Recent discussions concerning the beginning problem of Hegel’s Logic have reached the agreement that any promised interpretation of the beginning of the Logic must reject opposition between the immediacy and mediation and embrace their unity instead. It is how this unity is understood that divides interpreters. Either the mediation precedes the immediacy and justifies it first, or a somewhat one-sided immediacy occurs first and waits to be mediated later in a circular justification. However, both concepts are confronted (...) with their own difficulties. To avoid these difficulties, I propose that the pure immediacy or pure being is justified to be the Logic’s beginning in virtue of its alternativelessness. Only it can measure up to the rigorous requirement implied by the nature of the beginning. (shrink)

Research with computer systems and musical grammars into improvisation as found in the tabla drumming system of North India has indicated that certain musical sentences comprise (a) variable prefixes, and (b) fixed suffixes (or cadences) identical with those of their original rhythmic themes. It was assumed that the cadence functioned as a kind of target in linear musical space, and yet experiments showed that defining what exactly constituted the cadence was problematic. This paper addresses the problem of the status (...) of cadential patterns, and demonstrates the need for a better understanding and formalization of ambiguity in musico-cognitive processing. It would appear from the discussion that the cadence is not a discrete unit in itself, but just part of an ever-present underlying framework comprising the entire original rhythmic theme. Improvisations (variations), it is suggested, merely break away from and rejoin this framework at important structural points. This endorses the theory of simultaneity. However, the general cognitive implications are still unclear, and further research is required to explore musical ambiguity and the interaction of musical, linguistic, and spatio-motor grammars. (shrink)

Introduction The act of caring in nursing requires previous deliberation and decision, however this perception only arises when an ethical problem emerges. Objective: Identify ethical problems of nurses action in the area of beginning of human life Method: Exploratory and descriptive method, with a qualitative approach. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data, who were submitted to content analysis. The sample was constituted by 26 nurses. Results 18 categories of problem areas and 56 ethical problems in early (...) human life were identified. The results obtained are very diverse, including areas such as termination of pregnancy, informed consent or maintaining privacy. However, other problem areas also emerge and numerous new subcategories/ethical problems, including: dealing with miscarriage, extreme situations, minors’ pregnancy, serious malformations detected at birth, consent regarding care during childbirth, Non- identification of a ethical problem, nurse social recognition and non-involvement of the person in labour. Conclusion Nurses face different ethical problems that impact their lives. We intend to contribute in helping to make decisions in this field, which the outset is of hope and joy, but which hides, behind this evidence, countless situations of suffering for everyone involved. The identification of ethical problems in this field, it is the first step to reflect about theme and helping decision-making for nurses that are taking care in this area of beginning of human life, when confronted whit the same type of ethical problems. (shrink)

Hegel opens the first book of his Science of Logic with the statement of a problem: “The beginning of philosophy must be either something mediated or something immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other, so either way of beginning finds its rebuttal.” Despite its significant placement, exactly what Hegel means in his expression of this problem and exactly what his solution to it is, remain unclear. In (...) this book, Robb Dunphy provides a detailed engagement with Hegel’s “problem of beginning”, locating it within Hegel’s account of significant approaches to the topic of beginning in the history of Western philosophy, as well as making an extended case for the influence of Pyrrhonian Scepticism on the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. Dunphy’s discussion of the various putative solutions that Hegel might be thought to put forward contributes to debates concerning Hegel’s views on the methodology of logic, the relation between his Logic and his Phenomenology of Spirit, and differences between his Encyclopaedia presentation of logic and that of his greater Science of Logic. Hegel and the Problem of Beginning also functions as a critical commentary on Hegel’s essay, “With what must the beginning of the science be made?” which should be of interest to both researchers and students working on the opening of Hegel’s Logic. (shrink)

In this article I develop an interpretation of the opening passages of Hegel's essay ‘With what must the beginning of science be made?’ I suggest firstly that Hegel is engaging there with a distinctive problem, the overcoming of which he understands to be necessary in order to guarantee the scientific character of the derivation of the fundamental categories of thought which he undertakes in the Science of Logic. I refer to this as ‘the problem of beginning’. (...) I proceed to clarify the nature of the problem, which I understand to be motivated by a concern to avoid arbitrariness, and then to detail the nature of Hegel's proposed solution, which turns on understanding how the concept of ‘pure being’, understood in a specific sense to be both mediated and immediate, avoids the concerns about arbitrariness which accompany attempts to begin merely with something mediated, or merely with something immediate. On this basis, I offer a number of criticisms of alternative approaches to the beginning of Hegel's Logic. (shrink)

