"In this highly original book, Ada Agada responds to the question of how a philosophy can be African and at the same time universally relevant by constructing an original philosophical system that is at once African and universal. Drawing on African forms of thought and conceptual schemes like ethnophilosophy, ubuntu, sage philosophy, négritude, ibuanyidanda philosophy, and ezumezu logic, the author introduces new concepts and conceptual schemes like mood and proto-panpsychism into philosophical vocabulary and weaves them into a coherent and original (...) system that promises to significantly impact contemporary African philosophy. Arguing for intercultural and comparative philosophy as a desirable mode of philosophising in a continually globalising and interconnected world, the book demonstrates the universal applicability of consolationism. This book will be of interest to scholars in the fields of African Studies, intercultural philosophy, philosophy of mind, and existentialism"--. (shrink)

There has recently been an increased interest in debates on the nature of God, supernatural entities, and the problem of evil outside the Western tradition and there is a growing realisation that philosophical scholarship should go beyond Western perspectives in order to properly address issues in the philosophy of religion that arise in non‐Western cultures. Taking this on board, this article surveys the field of African philosophy of religion and highlights some of the concerns and issues driving debates in the (...) field. In particular, we focus on three important debates. Firstly, we outline the two main schools of thought that divide African philosophers into theistic and non‐theistic camps. We label the theistic perspective the 'African theistic view' and the non‐theistic perpective the 'limited God view'. Secondly, we explore how commitment to the two views has led to distinct explanations of the problem of evil. Thirdly, we highlight the role of ancestors in African belief‐systems and their place in the scheme of things. Adopting the method of philosophical exposition and argument, we show how the two dominant views of God's nature define this emerging field of African philosophy and will determine the future trajectory of the field. (shrink)

An original and constructive African though system with universal reach. Existence and consolation transcends the ethno-philosophies the dominated in the post-colonial period. While the African experience might lead one to say human life is pointless, the author argues that meaning comes in the form of consolation and is rooted in mood.

This paper explores the contradiction of positing the existence of a God who is at once omnipotent and not omnipotent in respect of his power that arises in the thought of two African philosophers of religion, John A.I. Bewaji and Ademola Kazeem Fayemi who accept the limitation thesis that projects a limited God and deny the legitimacy of the transcendence view in Yoruba and, by extension, African thought. I demonstrate in this paper that the contradiction arises from the fact that (...) while Bewaji and Fayemi explicitly deny the legitimacy of the transcendence view in Yoruba and, by extension, African thought, they implicitly accept the view and unwittingly and illegitimately attempt to reconcile the conflicting views through the analysis of the notions of God’s creatorship, co-creatorship, and controllership. I conclude by recommending that instead of attempting to reconcile the antinomy of God’s existence in African philosophy of religion, African philosophers should acknowledge the legitimacy of the two conflicting theses constituting the antinomy and, accordingly, sustain logical consistency by strictly thinking within either the framework of limitedness or the framework of transcendence. (shrink)

Igwebuike is a traditional knowledge system undergirded by the metaphysical assumption that the world is a totality of interconnected and interrelated entities.1–4 African scholars in West Africa often invoke igwebuike to make sense of African ethical, social and political perspectives that are grounded in the theory of Afro-communitarianism. Afro-communitarianism is primarily a socioethical theory that is concerned with the articulation of the moral relationship between the individual and the community. The term igwebuike is derived from the Igbo root words igwe (...) (number), bu (is) and ike (strength). Thus, the term igwebuike translates as ‘number is strength’.3 4 As an ethical theory, igwebuike espouses the ontological relatedness of the variety of entities in the world and the moral relatedness of all humans by virtue of their common possession of life, with the accompanying human capacity for feeling and thinking. Resultantly, it prescribes solidarity, companionship and identification with others as virtues that promote human flourishing. The reverence for life and humanness explicitly forbids actions that diminish this superlative and irreplaceable quality.5 This concept can be helpful in offering a conceptual framework for making healthcare more …. (shrink)

