During occupational trainings given to Polish employees, one can quite often observe complaining. The instructor can use it for problem-solving or for purification. Thus, complaining plays an instrumental or cathartic function. This has consequences for the entire training process. The aim of the article is to present the phenomenon of complaining during training courses and to discuss its correlation with different variables such as learning results, participants’ mood and the evaluation of the training course. Questions were therefore (...) posed about which function of complaining would be more conducive to the process of learning the material and result in an improvement of the participants’ mood, as well as how the instructor would be evaluated, at the response level, depending on which function of complaining is activated during the training. In order to answer these questions, the authors designed an experiment in which complaining was induced in members of an organization, performing either an instrumental function or a cathartic function. The results show that the most effective strategy is the use of its object as a point of departure for problem solution. (shrink)

Philosophers generally prescribe against complaining, or endorse only complaints directed to rectification of the circumstances. Notably, Aristotle and Kant aver that the importuning of others with one’s pains is effeminate and should never be done. In this paper, I reject the prohibition of complaint. The gendered aspects of Aristotle’s and Kant’s criticisms of complaint include their deploring a self-indulgent "softness" with respect to pain, yielding to feelings at the expense of remembering one’s duties to others and one’s own self-respect. (...) I argue that complaining may also take the form of mindful attention to shared suffering. A complainer may observe affective duties, such as commiseration and invitations to disclose pains. Against more contemporary views that justify only constructive complaints directed to change, I suggest that quotidian, unconstructive complaining sometimes fulfills important social functions, including the amelioration of loneliness and affective solidarity, for the sake of others as well as oneself. (shrink)

Consumer complaining behavior (CCB) is an important stream of research and practice, as it links the domains of service failure and service recovery. CCB research, although extensive and temporally wide, exhibits a lack of concern for the underlying assumptions of scholarly inquiry. Researchers neither explicitly mention, nor consciously indicate their ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions. We systematically identify the extant CCB literature and map it to two well-accepted paradigmatic classifications (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Deetz Organization Science 7(2): 191–207, 1996). (...) Normative or functionalist paradigm with the assumptions of an objective external reality, a positivist epistemology, a determinist view of human nature, and nomothetic methodology emerges as the dominant CCB research paradigm. The implications of this dominance are discussed as a barometer of the future of CCB research and practice. (shrink)

Complaining about humanitarian refugees is rarely an unequivocal activity for society members. Their talk appears dilemmatic: ‘sympathy talk’, comprising rhetorical displays of ‘care’, tolerance and aesthetic evaluations, is woven together with more pejorative messages. In this article we investigate how ‘sympathy talk’ functions as a discursive resource in talk-in-interaction when people give accounts of minority group individuals. A ‘synthetic’ discursive psychological approach was employed to analyse a corpus of 12 talkback radio calls to an evening ‘shock jock’ radio personality (...) in Adelaide, Australia, after the stabbing death of a Sudanese-Australian refugee. Analysis shows how host and callers dialogically negotiate and orientate to various sympathetic and humanitarian descriptions/evaluations. We contend that sympathetic talk advances the activity of conversation, softening complaints that could be made accountable as prejudiced. Sympathy talk also functions as a counter-argument to perceived punitive or ‘racist’ complaints. Moreover, this article proposes that such rhetoric shares an ideological thread that potentially undermines Sudanese refugees’ social positioning. Dialogue that deploys sympathetic formulations may be an element in the increasingly varied and subtle activity of ‘new racism’. We discuss how sympathetic accounts contain, within their semantic structure, their own antithesis for their deployment in anti-racist practice; for the development of counter discourses fundamental to the disruption of pervasive ideological representations and the construction of alternative refugee identities. (shrink)

This Article draws attention to a conceptual point that has been overlooked in recent discussions about the theoretical foundations of contract law. I argue that, rather than enforcing the obligations of promises, contract law concerns complaints against promissory wrongs. This conceptual distinction is easy to miss. If one assumes that complaints arise whenever an obligation has been violated, then the distinction does not seem meaningful. I show, however, that an obligation can be breached without giving rise to a valid complaint. (...) This Article illustrates the importance of this conceptual distinction by focusing first on the doctrine of substantive unconscionability. I claim that the doctrine can be best explained by the way in which a party who engages in exploitative behavior may lose her moral standing to complain. It is because such a party has lost her moral standing to complain that the law, through unconscionability doctrine, bars her from bringing a legal complaint. This explanation avoids the oft-issued charge of paternalism and it also offers benefits over an alternative state-oriented account developed recently by Seana Shiffrin. Using the conceptual distinction behind this account of unconscionability, this Article further argues that recent theoretical debates about the relationship between contract law and morality have been largely misconceived. Those debates have focused on whether contract law and morality impose parallel obligations. Once one appreciates the difference between imposing obligations and recognizing complaints, the comparison looks quite different. Contract law recognizes valid complaints against broken promises, much as morality recognizes moral complaints. (shrink)

This research aims to understand how two basic schemas—vigilante and reparation—influence online public complaining. Drawing on two experiments, a longitudinal field study and content analysis of online complaints, the current research makes three core contributions. First, we show that for similar service failures, each schema is associated with different justice motivations, which have different moral implications for consumers. Second, vigilante and reparation complainers write complaints in a different manner and are drawn to different online platforms; this information is helpful (...) to identify complainers using each schema. Third, the schemas moderate the process leading to different post-complaint benefits. Specifically, perseverance has a greater effect on obtaining a resolution for reparation complainers compared to vigilantes. Additionally, whereas a recovery leads to an increase in positive affect for reparation complainers, vigilantes experience a high level of positive affect simply by posting their complaint. The theoretical, ethical, and managerial implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

The process of medicalization has been analyzed in the medical humanities with disapprobation, with much emphasis placed on its ability to reinforce existing social power structures to ill effect. While true, this is an incomplete picture of medicalization. I argue that medicalization can both reinforce and disrupt existing social hierarchies within the clinic and outside of it, to ill or good effect. We must attend to how this takes place locally and globally lest we misunderstand how medicalization mediates power and (...) justice. I provide concrete examples of how this occurs by considering dysesthesia ethiopsis, autism, chronic fatigue syndrome, depression, and HIV/AIDS. (shrink)

Beginning from an analysis of what factors disqualify a person from complaining about a given moral breach, I show that the prima facie presumption that a complaint is justified in the face of non-moral offense in the context of a business transaction must be balanced against the potential consequences to the object of the complaint, especially given the particular realities of popular employment practices. In particular, I will identify three cases in which complamts are justified, presuming unjust employment arrangements, (...) as a way of showing that complaints in other situations should be, contrary to naive intuition, considered inappropriate. (shrink)