The analysis of historical literature allows to consider profoundly the development of national culture and science of the 18th-first half of the 20th centuries and the formation and change of different historical concepts. With the analysis of historical periods that are highlighted in the research, general trends in the changing of paradigms about Russian historical development were concluded, which were translated to mass historical consciousness from the beginning of the 18th century up to 1917. The periods were closely connected (...) with the specific political, historical and economic changes in Russian Empire and with the dominance of certain textbooks during this time. The books were selected because of a number of factors: their inclusion to the school curriculum, the number of publications, the equal number of textbooks devoted to different historical periods. For the analysis were used 19 textbooks, schoolbooks for different courses of secondary schools and primary schools. All the sources of educational literature were grouped into two concepts - officially-state and the liberal. Each publication was highlighted the dominant concept as a base for the whole textbook. There is also a characteristic of the concepts that are presented chronologically. The analysis represents school history books as an important source for the formation of state policy in the representing of Russian history, and, that is more important, for creation of the concept of the state of Russian history. (shrink)

With the clarity that James deemed obligatory, Some Problems of Philosophy outlines his theory of perception. The early chapters expose the defects of intellectualism and monism and the advantages of empiricism and pluralism. The novelty that enters into concrete perceptual experience, and that is disallowed by the rationalizing intellect, suggests exciting possibilities. Denied any absolute truth in an ever-changing world, privy to only a piece of the truth at any given moment, the individual can, with faith and good will, help (...) create order out of chaos. Some Problems in Philosophy, published posthumously, represents an important advance in William James’s thought. (shrink)

Robb Dunphy's new book, Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness, is a serious piece of scholarship intended for advanced reade.

In this brief commentary, I offer an appreciative yet critical analysis of Abram Brummett and Erica Salter's article, “Mapping the Moral Terrain of Clinical Deception.” I challenge the authors to clarify their choice of the term “deception” (as opposed to “lying” or “dishonesty”), and I explain how these different terms may affect one's moral analysis. I also draw attention to the authors’ claim that veracity is the ethical default of clinicians. I argue that their failure to defend this claim renders (...) their framework more limited in its usefulness than they seem to acknowledge. While their framework does an excellent job of identifying morally salient features of clinical deception, it cannot be used to measure the strength of justification for an act of deception apart from a normative conception of truthfulness. (shrink)

A bold and all-embracing exploration of the nature and progress of knowledge from one of today's great thinkers. Throughout history, mankind has struggled to understand life's mysteries, from the mundane to the seemingly miraculous. In this important new book, David Deutsch, an award-winning pioneer in the field of quantum computation, argues that explanations have a fundamental place in the universe. They have unlimited scope and power to cause change, and the quest to improve them is the basic regulating principle not (...) only of science but of all successful human endeavor. This stream of ever improving explanations has infinite reach, according to Deutsch: we are subject only to the laws of physics, and they impose no upper boundary to what we can eventually understand, control, and achieve. In his previous book, The Fabric of Reality, Deutsch describe the four deepest strands of existing knowledge-the theories of evolution, quantum physics, knowledge, and computation-arguing jointly they reveal a unified fabric of reality. In this new book, he applies that worldview to a wide range of issues and unsolved problems, from creativity and free will to the origin and future of the human species. Filled with startling new conclusions about human choice, optimism, scientific explanation, and the evolution of culture, The Beginning of Infinity is a groundbreaking book that will become a classic of its kind. (shrink)

At the beginning of the new century in Uruguay, evidence can be found of some significant transformations in the study of Physics at Udelar. Firstly, the separation of the treatments of some physics problems, such as electricity, from those philosophical traditions that were part of the development of the discipline in the nineteenth century, is definitive. Secondly, it is not difficult to define the study of physics from a series of problems that characterized its own identity, which several professors (...) began to take an interest in. Undoubtedly this coincides with those great milestones in the History of Physics, those related to the definition of thermodynamics, advances in knowledge of atomic structure, and of course, everything related to the theory of relativity. (shrink)

