This chapter contains section titled: Literary Revolution and its Meaning The Naturalistic Conception of the Universe and the Experimentalist Method History of Chinese Philosophy and Systematizing the National Heritage Political Philosophy and Liberalism Hu Shi as an Enlightenment Philosopher.

Extant research on design thinking is subjective and limited. This manuscript combines protocol analysis and electroencephalogram to read design thoughts in the core design activities of concept generation phase. The results suggest that alpha band power had event related synchronization in the scenario task and divergent thinking occupies a dominant position. However, it had event related desynchronization in analogy and inference activities, etc., and it is stronger for mental pressure and exercised cognitive processing. In addition, the parietooccipital area differs significantly (...) from other brain areas in most design activities. This study explores the relationship of different design thinking and EEG data, which is innovative and professional in the field of design, providing a more objective data basis and evaluation method for future applied research and diverse educational practices. (shrink)

Most current online distributed machine learning algorithms have been studied in a data-parallel architecture among agents in networks. We study online distributed machine learning from a different perspective, where the features about the same samples are observed by multiple agents that wish to collaborate but do not exchange the raw data with each other. We propose a distributed feature online gradient descent algorithm and prove that local solution converges to the global minimizer with a sublinear rate O 2 T. Our (...) algorithm does not require exchange of the primal data or even the model parameters between agents. Firstly, we design an auxiliary variable, which implies the information of the global features, and estimate at each agent by dynamic consensus method. Then, local parameters are updated by online gradient descent method based on local data stream. Simulations illustrate the performance of the proposed algorithm. (shrink)

本书内容包括生死之际, 生与死的本质, 向死而生, 个体生死, 社会生死, 优生优死, 生死歧路, 现代人的生与死等.

This article challenges the widespread view that causal relations are wholly non-normative natural relations. In the case of salient social categories such as race and sex, I argue for a dependency of the causal order of things on the moral and political. At the center of my argument is a puzzle about how audit studies, social scientific experiments that approximate the idealized controlled experiment, work to probe the causal significance of race and sex. Essential to these studies is the distinction (...) between differences that constitute rather than confound an effect of their variable of interest—a distinction, which, I claim, embodies judgments about the sorts of differences that constitute the wrongful causal influence of these categories. If our best scientific practices latch onto genuine features of causation, then normative theorizing’s place in scientific causal theorizing entails that normative facts figure in the causal structure. (shrink)

Most leading philosophical accounts of discrimination theorize discrimination as a causal notion: roughly, an action discriminates on the basis of X (e.g., race, sex) if X causes (in the right way) the adverse outcome. This article explores the prospects for this causal account. Focusing my attention on the case of sex discrimination, I argue that struggles to settle the causal question regress to question-begging. This argument calls into question not just whether the causal account can handle sophisticated cases, which have (...) recently been conceived of (by some) as discriminatory on the basis of sex, but even classic cases of sex discrimination. The negative argument in turn brings to light an alternative normative-causal approach to discrimination, which I sketch and suggest is promising indeed. (shrink)

Machine learning algorithms bring out an under-appreciated puzzle of discrimination, namely figuring out when a decision made on the basis of a factor correlated with race is a decision made on the basis of race. I argue that prevailing approaches, which are based on identifying and then distinguishing among causal effects of race, in their metaphysical timidity, fail to get off the ground. I suggest, instead, that adopting a constructivist theory of race answers this puzzle in a principled manner. On (...) what I call a “thick constructivist” account of race, to be raced is to be socially positioned in the way indicated by a certain set of statistical regularities on the basis of particular phenotypical traits. A thick constructivist sees that acting on the basis of correlations that constitute race qua social position just is acting on the basis of race, because races just are social positions that subject their member individuals to a particular matrix of social relations that define the raced position. This conclusion has considerable ramifications for our understanding of discrimination, algorithms and beyond. (shrink)