Traditional African societies tend to favor a theocentric and anthropocentric conception of the universe, with God at the top of the hierarchy of being, in which the human sphere is a major center of influence and meaning. God is sometimes conceived in the traditional theistic sense and attributed with superlative qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, and benevolence. On the other hand, a more critical study of oral sources of African traditional religious thought constrains the traditional theistic interpretation and presents the idea (...) of a limited God. This chapter will provide an overview of the issues and questions that have driven debates in African philosophy of religion. Specifically, this chapter will critically engage the question of the existence of God and the problem of evil from the perspective of African philosophical thought. This chapter will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches to the problem of evil adopted by African philosophers. In the process of reconciling the transcendental and immanent conceptions of God in African religious thought, this chapter will provide an outline of an African theodicy as a basis for further explorations of African theodicies formulated beyond the limit of traditional African thought. (shrink)

This paper examines Nietzsche’s conception of what persists, or occurs, as becoming in relation to Ramose’s reconceptualization of what persists, or occurs, as be-ing becoming with a view to showing how divergence and convergence of thought in the western and African contexts can inform cross-cultural philosophizing. Nietzsche radically subverts the traditional notion of an eternal immutable being that constitutes the ground of change and replaces it with the notion of becoming. Ramose’s notion of being, which is grounded in ubuntu philosophy, (...) integrates a dynamic perspective into a process view of reality. While Nietzsche seeks to abandon the categories of being, unity, and purpose altogether, Ramose ambiguously retains them and, in fact, endorses the category of unity. I highlight the dynamics of Nietzsche’s notion of becoming and articulate the basic principles of Ramose’s idea of being as be-ing becoming and argue that both thinkers’ struggle to subvert substance-based understanding of being invites us to question the intelligibility of the binary opposition of being with becoming and to regard both concepts as indicating different ways of understanding reality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The concept of vital force in African philosophy received its first full articulation in Placide Tempels’s Bantu Philosophy and has evolved over time from the ontological dimension of a universal actuation and energizing principle to an element of mind, notably in the work of Kwame Gyekye. In this essay, I present the concept of vital force and trace its evolution from the time of its first full articulation by Tempels up to its identification with spirit, or mind, in Gyekye’s (...) thought. I try to defend the thesis that the concept of vital force can ground the notion of mood that takes a pivotal position in the twenty-first century philosophy of consolationism. I adopt an analytical and constructive method in this paper. (shrink)

In this paper I compare Kwame Gyekye’s transcendentalist interpretation of the Akan conception of God with Kwasi Wiredu’s immanentist interpretation. I highlight the tension between the two thinkers’ interpretations of Akan religious thought within the broader conflict between transcendence and immanence. Using the analytic, critical, and interpretative method, I show how the reconciliation of Gyekye and Wiredu’s divergent, yet paradoxically overlapping visions can be effected in the idea of panpsychism. In the process of effecting this reconciliation, I open up a (...) new area of research in African philosophy of religion that African philosophers will find rewarding to engage. (shrink)

This paper examines Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence and the notions of reincarnation in Onyewuenyi and Majeed with a view to showing how convergence and divergence of thought in the Nietzschean, Onyewuenyean and Majeedean philosophy contexts can inform cross-cultural philosophizing. Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence represents his deep thought, which claims that every aspect of life returns innumerable times, in an identical fashion. On the other hand, Onyewuenyi posits that reincarnation is un-African as he conceives it as the theory that (...) when the soul separates from the body, at death, it informs another body for another span of life, while Majeed sees evidence of the African rootedness of the belief in reincarnation, based on his study of the Akan people of Ghana and concedes that the belief, itself, is irrational, since there is no scientific or empirical basis for it. Attempts are made to highlight the dynamics of Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence and to articulate the essential ingredients of Onyewuenyean and Majeedean conceptions of reincarnation. These forms of thought will be examined critically to exhibit their convergence and divergence in the context of cross-cultural philosophizing. Keywords: eternal recurrence, reincarnation, will to power, vital force, cross-cultural philosophy, spirit-world. (shrink)