Saying is experiencing: Affective consequences of complaining and affirmation In four experiments mood was measured before and after complaining or affirmation. Participants complained or affirmed either themselves or listened to such communications of another person. Mood decreased after complaining and increased after affirmation — a "saying is experiencing" (SIE) effect. This effect was found also in the cognitive load condition suggesting that automatic mood contagion underlies the SIE effect rather than mechanisms based on self-perception or self-awareness. Appropriateness (...) of a topic for complaining appeared a boundary condition of the SIE effect: When a topic was considered by participants the most appropriate for complaining, the act of showing dissatisfaction with the topic led to mood improvement. (shrink)

Background: Nursing home residents are a vulnerable population. Most of them suffer from multi-morbidity, while many have cognitive impairment or dementia and need care around the clock. Several ethical challenges in nursing homes have been described in the scientific literature. Most studies have used staff members as informants, some have focused on the relatives’ view, but substantial knowledge about the residents’ perspective is lacking. Objective: To study what nursing home residents and their relatives perceive as ethical challenges in Norwegian nursing (...) homes. Research design: A qualitative design with in-depth interviews with nursing home residents, and focus-group interviews with relatives of nursing home residents. The digitally recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. Analysis was based on Interpretive Description. Participants and research context: A total of 25 nursing home residents from nine nursing homes in Norway, and 18 relatives of nursing home residents from three of these nursing homes. Ethical considerations: This study was reported to and approved by the Regional Ethics Committee in Oslo, Norway. Findings and discussion: The main ethical challenges in Norwegian nursing homes from the residents’ and relatives’ perspective were as follows: (a) acceptance and adaptation, (b) well-being and a good life, (c) autonomy and self-determination, and (d) lack of resources. The relationship with the staff was of outmost importance and was experienced as both rewarding and problematic. None of the residents in our study mentioned ethical challenges connected to end-of-life care. Conclusion: Residents and relatives experience ethical challenges in Norwegian nursing homes, mostly connected to “everyday ethical issues.”. (shrink)

This article proposes that feminist legal critics need to be able to explain how some rape cases succeed in securing convictions. The means by which rape cases are routinely disqualified in the criminal justice system have received widespread attention. It is well established in feminist legal critique that female complainants are discredited if they fail to conform to an archaic stereotype of the genuine or ‘real’ rape victim. This victim is not only morally and sexually virtuous she is also cautious, (...) unprovocative, and consistent. Defence tactics for discrediting rape testimony involve exposing the complainant's alleged failure to comply with the sexual and behavioural standards of the normative victim.This understanding of how rape complain(an)ts are disqualified is not predictive, however, of the complainants whose cases succeed in securing convictions. This article reviews some successful Australian rape cases and considers the ways in which they disturb feminist understandings of how rape complaints are discredited in the criminal justice system. It proposes that recent research analysing the discourse of rape trials provides a way of explaining the apparent discrepancies between the ‘ideal’ rape victim and successful complainants. (shrink)

Historically, numbers of women complainants in rape trials have been regarded suspiciously, or prejudiced in that their credibility has been seriously called into question, or undermined, both from within and outside the courtroom. Arguably, public and legal perceptions as to the expected conduct and behaviour of the stereotypical rape victim have been grounded in the belief that genuine women who allege rape should act and portray themselves as unequivocal victims. This suggests that the contemporary construct of the female rape victim (...) and her associated stereotypical image should be considered not solely as a legal derivative but also within a wider cultural context. This article explores the historical influences that shaped the cultural construct operating in the U.K., in particular, the societal and legal attitudes of the mid-Victorians towards women and sexual violence, creating an historical mystification around the construct of the female rape victim and the crime of rape itself. Reference is made to a number of cases reported in The Times newspaper between 1850–1885 which underline the requisite portrayal of the rape complainant as an unequivocal victim. It is argued that the relocation of this historical and socially constructed mythological imaginary within the context of the law and the trial process has disproportionately contributed to the modern scepticism which surrounds the female complainant. (shrink)

Emotive speech is a social act in which a speaker displays emotional signals with a specific intention; in the case of third-party complaints, this intention is to elicit empathy in the listener. The present study assessed how the emotivity of complaints was perceived in various conditions. Participants listened to short statements describing painful or neutral situations, spoken with a complaining or neutral prosody, and evaluated how complaining the speaker sounded. In addition to manipulating features of the message, social-affiliative (...) factors which could influence complaint perception were varied by adopting a cross-cultural design: participants were either Québécois (French Canadian) or French and listened to utterances expressed by both cultural groups. The presence of a complaining tone of voice had the largest effect on participant evaluations, while the nature of statements had a significant, but smaller influence. Marginal effects of culture on explicit evaluation of complaints were found. A multiple mediation analysis suggested that mean fundamental frequency was the main prosodic signal that participants relied on to detect complaints, though most of the prosody effect could not be linearly explained by acoustic parameters. These results highlight a tacit agreement between speaker and listener: what characterizes a complaint is how it is said (i.e., the tone of voice), more than what it is about or who produces it. More generally, the study emphasizes the central importance of prosody in expressive speech acts such as complaints, which are designed to strengthen social bonds and supportive responses in interactive behavior. This intentional and interpersonal aspect in the communication of emotions needs to be further considered in research on affect and communication. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The present study features an interview between a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officer and a female indigenous minor, who was reporting her own sexual assault. The study highlights how the child's interview with the officer appears to include gender-specific judgements. Thus far, few critical studies, underscoring interview techniques, feature power relations and ideologies in the discourse. This study identifies police negotiation with female assault complainants as discursive Yentling. Inspired by the term Yentl syndrome, where female health is often (...) underappreciated because it is judged from male prerogatives, the present study proposes that discursive Yentling emerges from victim blaming, perpetrator mitigation, and the sexualization of rape. Drawing attention to transcripts of an RCMP interview with a child complainant, this study asks (1) what power relations and ideologies manifest in the dialogue between the officer and the complainant? (2) Do the findings give evidence for discursive Yentling? Transitivity analysis and a discourse historical approach reveal ideological predispositions towards the complainant during the interview. The implications for this study hopefully provoke more considered police interview techniques for potential victims of sexual assault and inculcate a culture of feminist understanding in Canadian public services. (shrink)

Mental health issues are becoming increasingly prevalent amongst university students. However, research on the psychological profile of the general university population is relatively limited. Thus, this study analyses the current state of university students’ psychological conditions; the demographic differences in depression, anxiety, and stress and the influencing factors. The objectives are to provide additional appropriate guidance in mental health for university students with different demographic characteristics. A cross-sectional study of 6,032 university students nationwide was conducted from October 2020 to January (...) 2021. A randomized whole-group sampling method was used to select the study participants, and the 21-item Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale was used. P < 0.05 in the final model were considered statistically significant. The number of university students with no complain of depression, anxiety, or stress was 3,751. The odds of developing complain of depression were higher amongst anxious respondents and senior year than their counterparts. Students with “myopia” were 1.263 times more likely to be anxious. In terms of “impaired” or not, impaired is defined as any injury, such as sprain, strain, and fracture, “impaired” university students were 1.321 times more likely to be anxious. Furthermore, history of impairment and myopia increased the odds of stress by 1.305 and 1.305, respectively. Myopia, physical-activity-related injury and irrational eating habits are risk factors for complain of anxiety and stress. Males, upper grades, low parental education, and irrational eating habits are risk factors for complain of depression. Low physical activity levels are also an influential factor for complain of depression. DASS consists of interchangeable risk factors and multiple complains of DASS may coexist. (shrink)

