What is known as ‘medieval atomism’ is most often a form of mathematical theory inspired by Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean ideas, in which atoms are considered as geometric points. Although these atomists asserted that the continuum is composed of indivisible entities, they did not renounce the continuity of the material world, unlike Democritus, Epicurus or Lucretius, who accepted the existence of the vacuum and, consequently, described the world as discrete. On the contrary, apart from Nicholas of Autrecourt in the fourteenth century, (...) the atomists of the Middle Ages conceived the world as continuous and they did not accept the existence of void spaces between the bodies or an infinite extra-cosmic space. Moreover, they did not question the main principles of Aristotelian physics, but only modified them at the margins. The aim of this paper is to show that, in addition to these famous atomists, some very interesting discussions on the nature of atoms can be found in more unexpected texts, particularly in the thirteenth century. This is particularly the case of four anonymous commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, whose authors took very seriously Democritus’ atomism. Some of them even seem to accept some form of corpuscularism. In order to understand these texts, we will look closer at the relationship between atoms, minima and points in the context of thirteenth-century philosophical debates. (shrink)

Dans son commentaire par questions aux Météorologiques d’Aristote, Blaise de Parme se demande « si les mêmes opinions se répètent plusieurs fois ou une infinité de fois ». Ce texte s’inscrit dans une tradition parisienne qui débute avec Nicole Oresme, suivi de près par Albert de Saxe, le Pseudo-Duns Scot et Thémon Juif. Nous proposons ici l’édition critique de la quaestio de Blaise de Parme, accompagnée d’une introduction doctrinale dans laquelle nous situons sa pensée par rapport à cette tradition parisienne (...) à propos des thèmes qui traversent le texte : vision cyclique de l’histoire, Grande Année, explication causale des cycles, possibilité de la liberté humaine et existence du hasard et de la contingence. (shrink)

Dans les grandes histoires de l’épicurisme, seul Nicolas d’Autrécourt est parfois mentionné pour le Moyen Âge en raison de son atomisme. Bien qu’il ne se dise jamais épicurien et qu’il refuserait probablement cette étiquette, il défend une thèse longtemps associée à Épicure : tout ce qui apparaît est vrai. Bien qu’il ait pu savoir qu’il s’agissait d’une thèse épicurienne, nous faisons l’hypothèse qu’il arrive à ce résultat parce que leur ambition était la même : sauver Démocrite sans tomber dans le (...) scepticisme qui lui est attribué par Aristote. Cet article compare de manière systématique Épicure et Nicolas d’Autrécourt dans le but d’éclairer leurs théories de la connaissance. (shrink)

Nicholas of Autrecourt, a philosopher of the fourteenth century, is renowned for his advocacy of atomism in opposition to Aristotle and his followers. While scholars unanimously acknowledge the pivotal role of the atom in his works, there remains considerable debate about the nature of these atoms: are they corporeal particles or mathematical points? Do they exist in finite or infinite quantities? Is there a discrepancy between physical theory and the mathematical analysis of the continuum? This paper examines these diverse interpretations (...) and offers a novel exegesis of Nicholas of Autrecourt’s principal work, his Useful Treatise to See Whether the Arguments of the Aristotelians Were Demonstrative, usually referred to as the Exigit ordo. The paper aims to demonstrate his acceptance of the existence of atomic bodies, minima, and mathematical points, within a physical theory that could admit different mathematical interpretations. Consequently, this paper seeks to elucidate the internal coherence of this physical system and its congruence with the epistemology of our philosopher, which is based upon a rigorous analysis of sensible phenomena. (shrink)

In his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Nicole Oresme raises a question that he is apparently the first to ask in these terms, in such a context: do all beings have the desire to persevere into being? Before him, this question is not found in any of the medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics. But after him it became canonical until at least the 16th century, since it can be found in Pietro Pomponazzi’s works for example. The novelty here consists in questioning (...) the validity of Averroes’ thesis, in his own commentary on the Physics, according to which all beings have the desire to persist into being, using the Augustinian analysis of voluntary death and suicide. How can we explain that one can freely put an end to his days if he is naturally inclined by a desire for life and even for eternity? Oresme’s solution consists in justifying not only the possibility, but also the moral obligation to accept death under certain conditions. In most cases, we do not really want to die. The desperate man wishes to cancel his misfortune and the heroic man who sacrifices himself for his country wishes to immortalize himself in the memory of other men. From a moral point of view, Nicole Oresme justifies only one case of voluntary death: that of individual sacrifice for the common good. The aim of this paper is to analyze precisely this important turning point in the long history of the notion of conatus in the West by comparing this quaestio from the commentary on the Physics with the glosses that accompany the French translation of the Nicomachean Ethics realised by Oresme at the court of Charles V. (shrink)

