This article discusses the imbrication of racialising and sexualising scientific practices of gender testing and verification in elite athletics competition, and their intersection with social politics, using as a theoretical frame the feminist, anti-racist work of Hortense Spillers (2003), Judith Butler (1990, 1993a, 1993b, 2004) and Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000), among others. It traces the practice of sex-gender testing of ‘women’ at sanctioned International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) and International Olympic Committee (IOC) track and field competitions in order to contextualise (...) South African middle-distance runner Caster Semenya’s experiences at the 2009 Berlin World Championships and the subsequent spectacularisation of her body through the discursive practices of representation. (shrink)

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

This study evaluates the comprehension of generalized conversational implicatures (GCI) in children with and without autism spectrum disorder (ASD), using a GCI test constructed based on the Levinson model, which distinguishes between three types of implicatures: type Q (or scalar: “what is not referred to does not occur”); type I (“by default, it is not necessary to say what can be assumed”); and type M (“if someone is expressing something in a not very simple or marked way, it is because (...) s/he is describing a situation that is not very typical, frequent, or prototypical”). In addition to the ASD group ( n = 22), two comparison groups were utilized: a group matched on chronological age with the ASD group, but with a higher linguistic age (TCD group, n = 22), and a group matched on linguistic age with the ASD group, but with a lower chronological age (TLD group, n = 22). In all cases, linguistic age was assessed with the Peabody test. The performance of the three groups on the GCI test was compared (overall and on each type of implicature), and performance on the three types of implicature was compared within each group. The ASD group obtained worse performance than the other two groups, both overall and for each implicature type, without also obtaining differences in performance on the three implicature types. The TCD group obtained better performance than the TLD group on overall performance, but not on each implicature type, and both groups obtained lower performance on the type M heuristics than on the type I. Based on these results, the children with ASD in our study presented limitations in the comprehension of the three types of GCI, but it was not possible to obtain evidence for an inferential continuum of the three types of GCI. However, in the two typical development groups, this evidence was obtained, leading us to propose an inferential continuum model based on the different levels of dependence on the context of each of the three types of implicatures, with type M implicatures being more contextually dependent. (shrink)

International criminal law (ICL) is an achievement, but at the same time a challenge to the traditional conception of the principle of legality (_lex praevia_, _scripta_, and _stricta_ – Sect. 1). International criminal tribunals have often based conviction for international crimes on unwritten norms the existence and scope of which they have failed to substantiate. In so doing, they have evaded the objection that they were applying _ex post facto_ criminal laws. This approach, the relaxation of the concept of law (...) by including norms whose existence is doubtful, has apparently served to maintain a concept of strict legality, but it is unsatisfying (Sect. 2). In my opinion, the strict principle of legality that has linked its absolute validity to the positivity of law is not the correct premise. It makes sense to state that positivity and validity do not necessarily go hand in hand (Sect. 3). Applied to ICL, this means that it is neither necessary nor convincing to “conceal” supra-positive law as positive law, as some decisions of the international criminal tribunals do. For this reason, I consider that Radbruch’s formula, consisting in admitting that there are supra-positive limits which positive law must respect in order to be valid, is well-founded (Sect. 4). The path taken by this significant philosopher of law is methodologically convincing, and it squarely faces the problem of the value of positive law. Nevertheless, if we admit Radbruch’s formula and thereby the limited value of positive law (if we claim that the validity of the law depends on it respecting supra-positive minimums of justice), we must also face the problem of the definition of supra-positive values, the epistemological difficulties of having access to them (Sect. 5), and the question of the scope and enforceability of supra-positive law (Sect. 6). In summary, this article aims to explain why Radbruch’s formula offers a convincing conceptual basis for international criminal legality and, in doing so, aims to contribute to the discussion about the foundations of ICL. (shrink)

We explore the view that subjective experiences, termed epistemic feelings in the literature, accompany reasoning, intuition and other cognitive processes. These epistemic feelings are considered to have a wide range of functions, providing us with information about many aspects of our cognitive content. For instance, they can tell us whether something we know is certain, uncertain, interesting, boring, doubtful, ambiguous, correct, plausible, informative, relevant, coherent or related to other cognitive content. To understand how epistemic feelings work is therefore essential in (...) comprehending any kind of thinking process, including any kind of reasoning process. In this work, we first analyze epistemic feelings with the aim of describing their nature and functions. Secondly, we explore the analogies and differences between somatic, emotional and epistemic feelings and try to show that epistemic feelings are not the same as epistemic emotions and that although somatic, emotional and epistemic feelings all make use of the same kinds of signals, they are triggered by different monitoring systems. Finally, we show that epistemic feelings guide us to choose specific kinds of reasoning processes and determine whether we rely on intuitions rather than on analytic reasoning. Finally, although epistemic feelings do not necessarily lead us to make the best choice in every context, they can be trained to provide us with better guidance. (shrink)

