It is often argued that cosmopolitanism faces unique motivational constraints, asking more of individuals than they are able to give. This ‘motivational problem’ is held to pose a significant challenge to cosmopolitanism, as it appears unable to transform its moral demands into motivated political action. This article develops a novel response to the motivational problem facing cosmopolitanism, arguing that self-interest, alongside appeals to sentiment, can play a vital and neglected, transitional role in moving towards an expanded cosmopolitical condition. The article (...) explicates the ‘motivational problem’, analyses the relationship between self-interest and sentimental cosmopolitanism in addressing it, and develops a series of claims that self-interest can be one important component in what we label as ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’. In doing so, we argue that self-interested motivations can be compatible with sentiment-based approaches, rendering them more plausible. In addition, two expected critiques of self-interested ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’ are tackled: (A) That it cannot address feasibility constraints, and (B) That self-interested motivations cannot meet what an ‘authentic’ cosmopolitanism entails. We refute and challenge these critiques and outline three conditions in which self-interest can advance a transitional form of cosmopolitanism, while also being compatible with cosmopolitanism writ large. (shrink)

In his preface to Hobbes: Morals and Politics, Raphael tells us his intention is to provide "a genuine introduction for the student starting from scratch." That ought not deter others more familiar with Hobbes from reading the book. Raphael’s analysis is well-informed, sometimes insightful, and certainly worth reading. In addition to its intention to serve as an introduction, the book is also a vehicle for a rather elaborate interpretation of Hobbes’s theory of obligation. The interpretation of its Raphael in with (...) the school of thought represented by Howard Warrender, F. S. McNeilly, et. al. (shrink)

Lemos’s examination of the political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke has as its intended focus "the timeless philosophical significance of their positions and arguments." He is as much concerned, however, with correcting their arguments and carrying out the implications of his own corrections as he is with their thought. Lemos’s decision to disregard the metaphysics, physics, psychology, and epistemology of Hobbes and Locke is merely stated, without support. One might dispute its validity. Likewise, his exclusion of any references to the (...) predecessors or contemporaries of Hobbes and Locke and references to other interpretations costs his book valuable perspective. (shrink)

Certain English writers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, whom scholars often associate with classical republicanism, were not, in fact, hostile to liberalism. Indeed, these thinkers contributed to a synthesis of liberalism and modern republicanism. As this book argues, Marchamont Nedham, James Harrington, Henry Neville, Algernon Sidney, and John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, the co-authors of a series of editorials entitled Cato's Letters, provide a synthesis that responds to the demands of both republicans and liberals by offering a politically (...) engaged citizenry as well as the protection of individual rights. The book also reinterprets the writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes to show that each contributed in a fundamental way to the formation of this liberal republicanism. (shrink)

Martin Rhonheimer and Michael Zuckert take me to task for what they argue to be the errors and flaws of my article "The Laws of Nature as Moral Norms in Hobbes' Leviathan. I respond to their criticisms, and my critics are afforded a second set of responses.

This chapter documents where and how Hobbes’s scriptural quotations diverged from contemporary translations of the Bible. While Hobbes usually relied on these translations, it reveals that on some points—especially regarding supernatural phenomena—he took considerable liberties to reconcile the Bible with the key tenets of his own political philosophy. The chapter also shows that attending to Hobbes’s translations both helps to locate some of the key sources for his biblical exegesis, such as work by the biblical scholar Joseph Mede, and provides (...) further evidence confirming that a Latin text of _Leviathan_ did not predate the English version. Hobbes’s alterations were of great interest to contemporary critics like Edward Hyde and Alexander Ross; this chapter shows why they should be of interest to modern critics as well. (shrink)

The article argues that Hobbes articulates a modern problematic of reason, where the shared rationality of human beings is an integral part of the danger they present to each other, and where reason suggests a solution, the social contract and the laws of nature, enforced and interpreted by absolute sovereign authority. This solution reflects a tension in modern reason itself, since it requires the alienation of self-determination of the rational human subject precisely to preserve the condition for the possibility of (...) the rationality of the rational human subject, i.e. one’s life, which is threatened by the very rationality of other human subjects. I discuss interpretations of Hobbes which stress the other motives of conflict, i.e. competition and vanity, and acknowledge that they play a role in the threat subjects present to each other, but argue that the danger presented precisely by shared rationality, which I discuss with some reference to the Hegelian dialectic of consciousness and mutual recognition, has been underplayed by Hobbes’ interpretation. (shrink)

