I will argue that understanding language is simply another form of sensory perception of the world. I have already argued that perception is a way of understanding natural signs or, better, of translating natural signs into intentional signs. So this will help pave the way to the view that understanding language is very much like understanding natural signs. A sign of a world affair that in turn signs a second world affair is itself a sign of that second affair ( (...) class='Hi'>Chapter Four). Similarly, if the second sign is a sign of a third --and so forth. And there is always a direct semantic mapping function from the first sign to the last affair signified. A certain sound may signify that the dehumidifier has come on when heard from our bedroom at home, and this in turn may signify that the local power failure is over (a frequently recurrent sign in the rural area where we live). In our summer cabin an indistinguishable sound may signify that the refrigerator has come on, in turn signifying that we are not yet out of propane. To interpret these signs, you must be sensitive to the sign domains they inhabit. But in this case, the domain in which the sound signals the dehumidifier and the domain in which the dehumidifier signals the power are the same. Likewise, the domain in which the sound signifies the refrigerator and the refrigerator signals a non-empty propane tank are the same. A child then might simply hear the dehumidifier sound as the sound of electric power coming on, not being aware that it is the dehumidifier that produces what she reads as a sound of electric power, or the child might hear the sound of the refrigerator directly as a sign of propane hence that we won't have to go to town today for gas. Similarly, suppose that certain patterns on the rabbit's retina are natural signs signifying presence of a fox and these patterns mediate between the fox and the rabbit's awareness of the fox. It will not be necessary that the rabbit possess an intentional representation of the retinal patterns in order to recognize the fox.. (shrink)

I further argue that we can make sense of. This requires a critique of nonsense, since, for reasons that I give, what replaces ‘x’ in the schema must be nonsense. I endorse an austere view of nonsense whereby there is nothing more to nonsense than sheer lack of sense, as in ‘phlump jing ux’. The point is this: because our ineffable knowledge is a mark of our finitude, and because we have a shared aspiration to transcend our finitude, we also (...) have a shared temptation to put our ineffable knowledge into words, which in turn gives us a shared sense of when a piece of nonsense is ‘apt’ to replace ‘x’ in the schema, where ‘aptness’ is a quasi‐aesthetic attribute. This is enough for instances of the schema to count as true or false—and, arguably, for ‘We are shown that transcendental idealism is true’ to count as true. (shrink)

Chapter 9 delivers a theory of what it means to achieve self-determination as a dependent, embedded unit. The chapter begins by assessing self-determination as non-domination and a modified version of self-determination as non-intervention. It argues that these accounts fail in instructive ways. In the rest of the chapter, Nine defends her theory of self-determination as functional autonomy. As an account of political self-determination, functional autonomy provides a semi-quantitative assessment framework for measuring a group’s capacity to complete (...) its functions autonomously. The framework entails two assessments. The first looks at the group’s capacity to complete functions, and the second looks at the available external relations and resources that help or hinder the group in the autonomous completion of those functions. When external resources, intervention, or relations are needed, this fact does not diminish the group’s self-determination, but rather informs the normative framework around those connections. (shrink)

This chapter establishes that the theory of foundational territories can protect the governmental systems of historical residents from being supplanted by newcomers. Because Nine’s view recognizes the inherent value of existing obligations, it incorporates backwards-looking considerations into what it means to respect the equal moral agency of persons. Obligations created prior to the arrival of newcomers continue to bind parties, and the newcomers have duties to try to avoid obstructing these obligations. Nine’s view has the tools to (...) demand an appropriate space for indigenous self-determination over territory, and it shows how cases of disrespect for their systems of governance are harmful. The last part of the chapter argues that historical reparations for colonial harms ought to be redressed by attending to structural and existential alienation. (shrink)

Chapter 6 argues that individuals have natural rights to access certain social relations and places. The central role that relationships play in individual autonomy justifies natural rights for individuals to continue to access specific social spheres and places. Nine contends that individuals draw on a variety of small, overlapping social spheres to develop their capacity for autonomous moral agency. Family, religion, profession, education, friendships, and political community all matter in Nine’s view. What’s more, diversity, change, and conflict (...) between social contexts contribute to our autonomous capacities to revise, to evaluate, and to choose between various life options. This view stands in contrast to identity-based accounts, like nationalism or cultural views like those defended by Will Kymlicka, where a significant group has the moral standing on its own to claim territorial rights. Instead, Nine’s view depends on diverse, multiple, overlapping, and conflicting social relations existing together. (shrink)

Chapter 7 identifies two problems with prevailing theories of self-determination and territorial rights. First, they fail to represent the political standing of small-scale groups in their overall account. Second, they face a boundary problem. The set of legitimate residents of territories and the set of persons who have a justified obligation to obey the territorial rule of law need to match. Unfortunately, these sets often do not match, and this throws up practical and normative obstacles. The chapter draws (...) three conclusions. First, theories should vary the justification for political obligations according to scale. Second, theories should develop a place-based account of political obligations. And third, theories ought to break down the right of collective self-determination into its component parts to analyse how political units at various scales may share the component rights. (shrink)

Chapter 3 introduces “foundational titles”. Foundational titles provide the geographical anchor from which territorial rights are built. The grounding rights of foundational titles will often be use-rights—liberties to access and to use things in the commons—and special claim rights to things while they are being used. Many agents can hold use-rights and other claims over the same resources, like fresh water in a river system, thus providing a consistent groundwork for justifying overlapping territorial rights. This chapter also defends (...) a Pufendorfian version of the basic needs proviso by discussing Robert Nozick’s water hole case. The proviso is triggered when persons cannot access the objects of their basic needs while at the same time respecting existing claims to those objects. (shrink)

The Introduction presents the “river model” for territorial rights theory. On the river model, groups with rights of self-determination over territory are interdependent and overlapping. If we imagine human settlements and territorial rights as established in river catchment areas—not on isolated islands—the primary features of group life are not independence and distinctness. Instead, groups are vitally connected to each other. Essentially, many mobile and flowing resources and resource systems are shared between groups, not divided cleanly between them. The Introduction presents (...) other key concepts in the book, such as “foundational titles” and “foundational territories”, and it provides a brief description of each chapter. (shrink)

Chapter 2 introduces and defends the normative framework used to ground arguments throughout the book. Nine’s theory grows from modern natural law, especially borrowed from Samuel Pufendorf. Chapter 2 defends the adoption of Pufendorf’s claim that the fundamental principle of natural law is to be sociable, to live in peaceful coexistence with others under conditions that respect the natural equality of persons. This chapter elaborates upon how this fundamental principle of natural law relates to specific rules (...) of natural law. It applies a rule-utilitarian method and derives the natural right to secure access to the objects of our basic needs from the principle of sociability. (shrink)

Chapter 8 defends the theory of foundational territories. It draws attention to the way that physical proximity often entails a kind of mutual obstruction. Residents in places of spatial integration—that entail entrenched and scaffolded mutual coordination—automatically become members of a political association tasked with coordinating local behaviour, just because of their location. This political obligation is necessary to meet the conditions of natural law. Because sharing space and resources in a place prohibits the fulfilment of obligations, people in that (...) place must abide by collective rules to (a) justify their actions that prevent others from fulfilling obligations, and (b) establish peaceful relations. River catchment areas and cities are archetypes of foundational territories. Chapter 8 also distinguishes three clusters of rights and obligations of self-determination. Foundational territories sit at the ground level. They constitute jurisdictional domains that cannot be divided, diminished, or extinguished by fiat. (shrink)

Chapter 5 argues that inhabitants have natural use-rights to their home as well as rights of residence in the wider area where they live. This chapter, which is grounded in extended mind theory, argues that central cognitive functions of autonomy are often embedded in the home environment. Use-rights to the home include claims against removal and the right to access and to use their home exclusively while the home serves its purpose for those persons. Nine’s theory does (...) not assume conformity in beliefs, values, or plans among the individuals who live in an area. This makes the right of residence in the home an essential foundational title for territorial rights. Arguments for rights of residence in regions, such as those from Margaret Moore and Anna Stilz, are sound but not inclusive enough to justify foundational titles. The right to reside in a region and the right to the home ought to support each other. (shrink)

This chapter demonstrates how resource rights can be shared by overlapping groups with territorial rights. The allocation of resource rights between groups will follow roughly the same principles as the allocation of jurisdictional rights and competencies argued for in Chapters 9 and 10. The allocation of resource rights between units should, first, support the functional autonomy of each unit, relative to its jurisdictional remit and competencies. Second, the allocation of resource rights between units should follow the narrow principle of (...) subsidiarity and the logic of achievement. The second half of the chapter argues that groups can legitimately acquire use-rights and property rights over resources, uniquely limited by the sustainability proviso. The final section introduces a warning against greedy takings that can be found in both Pufendorf’s and Locke’s work. (shrink)

This chapter applies the book’s theory of use-rights to resource domains that are sometimes argued to be part of the “global commons”. It resists the claim that _any_ resource—regardless of its legal status—of vital global importance ought to be under global control. In addition, it contends that the designation of a resource domain as a global commons does not morally prohibit its private acquisition. The chapter concludes that parts of Antarctica can be legitimately acquired and that forest carbon (...) sinks should not be brought under global control. Finally, it argues that territory and property rights to the Antarctic ice and to forest carbon sinks are constrained by the basic needs and sustainability provisos. In the case of forest carbon sinks, humanity must, where they can, compensate the territorial rights-holders for the costs of complying with this use-right to provide for humanity’s basic needs. (shrink)

Chapter 10 defends the narrow principle of subsidiarity applied to foundational territories embedded within higher-scale governments. It argues that both lower-scale foundational units and higher-scale political units like states or federal systems share metajurisdictional authority to determine which issues should fall under whose jurisdictional authority. In addition, foundational territorial units hold pre-emptive rights to control the jurisdictional issues and competencies over local issues that serve to protect the natural rights and obligations of their members. When mediation and negotiation between (...) metajurisdictional rights-holders are needed, it should be guided by narrow principles of subsidiarity and the logic of achievement. (shrink)

Nine’s theory of use-rights focuses on the physical act of incorporation. Multiple agents can claim use-rights to the same resource domain/system when the resources are physically incorporated into the way agents pursue plans or interests. Examples include using rivers for irrigation and the Antarctic ice sheet to regulate worldwide meteorological systems. The “enough and as good” proviso holds that legitimate acquisition of exclusive claims to resources requires compensating users who will no longer be able to use the required resources. (...) Where circumstances make this difficult or impossible, property rights can only be legitimate where users and property rights holders share a legitimate political jurisdiction. This version of the sustainability proviso is derived from the principle of sociability. A system of rights over resources must ensure sustainable management of ecosystems and resources to support the capacity of current or future generations to live together sociably in the area. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: A Story About Angie.