This chapter critically explores the question of being and fundamental reality in the thought of Placide Tempels, Kwame Gyekye, Innocent I. Asouzu, and Aribiah D. Attoe. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the vitalist tradition of Tempels and Gyekye and the non-vitalist tradition of Asouzu and Attoe. While the vitalist tradition of Tempels and Gyekye locates fundamental reality in a spiritual entity, namely, God, the non-vitalist tradition of Asouzu and Attoe avoids supernaturalist commitment and rethinks reality in the framework of Afro-relationality. (...) The chapter evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches to understanding fundamental reality adopted by the four philosophers and examines the place of God in their metaphysical systems. The chapter analyses the notions of vital force, sunsum, missing links, and singular realities and exhibits their conceptual structures and relationship, with the ultimate goal of showing how the articulation of these notions has deepened contemporary African metaphysical thought. (shrink)

In his 2015 Theoria article titled ‘A Rejection of Humanism in African Moral Tradition’, Motsamai Molefe argues that Kwasi Wiredu's humanistic interpretation of traditional Akan ethics cannot be the best account of African ethics because Wiredu overlooks the significant sentiment in traditional African thought that regards reality as a holistic totality of spiritual, social and environmental components. I point out that Molefe's rejection of Wiredu's humanism follows from the latter's de-emphasising of supernaturalism. I argue that Molefe overlooks the fact that (...) the displacement of God in this humanism is consistent with the limited God sentiment in traditional African thought, which confirms Wiredu's humanistic ethics as one rooted in traditional African worldviews. Adopting the method of philosophical exposition and analysis, I show how Wiredu's limited God framework motivates scepticism about the possibility of a supernaturalist ethics and renders a humanistic orientation a more attractive account of African moral tradition. (shrink)

This paper argues that the continued emphasis on ethno-philosophy and the relative absence of intellectual passion and curiosity are the greatest challenges facing African philosophy. The paper rejects the racist lamentation of scholars such as Olufemi Taiwo who blame the West for Africa’s absence from the stage of world philosophy. It highlights the link between L.S. Senghor’s doctrine of negritude, the philosophy of Innocent Asouzu, and the emerging synthesis of consolationism to underline the fact that African philosophy has made some (...) progress, although things could be much better. The paper concludes by urging African philosophers to be more radical and innovative in their thinking, as innovation and originality are the only conditions for the universal acceptance of, and interest in, African philosophy. (shrink)

Kwame Gyekye has been called a dualist to the extent that he accepts the ontological distinction between mind and matter, with both phenomena interacting with each other. I argue in this article that Gyekye’s presentation of the sunsum as a universal animating principle that is itself nonmaterial and irreducible to a material base warrants a second look at his philosophy of mind to determine whether he can be considered a pan-psychist and whether a pan-psychist reading can resolve the Gyekyean problem (...) of interaction. I assert that, while Gyekye’s interpretation of the Akan notion of sunsum invites a pan-psychist scrutiny, the interpretive difficulties surrounding the concept, as highlighted by Kwasi Wiredu and Safro Kwame, render a pan-psychist conclusion problematic even if persuasive. I recommend that the notion of sunsum as a nonmaterial principle that underlies material entities is significant enough to warrant further interrogation by African philosophers of mind. (shrink)

This chapter will examine the themes of nihilism, pessimism, and optimism as they feature in the thought of the Nigerian philosophers, Innocent Asouzu and Ada Agada. While endorsing Asouzu’s basic optimistic vision of reality, I will, nevertheless, point out the inadequacy of an almost entirely optimistic theory of human existence in accounting for the phenomena of nihilism and pessimism. I will compare Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda philosophy with Agada’s consolation philosophy. I will show that consolation philosophy supplies a broader vision of the (...) world that attempts the reconciliation of the optimistic and pessimistic outlooks. Finally, I will sketch a theory of meaning in life, based on the submissions of ibuanyidanda and consolation philosophies and present this outline as promising much for the development of an African philosophy of life. The essay will adopt the method of analysis and evaluation. (shrink)