This seminal work by political philosopher C.B. Macpherson was first published by the Clarendon Press in 1962, and remains of key importance to the study of liberal-democratic theory half-a-century later. In it, Macpherson argues that the chief difficulty of the notion of individualism that underpins classical liberalism lies in what he calls its "possessive quality" - "its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them." Under such a conception, (...) the essence of humanity becomes freedom from dependence on the wills of others; society is little more than a system of economic relations; and political society becomes a means of safeguarding private property and the system of economic relations rooted in property. As the New Statesman declared: "It is rare for a book to change the intellectual landscape. It is even more unusual for this to happen when the subject is one that has been thoroughly investigated by generations of historians.... Until the appearance of Professor Macpherson's book, it seemed unlikely that anything radically new could be said about so well-worn a topic. The unexpected has happened, and the shock waves are still being absorbed." A new introduction by Frank Cunningham puts the work in a twenty-first-century context. (shrink)

A central argument of the _Leviathan_ has to do with the political importance of education. Hobbes wants his book to be taught in universities and expounded much in the manner that Scripture was. Only thus will citizens realize what is in their hearts as to the nature of good political order. Glory affects this process in two ways. The pursuit of glory _by a citizen_ leads to political chaos and disorder. On the other hand, _God’s_ glory is such that one (...) can do nothing but acquiesce to it. The Hobbesian sovereign shares some of the effects of glory that God has naturally; this, however, has to be supplemented by awe and that but fear. (shrink)

Critical approaches to the canon of Western political and legal thought from the point of view of race or gender have developed in recent years, as have studies highlighting the connections between supposedly universalist philosophies and their role in sustaining or legitimizing imperial and colonial conquests. On social contract theory in particular, seminal works include Charles Mills’ The Racial Contract and Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract. The importance of this type of work cannot be understated, and Mills is right to (...) insist on the “blinding whiteness of the discipline.” In the case of Hobbes, I argue, the privilege established in his texts is better qualified as “civilizational” rather than “racial.” Hobbes’s texts construct a certain image of civilization, a form of exclusion and domination that eschews biological determinism in favor of social, historical bias. This “civilizational” thinking certainly can work – and will work later on in conjunction with modern racism and white privilege – to exclude many. The racial contract – as per Mills – is only a late installment on a more fundamental one, the civilizing contract. (shrink)

For whatever reason, scholars have recently reapproached the moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes with a renewed interest in establishing its validity. Two influential interpretations have emerged, a theistic interpretation and a concep- tualistic interpretation, the former by Howard Warrender in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, and the latter by David Gauthier in tfhe fcogic of leviathan.Both Warrender and Gauthier maintain that Hobbes's egoistic psychology invalidates his moral theory, and undertake to rescue its formal validity by regrounding the theory on his (...) theology, on the one hand, and on his methodological (rather than metaphysical) materialism, on the other. The result in both instances is a piecemeal analysis that dissolves the political realism for which Hobbes was famous, and ignores altogether the comprehensive intentions which he so carefully expressed. Hobbes takes on the appearance of something that might be best described as a pre-Kantian Kant. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. In the history of philosophy, views on the connection between Locke's Second Treatise and Hobbes' Leviathan have changed dramatically. Recent archival findings indicate that between 1658 and 1667, he [Locke] "almost always had Hobbes's Leviathan on his table, and recommended his friends read it." This provides stronger grounds to assert that Locke's Second Treatise is a response to Hobbes's thought experiment reconstructing the probable natural (pre-political) state of humankind. M e (...) t h o d s. A comparative analysis of argumentation and key concepts of Hobbes ("Leviathan") and Locke ("Second Treatise") has been conducted in this study, examining their approaches to the thought experiment concerning the natural (pre-political) state of humanity. R e s u l t s. While agreeing on the dangers of the state of nature and the necessity of political organization for society, Hobbes and Locke diverge in their conclusions regarding the optimal institutional-normative model for such organization. The key divergence between their projects (Hobbes's absolutism versus Locke's limited government) stems from the different status assigned to equality: purely descriptive for Hobbes and normative for Locke. Absolutism creates inequality incompatible with Locke's normative approach. Locke's proposal to establish the rule of law and a set of accompanying guarantees to ensure equality between those vested with power and their subjects became the starting point for the concept of human rights as a normative limitation on power. C o n c l u s i o n s. 1) John Locke, in his reasoning within the Second Treatise, reexamines Thomas Hobbes's thought experiment concerning the natural (pre-political) state of society. Despite some clarifications and minor discrepancies in describing the pre-political state, Locke reaches the same conclusion as Hobbes: the natural state of society is "full of Fears and continual Dangers,"and contains constant conflicts that, in such a state, are fundamentally impossible to cease or resolve. Both philosophers draw the practical conclusion about the desirability of avoiding the threats of the state of nature and the necessity of creating political institutions to address this task. The fundamental difference between Locke's and Hobbes's positions lies in how they envision the political organization of society meant to solve the problem of the state of nature: for Hobbes, it should be an absolute monarchy; for Locke, the rule of law. 2) A key element in the reasoning of both philosophers is their view on human equality: for Hobbes, considerations of equality are purely descriptive, whereas Locke also assigns equality a normative status. The normative status of human equality makes organizing society in the form of an absolute monarchy, as Hobbes proposed, unacceptable: vesting power in any single person leads to inequality. Instead, Locke proposes to compensate for such inequality by limiting power through law, guaranteeing the inviolability of certain individual freedoms, and the right to rebellion in case of encroachment upon these freedoms. 3) Locke's normative-institutional project should be considered the beginning of the liberal discourse of human rights. Based on Locke's reasoning, we can define human rights as a normative system that defines the relationship between governing institutions on one side and individuals on the other, limiting or obligating the power holders. (shrink)