Beginning Philosophy offers students and general readers a uniquely straightforward yet challenging introduction to fundamental philosophical problems. Readily accessible to novices yet rich enough for more experienced readers, it combines serious investigation across a wide range of subjects in analytic philosophy with a clear, user-friendly writing style. Topics include logic and reasoning, the theory of knowledge, the nature of the external world, the mind/body problem, normative ethics, metaethics, free will, the existence of God, and the problem of (...) evil. A concluding chapter outlines the worldview developed in the text and connects that view to questions about the meaning of life. The interconnection of philosophical problems and the relationship of philosophy and science are emphasized throughout. The book includes both extensive quotes from historical figures such as Aquinas, Descartes, and Hume and references to philosophically minded nonphilosophers like Dostoevski, Stephen Jay Gould, and Carl Sagan. Beginning Philosophy is designed for use in introductory philosophy courses at a wide range of institutions. It contains numerous pedagogical materials at the end of each chapter: sections called "misconceptions" list errors that introductory readers should avoid; guide questions prompt students to explain in their own words what the text is saying; review questions help students prepare for examinations; open-ended discussion questions call for independent judgment; and annotated bibliographies provide suggestions for further reading. The volume is further enhanced by a list of famous quotations from philosophers, a glossary of philosophical terms, a glossary of names of the most famous philosophers and scientists discussed in the text, and an extensive bibliography listing every work cited. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness by Robb DUNPHYJ. M. FritzmanDUNPHY, Robb. Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023. x + 213 pp. Cloth, $105.00This rich, learned, and important book investigates and critically evaluates how, according to Hegel, philosophy should begin. Briefly stated, the problem of beginning philosophy is that any (...) beginning seems susceptible to a skeptical challenge that takes the form of a dilemma. On the one side, if philosophy begins immediately with a presuppositionless assertion, skeptics will contend that it is dogmatic. On the other side, if philosophy begins mediately with a claim that presupposes an argument, skeptics will confront each premise of that argument with a trilemma: The premise is either only a dogmatic assertion; it is the conclusion of an argument whose premises must in turn be justified (which threatens an infinite regress); or it depends on an argument that is viciously circular. Hegel solves this problem with a beginning that is simultaneously immediate and mediate.The introduction explains that this book has three goals. First, it critically analyzes the problem of beginning, showing how Hegel responds to the skeptical challenge. Second, it explains how Hegel’s approach to the problem and his solution are informed by his deep engagement with the tradition of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Finally, it provides a guide to reading Hegel’s essay “With What Must the Beginning of the Science be Made?” in the Science of Logic.Chapter 1, “Hegel and Pyrrhonian Scepticism,” presents the essentials of Pyrrhonism and Hegel’s interpretation of it. Pyrrhonism is a way of life. It aims to find an equally good counterargument for every argument it encounters, thus leading to a suspension of judgment that allows the skeptic to live in a state of undisturbedness. Pyrrhonism presents encountered arguments with a trilemma: Either they depend on dogmatic assertions; they generate an infinite regress of arguments; or they are viciously circular. Hegel’s interpretation emphasizes skepticism’s equipollence, whereby it opposes every argument with a counterargument that is equally persuasive. Viewed historically, Pyrrhonism seems to have confronted arguments only as it happened to encounter them and to have restricted itself to epistemology. However, Hegel is open to the interpretation that skepticism’s inquiry could be completed. This would allow it to demonstrate that for every argument there will always be an [End Page 143] equally persuasive counterargument. He also interprets skepticism as accepting a metaphysical principle regarding the inherent instability of objects.“A Short History of the Problem of Beginning,” chapter 2, provides a detailed précis of Hegel’s essay. It also gives the brief history of the problem of beginning, discussing Descartes, Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. It notes that some philosophers posit an objective beginning, others a subjective beginning. It explains why Hegel regards previous attempts to solve the problem of beginning as inadequate. It recognizes that Fichte’s solution can be interpreted as much closer to that of Hegel than Hegel acknowledges.Chapter 3, “The Problem of Beginning,” supplies Hegel’s own account of the problem. His solution has two versions, one in the Science of Logic and the other in the Encyclopedia Logic. Each version posits a beginning without determinate content. In the Science of Logic, Hegel states that absolute knowing, the culminating shape of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, corresponds to the empty thinking with which philosophy begins. Philosophy’s beginning in the Science of Logic is mediate as it emerges from the progression of shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit and immediate as it does not have an object of thought. In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel proposes that a completed skepticism corresponds to the abstract concept of being with which philosophy begins. Philosophy’s beginning in the Encyclopedia Logic is mediate as it emerges from the skepticism’s equipollence and immediate as being without content. Hegel ultimately denies that a completed skepticism could play this role, however, which suggests that he believes that philosophy can begin immediately.“Meditation I—Phenomenology,” chapter 4, argues that Hegel’s first version is unsuccessful. To succeed, William Maker’s interpretation would have to be accepted, which... (shrink)

