level of intelligence does not depend on how much search it needs to do to accomplish a task. Rather, the level of intelligence depends on how much search it does not need to do to achieve the same level of performance. Examples were discussed to illustrate this idea. The first two examples show how machines that play games like tic-tac-toe and chess rely heavily on the efficiency of the heuristic search algorithm to achieve better performance, demonstrating the relation of heuristic search and intelligence in a bounded rationality system. The second example shows how humans adapt to different information ecologies to perform information search on the Internet and how their performance improves over time, demonstrating how heuristic search can be improved in an adaptive rationality system. The two examples demonstrate how better search control knowledge and representations of task environment can improve the efficiency of heuristic search, thereby improving the intelligence of the system. (shrink)

In 1966 Richard Levins argued that applications of mathematics to population biology faced various constraints which forced mathematical modelers to trade-off at least one of realism, precision, or generality in their approach. Much traditional mathematical modeling in biology has prioritized generality and precision in the place of realism through strategies of idealization and simplification. This has at times created tensions with experimental biologists. The past 20 years however has seen an explosion in mathematical modeling of biological systems with the rise (...) of modern computational systems biology and many new collaborations between modelers and experimenters. In this paper I argue that many of these collaborations revolve around detail-driven modeling practices which in Levins’ terms trade-off generality for realism and precision. These practices apply mathematics by working from detailed accounts of biological systems, rather than from initially idealized or simplified representations. This is possible by virtue of modern computation. The form these practices take today suggest however Levins’ constraints on mathematical application no longer apply, transforming our understanding of what is possible with mathematics in biology. Further the engagement with realism and the ability to push realistic models in new directions aligns well with the epistemological and methodological views of experimenters, which helps explain their increased enthusiasm for biological modeling. (shrink)

The design of medical knowledge-based computer systems requires effective interdisciplinary communication for the development of a community sharing common goals and a common language for design. Over the past 9 years the Perinatal Research Group, an interdisciplinary team of computer scientists, engineers and clinicians, have developed a prototype knowledge-based computer system to aid clinicians in the care of women in labour. The group were uncertain which approach to adopt to progress this system from a prototype (...) to a useful clinical tool to support decision making. A case study and activity theory analysis, of an existing clinical knowledge-based computer system in routine use, helped to resolve a number of communication and methodological issues that the design team encountered. Sharing of backgrounds and perspectives caused the design team to question previous assumptions and to explore alternative functions and roles for knowledge-based computer systems in maternity care. We are now undertaking a longitudinal case study and activity theory analysis of obstetric teams and women in labour to analyse the relationships between clinicians, patients and technology. This work will inform the development of our knowledge-based computer system to place the patient at the centre of the decision-making process. (shrink)

As genetic testing for the presence of potentially health-affecting mutations becomes available for more genetic conditions, many people will soon be faced with the decision of whether or not to have a genetic test. Making an informed decision requires an understanding and evaluation of the arguments for and against having the test. As a case in point, this paper considers argumentation involving the decision of whether to have a BRCA gene test, one of the first commercially available genetic tests. First, (...) argumentation in a five-page patient brochure from a for-profit company that provides BRCA gene testing, is analyzed. Next, for comparison, argumentation on BRCA testing in materials for healthcare consumers written by a not-for-profit health plan and a government organization, is analyzed. In view of the challenges identified by considering these examples, this article discusses how argumentation-oriented computer systems may be able to help the healthcare consumer to make informed decisions about genetic testing. (shrink)

Self Aware Computer Systems is an area of basic research, and we are only in the initial stages of our understanding of what it means: What it means to be self aware; what a self aware system can do that a system without it cannot do; and what are some of the immediate practical applications and challenge problems. This paper is a report capturing some of the salient points discussed during the DARPA workshop on Self Aware (...) class='Hi'>Computer Systems held on April 27-28, 2004 in Washington DC. (shrink)

How are human computation systems developed in the field of citizen science to achieve what neither humans nor computers can do alone? Through multiple perspectives and methods, Libuse Hannah Veprek examines the imagination of these assemblages, their creation, and everyday negotiation in the interplay of various actors and play/science entanglements at the edge of AI. Focusing on their human-technology relations, this ethnographic study shows how these formations are marked by _intraversions_, as they change with technological advancements and the actors' goals, (...) motivations, and practices. This work contributes to the constructive and critical ethnographic engagement with human-AI assemblages in the making. (shrink)

Sources of error and accountability in computer systems: Comments on “accountability in a computerized society”.