Histories of ocean science have emphasized the ways that state-sponsored deep-sea expeditions ushered in a new age of oceanic understanding during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This essay, on the other hand, examines the ways that shallow waters played host to less formal but nevertheless important efforts to create oceanic natural knowledge, often centuries earlier. By documenting the legends and experiences of people who worked on and lived by the ocean—divers, sailors, and fishermen, among others—and corroborating their stories (...) with firsthand observation, seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century natural historians built a nascent science of the sea. In its close focus on “sea beans” and “barnacle geese,” subjects of wide conjecture and earnest curiosity, the essay shows how shallow waters welcomed new actors onto the scientific stage and decentered the geographies of knowledge production, thereby advancing contemporary knowledge of oceanic circulation as well as the taxonomies and ecologies of coastal creatures. (shrink)

Este artículo propone acercarse a la jurisprudencia “ecocéntrica” para evaluar el papel que en la misma están jugando la noción de Gaia y la de Pachamama. Para ello, comienza analizando el actual proceso de ecologización del derecho y la noción de justicia socioecológica. Posteriormente, describe dos propuestas dentro de este ámbito: el Derecho de Sistema Tierra y los derechos de naturaleza. Además, expone las dos nociones de naturaleza que las informan: Gaia y Pachamama, analizando la compatibilidad o incompatibilidad conceptual entre (...) ambos. Tomando como base este trabajo conceptual realiza posteriormente un análisis cualitativo de sentencias “ecocéntricas”. En el mismo se evalúa el peso de las nociones de Gaia y Pachamama y si, en el ámbito de las sentencias, estas nociones se presentan como antagónicas. Finalmente, se valora si este supuesto giro “ecocéntrico” en la jurisprudencia está o no suponiendo un cambio político análogo en el razonamiento de las sentencias y si estas se alejan o no del utilitarismo antropocéntrico de nociones como el desarrollo sostenible. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendemos esclarecer a relação entre o governo neoliberal e as diversas formas que o sofrimento psicológico se constitui a partir de estilos de vida, e de trabalho, que aliançados às injustiças sociais, podem levar o indivíduo à perda subjetiva. Para tanto, iremos realizar uma revisão bibliográfica da literatura filosófica e psicológica contemporânea. Os fenômenos do capitalismo contemporâneo como o distanciamento social, o trabalho repetitivo, a lógica competitiva de trabalho, superação e produtividade em todas as áreas da vida estariam (...) associados a sintomas psicopatológicos, e ao uso de medicações psiquiátricas como uma solução rápida para o sofrimento, sem levar em conta outras formas de cuidado e de subjetividade humana. (shrink)

Healthcare professionals often face ethical conflicts and challenges related to decision-making that have necessitated consideration of the use of conscientious objection (CO). No current guidelines exist within Spain’s healthcare system regarding acceptable rationales for CO, the appropriate application of CO, or practical means to support healthcare professionals who wish to become conscientious objectors. As such, a procedural framework is needed that not only assures the appropriate use of CO by healthcare professionals but also demonstrates its ethical validity, legislative compliance through (...) protection of moral freedoms and patients’ rights to receive health care. Our proposal consists of prerequisites of eligibility for CO (individual reference, specific clinical context, ethical justification, assurance of non-discrimination, professional consistency, attitude of mutual respect, assurance of patient rights and safety) and a procedural process (notification and preparation, documentation and confidentiality, evaluation of prerequisites, non-abandonment, transparency, allowance for unforeseen objection, compensatory responsibilities, access to guidance and/or consultative advice, and organizational guarantee of professional substitution). We illustrate the real-world utility of the proposed framework through a case discussion in which our guidelines are applied. (shrink)

En este artículo planteo una crítica a la noción de chora manejada por Julia Kristeva. Para ello, me sirvo de su misma noción de “intertextualidad”, que sitúo en el contexto de su encuentro intelectual con Jacques Derrida y, específicamente, con sus nociones de “différance” y “deconstrucción”. Aceptando que la teoría kristeviana de la chora reproduce una versión binarista de la diferencia sexual al plantear lo simbólico y lo semiótico como espacios diferenciados, defiendo la tesis de que la “intertextualidad” invita a (...) una concepción de lo simbólico que pone en jaque la oposición binarista suscrita por Kristeva. (shrink)

Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities (...) that underpin lexical competence—so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’—and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. (shrink)

In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would (...) be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former—unlike the latter—retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented—i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory—points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual—or more often in propriosensitive perceptual—information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness versus abstractness of words and we show that—used conjointly—they can provide a measure of the internal versus external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only (...) definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. (shrink)

The increasing expansion of human settlements and encroachment into wildlife territories has led to an increase in human–wildlife conflict. This conflict is complex, and standardizing human–wildlife interactions remains a challenge.In this chapter, we describe four types of interactions: (1) negative for both tapirs and humans, such as collisions with vehicles, which can result in the loss of tapirs as well as serious accidents that pose risks to human safety in addition to economic losses, and crop raiding, which is negative for (...) humans mainly because of the economic loss when it triggers negative human attitudes, usually leading to tapir retaliation; (2) negative for wildlife and positive for humans, such as hunting/poaching, which is detrimental to tapirs; (3) positive for wildlife and negative for humans, such as cases of crop raiding where there is no retaliation; and (4) positive for both wildlife and humans, such as local initiatives to promote human well-being and tapir conservation through ecotourism. We also describe actions that have been called for to mitigate tapir crop raiding in some countries, such as the implementation of preventive measures and compensation programs, which can be effective tools to reduce conflict and promote coexistence. Compensating farmers who have suffered losses due to tapir crop raiding. Finally, the implementation of these measures will not only ensure the protection of tapirs and their habitats, but will also foster a sense of shared responsibility, leading to greater social cohesion and a better future for both people and tapirs. (shrink)

Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chap. 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that—even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world—they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed (...) via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also Chap. 2, Sects. 5 and 6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions—at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. (shrink)

Este artículo busca realizar una contribución específica a la agenda global de “inclusión educativa” a partir de la recuperación y discusión de distintas problematizaciones realizadas en la academia argentina en diálogo con aportes de la filosofía (política), la historiografía y la sociología de la educación. Luego de repasar algunas definiciones postuladas en el discurso académico y político global y de esbozar algunas coordenadas contextuales que sitúan las problematizaciones argentinas proponemos centrar la discusión en torno a tres ejes: 1) la crítica (...) etimológica o radical al concepto de “inclusión educativa”; 2) algunos principios y dilemas de justicia implicados en la agenda de reforma; y 3) las (im)posibilidades de la forma escolar ante el mandato inclusivo. Finalmente sugerimos la importancia de continuar avanzado en problematizaciones alternativas que habiliten la producción de políticas y sistemas educativos más justos. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper examines the American sojourn of the Enlightenment philosopher and theologian George Berkeley. While living in coastal Rhode Island between 1729 and 1731, Berkeley penned his longest philosophical tract, Alciphron: Or, the Minute Philosopher (1732), which criticized “freethinking,” mechanical conceptions of nature in favor of those that emphasized God's providence. To illustrate these two ways of knowing nature, Berkeley, a careful prose stylist, evoked nearby coastal landscapes for contrast. Accordingly, his work broke down dichotomies between ideas and matter and, (...) by extension, culture and nature, which could, this paper argues, inform an environmental ethic for a “hybrid” world. (shrink)

El análisis de nuestra filogenia, basado esencialmente en los registros fósiles y arqueológicos, nos ofrece información crucial sobre la trayectoria evolutiva del género Homo. Sin embargo, el problema radica es la escasez de muestras para un análisis concluyente, ya que la diversidad de especies en muchos casos se infiere a partir de unos pocos individuos o fragmentos óseos distribuidos en amplias zonas geográficas. No obstante, el notable éxito evolutivo de nuestro género no se atribuye únicamente al incremento en la capacidad (...) cerebral -desde Australopithecus, con un volumen cerebral aproximado de 500 cm3 a Homo sapiens entre 1500-1700 cm3- o a las variaciones genómicas. También deben considerarse otros factores, como los culturales, sociales y ecológicos. La interacción entre las distintas especies y su entorno en un ecosistema es fundamental en cualquier proceso evolutivo. Todo ajuste, regulación o interacción en el mismo, como indica Margalef, determinará el equilibrio necesario hacia la supervivencia o el declive del sistema. Para establecer un diálogo interdisciplinar entre la ecología integral y la antropología evolutiva, hemos considerado incluir las teorías cognitivas modernas como la Teoría del Compromiso Material (MET), la ciencia cognitiva (CS) y la biología cognitiva (BC). Estas teorías resaltan la importancia de considerar la cognición no solo como un proceso interno, sino como algo que está profundamente arraigado en el contexto material y social. Este artículo examina cómo el ambiente pudo influir en la evolución del género Homo y viceversa, proponiendo un análisis interdisciplinario que integra ecología ambiental, económica, social y cultural, o lo que el papa Francisco denominó ecología integral, con la antropología evolutiva. (shrink)

