This paper argues for a third kind of suspended belief. Two that have already been distinguished in the literature are positive suspension and negative suspension. The third kind that we describe is (what we call) aporetic suspension. All of these kinds of suspension count as suspended beliefs in the sense that they each share the same fundamental features of suspended belief—they are all a kind of neutral doxastic attitude. Yet, they are also unique in some important respects. Positive and negative (...) suspension can be distinguished along evidential lines. Positive suspension arises when one has (more or less) equally balanced evidence for a proposition; while negative suspension arises when one lacks evidence either for or against a proposition. Aporetic suspension, we argue, can be further distinguished from both positive and negative suspension in three important respects. According to (1) its evidential-input, (2) its functional-output, and (3) its phenomenal character. (shrink)

This article has two aims. The first is to open up a line of inquiry into whether epistemic and aesthetic values interact, at the most general level. Does an overall increase in epistemic or aesthetic value in the world have an effect on the alternative value? The second, and more specific, aim is to argue that yes, it does. In particular, I argue that an increase in epistemic value would result in a decrease in aesthetic value, across two important dimensions. (...) First, I argue that, if beliefs universally aligned with a commonly accepted epistemic principle—namely, doxastic correctness—then there would be less aesthetic diversity in the world. And second, I argue that, if beliefs universally aligned with doxastic correctness, then there would also be less overall aesthetic value in the world, at least in some important respects. (shrink)

Christine Atkinson; Beginning to Learn, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 69–76, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.