The notion of a “work-around” is a much-used resource within the sociology of technology, reflecting an interest in showing how users are not simply shaped by technologies but how they, through adopting artifacts in ways other than those for which they were designed or intended, are also shapers of technology. Using the language and concerns of actor-network theory and focusing on recent developments within computer-systems implementation, this article seeks to explore and add to our understanding of work-arounds through unpacking (...) the work of one group of “users” as they attempt to tailor and roll out a system within the administration departments of their university. This article argues that paying attention to the various networks that lead to and from work-arounds can improve our understanding of the way users both shape and are shaped by technologies. Focusing on work-arounds as “networks in place” also allows us to highlight some of their contingencies; for example, the other actors and entities on which these depend and are constituted. (shrink)

When software is written and then utilized in complex computer systems, problems often occur. Sometimes these problems cause a system to malfunction, and in some instances such malfunctions cause harm. Should any of the persons involved in creating the software be blamed and punished when a computer system failure leads to persons being harmed? In order to decide whether such blame and punishment are appropriate, we need to first consider if the people are “morally responsible”. Should (...) any of the people involved in creating the software be held morally responsible, as individuals, for the harm caused by a computer system failure?This article provides one view of moral responsibility and then discusses some barriers to holding people morally responsible. Next, it provides information about the Therac-25, a computer-controlled medical linear accelerator, and its computer systems failures that led to deaths and injuries. Finally it investigates whether two key people involved in the Therac-25 case could reasonably be considered to have some degree of moral responsibility for the deaths and injuries. The conclusions about whether or not these people were morally responsible necessarily rest upon a certain amount of speculation about what they knew and what they did. These limitations, however, should not cause us to conclude that discussions of moral responsibility are fruitless. In some cases, determinations of moral responsibility may be made and in others the investigation is still worthwhile, as the article demonstrates. (shrink)

The Borg are a conglomeration of a large number of different species. They exploit the positive traits of the individual species in order to progress towards their common goal of achieving ‘perfection’. When teaching about self-aware collective computing systems, the Borg are an ideal example. First, the collective system is often built from heterogeneous devices with different capabilities just like the different races in the Borg collective have different traits. Second, individual entities can enter and leave the collective without (...) destroying its general integrity. Third, the collective operates to achieve a common goal without central coordination, even if this may not be the goal of each individual. Fourth, a self-aware system needs to adapt to each new environment on (i) the individual and (ii) the collective level. However, in contrast to Borg, our computational collectives are usually cooperative rather than trying to forcefully assimilate any species with interesting traits. (shrink)

Despite the impressive amount of financial resources invested in carrying out large-scale brain simulations, it is controversial what the payoffs are of pursuing this project. The present paper argues that in some cases, from designing, building, and running a large-scale neural simulation, scientists acquire useful knowledge about the computational performance of the simulating system, rather than about the neurobiological system represented in the simulation. What this means, why it is not a trivial lesson, and how it advances the (...) literature on the epistemology of computer simulation are the three preoccupations addressed by the paper. (shrink)

The vision of the new generation of office systems is based on the hypothesis that an automatic support system is all the more useful and acceptable, the more systems behaviour and performance are in accordance with features ofhuman behaviour. Consequently recent development activities are influenced by the paradigm of the computer as man's “cooperative assistant”. The metaphors ofassistance andcooperation illustrate some major requirements to be met by new office systems. Cooperative office systems will raise a set of new (...) questions about the future of human work, human-machine interaction, the forms of individual control of work, the scope of action and the development of competence in the frame of AI-supported cooperative work, the relative benefits of different types of organizations, etc. With increasing autonomy of the computer in task accomplishment, research should also be concerned with the question of the limits of such a development. In AI-research and development there is much discussion of the intended performance of that new technology. Perhaps this will provide insights into, how these new machines should support numerous aspects of individual or cooperative work. But we find fewer ideas about the future ofhuman work. What will the role of thehuman actor be in future AI-supported cooperative work? What kind of work do we want to support with AI-machines? In the following article I will try to identify some questions for further sociological research activities. I will base my considerations on some theoretical aspects ofunderstanding andmeaning. Regarding identical and non-identical aspects in communication behaviour of human and machines, I will focus on some questions to be investigated. Finally some methodological problems of sociological research in the field of Artificial Intelligence will be discussed, especially the so-called “Time-Dilemma” of sociological research in technology. (shrink)

Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) has a wide influence on the exchange rate, education, health, training, and educational programs. In this paper we describe an intelligent tutoring system that helps student study computer networks. The current ITS provides intelligent presentation of educational content appropriate for students, such as the degree of knowledge, the desired level of detail, assessment, student level, and familiarity with the subject. Our Intelligent tutoring system was developed using ITSB authoring tool for building ITS. A (...) preliminary evaluation of the ITS was done by a group of students and teachers. The results were acceptable. (shrink)

Whereas computer simulations involve no direct physical interaction between the machine they are run on and the physical systems they are used to investigate, they are often used as experiments and yield data about these systems. It is commonly argued that they do so because they are implemented on physical machines. We claim that physicality is not necessary for their representational and predictive capacities and that the explanation of why computer simulations generate desired information about their target (...) class='Hi'>system is only to be found in the detailed analysis of their semantic levels. We provide such an analysis and we determine the actual consequences of physical implementation for simulations. (shrink)