A theoretical physicist and feminist theorist, Karen Barad elaborates her theory of agential realism, a schema that is at once a new epistemology, ontology, and ethics.

How much of philosophical, scientific, and political thought is caught up with the idea of continuity? What if it were otherwise? This paper experiments with the disruption of continuity. The reader is invited to participate in a performance of spacetime (re)configurings that are more akin to how electrons experience the world than any journey narrated though rhetorical forms that presume actors move along trajectories across a stage of spacetime (often called history). The electron is here invoked as our host, an (...) interesting body to inhabit (not in order to inspire contemplation of flat-footed analogies between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ worlds, concepts that already presume a given spatial scale), but a way of thinking with and through dis/continuity – a dis/orienting experience of the dis/jointedness of time and space, entanglements of here and there, now and then, that is, a ghostly sense of dis/continuity, a quantum dis/continuity. There is no overarching sense of temporality, of continuity, in place. Each scene diffracts various temporalities within and across the field of spacetimemattering. Scenes never rest, but are reconfigured within, dispersed across, and threaded through one another. The hope is that what comes across in this dis/jointed movement is a felt sense of différance, of intra-activity, of agential separability – differentiatings that cut together/apart – that is the hauntological nature of quantum entanglements. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is revolutionizing how humans conduct transactions, make decisions, and engage in social settings, with applications in important sectors, such as healthcare, banking, and criminal justice. While AI systems offer full efficiency, they additionally pose significant threats and ethical issues, such as accountability gaps and algorithmic biases. The challenge for AI-driven governments is to establish governance structures that effectively manage the evolving threats posed by increasingly complex and autonomous AI systems. This paper seeks to establish a theoretical framework (...) for analyzing AI governance by examining mainly four critical issues: bias, transparency, economic influence, and the need for adaptive regulatory approaches. These issues are selected based on their relevance to the societal and ethical implications of AI, their impact on public trust, and their influence on fairness and equitable outcomes. Through this lens, the paper evaluates current regulatory models and self-regulation initiatives, analyzing their capacity to balance effective oversight with the need for innovation. Drawing on governance theories and socio-technical systems, the paper explores how these frameworks can address AI’s risks while enhancing its positive contributions. In addition, the paper identifies key gaps in existing governance approaches and calls for further research and policy development. Ultimately, this work aims to advance the understanding of AI governance by offering actionable insights that inform the creation of models capable of protecting public interests while enabling technological progress. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Understanding and Experience of Compassion:Aquinas and the Dalai LamaJudith BaradHis Holiness the fourteenth Dalai Lama writes that the essence of Mahayana Buddhism is compassion.1 Although most people recognize compassion as one of the most admirable virtues, it is not easy to find discussions of it by Christian theologians. Instead, Christian theologians tend to discuss charity, a virtue infused by God into a person. Some of these theologians, such (...) as Cardinal Henri de Lubac,2 insist that Christian charity and Buddhist compassion are very different from each other. Are they correct? A good source to investigate this claim is in Aquinas's Summa Theologica, which contains a very developed discussion of charity. If we look at Aquinas's text and compare it to what the current Dalai Lama writes about compassion, we will recognize that they are discussing the same virtue. Moreover, by combining the insights from East and West, as expressed by the thoughts of the current Dalai Lama and St. Thomas Aquinas, we can achieve a better grasp of compassion so that we can more easily practice it in our daily lives. Though remarkably similar, the two accounts offer differing perspectives, which can be incorporated for mutual enrichment.Much of Aquinas's philosophy of compassion derives from his Christian beliefs, just as much of the Dalai Lama's teachings on compassion are based on Tibetan Buddhism. This explains some of the differences in their accounts. Unlike Christians, Buddhists neither believe in a personal God nor in a soul. Yet despite their theological differences, Aquinas and the Dalai Lama generally share a very similar view of compassion. In fact, one could well imagine Aquinas agreeing with the Dalai Lama who, after acknowledging his religious influence, writes that his goal is "to appeal for an approach to ethics based on universal rather than religious principles."3 It is appropriate, therefore, to begin by considering the similarities in their accounts of compassion, starting with their definitions of compassion. [End Page 11]DefinitionsEtymologically, the word "compassion"—compassio—comes from two Latin words: com means "with" and pati means "suffer." Literally, then, "compassion" means "to suffer with." Aquinas discusses compassion as an interior effect of charity, a theological virtue. It is interior because compassion is felt within the person who has charity. The cause of compassion, charity, Aquinas describes as the friendship between God's children and God Himself. Although Aquinas wrote prolifically on the subject of charity, someone could overlook his writing on compassion because he discusses it under the term "mercy." Diana Fritz Cates, for instance, who draws on an Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical framework to develop a theory of compassion, observes, "Aristotle and Thomas have little to say about compassion: hence, it will not be helpful to begin with their accounts."4 However, Aquinas uses the word misericordia (mercy) as a synonym of compassio (compassion). The synonymous relationship between compassion and mercy is also recognized by the Dalai Lama, who affirms, "Mercy and compassion are the same."5Aquinas defines mercy as "heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him if we can." If we experience this heartfelt sympathy, we're not discouraged if the person we try to help doesn't respond. Explicitly connecting mercy and compassion, Aquinas add that mercy, misericordia, gets its name "from denoting a person's compassionate heart (miserum cor) for another's unhappiness."6 The concept of "another's unhappiness" is important to his discussion. A necessary condition of being happy, in Aquinas's view, is that an individual must obtain what he or she wishes. Conversely, someone is unhappy when he suffers what he doesn't wish to suffer. Aquinas maintains that the suffering produced by one's frustrated desire for what he or she perceives as good is a sufficient condition for evoking mercy. In regard to the merciful response, it shouldn't matter what the suffering person perceives as good. So long as the person is suffering what he doesn't wish to suffer, this person should be treated mercifully. Suppose a teenager suffers from being unpopular with his peers. Although the compassionate person may not value popularity, she should extend compassion to the... (shrink)