This paper explores the constructed nature of legal complaints through the adoption of a socio-linguistic model with an emphasis upon pragmatics and elements of conversation analysis. When making a legal complaint, we posit that there is a conflict between effective communication and the uptake of politeness strategies. Furthermore, how complaints are ‘worked up’ in situ is a product of the arena in which such complaints are made. Through a textual analysis of the methods of complaining adopted by those who (...) make representations to the licensing authority, for the purposes of objecting to a licence application, we show the tension between making oneself clear and being polite, and how complaints in different settings take different forms. We conclude by exploring the implications of our findings for legal processes—is it reasonable, for instance, to talk of ‘consistency’ in testimony if each complaint is worked up in situ—and for pragmatic theory more generally, i.e the applicability of Brown and Levinson’s politeness model for legal processes. (shrink)

Constitutivists about moral norms are often suspected of providing an overly “self-centered” account of morality which does not take seriously enough morality’s interpersonal nature. This worry see...

The complex triadic relationships among consumers, providers, and platforms in the sharing economy have led to increasing conflicts in the interactions between the actors involved, especially when it comes to unethical behavior, such as rule breaking by consumers. This paper examines consumer misbehavior from the perspective of their peers, i.e., service providers. In two studies (an experiment and a survey, combined N = 452), we observe a significant positive effect of ethical climate and a significant negative effect of trust in (...) consumers on providers' strictness of ethical judgments of consumer misbehavior and through this on negative word of mouth. Further, the survey results show that the relationship between the strictness of ethical judgments and negative word of mouth is only significant for providers with low or medium levels of trust in the platform. The results highlight the importance of regulating consumer misbehavior in the sharing economy. (shrink)

This chapter presents findings from qualitative research into how fiction writers make a living in the UK. In particular, it focuses on how a number of aspects of making a living from writing combine to silence writers as cultural workers. There is a growing body of knowledge around what we might term media and cultural work, which highlights issues of precarity and structural inequality. This new research finds that writing is a precarious way to make a living and supports survey (...) findings on writers receiving low incomes. This chapter argues that writers as workers suffer from a lack of agency over career planning and are devalued by a publishing industry which produces them as voiceless and grateful providers of literary content for profit-making. In addition, it argues that writers’ own perceptions of writing as not-work, and the discourses of love and luck they employ when thinking and talking about writing, function in complex ways to position them in enchanted spaces which, nevertheless, exclude the possibility of complaint. In these ways, writers as workers lack both individual and collective voices.This chapter draws on ideas of passionate work and explores how fiction writers in the UK are, despite giving voice to others in their work, lacking a voice as cultural workers. (shrink)

Fear of public disclosure that will add to the humiliation of rape or other sexual assault is real for victims. In discussing this issue, cases for concealment and for disclosure are examined and suggestions are made for determining whether to publish names of victims.

Sexual assault leaves the victims with unbearable emotional pain from the experience. The unwanted aggression against their freewill causes them to suffer physically and mentally. On top of that, they also have to fight to be treated fairly and respectfully during their court trials. There has been some controversy regarding rape prosecution in the Islamic legal system. The reason for this controversy is that the rape victim would usually be either charged with zina because of her confession, or committing qadhf, (...) as a result of her failure to provide four male eyewitnesses. This paper aims at investigating the fundamental legal rights of rape victims who complain of being raped, to be defended fairly, and to get exemption from punishment as provided in Islamic law. This paper also seeks to investigate the admissibility of the individual testimony of the victim against the rapist. This paper suggests that proving rape is not similar to proving zina, because a rape victim who lodges a report or complains of her ordeal of being raped should not be treated the same as a person who confesses to zina. Proving rape is also different from accusing the rapist with committing zina. This study will explore opinions and arguments of classical Muslim scholars of Islamic jurisprudence from various schools of thought. (shrink)

After 50 years of institutional history in Canada, the focus of ombuds has shifted from resolving individual complaints to improving the quality of government services for all. New tools in the ombuds world enabled the conceptualization and promotion of administrative fairness. Ombuds’ acquired expertise, which, shared with government, improved the delivery of services. Public systemic investigations are now seen as the ultimate expression of ombuds effectiveness. Consistent dialogue with public servants and organisational administrators inevitably links ombuds to policy networks. While (...) informal links to policy networks can help ombuds resolve cases, they can also inadvertently create distance between ombuds and complainants. A former ombuds officer at Columbia University, Marsha Wagner emphasizes the importance of identifying systemic issues in ombuds practice, i.e., ombuds who do not focus on systemic issues may be derided as “wannabes”. This article suggests the pendulum has swung too far from the individual complainant to a systemic focus and urges caution in contemporary ombudship. (shrink)

This book draws on qualitative analysis of transcripts from Australian rape trials to explain why 50 years of ‘progressive’ law reforms have failed to remove rape myths from the courtroom or reduce intense scrutiny of the complainant’s credibility. After analysing tens of thousands of pages of transcripts from NSW and Victorian trials, the authors show that complainants in rape trials are still routinely accused of lying. They are still interrogated about their failure to behave in the manner expected of a (...) ‘genuine’ victim of sexual violence. The problem is not so much one of reform implementation, or imperfect translation to practice, but that statutory reform has never seriously attempted to prevent lawyers from engaging rape myths in the courtroom. Cross-examination continues to pursue traditional rape myth-inspired lines of questioning because the rules allow them to do so. Law-makers have never seriously attempted to eradicate rape myth engagement and victim-survivor character assassination. Favoured tools for ‘modernizing’ rape trials—such as rich and complex statutory definitions of consent and non-consent, and educative jury directions—do not address the practices that cry out for transformation, such as rape-myth inspired lines of cross-examination. The book concludes that if the criminal justice system is to have any hope of providing justice to victim-survivors of sexual violence, the parameters of law reform need to be widened. A key priority is to address the capacious concept of ‘relevant’ evidence, which is the gate through which rape myths flood into the courtroom. (shrink)