This article inserts the novel notion of the human being as a melancholy being, or homo melancholicus, into the African discourse on the human person and promotes the perspective as an Afro-existentialist contribution to the understanding of human nature from an African angle. The article analyzes the concept of consolation and exhibits certain emotions and orientations of the melancholy being in relation to the key questions of the philosophy of consolationism. The key questions raised for discussion here are as follows: (...) (1) Is human life futile? (2) Is the universe pointless? The article identifies such emotions and orientations of the melancholy being as anxiety, joy, sadness, and homelessness. It proposes that for a consolation-seeking entity like the melancholy being, death may serve as a kind of home. It argues that human life is ultimately futile even as the universe may well have a purpose that, tragically, humans cannot know with certainty although they may speculate about it. (shrink)

Are the existence of God and evil logically compatible? Philosophers have been dwelling on this question since the era of Ancient Greek philosophy. Most responses to this philosophical problem have come from a Western viewpoint. This article aims to answer this question by considering an African cosmological and ethical groundwork. Working conceptually within this cosmology and ethic, we argue that if the evil in the world is understood as a lesser evil, then a good God can plausibly allow evil to (...) happen. This is the case because God preventing evil will lead to a worse state of affairs which will result in a worse world. Allowing a lesser evil is the best possible outcome. We assert that this view offers a better theory than the theodicy defended by some mainstream Western philosophers according to which a greater good is achieved through evil. (shrink)

Kwame Gyekye’s interpretation of traditional Akan religious thought leads him to the conception of God as a being that possesses the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. Adopting an analytical and hermeneutical method, I argue in this article that Gyekye’s understanding of God as the direct source of the sunsum, or spirit, in the context of his presentation of the sunsum as a wholly immaterial and ubiquitous principle introduces a clear panpsychist dimension to his commitment to theism. I point out (...) that just as Gyekye’s account of the sunsum raises the question of its nature, so does his description of God as the direct source of the sunsum raise the question of God’s nature, whether he is indeed a wholly immaterial entity or not. I explore possible ways that Gyekye can defend the claim that a God who distributes sunsum in the physical world is wholly immaterial, and conclude that the claim cannot be sustained on account of the interpretive difficulty that the idea of sunsum raises. (shrink)

African philosophy of mind is still a developing area of African philosophy. The main issues driving debates in the field include the essential components of the human being (whether this being is wholly physical or partly physical and partly non-material), the relation of the body with the mind or consciousness, whether there is a unifying principle that grounds both body (matter) and consciousness, and whether there is an aspect of the human being that survives biological death. Physicalist theories such as (...) sense-phenomenalism, equi-phenomenalism, and quasi-physicalism have been proposed by some African philosophers as theoretical frameworks for thinking and rethinking the relation of the body with consciousness in the African universe. This chapter examines the plausibility of the three frameworks and argues that the persistence of the quality of subjective experience and the seeming independence of the subjective sphere require a recourse to panpsychism as a theoretical framework that better accounts for the fact of subjective experience. The chapter proposes a moderate version of panpsychism labelled proto-panpsychism as a metaphysical framework that adequately accounts for the phenomenon of consciousness while unifying the African universe of material and non-material entities. (shrink)

In this article, I locate Okot p’Bitek’s evaluation of African traditional religion and his critique of the traditional African theistic stance in the broader African limited God tradition. I argue that while p’Bitek’s claim is plausible that traditional African societies do not believe in a supreme being that possesses the omni-properties in the context of commitment to the limitation thesis, the other claim, that these societies are atheistic because they merely acknowledge the reality of mystical forces and powers rather than (...) God or gods, constitutes a hasty, unsustainable generalisation. Adopting the method of philosophical exposition and argumentation, I point out that in purporting to make a cultural statement in favour of atheism, p’Bitek fails to reckon with the existence of two culturally rooted but conflicting views of God in African traditional religion and traditional African thought. One view endorses traditional theism while the other, for the most part, proposes that God is limited in power, knowledge and goodness. I argue that both views are damaging to p’Bitek’s second claim. (shrink)