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This paper engages with questions of agency and atmospheres, in a revivification of the paper “TransMaterialities: Trans*/Matter/Realities and Queer Political Imaginings,” published in glq in 2015. The abstract of the published paper reads: “Drawing on a disparate set of naturalcultural phenomena from regenerative biology, quantum field theory, and queer and trans theories that include lightning, primordial ooze, frogs, bioelectricity, monstrosity, trans rage, virtual particles, and errant pathways, this article is about the materiality of political imageries and the possibilities for making (...) queer alliance with nature’s nonessentialist nature. In particular, it makes an argument for the radically deconstructive, queer, and trans nature of nature, including nature’s own engagement with materialist practices of imagining.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN MORAL JUDGMENT AND ACTIVITY JUDITH BARAD Indiana State University Terre Haute, Indiana MONG PHILOSOPHERS who have discussed the role of emotion in morality there is much disagreement. At one extreme there is a tradition of ethical thinkers, represented by David Hume, who juxtapose reason and emotion and hoM that the choice of ultimate va:1ues is always made by the emotional side of (...) our natul'e. Insisting that emotion, not reason, is the foundation of moral philosophy, Hume says "Reason is, and ought to he, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any office other than to serve and obey them." 1 Conv:erseily, Immanuel Kant adamantly insists that reason must be the sole determinant of morality. Since morality is stricrtly a rational endeavor, the emotions (or what he more generrully called the incJinations), whethei!.' beneficent or ma1e:fiicent, should never be alilowed to intrude into our moral judgments. Each extreme claims that a part of our nature, respectiv 'e,ly reason or emotion, is not essentirul to the moral life. Hut the be1lief that we shouM sev;er any part of our nature from swch a pervasive area of our lives leads to unfortunate consequen1ces. If we base our understanding of morality on Hume's call for the slavish submission of reason, we can justify all kinds of social exploitation and sensuous indulgence. On the other hand, if we follow Kant's ideal of suppressing our emotions, then bodi1ly desires can appear ba:d to us, and we may irrationaHy disaJfow many human needs, both to ourselv;es and to others. i David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 3, 3. 397 398.TUDITH BARAD But on this question of the role of emotion in mol'lwl judgment, Aquinas oiooupies a position intermediate between Kant and Hume. He neither dismisses reason as a guide to practical affairs nor regards emotions as mere obstacles to be overcome in form.mating a moral judgment. For Aquinas even though e&ch of the human £acmlties has a unique role to perform, an individual £unctions in his entirety in the moral sphere. This essay will focus on how our emotions can support as well as impruir our moraJ conduct. The purpose of this study is to show thrut emotion may be either 1an impediment or a usefuJ srtimu1us to obj·ectiv;e moral decision malcing, obscuring our morrul judgments or 11einfol'lcing our commitments. Obviously, Hume's argument ·that reason cannot judge or criticize the emotions is very foreign to Aquinas's thought, and no one has yet ruttemp ;!Jed 1to subsume one •ruooount under the other. Afan Donagan, however, has clwimed that Aquinas's moll"al theory " anticipates Kant's metaphysics of morals," because of what " both ~are] found to 1say about motiViation." 2 But, contrary to Donagan 's claim, this study will make clear rlihat in the area of how emotions a:ffrect our moral life ·the two g11eat thinkers pal'lt company. To understand how emotion :liun:ctions mthe moral judgment, we must fust examine what Aquinas means by "emotion." 3 He describes :emotion as a spontaneous.feeling consisting of both a phy;siofogical 1and an affective response to an object.4 He observes that emotion involves virtually ithe en2 Alan Donagan, " Teleology and Consistency in Theories of :Morality as Natural Law," in Georgetown Symposium on Ethics, edited by Rocco Porreca (Lanham, :Md.: University Press of America, 1984), p. 96. a Throughout this paper I will use the word "emotion " for the Latin passia, since " passion" has a more intense connotation in contemporary English than the term employed by Aquinas. "Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, (Westminster, :Md.: Christian Classics, 1981), I-II, q.22. In the first article of this question, Aquinas says that " Passion... is only in respect of a bodily transmutation." Quoting Damascene in the third article, he says " Passion is a movement of the sensi· tive appetite when we think of good or evil." I have combined both passages to arrive at Aquinas's description of emotion. AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS 399 tire human being: intd1ect, sense cognition, spontaneous volition, and bodily changes. Aquinas bases this position on his hylomorphic... (shrink)

