Biotechnology's promises has been widely recognized as a major enterprise accelerating the commodification of the biological. After the 9/11 events and the subsequent anthrax letters, biotechnologies have additionally been described as contributing to the construction of biosecurity risks. This paper proposes to investigate the collaboration between the FBI and the DIYbio network as a case study illustrating the productive entanglement of biological risks and promises. To do so, the paper explores the social construction of risks and promises associated with (...) the vision of distributed biotechnologies as enacted in this collaboration. We argue that the FBI needs to police the DIYbio network in order to disseminate a specific notion of bioterrorist risk, while, in a counter-intuitive manner, the DIYbio network benefits from being policed by the FBI as it helps them disseminate their socio-technological vision. If the entanglement of technoscientific risks and promises is a well established finding of the STS literature, our case study suggests that such entanglement now additionally comprises the sphere of biosecurity and the promises of a distributed biotechnology available to everyone. (shrink)

The SynBioSecurity argument says that synthetic biology introduces new risks of intentional misuse of synthetic pathogens and that, therefore, there is a need for extra regulations and oversight. This paper provides an analysis of the argument, sets forth a new version of it, and identifies three developments that raise biosecurity risks compared to the situation earlier. The developments include a spread of the required know-how, improved availability of the techniques, instruments and biological parts, and new technical possibilities such as (...) “resurrecting” disappeared pathogens. It is first shown that the general argument from SynBioSecurity needs to be qualified and that many improvements to biosecurity have already been implemented, most notably in the United States. Second, I suggest a new strain of the argument: the situation that most branches of synthetic biology fall under the gene technology regulation in the European Union and that this regulation in its current form does not adequately address SynBioSecurity risks together provide a weighty reason to review and possibly refine the legislation as well as the supervisory practices. Ethically speaking, the rise in the relative risk of bioterrorism brings to the fore new extrinsic issues. (shrink)

The two significant zoonotic bacterial infections that have remained a concern due to the complex dynamics involved in transmission and global prevalence are anthrax and brucellosis. The present paper attempts to address some of the most important zoonotic pathogens, highlighting their epidemiology, clinical manifestations, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention strategies. Anthrax is largely transmitted through direct contact with the infected animals or their products resulting in cutaneous, inhalational, and gastrointestinal forms, all with specific clinical outcomes and approaches for treatment. Similarly, the (...) genus Brucella primarily transmits brucellosis to humans by occupational exposure and consumption of contaminated animal products. Its presentation may be acute, chronic, or in relapse. Diagnosis is made by a combination of serological, molecular, and culture-based techniques, while the treatment focuses on antimicrobial regimens specific to the pathogen. However, this increases the problem of antimicrobial resistance, which makes their effective management challenging, necessitating an integrated approach. Mitigating risks through biosecurity measures, vaccination, public health education, and a One Health approach that includes human, animal, and environmental health, all facilitate prevention and control of an outbreak. Advanced surveillance and diagnostic technologies further support the prompt interventions to contain outbreaks. It then goes on to highlight the importance of interdisciplinarity for decreasing the global burden of zoonotic bacterial diseases. (shrink)

The discourse on the fundamental issues raised by synthetic biology, such as biosafety and biosecurity, intellectual property, environmental consequences and ethical and societal implications, is still open and controversial. This, coupled with the potential and risks the field holds, makes it one of the hottest topics in technology assessment today. How a new technology is perceived by the public influences the manner in which its products and applications will be received. Therefore, it is important to learn how people perceive (...) synthetic biology. This work gathers, integrates and discusses the results of three studies of public perceptions of synthetic biology: an analysis of existing research on how media portray synthetic biology across 13 European countries and in the USA, the Meeting of Young Minds, a public debate between prospective politicians and synthetic biologists in the Netherlands and the experiences of citizen panels and focus groups in Austria, the UK and the USA. The results show that the media are generally positive in their reports on synthetic biology, rather unbalanced in their view of potential benefits and risks, and also heavily influenced by the sources of the stories, namely scientists and stakeholders. Among the prospective Dutch politicians, there were positive expectations as well as very negative ones. Some of these positions are also shared by participants in public dialogue experiments, such as not only the demand for information, transparency and regulation but also a sense of resignation and ineluctability of scientific and technological progress. (shrink)

This chapter examines the post-9/11 attempt to merge public health with police and counterterrorism, with particular emphasis on DNA profiling. Post-9/11 pandemic fear has led to an overemphasis on security, including biosecurity. Even before 9/11, governments were intent on using DNA in criminal investigations. Likewise, privacy advocates have long sought to limit the use of DNA, and more recently of other bioidentifiers as well, and not just in the United States. The oversimplified and often phony security versus civil liberties (...) debate gets played out in the DNA identification debate. This chapter considers two legal cases from Europe that explore the privacy problems—including family privacy—inherent in collecting DNA samples for use in large databanks: one from the European Court of Human Rights and involving the use of DNA in police investigations, the other from Iceland's Supreme Court and involving the use of DNA in medical research. (shrink)