Discussions of statistical criteria for fairness commonly convey the normative significance of calibration within groups by invoking what risk scores “mean.” On the Same Meaning picture, group-calibrated scores “mean the same thing” (on average) across individuals from different groups and accordingly, guard against disparate treatment of individuals based on group membership. My contention is that calibration guarantees no such thing. Since concrete actual people belong to many groups, calibration cannot ensure the kind of consistent score interpretation that the Same Meaning (...) picture implies matters for fairness, unless calibration is met within every group to which an individual belongs. Alas only perfect predictors may meet this bar. The Same Meaning picture thus commits a reference class fallacy by inferring from calibration within some group to the “meaning” or evidential value of an individual’s score, because they are a member of that group. The reference class answer it presumes does not only lack justification; it is very likely wrong. I then show that the reference class problem besets not just calibration but other group statistical criteria that claim a close connection to fairness. Reflecting on the origins of this oversight opens a wider lens onto the predominant methodology in algorithmic fairness based on stylized cases. (shrink)

What is an appropriate response to insults? The question is not only relevant to contemporary discourse but also once piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. This paper brings Songzi (~382 BCE–~305 BCE), a much-neglected thinker who maintains one should remain indifferent to insults, into the dialogue and discusses how Songzi prompted the Confucian Xunzi to address a long-standing ambiguity within Confucian doctrine. Specifically, the Confucius and Mencius believe that an individual’s internal virtues can shield them from hostile (...) external stimuli, but they also believed that the external environment can and should affect one’s moral life in meaningful ways. In response to Songzi, Xunzi reaffirms the importance of cultivating one’s moral self, including the ability to experience shame in response to one’s own moral lapses, but he also acknowledges that purely external factors can induce negative emotions like shame even in the virtuous. (shrink)

Veritists hold that the goal of inquiry is true belief, while justificationists contend that the goal of inquiry is justified belief. Recently, Christoph Kelp makes two new objections to both veritism and justificationism. Further, he claims that the two objections suggest that the goal of inquiry is knowledge. This paper defends a sophisticated version of veritism against Kelp's two objections.

According to the Song critic Guo Ruoxu, the last five laws by Xie He are "open to study," while qiyun 氣韻 "necessarily involves an innate knowledge; it assuredly cannot be secured through cleverness or close application, nor will time aid its attainment. It is an unspoken accord, a spiritual communion; 'something that happens without one's knowing how'".1 For Guo Ruoxu, although the qiyun within a work refers to the quality of a painting and cannot be identical with the qiyun of (...) the artist, the ability to produce a painting replete with qiyun is determined by the painter's innate mental disposition. This idea has been echoed... (shrink)

In this paper, I distinguish between two senses of “understanding”: understanding as an epistemic good and understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind. I argue that understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind is an intellectual virtue while understanding as an epistemic good is not. Finally, I show how the distinction can help us better appreciate Aristotle’s account of intellectual virtue.

This book attempts to revolutionise epistemology. A traditional goal of epistemology is to provide an analysis of knowledge in terms of more basic things. But the post-Gettier literature has made some philosophers like Timothy Williamson suspect that knowledge cannot be analysed. Kelp claims that both the traditional project and Williamson's knowledge-first project are misguided. He provides an alternative: Knowledge is an item in an inquiry-related network and can thereby be analysed in terms of its relations to other items in the (...) network, rather than of things that are more basic than knowledge.Kelp begins his book by distinguishing two types of inquiry: inquiry into specific questions (such as whether Plato's Republic advocates totalitarianism and when World War I took place) and inquiry into general phenomena (such as the rise of the Roman Empire and the origins of species). Chapter 1 argues that the goal of inquiry into specific questions—Kelp's discussion focuses on whether questions—is knowledge. This is because even if the inquirer into whether p acquires a Gettierised justified true belief that p, she has not achieved the goal of inquiry, for the question of whether p has not been properly closed for her: she can be sensibly asked to do more research. (shrink)

Shame is frequently viewed as a destructive emotion; but it can also be understood in terms of change and growth. This essay highlights the problematic values that cause pervasive and frequent shame and the importance of resisting and changing these values. Using Confucian insights, I situate shame in an interactive process between the individual's values and that of their society, thus, being vulnerable to shame represents both one's connection to a community and an openness to others’ negative feedback. This process (...) provides an important arena where personal values interact with communal ones. The Confucian tradition, I argue, affords individuals a degree of autonomy in internalization through urging them to cultivate and maintain a keen sense of shame. My discussion also offers resources for understanding the various aspects of this interactive process—how individuals with similar experiences of shame may, through channeling their experiences, influence social values and propel moral progress. (shrink)