"Everyone complains about what is lost in translations. This is the first account I have seen of the potentially positive impact of translation, that it represents... a genuinely new contribution." —Drew A. Hyland In his original philosophical exploration of translation, John Sallis shows that translating is much more than a matter of transposing one language into another. At the very heart of language, translation is operative throughout human thought and experience. Sallis approaches translation from four directions: from the dream of (...) nontranslation, or universal translatability; through a scene of translation staged by Shakespeare, in which the entire range of senses of translation is played out; through the question of the force of words; and from the representation of untranslatability in painting and music. Drawing on Jakobson, Gadamer, Benjamin, and Derrida, Sallis shows how the classical concept of translation has undergone mutation and deconstruction. (shrink)

Melnyk complains that my account of the way reasons explain behaviour cannot be extended to cover novel behaviours. I admit that I did not extend it, but deny that it is not extendible. This, indeed, is what Chapter 6 of Dretske (1988) was all about. Noordhof finds faults with my account and claims there is another account (partial supervenience) that does a better job. I acknowledge one of the defects—a defect I was aware of when I wrote the book‐but deny (...) that the partial supervenience of content on intrinsic properties represents a better theory of the explanatory role of content. (shrink)

This chapter argues in favour of three interrelated points. First, I argue that demonstration (as expression of scientific knowledge) is fundamentally defined as knowledge of the appropriate cause for a given explanandum: to have scientific knowledge of the explanandum is to explain it through its fully appropriate cause. Secondly, I stress that Aristotle’s notion of cause has a “triadic” structure, which fundamentally depends on the predicative formulation (or “regimentation”) of the explanandum. Thirdly, I argue that what has motivated Aristotle to (...) choose the syllogism as a demonstrative tool was precisely the fact that syllogisms are apt to express causal relations in their triadic structure. Instead of complaining against Aristotle’s preference for the syllogisms as demonstrative tools, I argue that Aristotle was fully aware of the advantages of regimenting the explanandum into a predication. One of these advantages is to abandon a purely extensional standpoint and to highlight the importance of the notion of relevancy in explanation. (shrink)

This paper is a satire of the response document submitted when a paper needs revisions. It expresses the perspective of a disgruntled author, who, instead of actually discussing the reviewers’ comments, gets sidetracked into complaining about the role of the peer reviewer. Through a discussion of the goals of philosophical research, it defends the claim that philosophers should be allowed to charter their own course and develop theories that appease their intellectual tastes. Yet, peer reviewers often insert their own (...) tastes when reviewing a manuscript. As a result, too many papers end up getting rejected. (shrink)

In earlier contributions, I have drawn attention to how some people teach their children: do your best in the sport competition and if you lose, that’s life. But other people teach their children something else: if the opponent is overwhelmingly likely to win, do the minimum. I think this is a different social class perhaps, sometimes anyway. I have come upon a R.K. Narayan story in which a boy is being encouraged to complain not necessarily when a person merits complaint (...) but whenever complaining best serves one’s ends: rational actor complaints; economics as rational strategy. I present a discussion of the story as a dialogue, with a character called JKURT. Apologies PhilPapers, I have been doing well and I feel this material is IMPORTANT. (shrink)

In the past few years, scholars have been questioning whether the current approach in data ethics based on the higher level case studies and general principles is effective. In particular, some have been complaining that such an approach to ethics is difficult to be applied and to be taught in the context of data science. In response to these concerns, there have been discussions about how ethics should be “embedded” in the practice of data science, in the sense of (...) showing how ethical issues emerge in small technical choices made by data scientists in their day-to-day activities, and how such an approach can be used to teach data ethics. However, a precise description of how such proposals have to be theoretically conceived and could be operationalized has been lacking. In this article, we propose a full-fledged characterization of ‘embedding’ ethics, and how this can be applied especially to the problem of teaching data science ethics. Using the emerging model of ‘microethics’, we propose a way of teaching daily responsibility in digital activities that is connected to the higher level ethical challenges discussed in digital/data ethics. We ground this microethical approach into a virtue theory framework, by stressing that the goal of a microethics is to foster the cultivation of moral virtues. After delineating this approach of embedding ethics in theoretical detail, this article discusses a concrete example of how such a ‘micro-virtue ethics’ approach could be practically taught to data science students. (shrink)

Kripke complained that counterpart theory makes modal claims be about counterparts and not about us, and that it is a misguided model of modality since we do not care about counterparts in the same way we care about ourselves. The first part of the complaint, I argue, has been met by Hazen and Lewis, while the second can be countered by observing that most of our modal concerns are about role‐fillers and that counterparts are well‐suited to such concerns. The role‐filler (...) analysis of modal concerns, however, does not seem to capture certain attitudes ‐ especially that of regret. Regret, however, I will argue, is not intrinsically modal and thus is no challenge to my general analysis of modal concerns. (shrink)

Kierkegaard complained that Hegel’s system, for all its pretensions to completeness, was lacking an ethics. Even readers more sympathetic to Hegel have often agreed with this, saying that Hegel intended to replace ethics with some form of empirical social science.

Deianira complains that Hercules, as a slave of Omphale, did not refrain from telling to the Lydian queen his famous labours; among them, the Hydra: quaeque redundabat fecundo vulnere serpens fertilis et damnis dives ab ipsa suis ‘It will be admitted that redundabat, which usually means to “overflow”’ can only be applied to the Hydra by a very strong metaphor; but it is not only a strong one, it is quite unexampled: so A. Palmer in The Academy 49, 160. But (...) his own emendation rebellabat has not convinced anybody – rightly, as I think. Still, his remark was not otiose: redundabat refers to the ‘growing again’ of Hydra's heads, that seem to ‘spring’ from the wounds like water's spurts; it is not impossible, but nevertheless it is strange. Why does Ovid use this metaphor ‘a fluctibus desumpta’ here? I suggest that there is a precise reason: Ovid does not mention the name of the serpens, but of course his reader knows it and also knows why the Hydra is so called: πò τν δτων. (shrink)

Seneca complained that philosophy had become philology. In the inaugural conference which signs his entry into the profession of philologist in 1869, Nietzsche claims that philology becomes philosophy. In the inversion of a gesture as old as the invention of the scholarly philology, the German philosopher, who still was a young teacher of 24 years at the University of Basel, criticizes both philosophy and philology. But unlike Seneca, he maintains philology in its rights, and will claim it as a necessary (...) “art of reading” until the end of his work. (shrink)

Patients suffering from depersonalization complain of feeling detached from their body, their mental states, and actions or even from themselves. In this chapter, I argue that depersonalization consists in the lack of a phenomenal feature that marks my experiences as mine, which is usually called “mineness,” and that the study of depersonalization constitutes a neglected yet incomparable probe to assess empirically the scope, role, and even the nature of mineness. Here is how I will proceed. After describing depersonalization (§2) and (...) arguing that it involves a lack of mineness (§3) I will confront a series of objections (§4). I will then spell out what depersonalization can teach us about the scope of mineness (§5), about its role and psychological function (§6) and even about its nature (§7). (shrink)