Beginnings can be empirically described, philosophically debated, fictionally recounted or theatrically staged – each kind of discourse approaches beginnings via an examination of representation as an impossible return to source. The work of French philosopher Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe articulates the problem of beginnings by considering them as a form of subjective collapse, loss of integrity and aggravation of emotion resulting from the paradoxical logic of representation. While Lacoue-Labarthe’s position has been largely developed in his philosophical writings, this study focuses more (...) specifically on his literary production, namely his collection of short stories, L’ “Allégorie”, and his staged debate with Jean-Luc Nancy in Scène: suivi de Dialogue sur le dialogue, in which the two writers present opposing views on the theatre. The analysis of the above texts centres on the two key “locations” for beginnings, namely narrative voice and the theatrical stage. (shrink)

Early in this volume, David Ehrenfeld describes what prophecy really is. Referring to the biblical prophets, he says they were not the "holy fortunetellers that the word prophet has come to signify....The business of prophecy is not simply foretelling the future; rather it is describing the present with exceptional truthfulness and accuracy." Once this is done, then it can be seen that broad aspects of the future have suddenly become apparent. The twentieth century is drawing to a chaotic close amidst (...) portents of unprecedented change and upheaval. The unravelling of societies and civilizations and the destruction of nature march together--linked--a fact whose enormous significance is often lost. In Beginning Again, David Ehrenfeld has undertaken the difficult task of describing the present clearly enough to reveal the future. Out of his broad vision emerges a glimpse of a new millennium: a vision at once frightening and comforting, a scene of great devastation and great rebuilding. Ehrenfeld ranges far and wide to present a coherent vision of our relationship with Nature--its many aspects and implications--as our century opens into the next millennium. Whether he is writing about the problem of loyalty to organizations, rights versus obligations, our over-managed society, the vanishing of established knowledge, the failure of experts, the triumph of dandelions, Dr. Seuss, Edward Teller, or the future of farming, he is always concerned with the intricate interaction between technology and nature. As in his classic book, The Arrogance of Humanism, Ehrenfeld never loses sight of our fatal love affair with the fantasy of control. We now have no choice, he argues, but to transform the dream of control, of progress, from one of overweening hubris, love of consumption, and the idiot's goal of perpetual growth, to one based on "the inventive imitation of nature," with its honesty, beauty, resilience, and durability. Few American writers and even fewer scientists can describe these timeless, transcendent qualities of nature so well. In "Places," the opening chapter, David Ehrenfeld tells about nightly vigils he spent alone on the moonlit beach of Tortuguero, watching giant sea turtles emerging from the sea to lay their eggs in the black sand where they were born. "I could watch the perfect white spheres falling," he writes. "Falling as they have fallen for a hundred million years, with the same slow cadence, always shielded from the rain or stars by the same massive bulk with the beaked head and the same large, myopic eyes rimmed with crusts of sand washed out by tears. Minutes and hours, days and months dissolve into eons. I am on an Oligocene beach, an Eocene beach, a Cretaceous beach--the scene is the same. It is night, the turtles are coming back, always back; I hear a deep hiss of breath and catch a glint of wet shell as the continents slide and crash, the oceans form and grow.". (shrink)

How a theory (or a part thereof) begins affects how it develops, and so we start at the roots of the Informal Logic discussions over the Principle of Charity and look at the contributions made in the exchanges between Ralph Johnson (1981) and Trudy Govier (1981). As valuable as the insights of these two theorists are, they include two assumptions that we find problematic. Johnson organizes his account of Charity by drawing from Michael Scriven’s (1976) treatment and identifying the issue (...) as finding the “best possible interpretation.” This raises the serious question of whose terms are used in making such a best interpretation. Or, best for whom? In the etic/emic debate surrounding the anthropological approach to argument, this is an important question to address. Govier disagrees with Johnson and approaches the issue from the direction of determining the best argument. The assumption here is that a common understanding of “argument” will underly all situations in which charity is required. Grounding our understanding of Charity in Aristotle’s discussion of goodwill (eunoia) in the Rhetoric, we ask what charity must look like in an emic environment characterizing so much cross-cultural argumentation; and we do so in relation to the problem of deep disagreement as introduced by Robert Fogelin (1985/2005) and developed by cross-cultural argumentation scholars. (shrink)