Organizations have increasingly relied on team-based reward systems to boost productivity and foster collaboration. Drawing on the literature on ethics and justice as well as appraisal theories of emotion, we examine how team-based reward systems can have an insidious side effect: They increase the likelihood that employees remain silent when observing a team member engage in unethical behavior. Across four studies adopting different methods, measures, and samples, we found consistent evidence that people are less likely to report (i.e., speak up (...) or provide anonymous feedback about) a team member’s unethical behavior in team-based than in individual-based reward systems. Furthermore, our research reveals that this effect is primarily driven by a decrease in the experience of moral anger, which subsequently leads to a decreased likelihood of reporting unethical behavior when it benefits the team rather than the individual. We do not find support for perceived indirect benefit or envy as alternative explanations, suggesting that the decision to report a team member’s unethical behavior is not driven by calculative and selfish motives, but by moral motives. Finally, we establish that the effect is contingent on the observer and the perpetrator being members of the same team; it dissipates when the observer and the perpetrator are part of different teams. Our work contributes to research on reward systems and business ethics and provides practical implications for human resource practices. (shrink)

To overcome the opaqueness of artificial intelligence (AI) operation, post hoc explanation techniques provide clear and interpretable accounts of AI decision-making. While post hoc explanation techniques help alleviate concerns about the “black-box” nature of AI systems, the explanations are not self-evident claims and therefore require justifiable scrutiny. Within the sociological framework, justification is interpreted as compliance with social systems, legal structures, and mechanisms regulating individual behavior. While within the theoretical framework of scientific explanation, it is understood as comprising both evidential (...) and normative components. When using a scientific explanation framework to examine the methods used in post hoc explanations, one finds that the criterion for scientific explanation may be overly strict in evaluating post hoc explanations. Therefore, a shift in the evaluation criteria is needed. From a pragmatic perspective, post hoc explanations could be regarded as offering a form of justification, insofar as they conform to institutional rules and contribute to increased explanatory information. Moreover, in future social interactive scenarios, the credibility and applicability of post hoc explanations are expected to increase. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. (...) If my defense is successful, it would cast doubt on an influential account of the epistemic value of understanding. (shrink)

This study examines Chinese undergraduates’ perceptions of plagiarism in English academic writing in relation to their disciplinary background (i.e., hard vs. soft disciplines), academic enculturation (i.e., length of study in university), and gender. Drawing on data collected from 270 students at two universities in China, it finds clear discipline-based differences in participants’ knowledge of plagiarism and perceptions about its causes; an enculturational effect on perceived acceptability of and condemnatory attitudes toward plagiarism, with senior students being less harsh than their junior (...) counterparts; and complex interactions among disciplinary background, length of study, and gender. Furthermore, it reveals conceptions of (il)legitimate intertextuality (i.e., textual borrowing) differing from those prevalent in Anglo American academia and clearly punitive stances on perceived plagiarism. These results suggest the need to take an educative rather than punitive approach to source use in English academic writing. (shrink)

There is a long-standing debate concerning the eligibility of patients suffering from alcohol-related end-stage liver disease (ARESLD) for deceased donor liver transplantation. The question of retrospective and/or prospective responsibility has been at the center of the ethical discussion. Several authors argue that these patients should at least be regarded as partly responsible for their ARESLD. At the same time, the arguments for retrospective and/or prospective responsibility have been strongly criticized, such that no consensus has been reached. A third option was (...) proposed as a form of compromise, namely that responsibility should only be used as a tiebreaker in liver allocation. The present study provides an ethical investigation of this third option. First, we will provide an overview of the main arguments that have been offered for and against the use of responsibility as an allocation criterion. Second, we will explore the concept of responsibility as a tiebreaker in detail and discuss several types of situations, in which responsibility could be used as a tiebreaker, as well as the main ethical challenges associated with them. As we will show, an ethical justified use of responsibility as a tiebreaker is limited to a very restricted number of cases and is associated with a number of ethical concerns. For this reason, waiting time should be preferred as a tiebreaker in liver allocation, even though the criterion of waiting time, too, raises a number of equity-related concerns. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