I respond to some questions raised by Frances Kamm with respect to my book Rights and Demands (2018). The book focuses on demand-rights and asks how we accrue them. In other words, how does one accrue the standing to demand an action of someone or rebuke them for non-performance? My response to Kamm emphasizes how I understand “directed duties” in this context. Contrary to the standard practice of rights theorists, I do not start from the assumption that directed duties are (...) constituted by “plain” duties in the context of other factors (about which rights theorists disagree). Rather, I understand my duty to you as the correlative and equivalent of your standing to demand the action in question. I offer a number of further clarifications and conclude by distinguishing the targets of my discussion from other phenomena of interest to moral philosophers, such as complaining and blaming. (shrink)

In a feature article in the Journal of Medical Ethics entitled ‘Where is knowledge from the global South? An account of epistemic justice for a global bioethics’,1 Pratt and de Vries give a highly persuasive account of global injustices within global bioethics especially health ethics against the global South that every bioethicist needs to read and to reflect on. The opening three sentences of the abstract of this account capture the ethical essence of the whole article. > The silencing of (...) the epistemologies, theories, principles, values, concepts and experiences of the global South, constitutes a particularly egregious epistemic injustice in bioethics. Our shared responsibility to rectify that injustice should be at the top of the ethics agenda. That it is not, or only is in part, is deeply problematic, and endangers the credibility of the entire field.1 It is quite significant that both authors of this article are scholars of the global North with research interest in the global South; so where are the scholars of the global South, the putative conceptualisers and creators of global South knowledge who should be complaining about the injustice in question? The answer to this question is part and parcel of the question itself that has been so boldly raised by Pratt and de Vries. They go on to describe in some detail the general conditions and requirements of epistemic justice for global health ethics and bioethics including even a consideration …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle On MetaphorJohn T. KirbyMuch Madness is divinest Sense—To a discerning Eye——Emily DickinsonOurs is an age of metaphor. Wayne Booth, in his inimitable fashion, remarks,There were no conferences on metaphor, ever, in any culture, until our own century was already middle–aged. As late as 1927, John Middleton Murry, complaining about the superficiality of most discussions of metaphor, could say, "There are not many of them."... Explicit discussions of (...) something called metaphor have multiplied astronomically in the past fifty years.... students of metaphor have positively pullulated.1In the postmodern era philosophers of language, particularly those outside the analytic tradition, tend to think more and more in terms of all language as being metaphorical. This trend, however, is not a new one; it seems to have its roots back as far as Heraclitus, and, in the modern world, was certainly espoused by Giambattista Vico in his Nuova Scienza (1725). What we may call the Viconian tradition was embraced on the continent by Nietzsche, and, in the Anglo–American world, by Ivor Richards.2 Nietzsche's thought had far–reaching consequences in terms of its influence on the work of Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida, who in the late 1960s and the 1970s found themselves in the center of a vortex of controversy over the notion of "deconstruction," and its interrogation not only of Western metaphysics but also of human language and thought generally. Now, it seemed, such simple formulae as "This X is Y" called into question the whole process of naming and predication. But even among those for whom this is an unconvincing position, the problem of metaphor continues to be a fascinating one. How to define [End Page 517] it? What are its uses? What is its relation to literal, or nonfigured, language? And what its relation to human cognition?3Booth goes on to say, "there have been many more discussions of what people from the Greek philosophers on called metaphor than any bibliography could show."4 That being so, a sustained study of Aristotle's concept of metaphor needs no further justification, since it is to him that we owe the terms in which the debate was framed for many hundreds of years. Indeed, here as often, even those who wish to propose new or different parameters for the analysis of metaphor must do so against the grain of the Aristotelian tradition.5 This, if nothing else, is a measure of the tremendous influence Aristotle has had on the history of Western rhetoric and poetics.As on many other topics, it is now fashionable to condescend to Aristotle for the limitations of his study of metaphor, or—more aggressively still—to find fault with its parameters. Certainly he did not preempt any further discussion on the issue; nor, I imagine, would he have wanted to. But I surmise that there is more to be learned from an appreciative study of his methods here than one might initially suppose. In this study, then, after a few remarks on recent studies of metaphor, I propose to examine the state of the question before Aristotle, and then [End Page 518] to look at what he has to say about metaphor in the Poetics and Rhetoric.In their attempts to cope with the notion of language generally, and specifically with the questions of literal versus figurative language, scholars over the last hundred years or so have themselves appropriated a number of metaphors purporting to describe the phenomenon. These include (above all) models based on comparison and interaction. The comparison model, it is typically said, conforms more to the classical approach to metaphor, whereas those based on interaction stem primarily from the work of Richards and Black.6 Indeed it is from this notion of interaction that the terms "tenor" and "vehicle" were born, the former referring to the underlying idea that is illustrated or illuminated by the latter, which is "applied" to it; and Richards is right both to point out [1] that the word "metaphor" is sometimes used to signify what he means by "vehicle," and sometimes to mean the symbiosis resulting from the conjunction of tenor and vehicle, and [2] that... (shrink)

During the last 25 years, rape law has undergone a profound transformation, as the articles in this symposium clearly show. To mention just three of the more striking doctrinal reformations: All states have repealed the most egregious aspects of die marital rape exception; most have abandoned the “utmost resistance” requirement; and all have enacted rape shield laws to protect complaining witnesses from intrusive inquiries into their sexual history. All three reforms were the product of feminist agitation, all three were (...) aimed toward the general end of redirecting rape law toward the protection of women's, rather than men's, interests, and all three did, to some degree, broaden and democratize the scope of the law's protection: Wives, prostitutes, promiscuous girls, and women not inclined to risk their deaths by fighting off their rapists “to the utmost” are now protected by the law of rape against sexual assault, at least in theory, and at least to the same degree as non-wives and non-prostitutes, fighters, and virgins. All of this, virtually every contributor to this symposium agrees, is very much to the good. (shrink)

In this research, we evaluate the response of Brazilian consumers to corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives accompanied by a price increase. We demonstrate that the extent to which Brazilian consumers perceive a company to be socially responsible (i.e., their CSR perceptions) is related to both the basic transactional outcome of purchase intentions as well as two relational outcomes: the likelihood to switch to a competitor and to complain about the CSR-based price increase. More interestingly, we find that these relationships are (...) jointly mediated by the consumers’ perceptions of price fairness and feelings of personal satisfaction. Perhaps most interesting, we find that these mediating effects vary with consumer purchasing power; the mediating effect of price fairness on purchase intention is stronger for lower income than for higher income consumers, whereas the mediating effects of personal satisfaction on switching and complaining intentions are stronger for higher income than for lower income consumers. (shrink)

Critics have long complained that naive realism cannot adequately account for perceptual illusion. This complaint has a tendency to ally itself with the aspersion that naive realism is hopelessly out of touch with vision science. Here I offer a partial reply to both complaint and aspersion. I do so by showing how careful reflection on a simple, empirically grounded model of illusion reveals heterodox ways of thinking about familiar illusions which are quite congenial to the naive realist.