The recognition of metaphilosophy as a separate independent philosophical discipline forces us to pay attention not only to the various variants of its understanding and its own status, but also to the history of its origin and development. It is believed that the beginning of metaphilosophy as a study of the nature of philosophy was laid by several articles by M. Lazerowitz, although some other philosophers are mentioned in passing. The study characterizes Lazerowitz’s desire to understand metaphilosophy as a (...) view of philosophy “from the outside” and demonstrates the failure of this attempt: in fact, his metaphilosophy represents a position “inside” philosophy itself. The author of the research argues that the beginning of philosophy of philosophy should be associated with the works of the Russian and Polish philosopher Heinrich Struve and suggests a broader reconstruction of his approach. A comparison of the works of these philosophers makes it possible to identify their common starting point, which is the statement of the presence of many disagreements in philosophy, that is, what Kant called a “scandal” in philosophy. The differences between the two approaches are also revealed, in particular, Struve’s philosophy of philosophy is a precursor to any philosophy in general, aimed, while maintaining the different points of view of individual philosophers, at developing a “common worldview”. As the subject of his philosophy of philosophy, Struve calls a historical and critical analysis of the current state of philosophy, an explanation of the subject, tasks, goals, aspirations and method of philosophy; among the “principles” of philosophy is the study of the relationship of philosophy to other “phenomena of mental life.” In addition to Lazerowitz and Struve, the author points to other philosophers (for example, J. Maritain, V. Ern, E. Kalinowsky, T. Oizerman), whose interests include metaphilosophical problems, and a detailed study of their works can help to see a certain historical tradition of metaphilosophy. (shrink)

In this provocative book, Edward Schiappa argues that rhetorical theory did not originate with the Sophists in the fifth century B.C.E, as is commonly believed, but came into being a century later. Schiappa examines closely the terminology of the Sophists—such as Gorgias and Protagoras—and of their reporters and opponents—especially Plato and Aristotle—and contends that the terms and problems that make up what we think of as rhetorical theory had not yet formed in the era of the early Sophists. His revision (...) of rhetoric’s early history enables him to change the way we read both the Sophists and Aristotle and Plato. Schiappa contends, for example, that Plato probably coined the Greek word for rhetoric; that Gorgias is a “prose rhapsode” whose style does not deserve the criticism it has received; that Isocrates deliberately never uses the Greek work for "rhetoric" and that our habit of pitting him versus Plato as “rhetoric versus philosophy” is problematic; and that Aristotle "disciplined" the genre of epideictic in a way that robs the genre of its political importance. His book will be of great interest to students of classics, communications, philosophy, and rhetoric. (shrink)

The present article shows the beginning of the controversy about the real difference between essence and existence. The controversy started with the declaration of Giles of Rome, who was the first to describe the difference between essence and existence as an inter rem et rem difference. In this way, he brought a bout a reification of essence and existence, which deviated completely from the views of Thomas Aquinas, for whom essence and existence form a compositum in a complex type (...) of being, combining with each other according, to the principle of actuality and potentiality. Existence becomes thus an actualisation of essence, with the latter remaining towards the former in the relation of potentiality.Later, a very acute controversy erupted over the problem of the real difference in which its advocates often cited the views of Giles of Rome. (shrink)