As a 4th century BCE Confucian text, Mencius provides a rich reflection on moral emotions, such as empathy and compassion, and moral cultivation, which has drawn attention from scholars around the world. This two-part discussion dwells on the idea of natural moral motivation expressed through the analogy of the four sprouts—particularly the sprout of ceyin zhixin (the heart of feelings others' distress)—as the starting point, the focus, and the drive of moral cultivation. In this paper, Part 1, I stress the (...) importance of holding an integrated view of the sprouts as consisting of three components: cognitive, affective, and motivational. Through examining scholarly accounts that do not adhere to such a view, I demonstrate why the integrative perspective is necessary for understanding the dynamic nature of human moral potential and the centrality of moral cultivation in Mencian ethics. (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio has criticized the reasons-responsiveness theory of freedom for being inconsistent with the actual-sequence view motivated by the Frankfurt-style cases. Specifically, reasons-responsiveness conceived as a modal property does not pertain to the actual sequence of the agent's action and thereby it is irrelevant to the agent's freedom and moral responsibility. Call this the challenge of irrelevance. In this article, I present this challenge in a new way that overcomes certain limitations of Sartorio's argument. I argue that the root of (...) the challenge is that reasons-responsiveness as an unmanifested modal property seems to be nonexplanatory for the agent's action. I show that reasons-responsiveness theorists will confront this challenge even if they do not endorse the actual-sequence view. Finally, I deflate this challenge with David Lewis's model of causal explanation, showing that reasons-responsiveness is explanatory in virtue of providing information about the causal history of the agent's action. (shrink)

Teachers strive to help students grasp significant propositions beyond merely knowing their content. The phenomenal theory holds that grasping a proposition requires corresponding phenomenal experiences, such as visualizing or perceiving its referents. We argue against this theory and propose an alternative: One grasps that p if and only if one mentally processes p in a way that enables relevant counterfactual reasoning about it. This account not only explains intuitive cases of grasping without phenomenal experiences but also clarifies the precise epistemic (...) role of such experiences. Finally, we demonstrate the practical value of our account by showing how it can be applied to assess students’ grasp of philosophical propositions. (shrink)

Using logic-laden terms to translate and interpret what the ancient Indian Buddhist thinkers said when we are not sure what they spoke about when they spoke about ‘contradictions’, etc. in natural languages can sometimes make things frustrating. Keeping in mind Wittgenstein’s exhortation, “don’t think, but look!”, I approach the issues of contradiction, negation, and the _catuṣkoṭi_ via case-by-case study on several pertinent passages in Dharmapāla’s _Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun_. The following are some interrelated observations which should not be overgeneralized, especially considering (...) the limited scope of this study and its methodological considerations. First, there is an implicit rule of non-opposition and there could be no real oppositions for apparent oppositions because of implicit qualifications. Moreover, these are not new since or after Dignāga. Second, Dharmapāla and his contemporaries are familiar with the two negative usages, and _prasajya-pratiṣedha_ is used for negating the opponents’ theses and is related to the no-thesis view. It’s not a good idea to assign truth values to sentences using _prasajya-pratiṣedha_ or to a thesis in which the terms have no real objects. And Dharmapāla’s theses are just therapeutic tools. Third, in Dharmapāla’s discussion of the negative _catuṣkoṭi_, one can see the rule of non-opposition, the strategy of qualifications, and the two negative usages. Although the four positions in the _catuṣkoṭi_ are regarded as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, they are jointly exhaustive in pragmatic context, and are mutually exclusive under some interpretations, but not all. My tentative suggestion is that the _catuṣkoṭi_ is a loosely term-based way of categorization. Last but not least, in the text discussed, I do not see Buddhist thinkers endorsing any contradictions. (shrink)