Contrary to what is generally said about the reception of Epicurus in the Middle Ages, many medieval authors agreed on his great wisdom, even if he made some philosophical and theological errors. From the 12th century to the 14th century on can find several "Lives of Epicurus" in which the best sayings of Epicurus are gathered from ancient sources (Seneca, Cicero, Lactantius, etc.). In this paper, we follow these quite unknown sources about Epicureanism in the Middle Ages. We try to (...) show that if Epicurus was considered as a wise man in the MIddle Ages, Epicureans are condemned because after the Revelation of God's word, Christians can only accept Epicurus's ascetic ethics, not his errors about the eternity of the world, the mortality of the soul et the subordination of happiness to pleasure. (shrink)

Comment définir l’homme d’un point de vue médical, sans tomber dans un pur matérialisme? Voilà la question que se posèrent les médecins italiens de la fin du Moyen Âge lorsqu’ils élaborèrent une théorie complète de la notion de complexion, conçue comme « qualité substantielle » propre à l’homme, mais variant dans certaines limites en fonction de l’hérédité, du régime, de l’âge ou encore des climats et des moeurs. Dès lors, certains de ces médecins pouvaient envisager d’améliorer, par leur art, non (...) seulement la santé, mais aussi l’humanité de chaque individu. (shrink)

This paper tries to understand how three medieval philosophers (Roger Bacon, Albert the Great and John Buridan) developed the idea of a special logic for ethics, taking into account Aristotle's thesis according to which ethics does not need theoretical syllogisms and uses a special kind of scientific reasoning. If rhetoric is a good candidate, we find three different readings of this approach and then three different theories of ethical reasoning.

The paradigmatic examples of what we call nowadays ‘mere Cambridge changes’ are relational properties. If someone is on the left of a table at t − 1 and on the right of this table at t, the table does not undergo a physical change, but it has nonetheless new relational properties. What kind of relation lies behind this kind of change? Should we abandon the definition of identity as a set of permanent properties through time? This concern with identity and (...) change was already present in Aristotle's Physics 5 and 7 and medieval commentators tackled the problem with some important refinements due to their metaphysical discussions about the nature of relations. John of Jandun's discussion of this topic, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, is particularly interesting. First, he defines self-identity as a relation of reason, which means for him that it is not a real relation. Second, he distinguishes two kinds of relational changes: those involving real relations and the acquisition a qualitative propert... (shrink)

Non-standard analysis gives a proper foundation to the theory of infinitesimals. Nelson's axiomatic approach of it uses a new (undefined) predicate which is added to the classical language of set theory. We interpret this new predicate and formulate Nelson's axioms in a way that can be compared to P. R. Halmos' discussion of set axioms in his book « Naïve Set Theory ».

Le lecteur francophone peut enfin apprécier ce qui subsiste de la correspondance entre Nicolas d’Autrécourt, Bernard d’Arezzo et Gilles du Foin. Malgré les quelques lettres perdues, les deux lettres envoyées à Bernard, la lettre de Gilles et la réponse de Nicolas sont autant de témoignages remarquables des discussions philosophiques du XIVe siècle. On trouvera aussi dans ce volume, en annexe, quelques textes choisis avec soin, pertinents pour une bonne compréhension de la philosophie autrécurienne dans son contexte historique. Il s’agit d’articles (...) condamnés dont quatre confessés et trente-deux contenus dans la cédule «Malheur à moi», des extraits de l’Exigit ordo, ainsi qu’un court texte intitulé «Proclamation présomptueuse» et des articles envoyés à Paris. Ces articles sont des rétractations sur certaines de ses positions fondamentales condamnées pour la plupart en 1347. (shrink)

Dino del Garbo, médecin actif dans les premières décennies du xiv e siècle, est surtout connu pour son commentaire au poème de Guido Cavalcanti Donna me prega. La présente étude propose l’édition d’une question quodlibétique sur la capacité de l’imagination à altérer le corps, disputée à Bologne ou Sienne dans les années 1320. Nous examinons le contexte médical et philosophique dans lequel s’inscrit cette question, en montrant notamment comment le débat s’est progressivement cristallisé autour de l’opposition entre un modèle avicennien (...) et un modèle aristotélicien des rapports entre l’âme et le corps. L’analyse de ce débat permet d’éclairer d’un jour nouveau la glose de Dino del Garbo à Donna me prega et aussi, de manière incidente, le poème lui-même. (shrink)