In this short middleword, I focus on physics’ historical and ongoing colonization of space and time, and how nuclear physics—indeed, the theoretization of nuclear forces in and through quantum field theory—materialized this in multiply violent ways, and also holds the potential to explode sedimented forms of thought that contributed to the production of the atomic bomb.

As in America, so in Athens, citizens received a basic education that made them literate and gave them simple skills. But if Athenian families wanted their children to be successful, more was needed. This concern with success led to the birth of sophism in the second half of the fifth century BCE. The Daily Show commonly takes on sophists in its satirical news segments. Jon Stewart's primary objects of derision, though, are sophists in politics and the mainstream media. The ironic (...) element in Enter Socrates' and Stewart's method should not be denigrated or underestimated, for it's what helps both of them to attract such large audiences. Based on a shared understanding of the deeper underlying meaning of an ironic exchange, people bond, and bond more closely. In their way, both Socrates and Stewart seek to create a dialogue among people who use their minds in an active way. (shrink)

La catégorie du « naturel » a mauvaise réputation quand il est question de genre et de sexualité : elle est bien souvent utilisée pour essentialiser et valoriser les « bons » comportements et rejeter les « mauvais genres » du côté des monstres et du contre-nature. Mais si la « Nature » elle-même était déviante? Et si la matière elle-même était faite d’êtres qui défient la logique? Dans cet article, la physicienne et philosophe des sciences Karen Barad propose une (...) lecture oblique de la physique quantique et de ses réceptions, à la recherche de créatures (des éclairs, des électrons, du vide, un monstre de Frankenstein…) aux côtés desquelles toustes celleux qu’on a désignées comme contre-nature pourraient trouver compagnie. (shrink)

In this book, Judith Barad offers a fresh treatment of St. Thomas Aquinas' account of faith by emphasizing his distinction between assent and consent. The distinction entails that although intellectual assent is a necessary condition of faith, the consent of the will, issuing in moral activity, is required for faith's completion. Through her analysis of Aquinas' distinction, Barad maintains not only that the traditional characterization of Aquinas as an intellectualist in matters of faith is false, but that Aquinas can shed (...) light on the difference between religious hypocrisy and devotion. (shrink)

_A bold and revelatory exploration of Walter Benjamin’s theory of history alongside experiments in quantum physics, giving us flashes of possibility in this dark moment of danger_ Walter Benjamin’s concept of messianic materialism, developed as fascism overtook Europe, has held out hope to thinkers, artists, and activists for nearly a century. Benjamin’s key insight is that the potential for justice exists in the “thick-now” of the present moment, and not in pinning political hope on some future era. In this invigorating (...) and audacious new book, philosopher and physicist Karen River Barad proposes a method to think time anew, one that brings Benjamin’s ideas into conversation with the discoveries of quantum physics and the mystical-materialist insights of Jewish Kabbalah. Arguing that Benjamin was himself a kind of “bench scientist,” Barad demonstrates how Benjamin’s conception of messianic time and the thick-now of the present (flashing through with bolts of eternal time), are material matters to be literally grasped (if you dare!). Diffractively reading each of Benjamin’s key concepts together with natural phenomena (crystals, constellations, lightning), Barad transduces the tangible existence of Benjamin’s revelatory theories. The memory-encrusted world all around us, Barad argues, holds energetic possibilities for remembering past injustices, reckoning with historic violence, and reconfiguring the world in ways that move us toward more just material conditions. (shrink)

Microhabitable is a study program resulting from the collaboration between Matadero Madrid, Serpentine Galleries and INLAND--Campo Adentro. It spans a monthly seminar from September to December 2019, a publication, a radio station and a residency program articulated around reflections focused on the scale factor from the fields of art and the politics of ecology.