She was lying in the bed: had been lying there for some time, had indeed lost track of time, just lying there observing the progress of shadows across the wall, up the wall actually and then across the ceiling; watching the way the sheer white curtain, lifted every now and then by a sneaking finger of breeze, exposed brief glimpses of outside. Since she, narcotized, lacked the will to look at the clock (though she could hear it, very close by: (...) its relentless accusatory ticking), the room for her with its very white walls and very sharp corners, its terrain of familiar landmarks—the mirror; the walnut bureau, on which lay scattered the hairbrush in which a dark twist of hair was caught, the little yellow jewelry box with its peculiar surface like granulated sugar, decorated with small seashells, the book lying spread-eagled, open to page 119, the small lamp, its stiff, frilly shade with the plastic wrap still on; then too the wooden chair upon which she had thrown, possibly carelessly, expecting but then unable to hang up the following day, as was her usual habit, the blue shirt, the black slacks, and the taupe brassiere she had worn the last time she went out; the closet door, slightly ajar, with its glass knob glittering gemlike at certain times, when the beam struck it—this museum as it were of her last day before the pain began—had become for her a sundial upon which, as the shadows crept across, she read or rather inferred the passing of the day. Though she was not sure how long she had been lying there—how many days, in the bed. She had tried to count the days on the nubbles of the white bedspread or else tried to read the nubbles with her fingertips like braille or feel them like a sort of impasto forming pictures or patterns, fields forests mountain ranges, a long tapestry unwinding, but she was always losing her place, starting over without realizing she had started over. On the table beside the bed was the importuning clock, the glass of water, the empty bowl slick with the remains of the soup, another frilly lamp preserved in plastic, the bottle of pills, the framed black-and-white photo of a smiling white poodle in whose obsidian eyes the image of the photographer was reflected... and another, of a young woman in tennis shorts and a sweater, perched on the top rung of a wooden fence or gate, smiling, chest thrust preeningly forward: it may have been herself, in a past life, or it may not have been... the resemblance between the woman in the bed and the woman in the photo was uncertain... and at any rate she in the bed seldom looked at these objects, or, if she did, forgot them immediately and had to learn of them again. She was propped up on pillows, her long dark hair spread around in loops and glissandos: these she felt or rather intuited but had not seen in several days. Nor had she seen the neatly stitched incision or the disconcertingly stained bandage covering it: preferred not to: but nonetheless could not un-know that her chest had become a cage in which pain lived, if unseen. If she lay very still she might not feel it, or only in a small way: and she did lie still. Possibly she had just awakened: she had a sense of emerging from something, of rising up as if from underwater, her awareness enlarging beyond the ticking of the clock to the frisking curtain, the window with its square of light, the room her sundial, then to the house sensed but unseen around and beneath her, its uneasy inanimate creaks and shiftings, an echo suggesting size, distance, emptiness, but then too certain other, volitional sounds coming up from downstairs—footsteps, a cabinet opening and closing, a drawer pulled out on its runners, as if from a great, echoing distance. Who, she wondered, who...? But could not know. Outside the window a bird was singing, a car was passing in the street... And now certainly she was indeed awake, but all the same the decision was not volitional, possibly there was no decision at all, instead rather suddenly and unaccountably she found herself trying to rise, trying to get out of the bed despite the insistent pain and despite the great weight of her limbs, of each limb individually and of all four limbs collectively; she could not, she found, sit up in the bed where she had lain for who knew how many days now, but rather could only, like a turtle on its round hard back, attempt to roll, to swing herself, leveraging the great unaccountable weight of her legs, up onto the edge of the bed and off it. In her chest there was something like the grip of a hand or of a clamp that somebody had left inside her. Nonetheless, her robe. And now entering the long hallway, doors opening off either side, she could hear, from very far away, a small tinny buzzing that she recognized as music though without discerning, for she could not discern, either the voice or the tune: it was rather a small thread that she followed along the hall, where nobody was, to the staircase of dark wood which she began to descend, slowly and bent over from the pain and the weight and the great effort involved in moving these limbs which had at one time surely belonged to her but which seemed now to be somebody else's, so awkward were they, so unwilling. Though surely she too, once upon a time, had danced... Down and down she went, around the several turnings of the staircase (certainly it was farther than she remembered), passing, on one landing, a large framed photographic close-up of a golden cock-of-the-rock, with its resplendent crest like a half-wedge of orange, and a dark, bellicose eye... on the next landing, the photo of a girl in a little sealskin cap and tippet, hands hidden in a matching muff... on the next landing, in a recessed niche, a plaster bust of Queen Victoria with a chip out of the nose and several curls missing off the back of the head. Though the cock-of-the-rock reminded her of something (she wasn't sure what), she was sure she had seen none of these objects before... Nor had the staircase ever seemed so wide, so deep, so dark. Is this, she wondered, descending, really Ma's house? She clung to the fraying thread of music that was leading her down, emerging at last like a ghost into what was certainly Ma's capacious kitchen. A dark-haired woman uncannily like herself sat at the table barefoot, swinging her leg rhythmically to the music issuing from the transistor radio on the counter while sipping a glass of something yellow on ice and paging absorbedly through a Life magazine. At her elbow sat a bottle of golden liqueur in which a mysterious object—a bit of flowering branch, an antler of coral, possibly the efflorescent finger of a saint—was floating; on the cover of the magazine a model in a crescent hat gazed provocatively, while holding out her hands to display, on the right hand, a white glove with black polka dots, and on the left hand, a black glove with white stripes. Above the model's shoulder a caption read: News In Gloves.The sick woman hovered on the threshold; her doppelganger at the table did not look up, but, fully absorbed, continued obliviously paging and sipping.Maybe, thought the other, amazed, I really am invisible—The tableau persisted, until at last somebody (it was unclear who) said, I don't know how you can drink that stuff—Now the woman at the table did look up, jumped up in fact, dropping the magazine and crying, Rose! What are you doing down here? You shouldn't be out of bed, you silly!She flung herself at her sister, waving her hands and making small, solicitous noises and appearances of kissing.Ma'll never forgive you, the other said calmy, for breaking into her special bottle—Rose regarded the vessel, along with its enigmatic contents: then suddenly felt that the mysterious branch or wand or finger in the bottle had gotten lodged inside her, somewhere beneath her right breast; it was rotating, playing her ribcage like a harp.Oh Rose! cried the sister in a tone of anguish, who cares what Ma says! You need to go back to bed—let me help you—I'm all right Lucy! I'm all right! Though blanching slightly.Here, let me—Lucy took Rose around the waist and began to lead, or rather pilot, but instead of taking her up the stairs, was ushering her down.Lucy, what are you doing? It's so dark down here I can't see a thing—clinging tight, however, as they descended into what must have been the basement: though it could not be seen, but only smelled and heard. The mildew was characteristic, as was the aroma of fermenting apples. There was as well a soft, subtle scurrying, suggestive of unseen, inhabited corners.Subtly Lucy withdrew: Rose felt herself hovering, blind, above an abyss.The patient thrashed, panicking.I can't see! I can't see!Oh Rose! said Lucy, somewhat fed up. Just open your eyes then!The woman in the bed did: and found herself propped on pillows, her sister Lucy leaning over her with a spoonful of broth. The room was very bright; somewhere a bird was singing, or shouting, loudly.Oh Micheletto! Shut up Micheletto! You're bothering Rose! said Lucy crossly: but the canary, undaunted, continued its racket, leaping from perch to perch, hanging upside down from a bell, committing wild acrobatics on the swing, and regarding the patient, from behind the bars of its prison, with a darkly defiant jujube eye.I don't know how you can stand having him in here, Rose. He's so noisy.I like him.But not the soup evidently, from which the patient shrank with a scowl. Sister and spoon therefore subsided, one into a chair, the other into a bowl.I could take him out of here, if he's bothering you.No.The woman in the bed shut her eyes, easing back, if not disappearing, into the trailing vinelike thicket of her hair: turning inward, perhaps, to attend to the branch or wand or finger that was still plucking at her ribcage, playing a music more compelling even than that of Micheletto the canary. This, though, the sister could not allow.Joey called, Rose. Did you hear me? Joey called. He's so worried about you.Joey? A green glimmer between dark lashes.Don't tell me you've forgotten Joey!Lucy gestured to the photo on the bedside table, which was no longer that of a poodle but was, rather, of a curly-haired young man with a long, somewhat sanctimonious nose. If she was disappointed by the transformation, Rose was careful to conceal it.Course not. Don't be silly. How could I forget Joey?The patient spoke softly, slurring: that was the narcotic.He's awfully worried about you, Rose.Suddenly Lucy began to giggle. Rose, peering out from behind her thicket, saw her sister perched forward in her chair.D'you remember, Rose? You were so sick you threw up in the back seat of the convertible. Snickering now.I did not.You did.I didn't.Though in fact that night, with its wild ride of pain, was a blur to Rose: she recalled, vaguely, parking on the bluffs, seeing the lights of the town below, a smeared fistful of rhinestones flung at random along the silvery-black