This chapter examines the link between health and human rights in the post-9/11 attempt to remodel public health as a national security activity. Many public health officials hoped to take advantage of the new funding available for terrorism preparedness after 9/11 not only to do their part in national security, but also to make “dual use” of the funding to help public health fulfill its core missions. Others argued that the traditional role of public health should be abandoned, and that (...) it should be merged into the national security apparatus (at least in the area of biological threats) under the rubric of “biosecurity.” This chapter tackles two important questions: whether 9/11 means making fundamental changes in public health practices regarding epidemic control and reverting to nineteenth-century, Ellis Island-type quarantine and forced treatment; or whether human rights and civil liberties must be sacrificed in the name of increased safety and security. It shows that bioterrorism is hyped beyond all scientific or historic reality, both in the biosecurity industry and in the public health community. (shrink)

This paper analyses the suitability of the Spanish legal criminal system to deal with the hypothetical case in which a person subjected to a biosecurity isolation regime (that is, to “quarantine” as he is a carrier of a serious illness) decides to ignore the advice of the health authorities (or, if applicable, the Judge), escaping from the hospital facilities where he is deprived of his liberty (we will begin describing two similar and real examples of this situation, one of (...) them occurred in the African context, and the other one in Spain). In addition to the identification and analysis of rights or interests at stake (life, individual health, public health, freedom of movement, etc.), we propose the creation of a criminal offense to overcome the legislative loopholeLegislative loophole that we will identify which is also present in the criminal systems of most European and Latin American countries. (shrink)

Infectious diseases of the gastrointestinal tract of pigs significantly impact animal health, animal welfare and finally the economic outcome of any pig production worldwide. Preventing enteric diseases in pigs allows producers maximising the average daily weight gain and the feed conversion ratio in pigs, thereby making pig production a very meaningful process of protein refinement and source of food products. Bacterial diseases of the gastrointestinal tract of pigs often necessitate the use of antimicrobials, which can create antimicrobial resistance that threats (...) both animals and humans. Many viral diseases of the gastrointestinal tract provoke long-lasting damage of the gut and/or the gut function, which causes poor performance and an extended period from birth to slaughter along with the need of more resources to reach slaughter weight. Therefore, farmers and veterinarians should focus on the prevention of infectious enteric diseases by means of vaccination where justified and improved internal and external biosecurity and last but not the least by optimised management of the different age and production categories of pigs.In this chapter, bacterial, parasitical and viral diseases of pigs are described for the corresponding age category, where they have the major impact. (shrink)

This essay argues that scientific progress in STEM areas and US national biosecurity are best achieved when US scientists self-regulate, work to influence the lawmaking process at every stage of their career, and welcome or even initiate interactions with the public. Events that draw negative public attention drive laws because laws are proposed by elected representatives of the public. Laws are therefore reactive in nature, as are regulations promulgated by agencies that implement these laws. Laws and regulations are difficult (...) and time-consuming to change.While scientists provide testimony and serve on expert panels that produce reports to Congress, only a very few... (shrink)

The management of the sanitary status of laboratory animals is essential both from an animal welfare and a scientific standpoint. Poor sanitary status may have clinical impact and lead to invalid and/or irreproducible scientific results. Most of the laboratory animals are bred for research under strict hygienic procedures in order to exclude microorganisms that can impact their health and the outcome of experimental procedures. In these circumstances, the microbiological component of the animal models is defined by an exclusion list, i.e. (...) the animals are free of certain microorganisms. In certain fields of research, the microbiota carried by the animals (microorganisms present in the animal, at interfaces with the environment, i.e. skin, mouth, nose, respiratory tract, genital tract, digestive tract) needs to be defined, and therefore gnotobiotic animals need to be used. Indeed, the phenotype of an animal depends on both its genotype and the envirotype, and like the genome, the microbiota can be manipulated to investigate its impact on the biology of the host.In this chapter, we will answer to practical questions to understand the procedures to put in place when building a standard biosecurity program, and the specific ones that need to be implemented to produce germ-free and gnotobiotic animals.We will focus mainly on laboratory rodents, but the main principles may apply to other species used in research. (shrink)

Determining appropriate mechanisms for transferring and translating research into policy has become a major concern for researchers (knowledge producers) and policymakers (knowledge users) worldwide. This has led to the emergence of a new function of brokering between researchers and policymakers, and a new type of agent called Knowledge Broker. Understanding these complex multi-agent interactions is critical for an efficient knowledge brokering practice during any given policymaking process. Here, we present (1) the current diversity of knowledge broker groups working in the (...) field of biosecurity and environmental management; (2) the incentives linking the different agents involved in the process (knowledge producers, knowledge brokers and knowledge users); and (3) the gaps, needs and challenges to better understand this social ecosystem. We also propose alternatives aimed at improving transparency and efficiency, including future scenarios where the role of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies may become predominant in knowledge-brokering activities. (shrink)

