This article puts forth a novel framework for understanding conceptions of disability using six models of disability: the “Social,” “Medical,” “Tragedy,” “Affirmative,” “Minority” and “Universal” models. It analyzes these models as three opposed pairs, each pertaining to a distinct aspect of the multifaceted experience of disability: (1) the cause of disabled people’s social disadvantage and exclusion; (2) the effect of impairment on individuals’ quality of life and well-being; (3) the dichotomy or lack thereof between disabled and nondisabled people. The article (...) argues that although each model is incompatible with its opposed pair, it is compatible with the remaining four models, in the sense that there is no contradiction in holding the views associated with these models at the same time. It therefore concludes that conceptions of disability are best understood as clusters of views on disability that are associated with compatible models. (shrink)

Recent changes in conceptions of disability pose a challenge for tort law theory, which amounts to making sense of this area of law without reinforcing outdated negative views about disabled people. This article takes up this challenge by critically engaging with Gregory Keating’s recent book Reasonableness and Risk: Right and Responsibility in the Law of Torts (2022). Drawing on social conceptions of disability and impairment, it criticizes Keating’s characterization of physical injury as a harm-based tort, one that diminishes people’s capacity (...) for agency. By contrast, it suggests that physical injury is a sovereignty-based tort, which Keating defines as an unjust interference with people’s protected zones of discretion. This article argues that reconceptualizing physical injury like so provides a sound theoretical basis for tort law doctrine, including its prioritization of safety. It also better aligns with disabled people’s lived experiences and can reduce negative stereotypes of disabled people perpetuated by current tort law practice. (shrink)

The enforcement mechanisms of anti-discrimination law manifest a puzzle: while the dominant view is that discrimination is a wrongdoing against individuals, which suggests that discriminatees should have the power to vindicate their rights, legal provisions sometimes authorise public officials to file claims against alleged discriminators, regardless of discriminatees’ preferences. Seeking to make sense of this puzzle, this article draws on theories of state enforcement under criminal law to explore the justification of public enforcement under anti-discrimination law and reflect on the (...) nature of discrimination more broadly. It claims that an instrumental justification of public enforcement of anti-discrimination law is left wanting. Instead, it argues that public enforcement in this domain is warranted because discrimination is not only a private wrong against individuals, but is also a public wrong, namely a wrong against the community as a whole. (shrink)