thread of the river: Joey, easing his arm around her shoulders: and the first mild, then abruptly definitive jabs just below and to the right of the breastbone... But then too, she thought she remembered gazing into the dark, empathetic eyes of a poodle... This, though comforting, was difficult to understand.Joey's been wonderful about it. He's not mad at all. Apparently the upholstery cleaned up great. He had the entire car detailed too. He said he's going to visit later. Isn't that nice? Isn't it? Rose, did you hear me?But the patient, lowering pale lids, had disappeared again.Rose? Rose?Yes Lucy, resurfacing, I heard you. ’S nice. But wondered whether her sister had always been so annoying. It was difficult to give this question the attention it deserved because of the ragged strumming, rising almost to the level of a pain, from somewhere deep inside, just beneath her right breast. So absorbing was this internal music that Rose found she could not resist the urge to sing along... which she did do, for an unknowable, perhaps immeasurable, period of time.Rose, the sister was saying, Rose. I think it's time for your pill.Lucy was leaning over her again, brow creased, this time with the pill in her hand, and the glass of water in which, somehow, certain stars had been contained: Rose consumed these along with the medicine.Now, Lucy said, I'll let you sleep. Hush! Micheletto! Hush! Rose is sleeping!But the canary, rocketing crazily, continued.Later, when Rose woke (or so it seemed), the sun had shifted considerably, the shadows moving around the sundial, or room, in such a manner that certain things loomed larger than they had before: the crucifix on the wall for example, and the little box on the bureau, the hairbrush with the curls of hair caught in it, the lampshade, the wooden chair in which Lucy was no longer sitting all cast monstrous elongated shadows, as if implying some significance they did not have. The white curtains, on the other hand, hung quite still now on the open window. Rose emerged slowly from a dream in which she and her sister were acting in a play Joey had written: they were seated side by side on stage, on a green velour couch, and Lucy, turning toward her, had very sincerely said, What's the pup, Rose? What's the pup? which made no sense at all: maybe Rose had misheard: in the dream she replied, over and over, What's the what? What's the what?, growing more and more annoyed, to which Lucy answered, every time, What's the pup? until at last Rose awakened very cross. And now she lay, propped on pillows, becoming aware once more of the pain she had forgotten while dreaming, and of Micheletto's song. What's the what? thought Rose, what's the what? Until suddenly she realized she was saying it out loud. And then at last the dream truly fell away, and she realized her pain felt very near, but that Micheletto's singing had grown very distant: no matter how she squinted she could not see the canary in his cage, though she could hear the distant singing: until at last she realized that the cage was empty, and that Micheletto was singing from somewhere else. Lucy must have taken Micheletto away, Rose thought, bitterly. She wanted to do something about it, get Micheletto back, he was her friend, her only friend, but she didn't do anything; she lay perfectly still, listening to the familiar fugues and arias, which were emanating, it seemed, from some other room, or other dimension: as if Micheletto had become a ghost, or phantasm. I can hear you, Micheletto, she thought, or said, but I can't see you... In response (if it was a response), the song, with its characteristic trills and arabesques, seemed to draw nearer, though a barrier remained, the voice sounded muffled, as if Micheletto were smothered under a bolster, or stuffed in a sack. Rose's eyes probed the room, rummaged the corners, explored the elongated and vaguely palpitating shadows, searching for Micheletto, though her body remained motionless, paralyzed, as if still dreaming. Micheletto, where are you? Rose sang, or said, to herself, or to the room: this was unclear, though the reply when it came was startlingly distinct, a spirited coloratura pronounced right at her elbow, or so it seemed: though Micheletto himself, as a small, yellow, feathered entity, continued imperceptible. Rose lay rigid like a mummy, wrapped in sheets, propped on pillows, anointed with juniper, sealed with beeswax... I too am an artifact, she thought, of my former self... Micheletto however spoke back, with asperity, demanding some solution, some action on her part—I can't, Micheletto, she said, it's not possible—taking in with desperate eyes the room around her, lingering especially over the crucifix with its gargantuan shadow, the glass of water on the bedside table whose stars she had consumed (she could feel them now, sparking inside her, the sharp edges lodged beneath her sternum), the photo of the white poodle, with its gentle dark eyes and sympathetic smile: none of these however offering any help, or advice... I'm sorry, Micheletto, I can't—The bird, however, was inexorable.Therefore Rose as she had done earlier rolled herself to the edge of the bed, using the weight of her legs to lever herself up until she sat, curled wormlike but facing the window: through which she could see the canary perched outside, on the slope of the roof.Oh Micheletto!, said Rose, dismayed, how did you get out there?Certainly the canary did reply, but his words, conveyed in a series of runes, were eclipsed by a delivery truck passing in the street below.What, Micheletto? What the—what?She couldn't hear him, and maybe it didn't matter: out was out, after all: though the closed door of the cage and the firmly lowered window screen rendered the mode of escape enigmatic... possibly even supernatural... Unless Lucy, Rose thought, conjuring an image, masticating upon it in her mind with the satisfaction that comes of blaming, till at last she struck the gristle: which was, why would Lucy? Since Lucy also loved Micheletto... And anyway what mattered now was not the escape, but the rescue... Micheletto, outside the window, made further cryptic remarks conveying urgency, possibly even gruff impatience.All right, all right—Sinking down slowly tentatively painstakingly from the edge of the bed to the floor Rose inched on her buttocks to the window and with some effort and tugging of incision managed to raise the screen, allowing into the bedroom a greater blueness, along with several mosquitoes. Inside her chest the wand of coral was cryptically turning, though what she felt was not exactly pain: and as for the disconcertingly stained bandage, of this she continued willfully unaware.Micheletto! Micheletto!The canary, bright on black shingles, cocked its head. There was a throb of a sort, Rose thought, in the bright black eye. But Micheletto did not come toward. She leaned out, to gesture.Here, Micheletto! Here!The small blond figure hopped along the ridgeline of the roof.Micheletto! Micheletto!Though the canary did not come, Rose suddenly found herself, or the upper half of herself at least, partially extended through the open window. If only I had a thistle to offer him, she thought, or some suet... But she had only herself, dangling, and, either in eagerness or desperation (this was unclear), extending further out and then down, palms first, onto the surprising rough warmth of the shingles.Micheletto! Micheletto!She could no longer see him, but took hope from a small, eager scrabbling in the gutter.Oh, Micheletto... Suddenly she found she was curled up right beside the dormer, on the black shingled slope of the roof. Looking down she could see the cracked concrete walk, and, in the sullen green shadow of the house, Ma's small garden, the tomatoes and zucchini quivering on their stakes, the brown pendulous faces of the sunflowers as they contrived, unsuccessfully, to look the other way. In the upstairs bathroom in the house next door, the neighbor Mrs. Benedetti, squatting in her housecoat of dusty rose pattern, gave a quick, scandalized look, and abruptly drew down the shade... Well, thought Rose, refusing to feel bad about it, you can't please everyone... Lulled by the warmth of the shingles, she had stretched out tentatively upon the somewhat tacky surface. It was impossible to lie comfortably on her right side—she had been wounded on the right side, damaged, something in her had been breached, she'd been ripped up, she couldn't remember how—or on her left either for that matter, because of the stars gyrating relentlessly inside her; nonetheless she did lie somehow, along the slope of the roof, with her head turned toward the gutter. Above her was a blue dome upon which a pink line of cloud languorously reclined: it was beautiful: but looking made her feel dizzy. Micheletto! Micheletto! she called. The response was not immediate, giving her time to notice, in the lee of the dormer, an abandoned hammer and a roll of tape evidently left behind by some workman, who knew when... Nobody cleans up anymore, thought Rose. Ma, she thought, wouldn't like it at all, if she knew. But Ma would never know, because she, Rose, would never tell her. Now resumed the scrabbling in the gutter. Micheletto! Is that you, Micheletto? Though there was no reply, the scrabbling went on, until, suddenly, a bright yellow head with a mischievous, berry-bright eye popped up out of the drainpipe. Micheletto looked in her direction and spoke with some severity... Well, it's not my fault, is it, Rose said, bitterly. Just look at all I've done for you already, all this for your sake—The bright eye bulged. There was a volley of expostulation.But I can't! Yes of course I love you, I just can't! It's... physically impossible! Her voice dropped to a whisper. I think there's something wrong with me, Micheletto... Then Rose fell silent. She had become confused, trying to remember what was wrong. Micheletto, while not unsympathetic, did not cease his complaining: the yellow head turned furiously round and round in the drainpipe, there was a sound of scrabbling feet as he espoused various arguments, interspersed with moments of fugue and passages of overripe bel canto. Rose lay back on the slope of the roof so that her long dark hair fell in rivulets over the gutter... If she stretched out her arm from there, she could almost, but not quite, reach the drainpipe.All right, she said somewhat feebly, I'll try—Meanwhile something was going on down below. There was a clamor of car doors and tires; somebody was speaking. Rose, Rose! What are you doing up there! Oh Rose! Joey, come quick—Rose is up on the roof!It was very silly of Lucy, Rose thought dreamily as she reached: certainly I'll wake up in bed in a minute. Leaning back, she saw the line of pink recumbent upon the cerulean dome of the sky: and heard, from somewhere in the distance, the sound of a poodle barking. (shrink)