Enclosed is a guidebook for philanthropists, advocates, and policymakers who want to do the most good possible. This book introduces the philosophy of “longtermism,” the idea that it is particularly important that we act now to safeguard future generations. The future is vast in scale: depending on our choices in the coming centuries, the future could stretch for eons or it could dwindle into oblivion, and be inordinately good or inordinately bad. And yet future generations are utterly disenfranchised in the (...) world today: they cannot participate in our markets, our movements, or our civil society. This presents 21st Century philanthropists with a historically unprecedented opportunity to do good by protecting the long-term future. The essays within are from the pioneers who have developed the intellectual foundations of longtermism, as well as the experts and advocates who are now putting it into practice. Readers will hear the case for longtermism from professors at the University of Oxford and Longview’s own founders; longtermist policy proposals from political philosophers, members of the House of Lords, and the All-party Parliamentary Group for Future Generations; the case for work on biosecurity, artificial intelligence, and climate change from leading experts; and the first ever essay on longtermist cultural change from the former Chief of Cabinet to the Finnish President. Together, these essays chart the path forward toward maximising the good that we do for our grandchildren, our grandchildren’s grandchildren, and every generation beyond. (shrink)

In _Animacies_, Mel Y. Chen draws on recent debates about sexuality, race, and affect to examine how matter that is considered insensate, immobile, or deathly animates cultural lives. Toward that end, Chen investigates the blurry division between the living and the dead, or that which is beyond the human or animal. Within the field of linguistics, animacy has been described variously as a quality of agency, awareness, mobility, sentience, or liveness. Chen turns to cognitive linguistics to stress how language habitually (...) differentiates the animate and the inanimate. Expanding this construct, Chen argues that animacy undergirds much that is pressing and indeed volatile in contemporary culture, from animal rights debates to biosecurity concerns. Chen's book is the first to bring the concept of animacy together with queer of color scholarship, critical animal studies, and disability theory. Through analyses of dehumanizing insults, the meanings of queerness, animal protagonists in recent Asian/American art and film, the lead in toys panic in 2007, and the social lives of environmental illness, _Animacies_ illuminates a hierarchical politics infused by race, sexuality, and ability. In this groundbreaking book, Chen rethinks the criteria governing agency and receptivity, health and toxicity, productivity and stillness—and demonstrates how attention to the affective charge of matter challenges commonsense orderings of the world. (shrink)

Biosecurity plays an important role in the transformation process that livestock farming is currently undergoing. It not only reduces the risk of introducing pathogens into animal holdings but can also help improve animal welfare by protecting animals from infectious diseases that can lead to pain, suffering, and death. Moreover, biosecurity is an essential component for sustainable and profitable livestock farming. It is important to note that it has recently been clarified, in the European Union, that the prime responsibility (...) for biosecurity lies in the hands of the operator, i.e., the farmer (Regulation (EU) 2016/429). (shrink)

Species lists play an important role in biology and practical domains like conservation, legislation, biosecurity and trade regulation. However, their effective use by non-specialist scientific and societal users is sometimes hindered by disagreements between competing lists. While it is well-known that such disagreements exist, it remains unclear how prevalent they are, what their nature is, and what causes them. In this study, we argue that these questions should be investigated using methods based on taxon concept rather than methods based (...) on Linnaean names, and use such a concept-based method to quantify disagreement about bird classification and investigate its relation to research effort. We found that there was disagreement about 38% of all groups of birds recognized as a species, more than three times as much as indicated by previous measures. Disagreement about the delimitation of bird groups was the most common kind of conflict, outnumbering disagreement about nomenclature and disagreement about rank. While high levels of conflict about rank were associated with lower levels of research effort, this was not the case for conflict about the delimitation of bird groups. This suggests that taxonomic disagreement cannot be resolved simply by increasing research effort. (shrink)

This paper argues that digital preservation institutions face a paradigm shift from entropic to adversarial threat models. Drawing on Weber’s method of ideal-typical construction, it distinguishes two orientations: the Archivist, who operates under what the paper terms institutional innocence — the historically warranted assumption that threats are passive, access is an unqualified good, and institutional continuity can be presumed — and the Fortress Commander, who designs for active, intelligent adversaries targeting cultural memory. The analysis traces this transformation across four fronts: (...) cybersecurity, where ransomware campaigns exploit the trust architectures of open institutions; geopolitical instability, where preservation demands strategies of radical concealment and geographic distribution; biosecurity, where the pandemic revealed the invisible human infrastructure underlying all preservation as a complex operational achievement; and information warfare, where generative AI and coordinated disinformation erode the willingness of populations to distinguish truth from fabrication. Each front exposes a distinct logic through which the Archivist’s assumptions become vulnerabilities. The paper concludes with five operational imperatives and argues that preservation must now defend not only its contents but the epistemic conditions under which those contents retain their value. (shrink)

Biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biological threat to public health and/or national security is termed dual use. In Poland there are adequate conditions for conducting experiments that could be qualified as dual use research, and therefore, a risk of attack on Poland or other countries exists. Optimal solutions for limiting such threats are required, and the national system of biosecurity should enable early, reliable, and complete identification of this type of research. (...) Scientists should have a fundamental role in this process, their duty being to immediately, upon identification, report research with dual use potential. An important entity in the identification system of dual use research should also be the Central Register of Biological and Biomedical Research, which gathers information about all biological and biomedical research being conducted in a given country. Publishers, editors, and review committees of journals and other scientific publications should be involved in evaluating results of clinical trials. The National Council of Biosecurity should be the governmental institution responsible for developing a system of dual use research threat prevention. Its role would be to develop codes of conduct, form counsel of expertise, and monitor the problem at national level, while the Dual Use Research Committee would be responsible for individual cases. In Poland, current actions aiming to provide biological safety were based on developing and passing an act about genetically modified organisms (GMO’s) and creating a GMO Committee. Considering experiences of other nations, one should view these actions as fragmentary, and thus insufficient protection against dual use research threats. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of wild boars as beasts of the Anthropocene by examining their physicality and the policies focused on controlling their populations. Considering the labeling and perception of the species as a beast, the study investigates the sociopolitical implications of such categorization. Specifically, it examines how wild boars have been described and portrayed as intimidating, dangerous, and threatening within Uruguay’s hunting and conservation communities. By analyzing the processes that frame the lives of wild boars and render them (...) legitimate targets of eradication, this article sheds light on the semiotics and naming of wild boars’ changing corporeality throughout history. It reveals how the hunting community motivates their practices by portraying themselves as guardians of biodiversity and agricultural production rather than mere leisure hunters. I argue that the notion of beastliness is instrumental in wildlife management strategies employed for wild boars. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In the Belly of the Whale:Some Thoughts on Preserving the Integrity of the New Bioethics CommissionF. Daniel Davis (bio)10 July 2010. Washington, D.C. President Obama's Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues has just concluded its inaugural meeting, designed as a primer—the first of three that it plans to hold—on synthetic biology. As a topic for deliberation by a national bioethics commission, "synbio" is ideal. A cloud of (...) equipoise hangs over the practical implications of recent developments in this, the latest phase in the evolution of biotechnology—a seemingly genuine uncertainty about the need for additional mechanisms of oversight to mitigate potential risks to biosafety or biosecurity. Despite these concerns, its advocates and practitioners enthusiastically champion the prospect of eventual, perhaps significant benefits to be gained with progress in "synbio," including, for example, enhanced processes for the mass production of vaccines and biofuels. And yet like the advent of recombinant DNA technologies in the mid-1970s, synthetic biology has generated not only hope for benefits and concern for risks, but also questions variously described as "deep," "profound," "fundamental," and "philosophical": Is the capacity to synthesize novel, living entities yet another technological invitation to hubris on the part of humankind? Will that capacity alter the relationship between humankind and nature? How should we think about the moral status of living entities created de novo in the laboratory? Should we even care? How will wide-scale applications of synthetic biology tip the scales of social justice? And finally, the democratization of synthetic biology, the growth of DIY-BIO (do-it-yourself-biology) communities beyond the usual scientific arenas of academia and industry, has infused old questions about scientific freedom and responsibility with new complexities—all in the midst of an American public that is reportedly unaware and uneducated about this new chapter in the often triumphant, unsettling history of biotechnology.Thus, the topic of synthetic biology presents the new commission with several possibilities. It could very well make a substantial contribution to public policies responsive to both the current capabilities and the possible trajectories of [End Page 291] these emergent biotechnologies. The very fact that the President explicitly asked the Commission to take up the topic and report back to him (in six months) means that that potential is especially promising. It could, as well, delve into the "deeper" philosophical questions that "synbio" raises with the aim of bringing both depth and breadth to the tasks of critically analyzing and reflecting upon what currently is known and what, with regard to the future, can only be glimpsed of this amalgam of the life sciences, engineering, and other disciplines. The Commission could also set its sights on diminishing the apparent deficit in public understanding of these biotechnologies. And finally, with this topic as well as any others it takes up, the Commission, along with the administration that established it, could make an effort to reinvigorate public bioethics in the United States. At the very least, in the sobering light of experience with the President's Council on Bioethics, certain actions or behaviors could be avoided in the interests of preserving the integrity—the moral and political legitimacy—of the new commission. Although each of these possibilities warrants further explanation, my focus here is the final one.The Belly of the WhaleIn several decades, some future historian of public bioethics in the U.S. will be able to look back on the bioethics commissions established to date and offer an insightful, comprehensive—maybe even magisterial—account of their beginnings and endings, their deliberations and the political forces that shaped them, and perhaps most important, their ultimate value as public bodies. Lacking the strategic perch of historical distance, and fresh from the trenches, I can only offer a few somewhat informed but partial observations and arguments about public bioethics in the context of contemporary American politics, acknowledging at the outset that my thoughts are open to, and needful of, critical amendment or supplement by others.In the U.S., bioethics commissions are political creatures, established through the authority of the Congress or the President for the purpose of providing counsel to the legislative and/or executive... (shrink)