Wiredu has argued that traditional Akan (African) ethics is humanistic in orientation and that human welfare, rather than God’s will, is the basis of morality. In response, Motsamai Molefe asserts that Wiredu’s conclusion overlooks the supernaturalist dimension of traditional African ontology which presents God as the apex being in the universe and the ultimate ground of reality. According to Molefe, a vitalistic conception of God supports the claim that an African supernaturalist ethics is possible. He proceeds to develop an intriguing (...) supernaturalist vitality-based ethics that makes God the foundation of morality. I argue in this article that while Molefe indeed succeeds in demonstrating the possibility of an African supernaturalist ethics, Wiredu’s humanistic framework has a practical advantage over Molefe’s supernaturalist framework to the extent that the problem of revelation in African Traditional Religion forces Molefe’s supernaturalist ethics to assume a speculative aspect. I point out that a vitalistic God who acts intentionally may well define morality in terms of a divine property like knowledge rather than vitality. (shrink)

In the 2019 work “A Sense-Phenomenal Look at the Problem of Personal Identity,” Jonathan O. Chimakonam articulates an intriguing and novel body-only perspective of personal identity that has a direct implication for our understanding of consciousness. In this article, I focus on the aspect of the work that adopts a seemingly eliminativist stance on the hard problem of consciousness. Chimakonam’s version of physicalism rejects the reality of consciousness or experience while accepting that humans have sensations. Having transferred the location of (...) sensation from the mind (the within), and even the brain, to the sense organs (the outside) without eliminating the category of mind, Chimakonam unwittingly raises the question of whether his philosophy of mind represents an eliminativist stance or a reductive physicalist stance. In this article, I argue that while a reductive physicalist reading of Chimakonam is a plausible interpretation of his stance, the non-rejection of the category of mind and the seeming distinction between mind and brain supports the claim that sense-phenomenalism does not radically overcome the hard problem of consciousness. (shrink)

In much of Western philosophy of religion, God is conceived as a perfect being in terms of power, knowledge, goodness, and related attributes. In contrast, a dominant characterization of God in contemporary African philosophy of religion presents the deity as limited in power, knowledge, goodness, and related attributes. In this chapter, I engage in a comparative, cross-cultural exercise that brings divergent Western and African perspectives on the problem of evil into a philosophical conversation. I compare Richard Swinburne’s Western/Christian approach to (...) the problem of evil with Kwasi Wiredu’s African approach. I argue from a comparative, cross-cultural philosophical perspective that the free will and greater good theodicy of Swinburne faces philosophical difficulties that Wiredu’s limited God approach to the question of evil does not contend with. I argue that given the philosophical difficulties that Swinburne’s theistic perspective faces, Wiredu’s limited God view offers an attractive alternative viewpoint that more persuasively accounts for the reality of (moral) evil in the world. (shrink)

We explore the question of the existence of God from an African vitalist perspective. We raise the question of the kind of properties that God may possess if the universe is conceived as expressing vitality. We conceive vitality in two ways, namely (1) as an animating principle which God maximally embodies in himself and which is a perfection indicative of God’s all-round perfection (2) as a universal limiting principle indicative of the existence of an imperfect God who, nevertheless, embodies vitality (...) in a more excellent way than humans and other entities. Adopting aspects of the traditional cosmological and teleological arguments for God’s existence, we argue that a vitalistic conception of the universe ultimately favours belief in the existence of a limited God rather than the existence of a perfect God even as force of argument alone cannot show that the limited God actually exists. (shrink)