Based on the analysis of primary documentation from interrogation manuals from both the United States and the countries of the South American cone -Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile-, as well as reports issued by the different countries, the aim of the article is to analyse the common patterns in the detention and torture process suffered by guerrillas and insurgents belonging to violent organisations. We also seek to highlight the importance of the US model and the mutual influences between the dictatorships (...) that developed in these Latin American countries in the 1960s and 1970s, and to draw a comparative line in the methodology used by the police and military forces. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of school principal trustworthiness components (i.e., ability, integrity, benevolence) in helping shape teacher trust and affective commitment within schools. Using data from 1,026 teachers in Spain and structural equation modeling (via EQS 6.3), this study establishes how a principal’s integrity and benevolence are key in determining, both directly and indirectly (via trust in the principal), teachers’ affective commitment to their school. It also reveals that the perceived ability of a principal (...) is not effective in generating trust or affective commitment to the school in teachers. As a contribution to the literature, these findings reveal that the ethical trustworthiness (benevolence, integrity) of principals is key in engendering trust and affective commitment to schools. Thus, to shape work environments that are high in trust and commitment, principals should focus on behaving in ways that make their integrity and benevolence manifest to their teachers. (shrink)

Este artículo aborda la cuestión relativa a la crisis de la efectividad de los derechos humanos y fundamentales. Se trata de un desafío que requiere compromiso, vigilancia, responsabilidad compartida. Los derechos son una herramienta indispensable para expresar el valor de la dignidad que está ligada a la vulnerabilidad como condición humana común. Los derechos son un tipo de práctica social encaminada a su implementación y concreción. Está formada por principios, reglas, instituciones, procedimientos, actitudes, actos de interpretación. Esta práctica juega un (...) papel importante para contrarrestar y eliminar las situaciones que producen violaciones de los sujetos en sus múltiples diferencias y existencias específicas. (shrink)

The study of the human nature in Ramon Llull is fundamental because it works to show the divine magnificence and, thanks to the dignitates dei, to demonstrate that the Trinity is necessary, because if don´t God would be a passive being and that is impossible. This demonstration possesses apologetic features, because in Llull everything rotates around the infidel’s conversion.

The dream of the conversion in Ramon Llull is related with the own author’s vital vicissitudes. Therefore, the Islamic influence in the lulian system is obvious, besides the knowledge of Arab sources on the part of the author. On the other hand, Mohammed’s vision and the Islam that Ramon Llull presents is intimately related with its apologetic plans, inserting it in the Christian tradition of rebuttal, being in to traditional way a topic like the Antichrist.

La gestión de la emergencia pandémica ha amplificado algunas tenden-cias en marcha en la estructura actual de las fuentes del derecho. La discipli-na jurídica se configura en un contexto caracterizado por la convivencia y el concurso de varias fuentes y múltiples sujetos reguladores. Esto produce una relativización del principio de tipicidad de las formas y de las fuerzas nor-mativas, así como una creciente variedad de las reglas jurídicas, que oscure-ce su orden jerárquico. El sistema de las fuentes se desestructura, se (...) frag-menta y adquiere una dimensión reticular. En la fase actual de profunda reestructuración del paisaje jurídico el ordenamiento existe en la relación que conecta múltiples actos normativos, diversamente vinculantes. La regu-lación hard y soft refleja una compleja articulación de las fuentes que afecta a la seguridad jurídica y a la interpretación. (shrink)

Training for sustainable development is an educational challenge of prime importance. Physical activity and sports in natural environments provide training committed to sustainability and environmental education. The objective of this study was to assess the effects of an undergraduate training program in Physical Activities and Sports in Natural Environments concerned with sustainable development. A total of 113 students from the Autonomous University of Madrid who are studying a Bachelor’s Degree in Physical Activity and Sports Sciences and a Master’s Degree in (...) Teacher Training for Secondary Education and High School were involved. Specifically, we aimed to assess the impact of this training program on three dimensions related to Environmental Education. Its effect was also examined bearing in mind students’ sex, age and educational profile. Mixed-methods were used: for the quantitative approach, data were collected with the Environmental Attitude in Physical Activities in Natural Environments validated scale; for the qualitative approach individual reflective diaries completed by students that attended the program were analyzed. The results show positive effects on the students regarding the three dimensions of Environmental Education, for both the sportive and educational training profiles. The quantitative results do not present significant differences concerning the gender variable, although the qualitative information shows that female students perceived a greater environmental sensitivity during their practices. Regarding the age variable, significant differences are found in the youngest students with an educational profile. To conclude, the study ratifies that the program carried out generated improvements in terms of knowledge, behaviors and attitudes toward the environment and sustainable development. Future research should use larger samples and consider other variables related to education for sustainability. (shrink)