Governments must keep agricultural systems free of pests that threaten agricultural production and international trade. Biosecurity surveillance already makes use of a wide range of technologies, such as insect traps and lures, geographic information systems, and diagnostic biochemical tests. The rise of cheap and usable surveillance technologies such as remotely piloted aircraft systems presents value conflicts not addressed in international biosurveillance guidelines. The costs of keeping agriculture pest-free include privacy violations and reduced autonomy for farmers. We argue that physical (...) and digital privacy in the age of ubiquitous aerial and ground surveillance is a natural right to allow people to function freely on their land. Surveillance methods must be co-created and justified through using ethically defensible processes such as discourse theory, value-centred design and responsible innovation to forge a cooperative social contract between diverse stakeholders. We propose an ethical framework for biosurveillance activities that balances the collective benefits for food security with individual privacy: establish the boundaries of a biosurveillance social contract; justify surveillance operations for the farmers, researchers, industry, the public and regulators; give decision makers a reasonable measure of control over their personal and agricultural data; and choose surveillance methodologies that give the appropriate information. The benefits of incorporating an ethical framework for responsible biosurveillance innovation include increased participation and accumulated trust over time. Long term trust and cooperation will support food security, producing higher quality data overall and mitigating against anticipated information gaps that may emerge due to disrespecting landholder rights. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 142-144.

The last 12 years have seen historically high levels of interest in biosecurity among life scientists, science policymakers, and academic experts on science and security policy. This interest was triggered by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the ‘anthrax letters’ attack of the same year, and two virology papers, published early last decade, that were thought to raise serious biosecurity concerns.1 Ethicists have come relatively late to the game, but, in recent years, a lively debate has developed on ethical issues (...) raised by biosecurity policy, and, more generally, on the ethics of producing and disseminating ‘dangerous’ biomedical knowledge. Unsurprisingly, this debate has taken on increased sense of urgency over the last 18 months as the journals Science and Nature, the United States National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, and the World Health Organization, among others, have been considering whether and how to publish two academic papers reporting means of enhancing the transmissibility of H5N1 influenza, or ‘bird flu’.We hope that this issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics will substantially advance the emerging ethical debate in this area. The issue features five articles on the ethics of biosecurity: a feature article, by Allen Buchanan and Maureen Kelley ; three brief replies to this article, by Michael Selgelid, Thomas May, and Nicholas King ; and a stand-alone paper by Nicholas Evans, which discusses the recent H5N1 controversy and analyses the appeals to scientific freedom that have been made by some of its protagonists. In this ‘concise argument’, I can, regrettably, comment only on the Buchanan and Kelley piece.Buchanan and Kelley on the framing of the biosecurity debateBuchanan and Kelley aim to broaden and reframe the existing debate on biosecurity. They begin by noting that "science policy … ". (shrink)

In this article, we raise ethical concerns about the potential misuse of open-source biology : biological research and development that progresses through an organisational model of radical openness, deskilling, and innovation. We compare this organisational structure to that of the open-source software model, and detail salient ethical implications of this model. We demonstrate that OSB, in virtue of its commitment to openness, may be resistant to governance attempts.

A recent controversy over the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity's recommendation to censor two publications on genetically modified H5N1 avian influenza has generated concern over the threat to scientific freedom such censorship presents. In this paper, I argue that in the case of these studies, appeals to scientific freedom are not sufficient to motivate a rejection of censorship. I then use this conclusion to draw broader concerns about the ethics of dual-use research.

This article explores a unique opportunity for shaping public health law and policy to reflect a greater balance between public and private goods in two areas of primary concern to human well-being: medicine and human biosecurity. This opportunity is presented both by the rapid changes likely to occur in these areas as a result of nanotechnology and the fact that multinational corporate actors have not yet had the opportunity to use their well-honed techniques of governance influence to modify public (...) health policy and law in this area to their own narrowly focused advantage. Such a rare opportunity to rethink some fundamental assumptions about a regulatory framework for globally important health issues in advance is one reason why issues concerning nanotechnology regulation in medicine and human biosecurity should have considerable interest to health law and policy scholars. (shrink)

methods that have shown promise for improving extreme risk analysis, particularly for assessing the risks of invasive pests and pathogens associated with international trade. We describe the legally inspired regulatory regime for banks, where these methods have been brought to bear on extreme ‘operational risks’. We argue that an ‘advocacy model’ similar to that used in the Basel II compliance regime for bank operational risks and to a lesser extent in biosecurity import risk analyses is ideal for permitting the (...) diversity of relevant evidence about invasive species to be presented and soundly evaluated. We recommend that the process be enhanced in ways that enable invasion ecology to make more explicit use of the methods found successful.. (shrink)

Swine health management requires diligent observation of animals and the collection and analysis of production records to assess the efficacy of on-farm disease control programs and to plan corrective strategies. Diagnostic testing is used to enhance these monitoring efforts and to guide decision-making associated with disease control interventions as well as inform biosecurity and disease eradication programs. There are constantly new diagnostic tests being developed, and it is now possible to use a wide variety of sample materials including serum, (...) oral fluids, feces, semen, and tissues in monitoring programs. The usefulness and reliability of testing is dependent on several factors including the selection of animals to be tested and the attributes of the test that is used. Decision-making to determine intervention strategies, such as mass medication or vaccination, needs to be carefully evaluated to ensure a cost-benefit, in addition to addressing animal welfare and food safety concerns. (shrink)