The evidence of human wickedness in the world is so transparent that no rational person can dispute its reality. This paper approaches the question of the human person from an African philosophical perspective and explores the relation between the apparently free-acting human being and God conceived as the creator of the world and the ultimate cause of the human being. The paper will proffer answers to the following question: to what extent can the human being be absolved of blame for (...) the evil they perpetrate in a world conceived in African traditional religion and thought as the creation of a high deity who could have foreseen the negative bent of human nature and should have made human nature inclined to goodness all of the time? The paper will make novel contributions to the debate about human nature in African philosophical discourse by recasting the human being as a homo melancholicus, or melancholy being, whose evil inclination in the world can best be understood in the context of a tragic vision of reality. (shrink)

In the last few decades, African philosophy has emerged as an independent global intellectual tradition. African philosophy has decisively divided into specialist fields, thanks to the enormous commitment of African philosophers from all over the world. These specialist fields include metaphysics, ethics, logic, epistemology, socio-political philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, existentialism, and philosophy of development. In one form or the other, the various fields of African philosophy are undergirded by metaphysical assumptions and presuppositions derived from traditional African (...) relational-holistic ontology. (shrink)

This book introduces fundamental questions and problems driving debates in contemporary African philosophy of religion, which has emerged recently as one of the most vibrant new fields of African philosophy. The chapters in this book respond to African God-talk and approach questions like the nature of God, the problem of evil, death and immortality, transhumanism, moral enhancement, atheism, meaningful existence, and the decolonisation of African religious concepts. This book reflects the diversity of voices and perspectives in the literature with its (...) critical focus on such themes as the extent of the powers of the limited God, schools of thought in contemporary African philosophy of religion, the monotheistic credentials of African Traditional Religion (ATR), and the panpsychist presuppositions of African philosophy and ATR. The book addresses the possibility of immortality, the good life, decolonising the concept of Esu, Igbo notions of the person and the problem of evil, and transhumanist ideals and the limited harmony-God. Finally, the book highlights the significance of theosophical debate between the African perfect God perspective championed by philosophers like John S. Mbiti, Kwame Gyekye, and Ebunoluwa O. Oduwole, and the African limited God view defended by philosophers like Kwasi Wiredu, Okot p’Bitek, John A.I. Bewaji, Ada Agada, and Aribiah David Attoe. The book is of interest to academics, researchers, and postgraduate students active in the fields of African philosophy, African religious studies, African studies, comparative philosophy, global philosophy of religion, theology, and intercultural and comparative religious studies. (shrink)

There was a mix-up during the publication process. The Book Review file that was supposed to be part of this Vol 7 No 2 was mistakenly switched for the one that was published in Vol 7 No 1. We are withdrawing this Book Review piece because it has already been published in Vol 7 No 1. Book Title: Reincarnation: A Question in the African Philosophy of Mind Book Author: Hasskei M. Majeed UNISA Press. Pages: 275. Year of Publication: 2017.

Book Title: Philosophic Sagacity and Intercultural Philosophy: Beyond Henry Odera Oruka Book Author: Pius Maija Mosima African Studies Centre, Leiden, Netherlands. pp. 187. ISBN: 978-90-5448-152-2.

This contribution will outline some important aspects of Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlés groundbreaking work on Yorùbá oral philosophy. Using the Yorùbá story ‘The Toothless Queen’ as a vehicle, we will outline her understanding of oral philosophy as philosophy proper and investigate her radically inclusive, non-absolutist, anti-nihilist conception of philosophy as well as the fundamental onto-epistemological axioms of Yorùbá thought. We will especially focus on Olúwọlés radical and revolutionary philosophical approach to rationality and rational conjectures. We will finish our paper with Olúwọlés’ (...) reflections on some of the obstacles that must be overcome to make her revolution a reality in the global philosophical community, that is, the pain of letting theories, ideas, and principles dear to us go. (shrink)