The work of Hesiod, an ancient Greek epic poet, is considered, in particular, his poem “Theogony”, as one of the first cosmogonic constructions in European culture. Particular attention is drawn to the image and concept of Chaos – the initial state of the world, which also has a creative, creative essence. The primary instances that appear together with Chaos – Gaia, Tartarus and Eros also act as elements of the basic ontological model. The attitude of the ancient philosophical tradition to (...) the concept of Chaos, which was problematized even by the pre-Socratics and compared with the famous Orphic cosmologies, is analyzed. In this sense, the image of Chaos in Hesiod can be considered as the first principle of building the world by analogy with the search for arché in later philosophers, as well as in its abstract, idealized form – the initial theoretical model of being and the beginning of ancient ontology. Of particular interest in this sense is Chaos, a rather complex and mysterious reality that is primary in relation to others and, moreover, is itself a creative force. The problem can be formulated as follows: can Chaos in Hesiod’s poem be considered a mythological-poetic ontology, an analogue and prerequisite of the philosophical concept of being, or even a certain essence of the world, its eternal integral part. The task of the study is to describe a general approach to understanding Chaos in Hesiod’s poem as an ontological essential first principle, which serves as a prototype of the philosophical ontology of later philosophers. Chaos can be interpreted as the original state of being and as a reference system for all world coordinates and the ideal beginning of the world. The original, initial state of the world, as well as the origin of the latter, is a cross-cutting theme of ancient Greek philosophy and science. Already in the early theogony, in the Orphics and in Hesiod, we find a certain mythological-poetic and, at the same time, religious-philosophical model of the origin of the world and its first elements. It would be too bold to consider these rather fantastic images and constructions as a real philosophical or scientific theory, which already in the understanding of the ancient Greeks should have had clearly defined principles and a consistent logical structure. Nevertheless, already in the first attempts to describe the structure of the universe we see an attempt to find the beginning from which a kind of ontological intuition of ancient Greek philosophy begins and which will later lead to the emergence of the main philosophical schools. Moreover, this intuition allowed us to pose a question that is still the basis of ontological problems. Even a preliminary consideration of the historical-philosophical material demonstrates the possibility of various interpretations of the ontological constructions of early ancient cosmogonies. The vision of Chaos in Hesiod proposed here is the first step towards a hermeneutic reconstruction of the primary foundations of ancient Greek philosophy and its mythological and poetic origins. (shrink)

The question of when a human life begins is usually posed in ethical contexts. Whoever wants to know if – and when – abortion is ethically permissible links the question of the beginning of life with genuine ethical problems: the question of the ethical status of the human individual in her first stages of life is one way to frame the issue. The same applies to the disputes concerning the admissibility or inadmissibility of research on human embryos and preimplantation (...) diagnostics. Whoever enquires about the point in time at which an individual human life starts to exist does this mostly with a moral intention. Furthermore, the question of the beginning of life is frequently expressed in the first-person perspective, as exemplified by the title of Ford’s book When did I begin?. (shrink)

An examination of the origins of the concept of Being from the transition from pre-philosophical to philosophical thought. Brief discussion of the problem, and how it is manifested historically. A discussion of recent thinkers who tried to deal with the problem. A discussion of Myth and Logos; the origins of the conceptualization of Being. A brief examination of Hans Blumenberg’s understanding of myth as a “fleeing in the face of Being”. An argument for why relation has to be (...) both separate from relata and ontologically prior to relata and thus is a more coherent understanding of Being than a substance understanding. A conclusion that a relational understanding can be seen in the earliest Presocratics, even though the substance understanding, beginning with Parmenides, dominates historically. (shrink)

Based on archival documents, regulatory and other official materials, as well as the press of that time, the article attempts to shed some light on the complex beginning of Lithuanian Roman legal system research. Since the beginning of theUniversity law degree in 1922, the Roman law courses (then divided into history and dogma, the system) were taught with an exclusive focus. However, while assembling the faculty of professors at the Lithuanian university, in the beginning they had to (...) content mainly with practitioners, therefore it was particularly difficult to solve the problem of the Roman legal system researcher that required very specific knowledge. (shrink)

This paper isolates a hard, long-standing species problem: developing a comprehensive and exacting theory about the constitutive conditions of the species category, one that is accurate for most of the living world, and which vindicates the widespread view that the species category is of more theoretical import than categories such as genus, sub-species, paradivision, and stirp. The paper then uncovers flaws in several views that imply we have either already solved that hard species problem or dissolved it altogether (...) – so-called We Are Done views. In doing so the paper offers new criticisms of the general lineage species concept (GLSC), evolutionary species concept (EvSC), biological species concept (BSC), other similar concepts, Ereshefsky’s eliminative pluralism about the species category, and both Mishler’s pessimism and Wilkins’ phenomenalism about that category. Opposed to We Are Done views, the paper argues for a Revving Up view, on which we are nearly ready to begin the hard species problem in earnest. To help work towards these conclusions, the paper begins with an outline of a new kind of view of species (Barker 2019a), which proposes they are feedback systems of a mathematically specifiable and empirically testable sort. (shrink)