Israel has a long history of concern with chemical and biological threats, since several hostile states in the Middle East are likely to possess such weapons. The Twin-Tower terrorist attacks and Anthrax envelope scares of 2001 were a watershed for public perceptions of the threat of unconventional terror in general and of biological terror in particular. New advances in biotechnology will only increase the ability of terrorists to exploit the burgeoning availability of related information to develop ever-more destructive bioweapons. Many (...) areas of modern biological research are unavoidably dual-use by nature. They thus have a great potential for both help and harm; and facilitating the former while preventing the latter remains a serious challenge to researchers and governments alike. This article addresses how Israel might best (1) prevent hostile elements from obtaining, from Israel’s biological research system, materials, information and technologies that might facilitate their carrying out a biological attack, while (2) continuing to promote academic openness, excellence and other hallmarks of that system. This important and sensitive issue was assessed by a special national committee, and their recommendations are presented and discussed. One particularly innovative element is the restructuring and use of Israel’s extensive biosafety system to also address biosecurity goals, with minimal disruption or delay. (shrink)

Among various issues that concern human beings, there are a few that are of current interest and have really grabbed our attention: love for nature, environmental defense, and worries about Biodiversity and Biosecurity. The article considers one particular aspect regarding the bioethical concern of using animals in experiments that might benefit both humans and animals. The problematic aspect of the bioethical use of animals in scientific experimentation has been and will remain crucial for human life. Additionally, the results of (...) this type of research could contribute to animal welfare, which have an impact on public health. (shrink)

Although synthetic biology is a promising discipline, it also raises serious ethical questions that must be addressed in order to prevent unwanted consequences and to ensure that its progress leads toward the good of all. Questions arise about the role of this discipline in a possible redefinition of the concept of life and its creation. With regard to the products of synthetic biology, the moral status that they should be given as well as the ethically correct way to behave towards (...) them are not clear. Moreover, risks that could result from a misuse of this technology or from an accidental release of synthetic organisms into the environment cannot be ignored; concerns about biosecurity and biosafety appear. Here we discuss these and other questions from a personalist ontological framework, which defends human life as an essential value and proposes a set of principles to ensure the safeguarding of this and other values that are based on it. (shrink)

Effective control of weeds requires all land managers to manage weeds on their own properties and encourage others to do the same. Sources of social capital – trust, networks and norms – can influence the behaviour of land managers as well as whether weed management is done individually or collectively. Yet, social norms are understudied compared to other sources of social capital. The aim of this research was to describe the social norms associated with weed management on rural private property (...) in Victoria, Australia, and the extent to which they facilitate or hinder collective action. Data for this analysis came from semi-structured interviews with 31 landholders and observations of 13 events from two case study areas, focussing on the management of gorse (Ulex europeaus). Sixteen social norms were identified, which can be encapsulated by three themes: good landholders, good neighbours, and social learning. These norms influence landscape preferences, weed management practices, propensity to share knowledge and work with others. In general, good landholder norms discouraged collaborative weed management learning and practices. Some good neighbour norms reinforced the individualism of good landholder norms, while others prioritised the public good. Social learning norms supported landscape scale learning and action on weeds. Many of the social norms described here are applicable beyond weed management and indicate that further research on good landholder, good neighbour and social learning norms and the tensions between them are needed to inform agricultural policies that support collective action. (shrink)

Time plays in different ways in relation to pandemics. Since the early 2000s, for instance, a sense of urgency has been cultivated in anticipation of the "next pandemic"—a rather generative framework that set in place a body of knowledges, practices, resources, and infrastructures unevenly distributed around the world in preparation for a health crisis that was always just around the corner. The omnipresence of the pandemic-to-come created a time of preparedness, of an ongoing expectation of a threat projected into the (...) near future. When the pandemic finally became present, response schemes developed within the realms of biosecurity and of global public health triggered off the time of... (shrink)

Introduction -- The serenity of the wise man -- The seventh day of history -- The guarantor-state -- Biosecurity -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- Index.

:This article analyzes the ethics of synthetic biology from a consequentialist perspective, examining potential effects on food and agriculture, and on medicine, fuel, and the advancement of science. The issues of biosafety and biosecurity are also examined. A consequentialist analysis offers an essential road map to policymakers and regulators as to how to deal with synbio. Additionally, the article discusses the limitations of consequentialism as a tool for analysing synbioethics. Is it possible to predict, with any degree of plausibility, (...) what the consequences of synthetic biology will be in 50 years, or in 100, or in 500? Synbio may take humanity to a place of radical departure from what is known or knowable. (shrink)