African metaphysics question a variety of issues, ranging from the nature of fundamental reality to the meaning of human existence. African philosophers have introduced groundbreaking metaphysical theories in response to these metaphysical issues and questions. These theories provide uniquely African perspectives that challenge philosophers to look inwards and produce globally competitive ideas instead of exoticising traditional African worldviews for the intellectual entertainment of a non-African audience. This volume advances the field of African metaphysics by critically engaging with key metaphysical ideas (...) and concepts developed by African metaphysical thinkers. The chapters contributed in this volume by established researchers and promising young scholars challenge and modify existing metaphysical theories while proposing novel theories that shape debates in the field. Ada Agada is a leading contemporary African metaphysical thinker and the major proponent of consolationism in African philosophy. He is currently a senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Federal University Otuoke, Nigeria. He is the author of the 2022 landmark work, Consolationism and Comparative African Philosophy. Emmanuel Ofuasia is a Nigerian philosopher and a recipient of local and international grants and scholarships from organisations and institutions such as Birmingham Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham, the John Templeton Foundation, and Institute of African and Diaspora Studies at the University of Lagos. Bruno Yammeluan Ikuli is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Federal University Otuoke. He specialises in Political Philosophy and African Philosophy. Until February 2024, he was a member of the University Governing Council. Currently, he is the Chairperson of the Academic Staff Union of Universities of the University. (shrink)

The ongoing debate among African philosophers on the relation of the individual and the community has spawned radical, moderate, and limited communitarian views. In this paper we will insert the question of interpersonal communication into the individual-community conundrum and raise the discourse to the level of cross-cultural engagement. We will highlight the dominant perspectives in Afro-communitarianism with particular emphasis on the Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye and the Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti. Expanding the discourse into the domain of intercultural/comparative philosophy, this (...) paper will engage Gyekye and Menkiti’s Afro-communitarianism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s radical individualism and the resulting conflictual presentation of interpersonal relation. The paper adopts the conversational method. Keywords: Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, Afro-communitarianism, community, individual, Jean-Paul Sartre. (shrink)

The notion of love is one of the fascinating concepts available to humans. Love is perhaps the most powerful emotion a human being can experience. Love is immediately recognized as a feeling. It is only after observing human conduct that it dawns on us that there is a rational dimension of love. In this paper I will discuss the Idoma-African concept of ihotu, or love. Since the very idea of an Idoma philosophy of love is an entirely novel idea, with (...) no prior identifiable research in this field, I will rely heavily on my knowledge of Idoma culture and conversations with Ihonde Ameh of Ochobo community who has an in-depth knowledge of Idoma value-system. I will proceed to show how the consolationist theory of love is a systematization of the basic ethnophilosophical data supplied by Idoma traditional thought. With consolation philosophy transcending the basic intuition of the African collective, in this particular case the Idoma of Central Nigeria, I will argue for the rationality of love by pointing out its indispensability in the formation and expression of what we consider right or moral behaviour. I will argue that a greater part of the conduct we approve of as ethical is founded on our emotional experience and that this emotional experience is to a large extent determined by the urgings of pity or empathy. I will attempt to exhibit the philosophical grounds of empathy from the African perspective of consolationism and, in the process, delve into philosophical psychology from the African place. In achieving these objectives, I will have recourse to the metaphysics and epistemology of love from the consolationist perspective. The methodology adopted here is the analytical, conversational, and evaluative methodology. Key words: Love, Ihotu, reason, consolationism, emotion, empathy. (shrink)

While advancing the idea that morality is a universal human phenomenon, Kwasi Wiredu suggests that human reason, rather than the will of God, grounds morality and determines what is good in traditional Akan society. I note in this chapter that while Wiredu’s rationalism deviates from the traditional African theistic view that God is the source of morality, his appeal to reason rather than divine authority is consistent with his religious philosophy. This religious philosophy accommodates what I call the limited God (...) view in the African philosophy of religion. I compare Wiredu’s humanistic moral framework with the moral framework sustained by traditional African theism and argue that from a practical standpoint, both moral frameworks are attractive, as they enhance the dignity of the human being. (shrink)

In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or (...) so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino; ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada; ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe; and ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and the debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions. (shrink)

Book Title: African Philosophy and the Otherness of Albinism: White Skin, Black Race Book Author: Elvis Imafidon Publisher: Routledge. Pages: Pp. xvi + 146. Year of Publication: 2019.