Introduction, by R. Peters and M. Cranston.--Hobbes: the problem of interpretation, by W. H. Greenleaf.--Warrender and his critics, by B. Barry.--Hobbes and the just man, by K. R. Minogue.--Hobbes on the knowledge of God, by R. W. Hepburn.--The context of Hobbes's theory of political obligation, by Q. Skinner.--The economic foundations of Hobbes' politics, by W. Letwin.--Hobbes & Hull: metaphysicians of behaviour, by R. Peters and H. Tajfel.--Hobbes on power, by S. I. Benn.--Liberty, by J. W. N. Watkins.--Man and society in (...) Hobbes and Rousseau, by P. Winch.--On the intention of Rousseau, by L. Strauss.--The social contract and Rousseau's revolt against society, by J. McManners.--On le forcera d'être libre, by J. Plamenatz.--Rousseau's images of authority, by J. N, Shklar.--The notion of time in Rousseau's political thought, by W. Pickles.--The structure of Rousseau's political thought, by R. D. Masters.--Rousseau and the problem of happiness, by R. Grimsley.--Individual identity and social consciousness in Rousseau's philosophy, by J. Charvet.--Rousseau's theory of the forms of government, by B. de Jouvenel.--Bibliography (p. [498]-505). (shrink)

This article explores the conceptual relations Hobbes perceived between justice, law, and property rights. I argue that Hobbes developed three distinct arguments for the State-dependency of property over time: the Security, Precision and Creation Argument. On the last and most radical argument, the sovereign creates all property rights ex nihilo through distributive civil laws. Hobbes did not achieve this radically conventionalist position easily: it was not defended consistently until the redefinition of distributive justice as a virtue of arbitrators in Leviathan. (...) The argument is partly advanced as a critique of C.B. Macpherson’s possessive individualist reading of Hobbes. (shrink)

Tacit consent theories of political obligation have fallen into disfavor. The difficulties that plague such accounts have been well-known since Hume's "Of the Original Contract"1 and have recently been forcefully reformulated by M. B. E. Smith, A. John Simmons, and Joseph Raz.2 In this article, though, I shall argue that Hobbes' version of the argument from tacit consent escapes the criticisms leveled by Hume, Smith, Simmons, and Raz against tacit consent theories as a class. Crucial to my defense of this (...) claim will be a certain interpretation of Hobbes' account of covenants, an account quite different than that presupposed by the opponents of the argument from tacit consent. (shrink)