Some religious believers may see synthetic biology as usurping God's creative role. The Catholic Church has yet to issue a formal teaching on the field (though it has issued some informal statements in response to Craig Venter's development of a ‘synthetic’ cell). In this paper I examine the likely reaction of the Catholic Magisterium to synthetic biology in its entirety. I begin by examining the Church's teaching role, from its own viewpoint, to set the necessary backround and context for the (...) discussion that follows. I then describe the Church's attitude to science, and particularly to biotechnology. From this I derive a likely Catholic theology of synthetic biology.The Church's teachings on scientific and biotech research show that it is likely to have a generally positive disposition to synbio, if it and its products can be acceptably safe. Proper evaluation of, and protection against, risk will be a significant factor in determining the morality of the research. If the risks can be minimized through regulation or other means, then the Church is likely to be supportive. The Church will also critique the social and legal environment in which the research is done, evaluating issues such as the patenting of scientific discoveries and of life. (shrink)

Emergence of novel genome engineering technologies such as clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeat has refocused attention on unresolved ethical complications of synthetic biology. Biosecurity concerns, deontological issues and human right aspects of genome editing have been the subject of in-depth debate; however, a lack of transparent regulatory guidelines, outdated governance codes, inefficient time-consuming clinical trial pathways and frequent misunderstanding of the scientific potential of cutting-edge technologies have created substantial obstacles to translational research in this area. While a precautionary (...) principle should be applied at all stages of genome engineering research, the stigma of germline editing, synthesis of new life forms and unrealistic presentation of current technologies should not arrest the transition of new therapeutic, diagnostic or preventive tools from research to clinic. We provide a brief review on the present regulation of CRISPR and discuss the translational aspect of genome engineering research and patient autonomy with respect to the “right to try” potential novel non-germline gene therapies. (shrink)

This paper asks what influences farmers’ adherence to national and international zoonotic disease intervention efforts and argues that development and promotion of biosecurity interventions must take into account the economic and social context informing how livestock sectors operate and how those who work in them are making a living. Specifically, we explore how poultry farms in Viet Nam are managed amidst global efforts to combat disease and national ambitions to sustain growth. The growth of Viet Nam’s livestock sector has (...) been accompanied by a range of disease outbreaks that have caused the deaths of animals and humans, threatened businesses, and led to the introduction and ongoing revisions to biosecurity efforts. Despite a strict national (and international) agenda focusing on disease control through biosecurity strategies, on farms disease management is implemented in various ways and to varying degrees. Based on fieldwork in three provinces of Northern Viet Nam and in-depth interviews with actors working on farms and across the commercial poultry sector, we reflect on social, financial and political factors shaping the country’s biosecurity narratives and discuss key practices farming households engage in that influence their disease management efforts. Our findings reveal that strict adherence to biosecurity guidelines is often practically unfeasible for commercial poultry farming households to implement where zoonotic diseases are not a concern related to bird and human health so much as a potential risk to a household’s living, that exists among a range of diverse opportunities and uncertainties shaping farming operations in Viet Nam’s changing livestock sector. (shrink)

This article examines the convergence of synthetic biology and artificial intelligence (SynBioAI), focusing on co-evolving biosecurity threats as a novel security problem. Advances in genome-editing, CRISPR, AI-powered protein design, and automated biofoundries accelerate beneficial applications but also heighten risks, including the possibility of producing novel pathogens. Utilization of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and regime-complex theory is offered, emphasizing power in shaping governance. The key security problem this article identifies is the increasing ease with which AI enables biological engineering, (...) lowering technical barriers and making biosecurity threats more intangible, diffuse, and decentralized, despite persistent barriers like tacit knowledge and wet bench realities. This article contributes to existing debates by analyzing technological trends and how existing regulatory patchwork is prospectively relevant for securing SynBioAI. It examines the Biological Weapons Convention, WHO, USA, China, EU and Tianjin Guidelines. It concludes that a multi-layered governance model—encompassing new forums, updated BWC guidelines, and broader stakeholder engagement—is necessary to balance innovation with security. (shrink)

The development of technologies for the biopreservation of infectious organisms requires careful analysis of benefits and risks. This article reviews the regulatory landscape and oversight responsibilities in the United States in respect to pathogen biopreservation. Focused on two globally significant pathogens, Cryptosporidium and Plasmodium, the article explores advantages and potential risks of biopreservation concerning biosafety, biosecurity and biocontainment.

Buchanan and Kelley provide a sophisticated and thoughtful critique of contemporary discussions of biosecurity. They provide sound critiques of American biodefence institutions, and the general sense of imminent threat underlying the rush to fund biodefence. However, the essay consistently misrepresents the breadth and depth of scholarly research on the ethics and politics of biodefence.