In a large Colombian teaching hospital, a fifty-five-year-old woman complaining of stomach pain is examined by a foreign-exchange medical student from the United States. Speaking in Spanish, the student elicits a medical history that suggests a possible recurrence of gallstones, but nothing further. Upon discussing the patient's case in private with the attending physician, the student is shocked to learn that the patient is suffering from terminal, metastatic gastric cancer but is unaware of her diagnosis. The attending physician explains (...) that the patient's husband instructed the health care providers not to tell the patient what her diagnosis is. The medical student feels uncomfortable withholding the diagnosis from the patient. The thought of disclosure feels equally uncomfortable, however, as it would mean contradicting the instructions of the attending physician at the host hospital as well as violating what the student suspects, but is not sure, may be acceptable medical practice in Colombia. How should the medical student proceed? (shrink)

Few thinkers have enjoyed so pervasive an influence as Rousseau, who originated dissatisfaction with modernity. By exploring polarities articulated by Rousseau—nature versus society, self versus other, community versus individual, and compassion versus competitiveness—these fourteen original essays show how his thought continues to shape our ways of talking, feeling, thinking, and complaining. The volume begins by taking up a central theme noted by the late Allan Bloom—Rousseau's critique of the bourgeois as the dominant modern human type and as a being (...) fundamentally in contradiction, caught between the sentiments of nature and the demands of society. It then turns to Rousseau's crucial polarity of nature and society and to the later conceptions of history and culture it gave rise to. The third part surveys Rousseau's legacy in both domestic and international politics. Finally, the book examines Rousseau's contributions to the virtues that have become central to the current sensibility: community, sincerity, and compassion. Contributors include Allan Bloom, François Furet, Pierre Hassner, Christopher Kelly, Roger Masters, and Arthur Melzer. (shrink)

Philosophers who complain about the ‹demandingness’ of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ‹moral satisficing’ approach to determining when a morality is ‹demanding enough’, and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits.