In the first part of this paper I critically examine some of the main interpretations of “classical” Yogācāra philosophy of Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Among these interpretations, based on extant textual and contextual data, I consider philologically unlikely both metaphysical-idealistic readings, which ascribe to these authors the view that ultimate reality is a mental or subjective stuff, and epistemological-idealistic readings which advocate that either Yogācāra suspends judgment on the existence of the extramental or that it maintains that the extramental exists (...) in itself and ultimately. Instead, I consider more likely the thesis that classical Yogācāra upholds an epistemological idealism that, while admitting epistemological priority of the mental over the extramental, rules out the ultimate existence of both the former and the latter. This exclusion, however, does not amount to the exclusion of every metaphysics, but rather to the adoption of a metaphysics of emptiness conceived, in fact, as absence of the mental/extramental dichotomy. In the second part of the paper this reading of classical Yogācāra is compared with the interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy that I elsewhere called “realistic antimetaphysical”, and I reach the conclusion that, while with respect to epistemology between early Madhyamaka and classical Yogācāra there is continuity, regarding metaphysics these two schools are deeply distinct and discontinuous: while Nāgārjuna conceives of emptiness as an extinction of any metaphysical view, Yogācāra emptiness actually presents itself as a metaphysical point of view. (shrink)

Nas primeiras duas seções deste artigo, apresento alguns dos argumentos que os filósofos budistas indianos Nāgārjuna (ca. séculos II-III) e Vasubandhu (ca. séculos IV-V) usam para mostrar a insustentabilidade lógica dos fenômenos, respectivamente, do movimento e da existência de objetos externos/extramentais. A lógica desses argumentos é comparável à lógica que Zenão de Eleia utiliza nos seus paradoxos contra o movimento e a multiplicidade – e, de fato, no interior dos estudos budológicos contemporâneos, essa comparação já foi sugerida. Na terceira seção, (...) entretanto, pretendo mostrar que os objetivos filosóficos mais imediatos desses três pensadores divergem e são inconciliáveis: enquanto Zenão critica o movimento e a multiplicidade para demonstrar a plausibilidade dos atributos da imobilidade e da univocidade do Ser parmenídico, os paradoxos de Nāgārjuna e Vasubandhu devem ser entendidos no âmbito de projetos filosóficos que, em continuidade com o ensinamento budiano do caminho do meio, pretendem ficar equidistantes das categorias do “ser” e do “não-ser”, evitando ambas. Finalmente, na quarta e última seção, defendo a tese de que os objetivos últimos dos Eleatas e aqueles dos dois filósofos budistas voltam a ser parecidos: Parmênides e o Buda, como também seus respectivos epígonos, buscam promover nos seus seguidores uma “revolução epistêmica” que consiste na passagem de uma visão ordinária da realidade a uma compreensão extraordinária ou suprema, coincidente com a realidade em si e, portanto, verdadeira em última análise. (shrink)

I argue against the dialetheist interpretation of Madhyamaka propounded by Garfield and Priest, in part on textual grounds, but also on the grounds that their reading completely misses the rhetorical strategy behind the use of contradictions for soteriological ends in the Indian Buddhist tradition.

In 1955, an obscure socio-spiritual organization dedicated to the twin aims of individual spiritual realization and social service was formed in the state of Bihar, India. It was named Ānanda Mārga Pracāraka Saṃgha (abbreviated AM), literally translated as "Community for the Propagation of the Path of Bliss." AM stands alongside other New Religious Movements of Indian origin that have captured the imagination and allegiance of a substantial number of followers in both Asia and the West. It is in much the (...) same genre as New Religious Movements such as Transcendental Meditation and the International Society for Kṛṣṇa Consciousness. The founder of AM was a charismatic spiritualist and visionary, Prabhāt Ranjan .. (shrink)

"In the Sanskrit name of The Diamond Sutra, vajrachedika, or 'diamond,' refers to the unbreakable foundation of self-nature inherent in the human mind; prajñā to the light of self-nature that ceaselessly surges forth from that foundation; and pāramitā to the recovery of the adamantine self-nature and actions based on that self-nature, by using its light to hone wisdom for the practice of a life without delusion." -- Back of book.

Review of the Mongolian Buddhist literature and terminologies.

The Therigatha is a collection of verses (gathas) traditionally ascribed to elder Buddhist nuns. This paper looks at the presence of the Buddha in the Therigatha in terms of these questions: how the Buddha interacts with the nuns, his impact on other characters in the poems in which he appears as a literary character, and how his appearances differ. Despite his presence being restricted to the sidelines, the Buddha is an important character in the Therigatha because of (...) the various functions he performs, both as a literary character and as a motif around which the composition of some of the poems revolves. Considering the role of the Buddha in these poems, this paper offers some insight into their composition and literary features. (shrink)

The intellectual encounter of the Spanish-speaking world with Buddhism has a relatively short history dating back to the late nineteenth century. The initial written works on Buddhism in Spanish-speaking countries focused almost exclusively on the legend of the Buddha. As a result, the early reception of the figure of the Buddha Sakyamuni in Latin American countries had a predominantly literary character. Within this emerging vein of Latin American Orientalism, the persona of the Mexican intellectual José Vasconcelos (1882–1959) stands (...) out. In his seminal work Estudios indostánicos [Hindustani Studies] (1920), Vasconcelos portrays a multifaceted Buddha who embodies the roles of a literary figure, a preacher, and a teacher. Thus, Vasconcelos’ rendition of Buddha maintains its status as a literary construction, yet this aspect recedes in significance compared to the importance attributed to his teachings. For Vasconcelos, the Buddha’s teachings became another element to solidify his own post-revolutionary civilizing program. (shrink)

This chapter surveys the philosophical dimensions of the Chinese Buddhist discourse on the doctrine of universal buddha-nature (foxing 佛性; Skt. *buddhadhatu). It first offers an overview of the historical development of the discourse by examining the arguments of such exegetes as Daosheng 道生 (355–434), 僧宗 (438–496), Baoliang 寶亮 (444–509), and Emperor Wu of Liang 梁武帝 (464–549), as well as schools like Dilun 地論, Shelun 攝論, Sanlun 三論, and Tiantai 天台. The second section of the chapter focuses on one of (...) the culminations of the discourse realized in the Huayan 華嚴-Chan 禪 thinker Zongmi’s 宗密 (780–841) systematic and exhaustive critique of earlier theories and practices concerning buddha-nature. Through these discussions, the chapter will show how the discourse on buddha-nature gave rise to original theses concerning the relationship between awakening and delusion, and between the transcendent and the phenomenal. (shrink)

A shorter and less technical treatment of its subject than the author’s acclaimed _Buddhism As Philosophy_ (second edition, Hackett, 2021), Mark Siderits's _The Buddha’s Teachings As Philosophy_ explores three different systems of thought that arose from core claims of the Buddha. By detailing and critically examining key arguments made by the Buddha and developed by later Buddhist philosophers, Siderits investigates the Buddha's teachings as philosophy: a set of claims—in this case, claims about the nature of the (...) world and our place in it—supported by rational argumentation and, here, developed with a variety of systematic results. _The Buddha’s Teachings As Philosophy_ will be especially useful to students of philosophy, religious studies, and comparative religion—to anyone, in fact, encountering Buddhist philosophy for the first time. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Lin Qiuwu, and others advocated a Buddhism that was radical in two respects. Firstly, they adopted a more or less naturalist stance with respect to Buddhist doctrine and related matters, rejecting karma or other supernatural beliefs. And secondly, they held political and economic views that were radically anti-hegemonic, anti-capitalist, and revolutionary. Taking the idea of such a “radical Buddhism” seriously, A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism (...) asks whether it is possible to develop a philosophy that is simultaneously naturalist, anti-capitalist, Buddhist, and consistent. Rather than a study of radical Buddhism, then, this book is an attempt to radicalize it. The foundations of this “radicalized radical Buddhism” are provided by a realist interpretation of Yogācāra, elucidated and elaborated with some help from thinkers in the broader Tiantai/Tendai tradition and American philosophers Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine. A key implication of this foundation is that only this world and only this life are real, from which it follows that if Buddhism aims to alleviate suffering, it has to do so in this world and in this life. Twentieth-century radical Buddhists (as well as some engaged Buddhists) came to a similar conclusion, often expressed in their aim to realize “a Buddha land in this world.” Building on this foundation, but also on Mahāyāna moral philosophy, this book argues for an ethics and social philosophy based on a definition of evil as that what is or should be expected to cause death or suffering. On that ground, capitalism should be rejected indeed, but utopianism must be treated with caution as well, which raises questions about what it means – from a radicalized radical Buddhist perspective – to aim for a Buddha land in this world. (shrink)

On Buddhism, and on the life and philosophy of Gautama Buddha; includes contributed articles.

The Middle Way was first taught explicitly by the Buddha. It is the first teaching offered by the Buddha in his first address, and the basis of his practical method in meditation, ethics, and wisdom. It is often mentioned in connection with Buddhist teachings, yet the full case for its importance has not yet been made. This book aims to make that case. -/- The Middle Way can be understood from the Buddha's life and metaphors as well (...) as his teachings, and it is these that are used to provide an accessible way into it. In the traditional story, he moved from Palace to Forest, finally realising that neither offered the whole story. The acceptance of rice-porridge marks the moment of recognition. The Middle Way can also be found in the Buddha's practice throughout the rest of his life: his teaching, his politics, even his death. Well-known similes such as the raft, the lute-strings, the arrow, and the blind people with the elephant also offer a profound source of the Middle Way. They are not just allegories of Buddhist teachings, but relate closely to universal judgement in human experience. -/- This book emphasises a positive case, but also has a critical one. Although it has transmitted the Middle Way, the Buddhist tradition has also often ignored or distorted it. The Middle Way is experiential, authentic and creative, and thus threatening to the power of a tradition that has instead emphasised the Buddha's authority as a source of revelation. That authority is allegedly based on the Buddha's enlightenment, which is often interpreted as abstract, discontinuous and absolute. Too many other Buddhist teachings are routinely interpreted in these absolute terms, when they would be much more helpful and universal interpreted in the terms of the Middle Way. -/- Although it engages fully with Buddhist material, this book shows the Middle Way to be a principle of experiential judgement based on awareness that goes far beyond Buddhism. Because it's about how humans judge things, it's universal, not a Buddhist monopoly. In its final section it offers ten alternative non-Buddhist sources for the Middle Way, many of them recent. (shrink)

The Buddha-biography does not have a fixed narrative, with one exclusive authoritative rendition, but pulsates with energy, as each community tells the story again in their own way. These many tellings need not always be told from the Buddha’s perspective. Yasodhara, in particular, has received attention from many Buddhist writers. Telling her story may be counted as one of the classical methods for bringing the Buddha’s story to life. In the following article, I reflect on some of (...) my own experiences with writing the Buddha’s story, as I examined his narrative from Yasodhara’s fictionalised point of view. I argue that, while we rely on a number of excellent academic methodologies to do our work, the one method scholars rarely attempt is that of trying to write the story ourselves. My own experiences, however, have shown me how much there is to learn when we become the storyteller. (shrink)

Buddha vs. Rumi is an interesting comparison—not because they were in conflict (they weren't), but because they represent very different yet overlapping spiritual traditions. Here's a breakdown of how they differ and where they align.

An anthology of the writings of the Buddha on the subject of harmony selected and translated from the original Pali.

I argue that the Buddha did not discuss the free will and determinism problem because he only considered issues relating to overcoming suffering and his teaching about this did not raise the problem. As represented in the Nikāyas, the heart of his teaching was an empirically based account of the causes of suffering and how to modify these to end suffering. It was primarily a practical teaching about how to achieve this goal, more a craft knowledge than a philosophical (...) theory of causality. Similarly, the no-self teaching was more about living selflessly than about developing a theoretical analysis of agency. (shrink)

Buddha and Christ: Images of Wholeness. Robert Elinor. Lutterworth, Cambridge 2000. 233 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0 7188 3011 3. Jesus and Buddha: The Parallel Sayings. Edited by Marcus Borg. Duncan Baird, London 2002. 160 pp. £16.99. ISBN 1 903296 79 X.

Gotama Buddha. Mein Weg zum Erwachen. Eine Autobiographie. Detlef Kantowsky und Ekkehard Sass. Beniger, Zürich/Düsseldorf 1996. 111pp. Price/ISBN not noted.

Des Buddha Weg. H. Saddhatissa. Translated by Silvius Dornier. Theseus-Verlag, Zurich. 144pp. Sw. Fcs. 18.80.

Der Buddha und seine Lehre. Elf Beiträge zur rechten Anschauung. Herausgegeben von Raimund Beyerlein. Verlag Beyerlein und Steinschulte, Stammbach-Herrnschrot 2002. 235 pp. ISBN 3-931095-26-6.

This easy-to-understand translation of one of the earliest surviving Buddhist texts offers a pathway to awakening that is simple, straightforward, and free of religious doctrine One of the earliest of all Buddhist texts, the Atthakavagga, or “Book of Eights,” is a remarkable document, not only because it comes from the earliest strain of the literature—before the Buddha, as the title suggests, came to be thought of as a “Buddhist”—but also because its approach to awakening is so simple and free (...) of adherence to any kind of ideology. Instead the Atthakavagga points to a direct and simple approach for attaining peace without requiring the adherence to doctrine. The value of the teachings it contains is not in the profundity of their philosophy or in their authority as scripture; rather, the value is found in the results they bring to those who live by them. Instead of doctrines to be believed, the “Book of Eights” describes means or practices for realizing peace. Gil Fronsdal’s rigorous translation with commentary reveals the text to be of interest not only to Buddhists, but also to the ever-growing demographic of spiritual-but-not-religious, who seek a spiritual life outside the structures of religion. (shrink)