The paper is a contribution to discussions about prospects of reaffirmation of the ontological-political interpretation of Hobbes’s thought advised in the mid-twentieth century by Leo Strauss and C.B. Macpherson. The paper begins with an outline of the main avenues and lines of contention and division within contemporary Hobbes studies, constituted as examples of the “definitive rejection” of Strauss’s and Macpherson’s interpretations. In the second part, there are discussed some issues in detail that help us to define the meaning of the (...) political ontology in Hobbes’s thought as determined by the pair of oppositions “juridical (negative) power” — “ontological-generative (positive) power”. In the third and fourth parts there are considered two main aspects and implications of the Hobbesian theory of sovereignty, as well as the current debates around it (launched mainly as a result of inspiration by Carl Schmitt’s reading of the theory): firstly, the doctrine of an exception/state of emergency in relation to the idea of citizenship and human rights, and, secondly, metaphysical-political and theological-political, justifications of the “monistic” authority of the absolute power juxtaposed against a pluralist and democratic (republican), and at the same time a-secular and cross-religious-comparative considerations of sovereignty of the “people” (as a “multitude”). As a result of the proposed analyzes and reflections, the religious and theological foundations (considered through comparative studies on the doctrines and traditions of three monotheistic religions) are highlighted for questioning the “essentialist” approach to the “fetishism” of sovereignty in the most influential doctrines from Schmitt to Morgenthau and Hinsley. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hobbes: A Biography by A. P. MartinichMartin HarveyA. P. Martinich. Hobbes: A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xxxii + 384. Cloth, $34.95.In his most recent biography of Hobbes, A. P. Martinich informs the reader that he is “here to praise Hobbes, not to bury his theory”—a task which the author accomplishes with a great deal of literary dexterity (233). The work is chronological in structure with (...) each of the eleven chapters devoted to a specific period in Hobbes’s intellectual and personal development. The reader receives an in depth and well wrought treatment of Hobbes’s earliest years in Malmesbury, including a thorough discussion of his dissolute father and his tutelage in the classics under Robert Latimer. Martinich also goes into detail concerning Hobbes’s student life at Oxford, his lifelong relationship with the Cavendishes, Hobbes’s participation in the Great Tew Circle as well as his decade long exile in France and ultimate return to England. Hobbes’s later years, particularly his fruitless disputes with the Royal Society, are also admirably chronicled.Interwoven with the above is a detailed overview of most of Hobbes’s major and minor works, from his translation of Thucydides in 1629 to Behemoth, published in 1679. Martinich pays close attention to Hobbes’s foundational works in philosophy, particularly The Elements of Law, Leviathan, and De Corpore. The author provides a clear and concise introduction to all facets of Hobbes’s philosophical system and spends time explaining what Hobbes took his project to be; namely the construction of a tripartite Elementa Philosophiae devoted, respectively, to metaphysics/physics, psychology and ethics/politics (118–9). The critical exegesis of Anti-White is exceptional, providing as it does an excellent conceptual backdrop to Hobbes’s mature and considered philosophy of science as found in De Corpore. As such, Hobbes’s philosophical corpus is presented, rightly I believe, as a continuum, by no means seamless perhaps, but nonetheless exhibiting at base a considerable amount of theoretical integrity.As is well known, Hobbes was quite the cantankerous character engaging in numerous professional and, ultimately, personal rows with the great minds of his time. Hobbes’s acrimonious wranglings with René Descartes, Thomas White, Bishop Bramhall, Robert Filmer, Robert Boyle, Seth Ward, and John Wallis all receive their due. The comically churlish debate between Hobbes and Descartes is especially well presented. [End Page 680]Stylistically, Martinich adopts a somewhat pithy approach (e.g., William Cavendish is described as follows: “It was not that Cavendish was unprincipled; rather, his principle was opportunism.” [20]) which, for the most part, is quite successful in keeping the reader’s attention, even when complex philosophical ideas are being conveyed. The work, much to Martinich’s credit, is also punctuated with numerous amusing tidbits such as his listing of the oral exam questions which Hobbes and his fellow students adequately had to answer in order to receive their B.A., e.g., “Whether a new inundation of water [over the whole earth] would be a greater catastrophe than all of it freezing” (13). Hobbes would be happy to know that things haven’t changed all that much.Substantively, a few points are in order. First, as one might expect, Martinich spends a great deal of time discussing Hobbes’s theological views and he is at great pains to paint Hobbes as a committed Calvinist (137–43; see Martinich’s The Two Gods of Leviathan [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992]) for a fuller discussion of this issue. In all fairness, the author readily admits that his reading is a minority interpretation, but this being the case perhaps more time should have been devoted to discussing the received view, i.e., that Hobbes, if he is not an atheist, is at most a deist and not a theist. Second, Martinich portrays Hobbes’s sovereign as wholly absolute, unfettered not only by the civil, but the natural law as well. While quite correct in maintaining that the sovereign, since he or she (or they), is not subject to civil law, it does not follow that Hobbes necessarily believes that “whatever the sovereign says is law” (50). Indeed, in Chapter XXVI of Leviathan Hobbes... (shrink)