When contemporary philosophers look at the medieval debate on intentionality, they usually have in mind what we call “Brentano’s thesis”. Indeed, Brentano ascribes to some medieval philosophers the thesis according to which objects of thought have a special kind of being that explains how can our thoughts be about this or that kind of things. Here, we decided to focus on the debates among the so-called “Latin Averroists”, because they clearly show that the medieval question on intentionality cannot be reduced (...) to the well-known theory of intentional beings. More precisely, we endeavored to understand an apparently strange question that appeared in the faculties of arts in France and in Italy in the 14th century: to which category do intentions in the mind belong to? In Aristotelian terms: are they substances or accidents? The problem is the following: if they are accidents, how can they represent something else that an accident? If they are substances, what does it mean to affirm that we have substances in the mind, even intentional substances? After a detailed analysis of the responses one can find in Siger of Brabant, Angelo of Arezzo, Matthew of Gubbio, John of Göttingen, Anthony of Parma, Bartholomew of Bruges and John of Jandun, we try to show that only a very few philosophers adopted the formal identity thesis , according to which the object in the mind is formally identical with the object known outside the mind. This shows that a lot of medieval philosophers didn’t limit intentionality to intentional being or formal identity, but also considered other explanations of how the human mind can think about objects for which no representation can be found in the mind. (shrink)

Selon les histoires classiques de la philosophie, il aurait fallu attendre le XVe siècle pour voir le retour de Platon et de Pythagore sur la scène de la pensée. Pourtant, au XIVe siècle, bien avant la Renaissance, un noble vénitien, Marco Trevisano, écrit pour son fils un livre intitulé Du macrocosme. Il s'y définit lui-même comme un disciple des deux géants antiques et décrit l'origine du monde et sa constitution en termes mathématiques. Ce texte, encore inédit à ce jour, n'a (...) jamais été étudié pour lui-même et dans son contexte. Aurélien Robert fait revivre la pensée de ce lettré et savant laïc, qui ne fréquentait ni université, ni couvent. Le cas de Marco Trevisano montre à quel point la philosophie du Moyen Âge ne peut être résumée aux grands noms des manuels scolaires. Et surtout, il interroge les frontières entre ce que nous appelons d'ordinaire la scolastique médiévale et l'humanisme de la Renaissance. Une étude remarquable d'une figure méconnue mais capitale."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

La querelle sugli universali si presenta come un dibattito prevalentemente ontologico che rimette in gioco l'idea stessa di sostanza ed è un realismo ontologico che non mette per forza in discussione ogni cosa, ma contempla tutta la realtà delle specie e dei generi naturali della sostanza. Gli uomini sono legati tra di loro per convenientia e questo come una semplice similitudine essenziale tra di loro e le loro essenze individuali, secondo la linea espressa da Giovanni di Pietro Olivi , Riccardo (...) di Mediavilla , Vitale di Four , o come parte di una realtà comune, come espresso dall'altra linea rappresentata da Matteo d'Acquasparta . Anche se la loro posizione può essere definita concettualista, la loro teoria della conoscenza è ontologicamente neutra, dal momento che la ragione non consente di stabilire precisamente la natura dell'universale. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that John Wyclif’s theory of space is at once an interpretation of the Platonic theory of place and a Neopythagorean conception of magnitudes and numbers. The result is an original form of mathematical atomism in which atoms are point-like entities with a particular situation in space. If the core of this view comes from Boethius’ De arithmetica, John Wyclif is also influenced by Robert Grosseteste’s metaphysics, which includes the Boethian number theory within (...) the Christian tale of the creation of the world ex nihilo. John Wyclif, however, adds some novelty to this theory concerning the epistemological status of this hypothetical description of the creation of the world out of atoms. First, according to Wyclif, whereas geometry is concerned with sensible and imaginable beings, arithmetic, which is purely intellectual, has access to the deep mathematical structure of the universe. He then suggests a subordination of geometry under arithmetic, which he considers the most solid basis for his metaphysics. As a result, with the attribution of numbers and units to every level of reality, it becomes possible to reform our natural imagination, so that it can imagine the atomic structure of matter and space. (shrink)

It is well known that during the Middle Ages the Eucharist was not only a theological question but also a philosophical one. Recent studies have shown the semantical and ontological problems concerning the status of substances and accidents after the transsubstantiation. Here the paper focuses on the gnoseological problem of the Eucharist. How do we know that the substance has changed after the consecration of the host? Moreover, how do we manage to know substances in general if sometimes it changes (...) without apparent modifications in the accidental features apprehended by our sense faculties? The aim of this paper is to show that a new dilemma appeared at the end of the 13th century between the sceptical consequences of the dogma of transsubstantiation and the necessity to abandon or at least to interpret differently the sacrament. Wyclif chose the second option while most of the theologians and philosophers tried to adapt their theory of knowledge, especially the Franciscans, to which a large part of this paper is devoted. This paper tries to assess the different solutions to this problem of the knowability of substances. (shrink)