A long-standing debate has persisted on whether reciprocity reasonably justifies the priority rules in organ allocation as some countries (e.g., Israel, Singapore, Chile, and China) have adopted this priority policy based on reciprocity. This paper reviews the ethical dilemmas and challenges of incorporating reciprocity into a priority system by considering the following five aspects: (1) It exacerbates the risk of incorporating moral values in the organ allocation context. (2) It is incompatible with the reciprocity inherent in the gift- or gratitude-based (...) relationship in organ allocation. (3) The concept of “reciprocity,” which easily extends the idea of “moral desert,” could, thus, exacerbate social inequalities. (4) In the context of incentives instead of rewards, priority rules in organ allocation need not involve the obligation of reciprocity. (5) Reciprocity acceptability does not invariably translate into efficacy. In sum, reciprocity is not an appropriate moral rationale for being established as a priority rule in organ allocation, and alternatives such as altruism or charity (virtue)—though associated with several feasibility and fairness-related concerns—seem preferable. (shrink)

This paper offers several new insights into the epistemology of immunity to error through misidentification, by refining James Pryor’s distinction between de re misidentification and wh-misidentification. This is crucial for identifying exactly what is at issue in debates over the Immunity thesis that, roughly, all introspection-based beliefs about one’s own occurrent psychological states are immune to error through misidentification. I contend that the debate between John Campbell and Annalisa Coliva over whether the phenomenon of thought insertion provides empirical evidence against (...) claims like Immunity has wrongly focused on de re misidentification and largely overlooked the role of wh-misidentification. I argue that, once we properly distinguish the two notions, subjects of thought insertion can be seen to make an error of wh-misidentification in their judgments. I argue that this disproves the Immunity thesis, properly understood, and show what broader implications this has for our understanding of IEM and the first person. (shrink)

The no-wait flow-shop scheduling problem with sequence-dependent setup times and release times is a typical NP-hard problem. This paper proposes an enhanced differential evolution algorithm with several fast evaluating strategies, namely, DE_FES, to minimize the total weighted tardiness objective for the NFSP with SSTs and RTs. In the proposed DE_FES, the DE-based search is adopted to perform global search for obtaining the promising regions or solutions in solution space, and a fast local search combined with three presented strategies is designed (...) to execute exploitation from these obtained regions. Test results and comparisons with two effective meta-heuristics show the effectiveness and robustness of DE_FES. (shrink)

In this article, I set forth an inquiry into discrimination on the basis of race via two broad questions: What is a consideration of race a consideration of? And what is it for action to be on the basis of that consideration? Beginning with the matter of what constitutes race-based action brings out two conceptual hinges in analyses of racial discrimination, one in race and one in reason, that comprise what I call the race as a reason framework. Not only (...) are there different notions of practical reason that may be implicated in the stricture not to act on the basis of race (as a reason), there are also different conceptions of race that are relevant to these different notions of reasons for acting. Drawing out these two sites of ambiguity generates an illuminating taxonomy of acting on the basis of race that has significant theoretical and normative upshots for discrimination theory. (shrink)

Theories of causation within the causal modeling framework are among the most promising and well‐developed approaches to analyzing actual causation today. But since the advent of model‐based theories of causation, authors have struggled with the fact that virtually all such theories issue different causal conclusions when applied to different causal models (of the same case). In recent years, these concerns about model relativity have sharpened into a search for a general theory of model aptness, which lays out principled grounds on (...) which models may be ruled out as inapt for causal analysis. This article presents a new way of understanding what drives model relativity that shows why it is such an enduring problem. I show why extant proposals fail and furthermore, why they are not of the right form to be a solution. Along the way, I draw broader lessons about what an adequate answer to these problems must be like. I then take a step toward such an account by outlining a substantive constraint on when variables and paths in a causal model must not be drawn and when they may. (shrink)

Nāgārjuna, one of the most important Indian Buddhist philosophers, argues that all things, methods included, are empty. Many contemporary Mahāyāna Buddhists accept the doctrine, but not all of them apply it to sciences and scientific methods. Some of them might more or less take the authority of science for granted and/or think that science has nothing to do with religious beliefs. However, if Nāgārjuna is right, then sciences and scientific methods are no exception. That is to say, sciences and scientific (...) methods are dependently originated, impermanent, and empty of intrinsic nature. This paper aims to support that claim by drawing from Paul K. Feyerabend, one of the most important philosophers of science of the 20th century, and to elaborate on the issue of means of knowledge and on the emptiness of the statement that all things are empty. Feyerabend’s use of proliferation can be regarded by contemporary Buddhists as a first step towards the realization that all things, sciences in particular, are empty. Although liberation is attained through the halting of proliferation and the extinguishment of hypostatization engendered, Feyerabendian proliferation can also be of use afterwards in everyday life. Lastly, the implications of emptiness for naturalistic Buddhism and for the entangled world are briefly addressed. (shrink)