사단칠정논변四端七情論辨은 이황李滉과 기대승奇大升사이에 벌어진 논쟁으로, 사단四端과 칠정七情 그리고 이기심성론理氣心性論에 대하여 심도 있는 이해를 공유하였던 조선의 대표적인 철학논쟁 중 하나이다. 일반적으로 사칠논변은 정지운鄭之雲이 그린 「천명도天命圖」의 “四端發於理, 七情發於氣”라는 사칠설四七說을 이황이 “四端理之發, 七情氣之發”로 수정하였고, 이 수정된 사칠설이 적힌 「천명신도天命新圖」에 대해 기대승이 의문을 제기한 데서 시작되었다고 알려져 있다. 그러나 정지운과 이황이「천명도」를 수정한 과정과 사칠논변 제1서~제4서의 내용에 의하면, 기대승이 문제를 제기한「천명도」는 기존의 이해와는 달리「천명신도」가 아니라 「천명구도天命舊圖」일 가능성이 높다. 본 논문은 1996년에 이에 대한 문제를 제기한 김용헌의 「고봉 기대승의 사칠논변과 천명도」의 논거를 바탕으로 그의 주장을 검토하고, 마지막으로 (...) 「천명도설후서天命圖說後叙」와 「천명도설天命圖說」의 내용을 근거로 사칠논변의 발단이 된 천명도가 「천명구도」임을 확인하고자 한다. (shrink)

In Kierkegaard’s Instant, David J. Kangas reads Kierkegaard to reveal his radical thinking about temporality. For Kierkegaard, the instant of becoming, in which everything changes in the blink of an eye, eludes recollection and anticipation. It constitutes a beginning always already at work. As Kangas shows, Kierkegaard’s retrieval of the sudden quality of temporality allows him to stage a deep critique of the idealist projects of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. By linking Kierkegaard’s thought to the tradition of Meister Eckhart, (...) Kangas formulates the central problem of these early texts and puts them into contemporary light—can thinking hold itself open to the challenges of temporality? (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to take a close look at some little discussed aspects of the kalam cosmological argument, with a view to deciding whether there is any reason to believe the causal principle on which it rests (“Whatever begins to exist must have a cause”), and also with a view to determining what conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the First Cause of the universe (supposing thatthere is one). I am particularly concerned with the problems (...) that arise when it is assumed (as it often is) that that the First Cause is timeless and that it timelessly creates time. I argue that this forces the defender of the kalam argument to analyze the concept of “beginning to exist” in a way that raises series doubts about its main causal principle, and that it also undercuts the main argument for saying that the cause of the universe must be a person. (shrink)

In his remarkable but scarcely noticed paper “Logic and Analysis” (=\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$=$$\end{document} L&A), Church explains what counts as a formally correct and materially adequate solution to a problem of philosophical analysis. In this chapter it is shown that according to the L&A methodology, the λ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\lambda $$\end{document}-calculus may be considered as Church’s solution to the problem of a philosophical analysis of functions. L&A (...) establishes that problems of philosophical analysis are often problems of applied logic in the sense of formulating some system of ideas in coherent logical form. Usually, the ideas in question are already known to common sense. However, the common-sense formulation requires amendment and supplementation, in order to remove uncertainties and perplexities. In the case of the (non-extensional) concept of function-as-rules, the common-sense formulation corresponds to the traditional (or Euler’s) notation for functions. And there is a double ambiguity found in this traditional approach, one related to first-order functions (the Church-Kleene examples) and one related to higher-order functions (the Curry-Feys example) as well as Wittgenstein’s question on “f(f)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f(f)$$\end{document}”. In the chapter it is shown that the λ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\lambda $$\end{document}-calculus qualifies as an adequate solution to the problem of a philosophical analysis of functions according to L&A and Quine’s conceptions of philosophical analysis. (shrink)

