Basic Income Guarantee proposals aim at, among other objectives, the salutary goal of providing a minimum income floor beneath which individuals cannot fall. We analyze this family of proposals through the lens of comparative political economy, arguing that politics is not an appropriate institutional environment for pursuing the end of an income floor. Once the notion of a guaranteed income is cast in realistic, probabilistic terms, it becomes a live question whether the market or the polity can better secure a (...) Basic Income. Actual markets must be compared to real-world political processes rather than idealized policy proposals in order to ascertain their desirability. Drawing on the extant literature on the failure of political processes to realize the goals of other redistributive programs, we argue that Basic Income Guarantee proposals likewise ignore politics as practiced and are thus equally subject to critiques both of their means-ends coherence and their vulnerability to political opportunism. (shrink)

This chapter offers a synthetic account of the key methodological ideas espoused by prominent Austrian economists. It focuses on the contributions of Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig Lachmann, and Donald Lavoie, arguing that epistemological concerns fail to encapsulate their overlapping but distinctive and complementary methodological arguments. Their methodological positions are better explained as flowing from a shared and distinctive social ontology that underlies Austrian economic theory. Austrian social ontology is distinct because of its commitment to three key (...) concepts: radical subjectivism, sheer ignorance, and spontaneous order. The chapter then presents a stylized schema of social processes that embodies these key concepts and shows that the schema both accommodates distinctively Austrian theories and allows for a synthesis of the key methodological contributions of all the Austrian economists discussed earlier. (shrink)

:Advocates of cosmopolitan ideals, to the extent that they engage with questions of institutional design, typically imagine replicating or refining existing, nation-state models of governance but on an international scale. This essay argues that cosmopolitan ethics need not go hand in hand with international government, and may be better served by a different approach. I explore the concept of degeneracy as a principle of institutional evaluation and design in international politics. Degeneracy is a characteristic of complex systems in which multiple (...) components of the system offer overlapping functions, and is a key component in the robustness of such systems. Non-degenerate systems, by contrast, exhibit fragility in the face of adverse conditions. When applied to systems of governance, degeneracy commends polycentricity and allows for some evaluation of the robustness of different mechanisms and forms of polycentric governance. Cosmopolitan ideals are better served by providing alternatives to existing forms of governance than by building on them. I consider some concrete policy applications of this idea, focusing on immigration and intellectual property. (shrink)