Since the Trump administration took office again in 2025, the combined impact of trade imbalances and political factors has escalated China - US trade frictions. Analyzing The New York Times' coverage of the China - US trade dispute offers insights into how US media shapes China's image. Consequently, this study combined quantitative and qualitative research, guided by the transitivity theory in systemic functional linguistics and the international ecological philosophy of "harmony and diversity, mutual benefits and love", it constructed a small-scale (...) corpus from The New York Times' reports on China - US trade issues post Trump's 2025 presidency. Using Word Smith Tools 9.0, it extracted semantic networks of verb collocations in the "China + V" material process structure to summarize China's actor image and explored the ecological representation of this image, revealing the international ecological philosophies of China and the US reflected in the discourse. The study found that in terms of "China + V" material processes, The New York Times portrayed China as a "tariff imposer," "strong retaliator," and "crisis manager." The ecological representation of these images was predominantly destructive, followed by neutral and beneficial discourse. The findings imply that China advocates mutual benefits, independence, and autonomy, while the US is linked to hegemonism. This research enriches the application of transitivity and promotes the development of a more objective, fair, and rational international ecological discourse system. (shrink)

Since the beginning of human civilization, the interpretation of the meaning of poverty has always reflected the unique historical characteristics of each era. From the interpretation in moral perspective in early ancient age to the analysis by classical political economists who focus on economy, it was not until Marx’s revelation of the underlying motivation for the development of the history that the course of poverty has been found. Nowadays, the researching progress on poverty has been enriched by contemporary researchers who (...) have used Marx’s theory of poverty as the starting point and interpreted poverty in multiple dimensions. The dilemma is that, despite the improvement of basic material conditions, poverty has not been decreased, which requires for an institutional reflection that transcends the level of production. In addressing this major “obstacle” to social development, China, guided by the Marxism theory of poverty, has not only demonstrated to humanity its Chinese wisdom in dealing with poverty but has also highlighted the institutional advantages of socialism. Thus, it has become a crucial practical example of the eradication and reduction of poverty worldwide. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFew papers have offered clear guidance for the application of critical realism to empirical studies, particularly in the research field of entrepreneurship. The purpose of this paper is to critically review how the methodological principles used to conduct CR-based research can be applied in empirical studies and to develop a critical realist case study research design to guide empirical work in entrepreneurship. I demonstrate the value of a CR-informed approach in empirical studies by drawing on a qualitative case study that (...) explains the reality of entrepreneurial opportunities. My inclusion of the three domains of reality and various data analysis techniques within the process of conceptual abstraction and retroduction contributes a distinctive methodological development in this field, which illustrates how CR can work in an applied setting to explain competing theories. Such a research design enables us to conduct empirical studies and provide comprehensive causal explanations of complex s... (shrink)

The New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan once compared the ethics of Mengzi to that of Kant, claiming that Mengzi’s ethics shares the same fundamental features with Kant’s and can therefore be better understood through a Kantian lens. This paper aims to argue against Mou by elaborating on two important but hitherto insufficiently addressed differences between Kant’s and Mengzi’s ethics. First, the paper shows that, as opposed to what Mou suggests, passages 6A1 to 6A3 of the Mengzi demonstrate Mengzi’s adoption of (...) an a posteriori approach to ethics that stands in direct contrast to Kant’s a priori approach. Second, the paper argues that even if we read Kant’s ethics in a non-rigorous way that works in favor of Mou’s interpretation, ren (humaneness), yi (optimal appropriateness), li (observance of rites), and zhi (wisdom), as the core concepts of Mengzi’s ethics, can still hardly be regarded as Kantian moral laws. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 209 Seiten: 187-208.