This paper examines the evolution of the doctrine concerning the beginning of philosophy as evidenced in the philosophies of Heinrich Rickert and Werner Flach. The initial section of the paper explores Rickert’s anti-Hegelian approach to the problem of philosophical beginning, while the subsequent section delves into Werner Flach’s adaptation of Rickert’s principles, infusing them with a renewed Hegelian perspective. The concluding segment offers an assessment of the limitations inherent in both doctrines pertaining to the beginning of (...) philosophy. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders certain of Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's theoretical philosophy in the light of recent interpretations of the latter. The paper seeks to show how these criticisms, far from being merely parochial or rhetorical, turn on central issues concerning the nature of thought and what it is to think. I begin by introducing Hegel's conception of "pure thought" as this is distinguished by his commitment to certain general requirements on a properly philosophical form of inquiry. I then outline Hegel's (...) strategy for resolving a crucial problem he takes himself to face. For his account of the nature of thought depends upon the idea of a form of inquiry in which nothing whatsoever is presupposed; but this idea appears basically paradoxical inasmuch as the mere act of beginning to inquire in a certain way embodies an assumption about how it is appropriate to begin. Turning to Kierkegaard, I consider a key objection to the effect that Hegel's strategy for resolving this paradox depends on the incoherent idea of a purely reflexive act of thinking. Finally, I draw out some central features of the alternative account of "situated" thought and inquiry which Kierkegaard presents as distinctively Socratic. (shrink)

Williams did not think of political problems as a mere adjunct to ethical questions. He believed that there can be no timeless justification of political power, which he takes Kant and Rawls to aim at. Likewise, liberalism ignores that legitimation depends on historical circumstances. Williams’s historical relativism comes hand in hand with a realism that makes him object to utopian theories. To him, political projects are “essentially conditioned, not just in their background intellectual conditions but as a matter of empirical (...) realism, by their historical circumstances.”. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders certain of Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's theoretical philosophy in the light of recent interpretations of the latter. The paper seeks to show how these criticisms, far from being merely parochial or rhetorical, turn on central issues concerning the nature of thought and what it is to think. I begin by introducing Hegel's conception of "pure thought" as this is distinguished by his commitment to certain general requirements on a properly philosophical form of inquiry. I then outline Hegel's (...) strategy for resolving a crucial problem he takes himself to face. For his account of the nature of thought depends upon the idea of a form of inquiry in which nothing whatsoever is presupposed; but this idea appears basically paradoxical inasmuch as the mere act of beginning to inquire in a certain way embodies an assumption about how it is appropriate to begin. Turning to Kierkegaard, I consider a key objection to the effect that Hegel's strategy for resolving this paradox depends on the incoherent idea of a purely reflexive act of thinking. Finally, I draw out some central features of the alternative account of "situated" thought and inquiry which Kierkegaard presents as distinctively Socratic. © 2007 Taylor & Francis. (shrink)

Through an analysis of the relations between life and machine in Canguilhem and Simondon, I argue that by using analogy in its speculative or epistemic function, cybernetics unleashes a specular circulation without beginning or end. Along with Derrida’s analysis of the biologist Françoise Jacob, I argue that this makes it impossible to speak of epistemic “models” and, therefore, to settle on a starting point for their speculation on technology and its relation to life. On this basis I conclude that, (...) despite Canguilhem’s intention to begin with life and Simondon’s—or that of his commentators—to set the starting point of analogical speculation (allagmatics), a whole economy of imitation operates at and as the basis of cybernetics. This insight is generative, I argue, for current problems in the philosophy of technology and philosophy in general. (shrink)

Leibniz was and is well known for his effort to answer the philosophical and theological problems posed by evil. Already in his own day he was gratified that his Theodicy (1710), a book-length treatment of “the goodness of God, the freedom of man, and the origin of evil,” had “pleased excellent theologians of all three main confessions” (Antognazza 2009, 482–3). Voltaire’s popular play, Candide (1759), features Dr. Pangloss, whose refusal to acknowledge the badness of things seems to caricature Leibniz’s optimism. (...) More recently, scholars have given the problem of evil a central place in Leibniz’s thought (Rutherford 1995; Antognazza 2009). Major projects have provided access to key texts (CP; LGR; DPG), insight into the Theodicy itself (Rateau 2011; Jorgensen & Newlands 2014), and a synthetic understanding of Leibniz’s developing views (Rateau 2019). -/- This entry follows Leibniz’s effort to credit God for good while excusing God of evil, beginning with his first attempts in the early 1670s and culminating in his most extensive and popular published work, the Theodicy (Antognazza 2009, 480). The first section outlines Leibniz’s understanding of why evil presents a problem for his conceptions of God, freedom, and creation. The second section presents Leibniz’s first attempt at a complete answer, and the final section focuses on the emergence and coherence of Leibniz’s mature view. (shrink)