Fruit of the peculiar methodology of the Llull' system philosophical, and jointly with their evangelising mission, the demonstratio per aequiparantiam is erected as the definitive tool to combine Philosophy and Theology, Reason and Faith, indispensable elements to end up knowing the divine essence. With everything, this knowledge, according to Llull, it cannot only be carried out by means of Faith or Reason for themselves, but, rather, for reason of a comparison of both disciplines. In such a way, by means of (...) a demonstration that is defined in comparative terms, the man can end up understanding superior entities to his intellect -such as the divine one-, because a correspondence settles down among same elements. (shrink)

Erasmo fue un gran re- novador de la teología a partir del estu- dio de la Sagrada Escritura y de los Pa- dres de la Iglesia mediante su redditio ad fontes. Esta tarea tiene una fecha de partida —la de preparación fue al me- nos de quince años— el annus mirabilis 1516 en el que publica su primera edi- ción del Nuevo Testamento o Novum Instrumentum y su hercúlea edición en nueve tomos de las obras completas u Opera omnia de (...) san Jerónimo. Dos hi- tos en su proyecto bíblico y patrístico que continuará a lo largo de sus últimos veinte años con la edición de más de una docena de Padres tanto griegos como latinos. No menos impor- tante es su labor de traductor —al latín obviamente— de Padres griegos como Crisóstomo, Basilio y Orígenes —aquí estudiados bles bien por ser las primeras en el pa- norama humanístico del siglo xvi bien por la calidad de su latín, que han me- recido figurar —el caso de Juan Crisós- tomo— aún bajo su nombre en la Pa- trología griega de Migne. En este ar- tículo asistimos a la búsqueda apasio- nada por parte de Erasmo de manuscri- tos para editar o traducir, al intercam- bio epistolar con humanistas e impreso- res, y al trabajo bien hecho hasta los úl- timos días de sus vida en su querida ciudad de Basilea, la de los impresores Froben, con la edición de Orígenes que preparaba para la Feria del Libro de Fráncfort —en otoño de 1536— a la que él no llegó —falleció el 12 de ju- lio— pero sí sus dos gruesos volúme- nes, hermoso legado póstumo. (shrink)

Mucho se ha hablado de coodesarrollo, como de casi todas las cosas cuando se ponen de moda, no obstante yo creo que todavía no está bien definido el marco conceptual o al menos no hay un criterio uniforme de dicho marco que nos permita a todos partir de un mismo punto y tener los mismos indicadores que nos señalen cual es el punto de partida y también el de llegada. Comprendo que la tarea no es fácil y menos cuando uno (...) ve el desconocimiento existente entre realidades tan complejas y problemáticas como las que se dan el los países en vías de desarrollo. (shrink)

La "deconstrucción del cristianismo'' comienza con una evidencia que, sin embargo, no consiste en un saber claro y distinto. ni siquiera en un saber en cuanto tal. Esta extraña certeza de lo incierto hace acto de presencia como respuesta a una cuestión. La cuestión. pues, da paso a la deconstrucción y lo hace justamente en calidad de apertura de un pensamiento, porque de eso se trata con la deconstrucción del cristianismo, de pensamiento, sólo "de lo que se llama el pensamiento": (...) no de culto, ni de oración, ni de creencia, ni de religiosidad: lo confirma ella misma para terminar una reflexión que anota ser en cierto modo improvisada y provisional. (shrink)

We live in an era of unprecedented interconnectivity and challenges that require global mindsets and creative approaches. While research on global identification has increased in recent years, the question of whether it can facilitate creativity remains largely unexplored. Moreover, despite the evidence linking multicultural experiences and global identities, migrant populations have been overly underrepresented in this area of research. We examine the association between global culture identification and creativity in the Alternate Uses Test, across two different samples residing in Spain: (...) a host national and majorly student sample and a culturally diverse immigrant sample. Additionally, we test the predictive value of ethnic identification and host culture identification. Regression analyses reveal that global culture identification positively predicts creativity among host national participants, and host culture identification predicts creativity among immigrant participants. Our results suggest that developing a cultural identity that transcends the one acquired through enculturation has the potential of facilitating creative behavior. (shrink)