This article challenges the pessimistic view that empathy and other fellow feelings are biased and erratic motivation for morality. By discussing Mencius’ account on how to develop empathy from its biased and erratic beginnings, I argue that empathy can be extended to less common objects, such as non-kin, the faraway, the unfamiliar, and the abstract. The extension facilitated by empathy in turn enhances one’s moral cognition toward the sufferings of less common objects; the extension also helps to include less common (...) objects into one’s circle of care. I respond to critics of empathy such as Prinz by highlighting the dynamic cultivational process of empathy that they overlook, and further point out that empathy can be cultivated so as to provide a remedy for the biases that no emotion is immune to. This article contributes to the ongoing discussion on moral cultivation in the Chinese philosophy community and the dispute over empathy’s role in morality in contemporary ethics. (shrink)

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, more than 4 million Italians migrated to the United States of America (U.S.), which they regarded as a utopia. The film The Legend of 1900, which was inspired by Alessandro Baricco’s monologue Nocecento and directed by Giuseppe Tornatore, tells the story about the genius pianist 1900, an orphan, who is fostered by Danny, a black coalman in the boiler room of an ocean liner, and whose parents are presumably Italian immigrants. Due to (...) immigration law, 1900, a man with neither identity, visa, nor legal papers, cannot legally set foot on American soil. As a genius pianist, his existence is nothing more than that of musician—an entertainer to passengers on the gigantic trans-Atlantic liner Virginian, the only place he is permitted to live. According to Michel Foucault’s notion of heterotopia, a ship is “a piece of floating space, a placeless place”—a vessel transporting people to the land of their dreams. However, 1900, who has no legal status, will never arrive in utopia aboard Virginian. He can only construct a heterotopia—a mirror of utopia—so that it to him is a utopia. In the eyes of the law, 1900 is a legally non-existent person on Virginian, a placeless place. However, it is this lawless heterotopia and isolation that create a genius. In this paper, I illustrate how Virginian, as a place outside the law of land, metaphorically gives birth to a pianist, 1900, and why 1900 at the end chooses not to leave the ship, while also discussing the meaning behind the film and the relationship between law and space. (shrink)

This paper revisits Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in NE VII. 1–10. I try to offer a scientific reading of the book, according to which NE VII. 1–10 closely instantiates the main guidelines of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. I propose that NE VII. 1–2, which aims to establish the fact that akrasia exists, corresponds to the ὅτι-stage of an Aristotelian scientific inquiry, and NE VII. 3–10, which aims to explain both the cause and the object of akrasia, corresponds to the διότι-stage of (...) the inquiry. (shrink)

Sorensen has argued that one can exploit the vagueness of an ordinary predicate like ‘small’ to induce a sort of vagueness in ‘vague’, by constructing a series of predicates of the form ‘n-small’, where x is n- small if and only if x is small or x n. The resulting ‘Sorensen’ed’ predicates present a Sorites case for ‘vague’ ; hence the vagueness of ‘vague’. Hyde argues that this demonstrates that all vague predicates are higher-order vague. Others doubt whether Sorensen’s series (...) really delivers such a result, claiming Hyde’s argument to be either: unsound, because it misidentifies the true source of vagueness in Sorensen’s Sorites ; invalid, because it fails to generalize to all vague predicates ; or circular, because it presupposes the very thing it tries to prove, namely, higher-order vagueness. This paper contributes to the Sorensen-Hyde vs. Tye-Deas-Hull-Varzi debate by clarifying the relations between vague vagueness and higher-order vagueness. I show how claims of higher-order vagueness are derivable from claims of vague vagueness. This is the missing piece needed to complete Hyde’s argument and overcome the objections presented by Deas, Hull, Tye, and Varzi. I then show how Sorensen’s considerations, once properly generalized, pose more far-reaching consequences about the vagueness of ‘vague’ than either defenders or critics of Hyde’s argument have appreciated. (shrink)

In order to demonstrate the existence of the god, Plato introduces an investigation into the kinds of movement in the Laws X. This research begins obviously with the circular movement and the local movement of the Platonic Polyhedrons, follows with their combination, separation, growth and decay that result in the generation and destruction of the four elements and all perceptible things, and ends with the corporeal movement that encompasses the preceding eight elemental motion-types, and the motion of the soul, which (...) is proclaimed to be the self-motion. Given that the self-motion is caused by the intellect and functions as the principle and reason of all physical movements in the χώρα, the soul is deemed to be divine, in this sense the existence of the god is demonstrated. (shrink)