The concept of “health” in laboratory animal science is a crucial link that brings together ethical, scientific, and practical considerations. It plays a central role in ensuring the successful and responsible conduct of experiments involving laboratory animals. Comprehensive care of laboratory animals depends on effective health management and requires close co-operation between those working with the animals. Persons working with laboratory animals must be qualified, and the supervision of animals by trained personnel is essential to ensure animal health. This chapter (...) provides examples of how to establish effective communication and identifies key personnel responsible for animal health.Microbiological health monitoring is a fundamental aspect of the operation of an animal research facility. It provides the ability to identify and control the presence of microorganisms, which is important for both research integrity and animal welfare. This chapter serves as a practical guide to assist veterinarians at every stage, from planning and implementation to interpretation of results. It also provides guidelines for outbreak management and biosecurity programs, which are essential to prevent the spread of disease and protect the overall health of laboratory animals. Monitoring the health of laboratory animals in a proactive and facility-specific manner is an essential part of the veterinarian’s responsibilities. (shrink)

The global spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b has evolved into a multispecies panzootic that disrupts conventional boundaries between human, animal and environmental health systems. Using Brazil’s response as an illustrative case, this article argues that prevailing containment strategies—particularly mass culling—remain ethically insufficient and practically misaligned with the ecological complexity of H5N1 transmission. To clarify the normative foundations of an alternative approach, we introduce a theoretical framework grounded in zoonoethics and global ecological bioethics, emphasizing multispecies justice, relational (...) vulnerability, intercultural and community engagement and co-responsibility. We then apply this framework to evaluate the limitations of reactive biosecurity paradigms and to outline multispecies-sensitive One Health governance guidelines. The analysis demonstrates that effective and legitimate panzootic response requires moving beyond biomedical and anthropocentric models toward anticipatory, inclusive and ethically grounded governance capable of addressing structural drivers such as biodiversity loss, land-use change and the erosion of Indigenous territorial protections. We conclude by discussing how the H5N1 panzootic represents a ‘perfect storm’ that demands not only improved preparedness, but a reconceptualization of One Health as an ethical and political project of multispecies cohabitation in an era of planetary instability. (shrink)

I begin with my impressions of a narrative of redemption that is caught up in the formation of new environmental, social, and political aspirations for the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. I then reflect on, first, pre-pandemic scholarship on “biosecurity” and, second, taking up a variation of the syndemic approach to understanding the COVID-19 pandemic. I end by arguing that we should not expect to live with “new normals” for living in a post-COVID-19 world that leaves intact “old normals” (...) that have historically contributed to the rise of anthropogenic environmental harms and inegalitarian social arrangements in the world today. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of how the responsibilities for addressing the risks of dual use research ought to be divided. We begin by presenting the maximalist claim that proposes that since scientists are well placed to judge the potential for misuse of their studies, they alone are responsible for addressing these risks. Before assessing this position, we consider a claim that rejects the maximalist position, namely that scientists need not consider the possibility that their studies might be misused because (...) the goods of science are so important, they should not spend time on anything but generating valuable knowledge. This claim, we argue, fails, as these goods do not always outweigh the risks of misuse. Given this conclusion we turn to assess two versions of the maximalist claim. The first suggests that when a possibility of misuse arises, scientists ought to adopt the precautionary principle (PP) to discharge their moral responsibilities. We argue that PP is problematic as it does not give much guidance on what scientists should do. An alternative to meeting scientists’ moral responsibilities is through applying a risk-benefit analysis; however, due to epistemic biases and limitations, scientists are prone to make mistakes in their analysis. We thus suggest an alternative approach, in which responsibilities are divided between scientists and agents that can conduct an analysis that is more likely to generate unbiased and comprehensive conclusions on how the risks of dual use research, should be addressed. (shrink)

Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsic value of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim is to analyse (...) what exactly is the nature of the concerns and what rationale may lie behind them. The analysis concludes that the above-mentioned worries do not give genuine cause for serious concern. In the best possible way they are interpreted as slippery slope arguments, yet arguments of this type need to be handled with care. It is argued that although we are urged to be especially vigilant we do not have sufficiently cogent reasons to assume that synthetic biology will cause such fundamental hazards as to warrant restricting or refraining from research in this field. (shrink)

This review examines global human genetic resources management, focusing on genetic data policies and repositories in high- and middle-low-income countries. A comprehensive search strategy was employed across multiple databases, including official government websites and Google, to gather relevant literature on human genetic resources management policies and genetic resource databases. Documents were screened for relevance, focusing on high-income countries (United States, United Kingdom, Japan) and middle-low-income countries (China, India, Kenya). Data were extracted, coded, and analyzed to identify common themes and differences (...) in genetic resource management practices. High-income countries benefit from robust legal frameworks and advanced technological infrastructures. The United States enforces the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act to protect privacy and facilitate data sharing, while Japan relies on the Act on the Protection of Personal Information and ethical guidelines. Additionally, high-income countries host a variety of genetic databases and biobanks that support scientific research. In contrast, middle-low-income countries like China, India, and Kenya are still developing their frameworks. China has regulations such as the Biosecurity Law and the Regulations on the Management of Human Genetic Resources, but still requires more unified standards. India’s policies focus on genetic research and data protection through the Biological Diversity Act, while Kenya seeks to improve data management through the 2019 Data Protection Act. Significant disparities exist in human genetic resources management between high-income and middle-low-income countries. High-income countries have robust systems balancing privacy protection with research facilitation, supported by comprehensive and large-scale databases for scientific research. Middle-low-income countries need to enhance legal frameworks and build population-specific databases. Promoting equitable data sharing and adopting best practices from high-income countries are essential for advancing global scientific discovery and ensuring fair management of genetic resources. (shrink)